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Preface
This book is about animals. About animals like you and me but also – and 
mainly – about the members of other animal species such as dogs, cats, apes, 
or ants. A topic like this may not seem very original these days, because inter-
est in animals has grown immensely over the past few decades. It has grown 
to the extent that some even say that we are currently observing an ‘animal 
turn’ across various disciplines. Regardless of whether or not this is true, there 
is  undoubtedly much research being done on animals, their mutual relation-
ships, common history, differences, and commonalities at the moment and this 
interest is shared by people working in different fields, including philosophers. 
The philosophers’ main interest in this context lies, as many people think, in 
animal ethics, that is, the question of the moral status of humans in compari-
son to other animals. The answers given to this question surely matter, as they 
affect the way in which we interact with and act on other animals. However, 
there is also a second field that is philosophically relevant and this is the field 
of animal cognition. One might even argue that this field is more fundamen-
tal than animal ethics since arguments regarding the moral status of animals 
often rely on what we think about their cognitive capacities. Therefore, it is 
hardly surprising that the topic of animal cognition has a long philosophical 
history.
In recent years, several studies have shed light on this history. Some peri-
ods, however, have received considerably more attention than others. While 
the views of ancient, early modern, and contemporary philosophers have been 
studied a great deal, the views of medieval thinkers have yet to attract as much 
attention as they might. A very general reason for this lack of attention is that, 
despite all efforts, medieval philosophy still leads a relatively shadowy exis-
tence within contemporary (history of) philosophy. Yet, there is also a more 
specific reason, namely, the widespread opinion that there is not much to say 
about animal cognition in the Middle Ages. Medieval philosophers, it is often 
said, granted various sensory capacities to nonhuman animals, such as sight, 
hearing, imagination, and memory. Still, they denied them anything related 
to the possession of a rational soul, such as concept formation, judging, rea-
soning, or prudence. Consequently, nonhuman animals are non-rational ani-
mals and their cognition is nothing but a deficient version of human rational 
cognition.
Although this view contains more than a grain of truth, it fails to capture 
the depth and diversity of the medieval discussion. As this study shows, medi-
eval philosophers did not stop at the ascription of sensory cognition to other 
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animals. Rather, they wondered whether one can coherently account for many 
complex behaviours in nonhuman species without granting them complex 
cognitive processes. In particular, the question was whether those processes 
that were taken to be rational processes always require rational faculties or 
whether they can also exist without a rational soul. This question might, of 
course, seem to be heretical in at least two regards. First, it seems to contra-
dict the basic idea of Aristotelian faculty psychology, according to which every 
psychological process requires a particular type of soul or faculty of the soul. 
Rationality without reason thus seems to be impossible. Second, it seems to 
undermine the Aristotelian definition of the boundary between humans and 
nonhuman animals because, in Aristotle’s view, rationality is what sets  humans 
apart from all other animals. Yet, despite these dangers for Aristotelian psy-
chology and anthropology (which, incidentally, went hand in hand with the 
Christian idea of human nature), medieval philosophers did not refrain from 
asking these questions and the answers they gave were quite different. It is 
these answers that shall be called theories of animal rationality and they are 
the subject of this book.
It is important to note, however, that this book does not cover the whole 
range of medieval theories from the fifth to the fifteenth centuries. Rather, it 
focuses on the theories of Latin authors from roughly 1250 to 1350. This pe-
riod is a particularly rich and interesting period because the transmission of 
 Aristotle’s writings had been largely completed by that time. Aristotle’s trea-
tises on psychology and zoology as well as his works in other fields, such as 
metaphysics or ethics, gave a major boost to theorising in the Latin West. In a 
sense, this was a late-medieval precursor of the modern animal turn because 
animals became the subject of various debates not only in zoology but also in 
psychology and philosophy. Still, one must not forget that there are many theo-
ries that were developed before and after that period and outside the Latin 
cultural area, especially in the Islamic world during the eleventh and twelfth 
centuries. Many Islamic thinkers paved the way for the Latin discussion. Yet in 
the present book their theories will be considered only insofar as they had a 
notable influence on the ideas of Latin thinkers. This is not to say, of course, 
that they are less relevant or less interesting but they go beyond the scope of 
this book and definitely deserve a study in their own right.
The present study is a revised version of my doctoral thesis, which I defend-
ed in January 2017 at the Humboldt University of Berlin. Its writing would not 
have been possible without the help and support of several people and insti-
tutions. First of all, I would like to thank my supervisors Dominik Perler and 
Bernd Roling. Their articles on the subject were among those publications that 
mainly inspired me to begin working in this field. The supervision they gave me 
xiiiPreface
<UN>
from the very first moment was brilliant and this work has profited a lot from 
their advice and comments. Dominik Perler’s colloquium at the  Humboldt 
University was a stimulating place of intellectual exchange and the colloqui-
um’s participants who commented on various drafts of this book helped me to 
improve it a great deal. Many important suggestions I also owe to audiences 
at Berlin, Cambridge, Helsinki, Jyväskylä, Köln, Leipzig, Leysin, Münster, Ox-
ford, Porto Alegre, and Uppsala where I had the chance to discuss different 
aspects of my work over the past four years. I am particularly grateful to the 
following people who provided valuable materials and comments or inspired 
me in one way or another: Henryk Anzulewicz, Mark Barker, Manuel Bohn, Al-
exander Brungs, Emanuele Coccia, Tobias  Davids, Silvia Donati, Thérèse-Anne 
Druart, Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen, Martin Klein, Theodor W. Köhler, Jörn Müller, 
Martin Pickavé, Paolo Rubini, Juhana Toivanen, Cecilia Trifogli, and Markus 
Wild. Special thanks go to Christoph Sander since he never tired of discuss-
ing my project. His astute remarks definitely saved me from making several 
mistakes as did the careful eyes of Bradley Burroughs and Chad Jorgenson who 
proofread the entire manuscript. For any remaining flaws I naturally take full 
responsibility.
Financial support for this project came, for the most part, from the German 
Academic Scholarship Foundation. The grant I received enabled me to fully 
concentrate on the dissertation which is a privilege one cannot overestimate. 
In addition, I received a generous bursary from Dominik Perler’s Leibniz Prize 
project “Transformationen des Geistes” which gave me an easy start. For the 
final stage, José Filipe Pereira da Silva invited me to become a member of his 
ERC-funded project “Rationality in Perception: Transformations of Mind and 
Cognition 1250–1550” at the University of Helsinki (erc Grant Agreement No. 
637747). They thus put me in the position to begin and finish my work without 
financial concerns and for this I am more than grateful. I am also grateful to 
John Marenbon who accepted the book for publication in this series and to 
Marcella Mulder from Brill who was a very thoughtful and reliable editor.
Above all, I thank Minka and Nora. Minka, because she used to patiently sit 
on my desk when, time and again, I made her wait for lunch or dinner since 
I was too busy thinking over whether beings like her are rational animals. 







According to a long-standing philosophical tradition, we humans are ratio-
nal animals. This means that we are endowed with certain cognitive powers, 
namely, intellect and reason, that enable us to engage in various cognitive 
 operations, such as concept formation, judging, or reasoning. It is these opera-
tions that shape the way in which we perceive and interact with the world. We 
conceptualise the brown furry thing we see as a dog, we judge that the dog is 
hungry when it desperately stares at the feeding bowl, and we reason that we 
should feed it if we want its hunger to disappear. To some extent, these cogni-
tive operations even put us in a position to build our own worlds like, for in-
stance, the world of logic or the world of science. In these worlds, dogs are not 
simply our pets or companions but they become the objects of our research. 
We might study their biology, physiology, and psychology and perhaps find out 
that dogs are just as smart and intelligent beings as we are. This finding would 
definitely change the way in which we treat dogs. We would begin to give them 
all the rights we grant to human beings and dog lead producers might finally 
become redundant.
As we all know, we have not yet reached this point and maybe never will. 
Still, many people would say that we are much closer to reaching it than our 
ancestors ever were. Since the advent of modern biology, psychology, ethology, 
and similar disciplines we have left the above-mentioned tradition behind. 
In its original form, or so the usual story goes, this tradition is rooted in the 
thought of Aristotle because it was Aristotle who claimed that only human 
animals possess rational souls or souls with rational faculties like intellect and 
reason. The denial of intellectual faculties to other animals was fateful, accord-
ing to several scholars because it “produced a crisis in psychology, in ethics, and 
in religion,” as Richard Sorabji famously put it.1 It produced a crisis in the sense 
that nonhuman animals were henceforth trapped in the sphere of arationality, 
that is, in a sphere significantly inferior to the sphere in which our own species 
resides. It took more than two thousand years for this crisis to come to an end. 
Of course, we still put leads on dogs, keep chimpanzees in zoos, and eat cattle. 
Nonetheless, we have begun to understand that the Aristotelian definition of 
the boundary between human and nonhuman animals needs to be revised. 
And once this has happened, the crisis will be over.
Now one might object that there never was such a crisis in the history of 
Western philosophy. For not only was Aristotle one of the most important and 
1 Sorabji (1993a), 1. See also Sorabji (1993b), 7f., and Steiner (2008), 17f.
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impressive philosophers of all times, but he also was one of the most prolific 
writers in what can count as the precursors of modern biology, psychology, and 
ethology. His treatises on the physiology and psychology of animals, both hu-
man and nonhuman, consist of several thousand pages and so he seems to be 
above suspicion in this regard since his picture of the animal realm is far from 
being one-dimensional. Be that as it may, one can hardly deny that there are 
many passages in Aristotle’s writings in which he clearly rejects the attribution 
of intellectual powers to nonhuman animals.2 It would be naïve to think that 
these passages did not have an influence on those thinkers who came  after 
him. The crucial question, however, is: what did this influence amount to? 
Was Aristotle really the beginning of a one-way road? Did his denial of reason 
to nonhuman animals lead everyone after him into the same direction? Was 
 everyone hit by the crisis?
If one looks at the history of the animal/human boundary, one easily 
sees that there certainly was more than just one definition of this boundary, 
even following Aristotle. Ironically, it was Richard Sorabji himself who, in his 
seminal study of the history of the Western debate, has shown that already 
in  Antiquity there was a whole spectrum of positions concerning the cogni-
tive capacities of animals. Cats, bees, apes, or elephants were not taken to be 
dumb and unintelligent by everyone. There were also many who pointed to the 
astonishing abilities they have, many of which they share with us.3  However, 
this spectrum seems to have disappeared by the beginning of the medieval 
period at the latest because, according to Sorabji, the (Western) Middle Ages 
were dominated by a “Christian tradition which selected just one side from a 
much more wide-ranging Greek debate.”4 Thus, even if Aristotle’s views had 
produced less severe a crisis than originally thought, the beginning of the me-
dieval period marked the beginning of a “dark age” for nonhuman animals.5 
And if we still have to deal with the consequences of that crisis some say it is 
because of “the gulf that millennia of Judeo-Christian indoctrination have dug 
between us and other animals.”6
2 See, for instance, De anima II.3, 414b18-19 and 415a7-8; De partibus animalium 641b7f.; Politica 
1332b3-5. For a complete list of the loci classici see Sorabji (1993b), 12, n. 30.
3 Sorabji (1993b). Besides Sorabji’s study there are also valuable works on ancient views of 
animal cognition by Dierauer (1977); Cassin & Labarrière (1997); Steiner (2005), esp. 38–111; 
Gilhus (2006);  Osborne (2007); Newmyer (2011); Harden (2013); Li Causi & Pomelli (2015).
4 Sorabji (1993b), 8.
5 Preece (2002), 62–90.
6 Singer (2006), 158.
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Claims like these certainly gain some plausibility from the fact that  medieval 
Christian thinkers amalgamated the Aristotelian definition of the animal/ 
human boundary with two particular biblical doctrines found in Gen 1:26-28. 
The first of these doctrines is the idea of humans being created ‘in the image 
of God’. By and large, this was interpreted to mean that humans are the only 
earthly creatures with a rational and immortal soul. Because of this rational 
soul they are cognitively superior to other terrestrial creatures. Closely linked 
to this cognitive superiority is humanity’s moral predominance. The doctrine 
of the ‘imago-Dei’ was thus accompanied by the idea of what is called the 
‘ dominium terrae’, humans’ dominion over the earth, including all living be-
ings.7 Because of this exceptional position of humans, the chasm between us 
and other animals was certainly deepened. As far as the discussion of animal 
cognition was concerned, “[a]ny real study of animal psychology would have 
to wait until after the end of the Middle Ages,” as Joyce E. Salisbury put it.8 But 
is this actually true? Is it true that the Middle Ages were the height of the crisis 
diagnosed by Sorabji?
On the one hand, this picture is not entirely incorrect. For most, if not all, 
medieval authors subscribed to the premise that only human animals are ratio-
nal animals in the sense that only they possess rational souls or the faculties of 
intellect and reason. Furthermore, medieval thinkers did not devote the same 
amount of attention to the discussion of nonhuman animals’ cognitive capaci-
ties as to other fields or disciplines from logic and metaphysics to Christology. 
But, on the other hand, it would be equally wrong to think that they did not 
care about this at all. In fact, they had a keen interest in finding out what sepa-
rates humans from other animals, and they did not hesitate to ask whether the 
cognitive capacities we have are so much different from the capacities of other 
animals. They wondered what kind of cognitive processes underlie the behav-
iour of dogs, cats, bees, sheep, monkeys, ants, and many others, and they asked 
how such processes compare to those underlying our own behaviour. Are they 
entirely distinct or are they similar? Or are they even equal, perhaps? And how 
can we find this out if all we can do is observe other animals’ behaviour?
As the present study aims to show, not one but many answers were given to 
these questions. The spectrum of medieval views on the cognitive capacities 
of nonhuman animals was much more varied and disparate than one might 
think from hearing the story of the crisis. And so the denial of intellect and 
reason was not a one-way road. It led in different directions and, in particular, 
7 For a brief overview of these doctrines see Baranzke (2002), 82–88. For a critical discussion of 
the history of their reception see Cohen (1992).
8 Salisbury (2011), 5.
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to the development of what can be called theories of animal rationality. This 
might seem like a plain contradiction in terms. If there really was so much 
support for the view that only humans are endowed with intellect and reason, 
it seems odd, if not wrong, to say that medieval thinkers developed something 
like theories of (nonhuman) animal rationality. But the point is that there was 
not much of a debate about whether nonhuman animals have cognition. It 
was relatively uncontroversial that almost all animals share a certain number 
of external and internal senses, such as sight and hearing or imagination and 
memory. What was at issue was rather the kind of cognition they have and 
whether their cognition is entirely non-rational. Although one might think 
that this question was taboo in the Middle Ages, the present book shows that 
it was not. Despite all of the differences between the present and the medieval 
debate on animal rationality, there are also many astonishing parallels. This is 




What are and Why Study Later Medieval Theories 
of Animal Rationality?
Contemporary theories of animal rationality concern a relatively wide range 
of issues. They range from inferential and linguistic capacities to social and 
meta-cognition.1 What is common to most of them is that they are interested 
in  process rather than behavioural rationality.2 Generally speaking, these are 
different ways of telling whether or not a being is rational. When we focus sole-
ly on its behaviour and say that it is rational, since, for instance, it chooses the 
right means to achieve a certain end (and so ‘maximises utility’, as some people 
put it) we ascribe behavioural rationality to that being. According to this con-
cept of rationality, almost any kind of being could count as rational in one way 
or another. Not only people can be rational but also institutions, machines, or 
genes as long as they behave in a way that qualifies as rational.3 What matters 
is simply whether or not a certain behaviour can be described as rational. If 
this is the case, then the being exhibiting this behaviour can be called rational.
However, this type of rationality is much more interesting and relevant for 
economists, for example, than it is for psychologists. The latter are interested 
rather in the question whether the behaviour we observe is based on rational 
processes. To put it slightly differently, they wonder how a certain kind of be-
haviour is brought about. For instance, they examine whether a certain kind of 
behaviour that can be described as rational from the outside is actually based 
on a rational cognitive process such as reasoning. To be clear, this does not 
mean that psychologists or anyone else interested in process rationality work 
with a better or more appropriate concept of rationality than economists and 
people interested in behavioural rationality. They simply look at rationality 
from a different angle, and when they identify rationality they do this at a dif-
ferent level.
In the Middle Ages, one can also find this distinction between behavioural 
and process rationality – not literally, of course, but systematically. A passage 
that neatly illustrates this is found in Thomas Aquinas’ Summa theologiae. 
1 The most comprehensive and insightful volume on these theories is Hurley & Nudds (2006a). 
See also Perler & Wild (2005) and Lurz (2009).
2 See Hurley & Nudds (2006b), 5f.
3 See Kacelnik (2006), 90–93.
© Anselm Oelze, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004363779_003 
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When we look at how things behave, Aquinas says, we might get the impres-
sion that not only humans but also artefacts, such as arrows or clocks, are 
rational. An arrow, for instance, seems to behave rationally by moving directly 
towards its target.4 Taking up the above-mentioned terminology one could 
say that the arrow shows behavioural rationality. It chooses the right means 
for achieving a certain end. However, Aquinas stresses that this is some-
how  beside the point, because what really matters when we try to identify 
whether or not something is rational are the following two criteria. First, we 
need to ask whether a certain behaviour is based on a rational process. Thus, 
like  contemporary psychologists Aquinas looks for process rationality. In this 
sense, an arrow is not a rational being because its moving towards the target 
is not based on a rational process.5 The arrow does not reason that it needs to 
fly in this or that direction in order to hit the target. Rather, it is the shooter 
that engages in this sort of cognitive operation. Yet, one might ask why Aqui-
nas (and other medieval authors) think the shooter is capable of doing this. 
How is it that the shooter can engage in a process such as reasoning, while the 
arrow cannot?
The answer, in short, is that the shooter is endowed with certain rational 
faculties, namely, intellect and reason. This is the second thing one needs to 
take into account when talking about rationality, according to Aquinas. What 
lies behind this point is the Aristotelian theory of the soul. According to this 
theory, one can only engage in a certain process if one is endowed with a par-
ticular power or faculty. For things like digestion or growth one needs vegeta-
tive powers, sensing requires sensory powers, and rational cognition demands 
rational powers.6 So besides behavioural and process rationality there seems 
to be a third type of rationality for medieval Aristotelians and this could be 
called faculty rationality. Very likely, it is because of this concept of rational-
ity that Aristotle and his medieval followers have such a bad reputation these 
days when it comes to the question of animal rationality because it establishes 
4 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae i–ii, q. 13, a. 2, ad 3, ed. Leonina vi (1891), 99: “[…] in 
omnibus quae moventur a ratione, apparet ordo rationis moventis, licet ipsa rationem non 
habeant: sic enim sagitta directe tendit ad signum ex motione sagittantis, ac si ipsa rationem 
haberet dirigentem. Et idem apparet in motibus horologiorum, et omnium ingeniorum hu-
manorum, quae arte fiunt.” For a more detailed analysis of this passage see Chapter 19.
5 It is not even minimally rational in the sense in which Dretske (2006), 107, defines it because, 
in his view, “[m]inimal rationality requires that thought be involved in the process by means 
of which the behaviour is produced.” The arrow’s movement is, however, not based on any 
kind of thought or mental representation.
6 On Aristotelian faculty psychology see the articles in Perler (2015a). On its medieval Latin 
reception in particular see King (2008) and Perler (2015b).
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what is usually called a very strong ‘anthropological difference’. This means 
that it clearly defines “features of homo sapiens that (a) set us apart ‘categori-
cally’ or ‘essentially’ from all other animals; (b) are fundamental, in that (all) 
other relevant differences derive from them; (c) are important, notably to our 
self-image, for instance because they assure us of a higher spiritual or moral 
status than animals,” as Hans-Johann Glock summarises the key features of an 
anthropological difference.7
For Aristotelians in general and later medieval Aristotelians in particular, 
reason does exactly this kind of job: (a) It establishes a metaphysical  difference 
between humans and other animals because only humans are  endowed with 
immaterial rational souls. (b) It establishes a cognitive difference  because 
only these souls are endowed with what could be called the ‘triad of intel-
lectual  operations’, including concept formation, judging, and reasoning (see 
Chapter 6). (c) It establishes a moral difference because only rational  beings 
can act for  reasons, hence be morally responsible for what they do. Moreover, 
only such beings can be redeemed from sin, not at least because only their 
immaterial souls survive the death of the body. In sum, medieval Aristotelians 
defend a version of rationalism in the sense that for them reason is what marks 
the  decisive difference between humans and other animals – metaphysically, 
cognitively, and morally.8 Therefore, it seems that there exists nothing like a 
medieval version of theories of animal rationality because rationality is exactly 
what sets humans apart from nonhuman animals.
As mentioned before, this conclusion fails to capture the depth and diver-
sity of the medieval discussion. Most importantly, it ignores the fact that later 
medieval thinkers were well aware of what can be called the ‘grey areas’ of 
Aristotelian faculty psychology (see Chapter 7).9 These areas become obvious 
in those cases in which an animal that is non-rational by definition shows a 
certain behaviour that, when seen in a rational being, is explained by its ra-
tionality. A  classical example that illustrates such a case is the example of 
‘ Chrysippus’ dog’ (it is this example, by the way, that Aquinas discusses in the 
7 Glock (2012), 109. See also Glock (2016b), 17.
8 On this concept of rationalism see Wild (2006), 5f. Note, however, that defenders of this kind 
of rationalism usually put much emphasis on the capacity of language. In the medieval pe-
riod, this relation exists as well but is less prominent in the discussion of animal rationality, 
as we shall see.
9 I adopt this term from Jones (2013), 63, who, in his concise chapter on man and nature in the 
Middle Ages, remarks that “[i]f rationality could be used as a defining marker of humanity 
there remained a number of grey areas.” In particular, he has in mind the (apparently) ratio-
nal behaviours of human infants and nonhuman animals.
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passage  mentioned above).10 A dog chases a deer but suddenly loses sight of it. 
It comes to a fork with three paths and sniffs around the first and the second 
path. It then takes the third path but without having sniffed around it. The 
question is how to explain the dog’s behaviour. In the case of a human being, 
the explanation would go like this: the decision to take the third path arises 
from a rational operation such as ‘The deer must have taken path A, B, or C. 
If there is no trace of it at path A and B, then it must have taken C’. To put it 
in logical terms, the human being employs a disjunctive syllogism and this is 
what causes its behaviour. But what about the behaviour of the dog? How can 
one explain that the dog shows the same behaviour as a human being in this 
situation?
One possible answer is that the dog’s behaviour derives from the same kind 
of cognitive process as the corresponding human behaviour. If this human be-
haviour is explained by a process such as reasoning the dog’s behaviour should 
be explained by reasoning as well. The argument behind this answer is com-
monly known as the ‘argument from analogy’.11 In short, the argument goes 
like this: If we observe the same effects, that is, the same behaviours in two 
different animals we must assume that these effects are brought about by the 
same causes, that is, the same cognitive processes. So when we see a dog solve 
a certain problem that humans normally solve by reasoning we must assume 
that the dog solves it by reasoning, too. Two prominent defenders of this argu-
ment in the history of Western philosophy are Michel de Montaigne and David 
Hume. Both agreed that from like (behavioural) effects one should infer like 
(cognitive) causes, even across species.12 Therefore, it is hardly surprising that 
they made a strong case for the rationality of nonhuman animals.
This kind of argument, however, seems to be unavailable to medieval think-
ers because it is incompatible with the Aristotelian model of the soul. To argue 
that both humans and dogs solve problems by reasoning runs counter to the 
idea that a process such as reasoning requires a rational faculty, the possession 
of which is exactly what separates humans from dogs. Surprisingly, though, lat-
er medieval thinkers show much more flexibility than one is usually inclined to 
expect. Instead of discarding the argument from analogy right away, they em-
ployed different explanatory strategies to deal with the problem of grey areas 
10 On the origin, history, and reception of this example, see Floridi (1997). A recent philo-
sophical analysis and discussion is provided by Rescorla (2009). On Aquinas’s discussion 
see Chapter 19.
11 See Wild (2013), 84–89.
12 Although both Montaigne and Hume defend the argument from analogy the ways in 
which they spell it out differ slightly; see Wild (2006), 248.
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in Aristotelian psychology (see Chapter 32). Some (e.g. Thomas Aquinas and 
John Duns Scotus) chose what is called the strategy of ‘differentialism’ in mod-
ern animal philosophy. That is to say, they tried to maintain the anthropologi-
cal difference that is established by the Aristotelian model of the soul. In those 
cases where this model came under attack, for instance, in virtue of the simi-
larities in the behaviours of human and nonhuman animals, they searched for 
explanations that avoid the argument from analogy and trace similar behav-
iours back to different cognitive causes. Even though the behaviour of Chrysip-
pus’ dog looks rational from the outside and so might qualify as behaviourally 
rational it is not rational from the inside, that is, neither with regard to the 
faculties nor with regard to the processes that bring it about.
Still, this kind of explanation was not accepted by everyone. As will become 
clear, there are several cases in which later medieval authors chose the strategy 
that is now generally called the strategy of ‘assimilationism’. Instead of main-
taining, if not even deepening the anthropological difference, they somehow 
assimilated humans and other animals. To be clear, this does not mean that 
they abandoned the basic principles of Aristotelian faculty psychology. Most 
importantly, they did not reject the denial of rational faculties to nonhuman 
animals. Nevertheless, some of them considered the option of what might be 
called ‘rationality without reason’ (see Chapter 33). This means that they in 
some sense dissolved the link between process and faculty rationality. They 
held that at least some nonhuman animal species can engage in rational pro-
cesses, such as reasoning, although they lack rational faculties. How this is 
 actually possible was the matter of some debate, but there were different solu-
tions available. Albertus Magnus, for instance, argued that certain inner senses 
of some highly-developed nonhuman animals can engage in simple forms of 
reasoning (see Chapter 21).13 He thus upgraded the powers of the sensory soul. 
Nevertheless, he tried to maintain the metaphysical difference between non-
human animals’ material sensory souls and the immaterial rational souls of 
humans. John Buridan went even further by claiming that this metaphysical 
difference does not exist (see Chapter 22). In his opinion (which was inspired 
by Alexander of Aphrodisias), all souls are material forms. He did not deny 
that human cognition is superior to nonhuman animal cognition in various 
respects but cognitive performance depends on material complexity. Hence, 
those animals whose souls are (almost) as complex as those of humans can 
engage in similar cognitive operations.14
13 On this see, for instance, Roling (2011), esp. 229–233; Köhler (2014), esp. 388; Tellkamp 
(2016).
14 See Pluta (1996), 92–97, and (2015), esp. 281–286.
chapter 110
<UN>
What this variety of explanations shows is that later medieval authors did 
not necessarily select “just one side from a much more wide-ranging Greek 
 debate,” as claimed by scholars like Sorabji.15 Indeed, the medieval Latin 
 discussion differs from the ancient Greek debate in various respects. One of 
the main reasons for the differences is that many of the materials that cov-
ered different parts of the spectrum of the Greek discussion were not avail-
able to Latin medieval authors. Still, there was a vivid debate about whether or 
not nonhuman animals can be rational in the Middle Ages, too, and from this 
 debate arose various theories of animal rationality.
The landscape of those theories has not yet been mapped and it is the 
aim of this book to provide such a map. It will do this by combining primary 
sources from roughly 1250 to 1350 (see Chapter 2 below) and secondary litera-
ture, both systematical and historical. As far as the latter is concerned, several 
studies that have been published in current scholarship provide an excellent 
starting point. They include works on medieval anthropology and animal cog-
nition covering a wider range of views16 as well as studies on the positions of 
particular authors, from Albertus Magnus,17 Roger Bacon,18 and Thomas Aqui-
nas19 to Peter of John Olivi20 and John Buridan.21 This list might actually create 
the impression that the aforementioned gap in the scholarship does not exist. 
And, indeed, the growing cross-disciplinary interest in animals has generated 
increasing interest not only in ancient22 and early modern positions23 but also 
15 See p. 2 n4.
16 Among the most substantial and comprehensive studies on medieval anthropology are 
Köhler (2008) and (2014). Köhler (2000) also forms part of this impressive project. On 
animal cognition in the late ancient and early medieval period see Nitschke (1967); Clark 
(1998); Matthews (1999); Brittain (2002). Later centuries are covered by Sobol (1993); 
 Perler (2006), (2012b); Roling (2011), (2013a), (2013b). General overviews of animals in 
medieval philosophy provide De Leemans & Klemm (2007); Jones (2013), esp. 62–72; 
Toivanen (forthcoming).
17 See, for instance, Balss (1954); Hünemörder (1980); Resnick & Kitchell (1996); Guldentops 
(1999) and (2000); Köhler (2001); Anzulewicz (2009); Tellkamp (2013) and (2016).
18 Wood (2007) and Hackett (2013).
19 The most recent monograph on Aquinas is Davids (2017) who substantially revises Barad 
(1995). Articles on Aquinas include Deeley (1971); Hünemörder (1988); Manzanedo (1989) 
and (1990); Yamamoto (1998); Loughlin (2001); Juanola (2015).
20 Toivanen (2011) and (2013a).
21 Zupko (2008); Pluta (2015).
22 See p. 2 n3.
23 The prime example is undoubtedly Wild (2006) who covers Montaigne, Descartes, and 
Hume. Studies or volumes with a broader range include Fudge (2006); Muratori (2013); 
Muratori & Dohm (2013); Roling (2014); Meo-Ehlert (2015); Buchenau & Lo Presti (2017).
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in medieval ones. Nonetheless, there is no single monographic study which 
provides a historical reconstruction as well as a systematic discussion of medi-
eval theories with a particular focus on rationality. Such a study can aid those 
interested in the history of philosophy as well as provide interesting insights 
for anyone engaged in the present debate, because by looking at the theories 
from the medieval period we might see more clearly what characterises the 
theories of our own age.
<UN>
chapter 2
How to Study Later Medieval Theories?
The present book focuses on later medieval theories, more precisely, the theories 
of authors who lived and worked at some point between roughly 1250 and 1350. 
The main reason for concentrating on this period is that it is  characterised by 
a comparatively large amount of discussion about animal cognition in  general 
and animal rationality in particular. One of the pivotal driving forces  behind 
this was the transmission Aristotle’s writings in the Latin West.  Although it had 
begun much earlier, the translation of decisive parts of the Corpus  Aristotelicum 
had not been completed before the second half of the thirteenth century. This 
body of work contains two major collections of books that are relevant in the 
present context (see Chapter 4). First, there is the so-called ‘Books on Natural 
Philosophy’ (libri naturales). Among these are the Physics as well as the highly 
influential treatise On the soul (De  anima). Moreover, they  include a number of 
‘Little Treatises on Natural  Philosophy’, especially psychology and physiology, 
known as Parva naturalia. The second relevant collection, the ‘Books on Ani-
mals’ (De animalibus libri), unites at least three zoological treatises: the ‘ History 
of Animals’ (Historia  animalium), ‘On the Parts of Animals’ (De  partibus 
 animalium), and ‘On the Generation of  Animals’ (De generatione  animalium). 
 Together these collections fuelled the discussion on animals’ cognitive capaci-
ties because commenting on Aristotle’s works belonged to the principal tasks 
of (late) medieval academics.
There was, of course, also a discussion on animal rationality before this 
commentary tradition began to flourish in the Latin West. One of the most in-
teresting figures in this respect is Adelard of Bath.1 In his Questiones naturales, 
written during the first half of the twelfth century, he develops an interest-
ing and quite original account of the nature and capacities of animal souls.2 
 Undoubtedly, his interest in this topic arose from the far-reaching “discovery of 
nature” in the twelfth century (see Chapter 4). However, unlike thirteenth- and 
fourteenth-century theories, Adelard’s account is not connected to the Aris-
totelian model of the soul. Just as little is it influenced by the so-called theory 
1 On Adelard as natural philosopher see Burnett (1987) and Grant (2007), 117–122. On his 
 account of animal rationality see Roling (2011), 228f.
2 See Adelard of Bath, Questiones naturales, qq. 13–14, ed. Burnett (1998), 110–118. Another origi-
nal and perhaps even slightly earlier text that has recently been edited is Ralph of Battle, De 
nesciente et sciente, lib. i, c. 4, §§37–76, eds. Niskanen & Goebel (2015), 258–279.
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of inner senses. In its most influential form, this theory was developed before 
the thirteenth- and fourteenth centuries and outside the Latin West, especially 
by Avicenna. It is more than just the passive reception of Aristotle’s psychol-
ogy and very likely became as influential as it did in later centuries because it 
provided solutions to some of the problems produced by Aristotle’s model of 
the soul.3 Therefore, the influence of (earlier) medieval Arabic psychology and 
zoology cannot be ignored in a study of later medieval Latin theories of animal 
rationality.4
The setting of these theories was not restricted to commentaries on 
 Aristotle. There are also many other sources in which one can find relevant 
 contributions. These include, for instance, theological Summae and Sentenc-
es commentaries. They differ from commentaries on Aristotle with regard to 
content and function. Nonetheless, they must receive some attention in this 
context because later medieval theories of animal rationality are patchwork 
rather than all of a piece. This is illustrated by the fact that there is not a single 
medieval treatise on this subject. Rather, the question of animal cognition in 
general and of animal rationality in particular came up in very different kinds 
of texts, many of which do not, prima facie, seem to be concerned with these 
topics. But since nonhuman animals often functioned as a sort of heuristic tool 
in the Middle Ages (see Chapter 4), the discussion on their capacities was not 
limited to one particular genre but spread across various texts and disciplines 
which is why any reconstruction of late medieval theories of animal rationality 
must rely on various sources.
The sources of the present study are basically of two different kinds. The 
majority are texts which exist in critical Latin editions, such as many of the 
commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima or Peter Lombard’s Sentences. Some of 
these texts have already been translated into English or other European lan-
guages, either partly or entirely.5 This also applies to some texts for which only 
uncritical Latin editions are available, such as Albertus Magnus’ comprehen-
sive De animalibus. The second type of source are those texts which have not 
yet been edited and are only available in early prints or manuscripts. A good 
example is Pseudo-Peter of Spain’s commentary on De animalibus which, so 
3 See Hasse (2000).
4 For a general overview of animals in Islamic philosophy and theology see Lauzi (2012), 
 Wannenmacher (2017), and Adamson (forthcoming). On particular issues and authors see, 
for instance, Kruk (1995), (1997), (2001), and (2002); López-Farjeat (2010), (2012), and (2016); 
Druart (2016).
5 Unless otherwise indicated, all translations in this study are mine.
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far, has received only very little attention.6 These kinds of sources will not be 
used as extensively as sources of the first type but they will be used in order 
to establish a relatively broad basis which will help to show that there was 
not just one, but a whole spectrum of arguments and explanations in the later 
medieval period.
Despite the variety of sources, the present book does not aim to prepare a 
complete map of the theoretical landscape in the later Middle Ages. Instead, 
it aims to philosophically reconstruct, analyse, evaluate, and compare a wide 
range of views on four aspects of this problem: (1) universal cognition and 
concept formation, (2) judging, (3) reasoning, and (4) prudence (see Chap-
ter 3 more below). Such a systematic approach does, of course, bear the risk of 
 ignoring many aspects. For much could be said about the institutional context 
or the theological background of medieval theories. Yet, the advantage of this 
kind of approach is that it can deliver interesting philosophical insights into 
a historical discussion. This does not mean that we are to ignore its historical 
peculiarities. There are, of course, many significant differences between past 
and present theories of animal rationality, but there are also many astonishing 
parallels.
These continuities and discontinuities will be fleshed out by discussing 
the views of more than ten late medieval thinkers, namely, Albertus Magnus, 
Roger Bacon, Pseudo-Peter of Spain, Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, Giles of 
Rome, Peter of John Olivi, John Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, Gregory 
of Rimini, Adam Wodeham, John Buridan, and Nicole Oresme.7 Some of these 
figures have already been widely read and studied, while relatively little is 
known about others. Moreover, some of them were Dominicans, others were 
Franciscans, and some were not affiliated with a particular order at all. Still, 
all of them did, to differing degrees, participate in the academic life of their 
time, mainly at Oxford and Paris. They were trained in philosophy and the-
ology, commented Aristotle’s writings as well as those of other authoritative 
 figures, and all of them developed interesting – and different – views on various 
questions concerning animal rationality. This is an important finding,  insofar 
as all of them subscribed to the metaphysical premise according to which only 
human animals are endowed with intellect and reason. That is, from a com-
mon starting-point they went in divergent directions, and the aim of this book 
is to track their paths.
6 I am grateful to Theodor W. Köhler for providing me with his transcription of this work.
7 This study’s conception thus follows, for instance, Perler (1992), (2004) and (2011), or Pasnau 
(1997).
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Tracking their paths does not, however, require one to write a history of the 
development of their theories. Whether the views of the early Ockham or the 
early Aquinas accord with those of the late Ockham or the late Aquinas is not 
the primary concern here. Just as little is the aim to examine whether there is a 
notable difference between the theories from the beginning of the second half 
of the thirteenth and those from the end of the first half of the fourteenth cen-
tury. Instead, the aim is to depict the variety of theories that existed between 
1250 and 1350. So far, only very little attention has been paid to this variety 
because the denial of reason to animals did not seem to leave many theoretical 




Structure and Key Questions
Later medieval theories of animal rationality were part of a larger discourse 
on (nonhuman) animals. It is important to understand this background before 
discussing these theories in more detail. Therefore, Part 1 provides some infor-
mation on the role animals played in the Middle Ages, especially in medieval 
philosophy (Chapter 4). Briefly speaking, their philosophical role was to func-
tion as a sort of litmus test. This function derived from the common view of the 
metaphysical status of animals and, more precisely, from the usual and widely 
accepted distinction between the sensory souls they have and the intellectual 
souls of human beings. On the one hand, this psychological distinction drew a 
clear line between humans and other animals. Any kind of capacity found both 
in human and in nonhuman animals was easily identified as a capacity of the 
sensory (part of the) soul. To this belonged, for instance, simple perceptions 
but also memory (Chapter 5). By contrast, the cognition of universals or the 
formation of concepts, judging, and reasoning were usually taken to form the 
triad of intellectual operations (Chapter 6). On the other hand, this  distinction 
was put to the test by the observation of comparatively complex, human-like 
behaviour in nonhuman animals. The question was: Could such behaviour be 
brought about by the powers of the sensory soul or must one ascribe intellec-
tual powers to nonhuman animals? Accordingly, despite the seemingly clear 
boundary, there were obvious grey areas (Chapter 7). But how did authors of 
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries deal with these grey areas?
The main parts of this study will address this question by looking at the 
three main intellectual operations, namely, universal cognition and concept 
formation (Part 2), judging (Part 3), and reasoning (Part 4). Although it was 
commonly held that nonhuman animals cannot engage in any of these opera-
tions, several questions arose with respect to each of them. For instance, do 
sheep see wolves or grey, furry patches? Put differently, do they see something 
as something – for instance, as something dangerous – like we do by means 
of concepts or is their perception of the world entirely different from our way 
of seeing things? How do nonhuman animals (mentally) represent things? Do 
they only represent this or that particular thing or can they also form some gen-
eral representations, such as of water, for example, when looking for a drink? 
Furthermore, are their reactions to the stimuli they perceive based on acts of 
judgment? Do sheep flee wolves because they judge that wolves are danger-
ous? And if they do, how is this compatible with the definition of judgments 
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as propositions? In modern terms, shall we ascribe propositional attitudes to 
other animals? And shall we go even further and grant them the capacity to 
reason, too? For how else could we explain their capacity for problem solving? 
When we deal with novel situations we think or reason about what would be 
the best thing to do, so why should not other animals handle such situations in 
the same way? It is these and other questions that will be discussed in Parts 2 
to 4, which look at different late medieval answers given to them.
Part 5 then turns to what medieval thinkers called ‘prudence’ (prudentia). 
Prudence is slightly different from capacities like judging or reasoning, at least 
insofar as it is not part of the triad of intellectual operations. However, it is 
often mentioned in connection with nonhuman animals’ cognitive capacities. 
In a way, one could say that prudence is (or was) the medieval analogue of our 
modern notion of animal intelligence because even those authors who clearly 
denied any kind of rational operations to other animals did not refrain from 
calling them prudent. But what does it mean to say that an animal is prudent 
or behaves prudently? According to the common definition which medieval 
authors adopted from ancient thinkers, acting prudently means to do some-
thing in the present by memory of past events and with foresight of future 
events. Many animals, such as ants, seem to do this when storing food for the 
winter months. But do they really have something like memory and foresight? 
And how do these compare to the human capacity to remember and plan? 
Are other animals as prudent as we are or shall we say that calling them ‘pru-
dent’ is just metaphorical speech? Like in Parts 2 to 4, it will become clear that 
 different answers were given to these questions.
The variety of answers is what then leads to Part 6. This final part will offer 
a closer comparison of later medieval and contemporary theories (Chapters 
30 and 31) as well as an evaluation of the various explanatory strategies seen in 
Parts 2 to 5 (Chapters 32 and 33). The evaluation draws on a distinction that is 
often made in modern (animal) philosophy, namely, the distinction between 
differentialism and assimilationism. Usually, differentialists are taken to argue 
that there is a fundamental difference between us and other animals. Assimi-
lationists, in contrast, are said to hold the view that this difference is only a 
matter of degree. In their opinion, we are much more similar to other animals 
than the differentialist perspectives leads us to believe. Now, prima facie, all 
medieval authors must be classified as differentialists because by denying the 
faculties of intellect and reason to nonhuman animals they obviously establish 
a fundamental or anthropological difference. Yet, if one classifies all medieval 
theories in this way, one risks losing sight of their variety. Hence, it is worth 
looking at what unites and what distinguishes the different theories of animal 
rationality. As it turns out, most, if not all late medieval authors agreed on a 
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metaphysical differentialism. Nonetheless, they chose different strategies for 
dealing with this metaphysical premise and so they differed from a method-
ological point of view.
This is an important point also with regard to the comparison between 
medieval and modern theories of animal rationality because most modern 
scholars are inclined to see a sharp contrast between modern and medieval 
theories. Quite often, the latter are reduced to the denial of reason without ask-
ing what actually follows from this denial. Does this denial of rational  powers 
or faculties automatically lead to the denial of rationality, that is, to the de-
nial of rational processes or operations? Or did at least some medieval authors 
allow for what might be called ‘rationality without reason’? In other words, 
did they deny faculty rationality but ascribe process rationality to nonhuman 
animals? As will be shown, there are at least some authors who can be read in 
this way. But even for those who did not go into this direction, there is an im-
portant parallel in comparison to contemporary theories of animal  rationality: 
they all struggled with the question of how to define the cognitive processes 
that  underlie a certain behaviour. This question remains an issue in modern 
 research. And so even if the present book is unlikely to advance contemporary 
theories of animal rationality, it will hopefully elucidate some of the funda-
mental philosophical problems that unite past and present theories.
Part 1




Introduction to Part 1
Later medieval theories of animal rationality arose in a particular historical 
context. It is important to understand some of the particularities of this context 
because, despite many similarities, animals and rationality did not play exactly 
the same role they do today. The first chapter of this part (Chapter 4) therefore 
sets out to explore the role of animals in the Middle Ages both in general and 
in philosophy particularly. Their philosophical role depended  especially on the 
metaphysical status of nonhuman animals which was different from the  status 
granted to humans: while both were regarded as  having souls with  vegetative 
functions and sensory powers, humans were seen to surpass other beings 
through their possession of intellect and reason. The nature and operations of 
these different types of soul will be summarised in  Chapters 5 and 6. Particular 
emphasis will be placed upon the triad of intellectual  operations. Although 
these operations seem to establish a clear dividing line between the souls 
of human and nonhuman animals, there are certain grey  areas, as  Chapter 7 
shall show. These grey areas arise from the fact that there are many cases in 
which nonhuman animals behave in a very human-like manner and thus seem 
to have human-like cognition. This does not  immediately compromise the 
 animal/ human boundary. However, it calls for an explanation, and so the grey 
 areas are the source from which originate theories of animal rationality.
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chapter 4
The Role of Animals in the Middle Ages
In the medieval world, nonhuman animals were almost omnipresent. They 
were essential for the functioning of daily life as they supplied transporta-
tion, food, and raw-materials, among other things. They lived at the courts of 
wealthy kings as well as in the stables of poor farmers. Thus, medieval people 
had regular contact with all kinds of animals, and their life would have been 
much more difficult, if not impossible, without the existence and support of 
various domestic and wild species.1 Animals also played a prominent role in 
medieval art and architecture. They populated (and still populate) many man-
uscripts, paintings, and buildings, especially the portals of Gothic cathedrals, 
which overflow not only with biblical figures, saints, and demons but also with 
numerous animals, both realistic and fantastic.2
Yet, the religious role they had amounted to more than just decoration. In 
countless texts, they figure prominently as symbols for the wisdom and power 
of the divine creator whose ‘marks’ (vestigia) they bear, as Basil of Caesarea 
puts it in his Homiliae in Hexaemeron, which were well-known also to late 
medieval writers.3 In a way, animals were thus considered evidence for what 
is nowadays called ‘intelligent design’. Their physiological and psychological 
makeup seemed to be created relative to their needs, a consonance which, like 
everything else in the world, was taken to be a sign of God’s intelligence. They 
were also signs in the sense that their physique and behaviour were interpret-
ed as having allegorical meaning.4 In this connection, they were often used as 
moral role models. Many of their behaviours were taken to be instructive and 
1 On animals in daily life see, for instance, Dinzelbacher (2000), 181–211; Kiser (2007); Pascua 
(2007); Smets & Van den Abeele (2007); Obermaier (2009), 3–8; Salisbury (2011), 10–60. For a 
concise introduction to animals in medieval culture see Resl (2007a).
2 See Klingender (1971), Hicks (1993), and Resl (2007b) as well as the contributions in Flores 
(1996).
3 Basil of Caesarea, Homiliae ix in Hexaemeron, lib. ix, c. 4, ed. Migne (1886), 198B: “Ex his 
liquet, quo in omnibus inest natura, id doctrina non comparari, nihilque in rebus esse 
aut  inordinatum, aut improvidum: sed res omnes sapientiae conditoris sui vestigia prae se 
ferre […].”
4 On animals as signs and symbols or ‘vestigia Dei’ see Resnick & Kitchell (1999), 23–26; 
 Beullens (2007); Page (2007).
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exemplifications of ‘natural virtues’ (virtutes naturales), such as the diligence 
of ants or the care of storks, were praised as worthy of imitation.5
Although one might think that this symbolic value only mattered in  religious 
contexts, a look at so-called bestiaries and encyclopedias from the medieval 
period reveals that such symbolic views were woven into more zoological 
accounts of animals. Texts on animals in twelfth- and thirteenth- centuries 
 encyclopedias and bestiaries usually combine zoological information with 
theological exegesis. This is hardly surprising because, first, they heavily relied 
on earlier writings, such as the Physiologus and Isidor of Seville’s Etymologiae 
both of which also amalgamate zoology and theology.6 Second, any zoological 
(or scientific) enquiry concerning earthly creatures was taken finally to lead 
to a better understanding of the divine creator. This idea is already present 
in Augustine, who presumably coined the metaphor of the ‘book of nature’. 
 According to this metaphor, God is not only the origin of Scripture but has 
also written the ‘book of creation’ (liber creaturae) which, of course, includes 
animals.7 In order to acquire knowledge about God, one needs to carefully 
study both books he has ‘written’. From a modern perspective, this might seem 
like a baneful submission of ‘natural science’ (scientia naturalis) and its sub-
disciplines, including zoology, to the rule of theology. However, one should not 
conflate the theological framing of this science with its contents. Of course, 
any scientific enquiry into nature was considered to bring about some theo-
logical surplus. But this does not mean that the scientia naturalis was entirely 
theologised.
In fact, in the twelfth century in particular, the discovery of the theological 
value of natural science led to, or at least facilitated, what Marie-Dominique 
Chenu called “the discovery of nature.”8 This discovery was part of a more 
general “Renaissance” which, besides an increased interest in ancient science 
and sources, also produced an “increasing intellectual and practical interest 
among educated people, especially in the universities, in studying the things 
of nature through physical causes understood rationally, apart from their spiri-
tual potential,” as Willene B. Clark put it.9 This study of nature did not deny 
5 See Salisbury (2011), 81–107; Toivanen (forthcoming); Oelze (forthcoming a).
6 On animals in medieval encyclopedias see Schmidtke (1968) and (1993); Hünemörder (2003); 
Obermaier 2009, 13–16; Friedrich (2015). On bestiaries see Orlandi (1985); Clark & McCunn 
(1989); George & Yapp (1991); Clark (1995) and (2006); Hassig (1995); Voisenet (2000); White 
(2002).
7 On this metaphor see Speer (1995), 30f., and Kann (2003), 35f.
8 Chenu (1968), 4–24.
9 Clark (2006), 2. On the “Renaissance” of the twelfth century see Chenu (1968) and Speer 
(1995).
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its ‘spiritual potential’ by any means. But nature (as the object of natural sci-
ence) was ‘desacralised’ to some extent.10 For the purposes of the present study 
we need not go into the details of this twelfth-century “Renaissance.” What 
matters, however, is that it set the stage for many of the discussions on the 
 animal/ human boundary which shall be examined in the subsequent parts. 
Since nature not only includes things like minerals and plants but also human 
and nonhuman animals, the increased interest in nature also led to a more 
intense study of humans and other animals.
In the thirteenth century, the comparison between human and nonhuman 
species even became a “philosophical and anthropological key paradigm,” in 
the opinion of some scholars.11 There were various reasons for this paradigm 
shift. Among the most important factors is the transmission, translation, and 
reception of the Corpus Aristotelicum. The translation of Aristotle’s writings 
from Greek and Arabic into Latin had already begun during the first half of the 
twelfth century but it was not finished until the beginning of the second half of 
the thirteenth century.12 It had a huge impact on the academic discourse in the 
Latin West. Not only did it enlarge the textual basis of medieval learning and 
teaching, but it also set a certain agenda. The main subjects of Aristotle’s texts 
quickly became the dominant subjects in many fields, from logic and philoso-
phy of science to physics, metaphysics, and ethics.
As regards animals, the so-called ‘Books on Animals’ (De animalibus libri) 
became particularly relevant. These books are in fact a collection of three sepa-
rate writings on the history, the parts, and the generation of human and non-
human animals (Historia animalium, De partibus animalium, De   generatione 
animalium). They were, however, treated as a unified work by the  Arabic 
translator(s).13 Michael Scot who, presumably by 1220, had produced the 
first Latin translation, followed their lead on this point and so did William 
of  Moerbeke when also translating these books into Latin around fifty years 
 later.14 Even though the De animalibus did not receive as much attention from 
Latin commentators as other texts of Aristotle, it formed an integral part of 
the (later) medieval discourse on animals. With his extensive commentary of 
10 See Chenu (1968), 14.
11 Köhler (2001). For a thorough analysis of the comparison of human and nonhuman ani-
mals in the thirteenth century see Köhler (2008), 233–340. See also Köhler (2000), 52–73.
12 On the medieval translations and reception of Aristotle’s writings see Dod (1982) and 
Lohr (1982).
13 On the Arabic translations see briefly Kruk (2003).
14 See Dod (1982), 48f., and, in more detail, Drossaart-Lulofs (1992).
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the same title and the additional Quaestiones super De animalibus, Albertus 
 Magnus in particular made a major contribution to this discussion.15
Although Aristotle’s original treatise and Albert’s and other medieval schol-
ars’ commentaries cover virtually every aspect of zoology, the different books 
of De animalibus were not the only Aristotelian treatises dealing with animals. 
There also were two other works, namely, De motu animalium and De incessu 
animalium (known as De progressu animalium in the medieval period) which 
concern the physiology and, to some extent, also the psychology of animals.16 
It was these writings which, together with the De animalibus, formed the me-
dieval ‘science of animals’, the scientia de animalibus, in the broadest sense. 
Like today’s zoology, which is a sub-discipline of biology, this science was usu-
ally considered to be a sub-discipline of the much broader ‘natural science’, 
the scientia naturalis, because animals are a type of natural body (or thing), as 
Thomas Aquinas famously observed.17
Yet, the science of animals did not particularly focus on the aspect of 
 cognition. There certainly are various passages, both in Aristotle’s books on 
animals and in the medieval commentaries and supplements, which  contain 
statements on animals’ cognitive capacities. But the more important and 
 influential contributions to this field were Aristotle’s writings on  psychology, 
most  importantly, his De anima.18 In this work, he examines the souls of plants 
as well as nonhuman and human animals, and his theory gave rise to many 
 debates. Since the De anima concerns not only the nature but also the opera-
tions of the soul (or souls), it is one of the prime works on psychology in  general 
and on animal cognition in particular. Still, it is not the only place  to look. 
15 Besides Albert, there was, for instance, Peter of Spain who wrote a commentary on 
De  animalibus, a critical edition of which has been published by Francisca Navarro Sán-
chez. On these commentaries in particular and the discourse on animals in general see 
Asúa (1991), (1994), (1997), and (1999) as well as Resnick & Kitchell (1999), 34–42. See 
also the contributions to Steel, Guldentops & Beullens (1999), especially, Köhler (1999). 
In  addition, see Perfetti (2004). On some fourteenth-century debates in particular see 
Cova (1997).
16 On the Latin reception of these works see De Leemans (1999) and (2000). On the (late) 
medieval reception of Aristotle’s theory of animal motion see also Frampton (2008).
17 Thomas Aquinas, In primum librum Posteriorum analyticorum Aristoteles expositio, c. 13, 
lec. 25, ed. Leonina i (1882), 237: “Sed intelligendum est unam scientiam esse sub altera 
dupliciter. Uno modo, quando subiectum unius scientiae est species subiecti superioris 
scientiae; sicut animal est species corporis naturalis, et ideo scientia de animalibus est 
sub scientia naturali.”
18 On the extensive commentary tradition on the De anima see Bakker & Thijssen (2007); 
De Boer (2013).
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Some minor treatises that were part of the so-called Parva naturalia also ex-
amine  particular aspects of psychology, such as sensation (like the De sensu et 
sensibilibus) or memory (like De memoria et reminiscentia).19 Moreover, many 
other writings which are not (primarily) concerned with psychology, such as 
the Metaphysics and the Politics, contain crucial statements on the cognitive 
capacities of animals. Hence, (later) medieval theories of animal cognition 
in general and of animal rationality in particular not only drew on those of 
Aristotle’s writings that focused exclusively on psychological themes, but also 
upon other parts of the Corpus Aristotelicum, from treatises on zoology and 
psychology to works on entirely different topics.
Aristotle’s works were, of course, not the only source for the formation 
of theories in the Latin West, especially in the field of psychology. As is well 
known, the influence of Arabic psychology should not be underestimated in 
this respect. Besides Averroes’ commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima, there is 
Avicenna’s original Liber de anima in particular which found its way into Latin 
theories.20 Arabic authors were well acquainted with Aristotle’s writings, in-
cluding his treatises on zoology and psychology, but many of them did not 
content themselves with critically discussing Aristotle’s ideas. Rather, they 
also developed their own original theories, among which is Avicenna’s highly 
influential theory of inner senses. This theory was of utmost importance for 
the discussion on animal rationality, as we shall see in the following chapter, 
because it clearly defined a number of corporeal faculties apart from the five 
external senses that humans share with other animals. This theory of inner 
senses complemented Aristotle’s theory of the soul in a crucial regard.
However, neither in Aristotle’s nor in Avicenna’s psychology were nonhuman 
animals a subject in their own right. They were the subject of psychology, first 
and foremost, because like plants and humans they were ensouled beings and 
so the science of the soul would have to study all different kinds of souls rather 
than only one particular type.21 Yet their souls were included in  psychology 
for more than just the sake of completeness. Rather, their cognitive capacities 
played a pivotal heuristic role with regard to the study of human souls since 
any kind of enquiry into the nature of human souls needs to answer the ques-
tion of whether human souls are unique and, if so, what it is that makes them 
19 On the Latin reception of the Parva naturalia see the contributions to Crisciani, Lam-
bertini & Martorelli (2004), especially, Federici Vescovini (2004). On the reception of De 
memoria et reminiscentia in particular see Bloch (2007), 137–228.
20 On the reception of Avicenna’s Liber de anima see Hasse (2000).
21 Note that there was some debate over the subject matter of the ‘scientia de anima’, see 
Köhler (2000), 335–368; De Boer (2013), 71–77.
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unique.22 This is the reason why there was an active interest in comparing the 
souls of humans and of nonhuman animals with each other. This comparison 
was not restricted to psychology. In almost all fields of medieval philosophy 
and science, nonhuman animals were used as ‘a tool of knowledge’ (“un outil 
de connaissance”), as Jacques Voisenet put it.23 This means that, quite often, 
they were not the explanandum, that is, the thing which is to be explained, but 
the explanans, that is, the thing by which something else is explained.
A passage that nicely illustrates this explanatory role of animals is found in 
John Duns Scotus’ Quaestiones super secundum et tertium De anima.24 There 
Scotus discusses whether one should posit a so-called common sense, that is, 
a faculty which is superior to the particular senses, such as the sense of sight 
or taste. Scotus answers this question in the affirmative and his  answer  relies 
 heavily on the psychological makeup of nonhuman animals. Like  human 
 beings, they do not only perceive things such as a piece of food but also 
 experience pleasure (delectatio) in what they perceive. Feeling pleasure, how-
ever, is a cognitive act in which a power reflects on a particular object. When 
one enjoys the sweet flavour of a piece of chocolate cake it is not the sense of 
taste itself that creates the feeling of pleasure because what the sense of taste 
does is simply to receive the information that what it tastes is sweet. It is not 
up to the sense of taste to decide whether sweet flavour is pleasurable. If this 
is true,  then the question is whose task it is to do this. One possible answer 
would be that it is the intellect’s task to decide whether a certain perception is 
pleasing. Yet this answer is proven wrong when we look at nonhuman animals, 
Scotus argues. Like us they also enjoy certain things while they dislike others. 
According to the Aristotelian theory of the soul, however, they lack intellect 
and reason and so their pleasure must derive from a sensory power.
Regardless of whether Scotus’ argument is convincing, it shows how animals 
were used in a particular philosophical context. They served as a kind of litmus 
test: in Scotus’ argument they help to show that a certain power is  sensory 
22 See Toivanen (2013b), 357.
23 Voisenet (2000), esp. 329–352. Similarly, Köhler (2008), 234 and 237, states that nonhu-
man animals had the function of mutually elucidating various aspects (“wechselseitige 
Erhellungsfunktion”). Obermaier (2009), 2, calls them ‘a medium of knowledge and vi-
sualisation’ (“Medium der Erkenntnis und Vergegenwärtigung”). Davids (2017), 6, adopts 
Courtenay’s idea of nonhuman animals as an ‘analytical tool’ (“analytisches Hilfsmittel”).
24 See John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super secundum et tertium De anima, q. 9, §10, eds. 
Bazán et al. (2006), 72f. According to the editors, this text is “a series of independently 
disputed questions concerning the soul, written down in connection with some teach-
ing  activity in the liberal arts” rather than a commentary on Aristotle’s De anima; 
see ibid., 139*.
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rather than intellectual and they do this in many other arguments, several 
of which we shall encounter in what follows. What is common to all of these 
 arguments is that they rest on a very basic but crucial assumption: nonhuman 
animals have sensory souls by virtue of which they can engage in a variety of 
cognitive operations (see Chapter 5 below). There are, however, certain kinds 
of cognition in which they cannot engage because they require intellectual or 
rational faculties (see Chapter 6). Consequently, the kind of argument Scotus 
and many others present works only as long as this basic assumption about the 
animal/human boundary holds true. If there is a case in which this assumption 
is put to the test, namely, the case of animal rationality (see Chapter 7), it will 
have serious consequences for the arguments that rest on it.
<UN>
chapter 5
Animal Souls and Sensory Cognition
Among medieval philosophers, there was not much of a debate on whether 
dogs, cats, apes, or horses, and even more minute nonhuman animals, such as 
flies and bees, have souls. By and large, they all adopted the view of Aristotle 
according to which the soul is the ‘principle of life’. Hence, all living beings, 
from plants to humans, possess souls; otherwise they would not be alive. For 
ordinary people, the idea that nonhuman animals have souls seemed to be an 
odd idea. As Roger Bacon states in the Communia naturalium, the ‘crowd of 
 laymen believes that only humans have souls which is why they laugh about the 
clergymen who say that dogs and other nonhuman animals have souls’.1 Simi-
larly, Adelard of Bath, in his twelfth-century Quaestiones naturales, includes 
his nephew’s statement that the question of whether nonhuman animals have 
souls is ‘ambiguous to men of our time’. Adelard, however, who is his nephew’s 
interlocutor in this dialogue, stresses that only ordinary people would reply by 
clearly denying that animals have souls. Those, in contrast, who are familiar 
with natural philosophy do not at all hesitate to ascribe souls to other animals 
because they acknowledge that animals have ‘sensation’ ( sensus), and sensa-
tion is a clear sign for the presence of a soul.2
Sensation or sensory cognition is indeed what characterises animal souls, 
and we shall see shortly what it means to have sensation. But before that it 
is important to note that the presence of sensation is only a sufficient, not a 
necessary condition for the ascription of a soul. The reason for this is that, 
despite the lack of any kind of cognition, plants have souls too, according to 
Aristotle’s widely-accepted theory: trees and flowers nourish themselves, they 
grow, and propagate, and so they have what was usually called a vegetative 
soul. Admittedly, this type of soul does not enable them to see their food or to 
feel their partners, for example. But it endows them with the basic functions 
1 Roger Bacon, Communia naturalium, lib. i, pars 4, c. 1, ed. Steele (1911), 283: “Immo vulgus 
laicorum in multis regnis adhuc credit quod soli homines animas habent, unde derident 
clericos qui dicunt canes et cetera bruta habere animas.”
2 Adelard of Bath, Quaestiones naturales, q. 13, ed. and tr. Burnett (1998), 110–112: “Nepos: His 
dissertis, postremo urtrum bruta animalia animas habeant necne, solvendum suscipe. Id 
enim quidem etatis hominibus ambiguum est. adelardus: Ut vulgus de negatione non 
 dubitat, ita philosophus affirmatio certa est. Habent enim, et eas habere sic assero. Bruta 
sensus habent.”
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of life:   nutrition, growth, and reproduction.3 Since plants share these basic 
functions with nonhuman and human animals there is a certain continuity 
between them. This “principle of psychological continuity,” as it is sometimes 
called, is best expressed by the idea of the ‘great chain of being’ or the ‘ladder 
of nature’ (scala naturae).4
According to this picture, all (living) beings occupy the different steps of a 
ladder. And since the single steps build upon each other – it is much closer to a 
stairway than a ladder – there is continuity insofar as what is found at one step 
will also be found at the next step. For instance, nutrition, growth, and repro-
duction are found in plants, nonhuman, and human animals alike. The latter 
two, in turn, share not only the functions of the vegetative soul but they also 
have in common the functions of the so-called sensory soul. This is actually 
what sets them apart from plants and thus establishes a certain discontinuity, 
for plants count as living or ensouled beings, but unlike dogs or humans they 
are not animals.
In order to qualify as an animal, a living being needs to have sensation in 
addition to vegetative functions. In a nutshell, ‘animals’ (animalia) are living 
beings that have a sensory soul. In this sense, the concept ‘animal’ is a generic 
term which applies to various species of animal, both human and nonhuman.5 
Thus, it establishes some sort of ‘generic community’ between various kinds of 
animals.6 It is certainly true that several authors tried to make a terminological 
distinction between human and nonhuman animals, for instance, by referring 
to the latter as ‘irrational animals’ (animalia irrationalia), ‘brutes’ (bruta), or 
‘beasts’ (bestiae).7 Many of these expressions are pejorative rather than neutral 
and intend to emphasise the inferiority of nonhuman animals. Nonetheless, 
they do not exclude dogs, horses, or ants from the realm of  animals. They only 
show that this realm can be further divided in one way or another. Since this 
was commonplace among medieval philosophers, to speak of ‘humans and 
other animals’ or ‘human and nonhuman animals’ is not to take an  ideological 
stance towards the status of nonhuman animals. For medieval  thinkers  humans 
3 On the history of plant souls see Ingensiep (2001).
4 On the principle of psychological continuity see Matthews (1978). On the idea of a great 
chain of beings see Lovejoy (1936), esp. 24–98. On the Aristotelian scala naturae see Granger 
(1985) and Coles (1997).
5 There are even some exceptional cases in which celestial bodies and demons were taken to 
be animals by ancient and medieval thinkers, see Köhler (2014), 105f.; Sander (2016), esp. 262.
6 Köhler (2008), 184. Similarly, Davids (2017), 31, claims that it establishes a certain ‘animal 
conformity’ (“animalische Konvenienz”).
7 See Resl (1997), 3–10; Preece (2005), 1; Köhler (2008), 226–232; Salisbury (2011), 10–12. In earlier 
medieval texts one can also find terms like ‘belua’ (for wild animals) or ‘pecora’ (for cattle).
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clearly are living beings that have a sensory soul, and this is what unites them 
with all other kinds of animals.8 But what does it actually mean to have a sen-
sory soul? What is it that makes humans and other animals stand above plants 
on the scala naturae?
Above all, it is the possession of a number of organs by virtue of which they 
can engage in certain activities or operations or by virtue of which they have 
certain capacities. Of course, the possession of organs which have certain func-
tions is nothing specific to sensory souls. The functions of the vegetative souls 
also depend on various organs: there are organs for ingestion, digestion, and 
for reproduction. What matters is rather that the organs of the sensory soul 
are other organs than those of the vegetative soul and so they can bring about 
other operations. As mentioned before, one can summarise the operations of 
sensory souls as cognitive operations. This means that they are “mechanisms by 
which animals acquire, process, store, and act on information from the envi-
ronment,” to quote a definition of cognition that has become widely accepted 
in contemporary philosophy and psychology.9 By and large, this definition also 
catches the medieval notion of cognition.10 Still, it is important to note that 
medieval thinkers used to distinguish between sensory and intellectual cogni-
tion. One might therefore prefer to speak of ‘perception’ when talking about 
sensory operations. However, most of the authors covered by this study did 
not refrain from calling perception a kind of cognition (cognitio).11 Hence, it 
is neither anachronistic to call perception a kind of cognition nor is it wrong 
to claim that human and nonhuman animals have cognition because both of 
them clearly have various organs for sensory cognition.
Regarding the organs of sensory cognition a distinction was usually made 
between two different kinds of senses, namely, external senses and internal 
senses. The external senses are five: sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. All 
of them have corresponding organs: eyes, ears, nose, tongue, and skin or flesh.12 
8 This point is also emphasised by Resl (2007a), 3, who says that “[…] animal was used in 
its strictest Latin sense to refer to all breathing, moving, living beings, that is, to humans 
and nonhuman animals alike. In this language system no single word was available that 
corresponded to our modern animal in referring to all nonhuman animals. […] modern 
scholars who neglect this difference can all too easily jump to anachronistic conclusions.” 
On the medieval concept, see also König-Pralong (2011).
9 Shettleworth (2010), 4.
10 See Pasnau (1997), 4.
11 On scholastic theories of perception see, for instance, Knuutila (2008); Hasse (2010); 
Smith (2010); Perler (2015c).
12 In De anima II.7-11, Aristotle discusses at length the senses and their corresponding 
organs.
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Yet, if one compares the external senses of human and nonhuman animals, 
one will easily see that there are at least three important differences between 
the senses of different species. The first difference is that not all animals have 
the same number of external senses. While humans usually have all of these 
senses, there are other animals that lack certain of them. Bees, for instance, do 
not possess the sense of hearing, in the opinion of many late medieval think-
ers, such as Thomas Aquinas. Even though bees are obviously frightened by 
loud noises and so seem to hear, this is only because they feel ‘the motion of 
the air’ (commotio aeris) that is produced by such noises, Aquinas explains.13 
Lack of hearing is the reason why bees cannot be taught because ‘hearing is 
the sense of instruction’ (auditus est sensus disciplinae), as Aquinas remarks 
in the same place with reference to Aristotle’s De sensu et sensato. However, 
they are not seriously impaired by this lack because they still manage to find 
nectar and pollen and the combs they built are of an admirable geometrical 
regularity.14 Thus, one can be an animal without having all of the five senses. 
This is even more obvious with regard to those species that do have only one 
external sense. A prominent example is oysters, whose only external sense is 
touch. Therefore, they are only slightly superior to plants.15 Nonetheless, they 
qualify as animals because, in contrast to plants, they have at least one sense 
and hence can engage in sensory cognition.
Besides differences in number between the external senses of human and 
nonhuman animals there are also differences in physiology, that is, in the cor-
poreal quality of the sense organs. The eyes of bees have a different structure 
than human eyes, for example, and similar differences occur in the physi-
ology of any other of the four senses: the ears of elephants are much larger 
than human ears and so are the noses of horses. Although these differences 
might seem to be mere differences of shape or structure, they actually point 
to a third and more fundamental difference, namely, a difference in the way 
in which the various external senses function. In other words, there is a dif-
ference in the senses’ degree of perfection. Certain species, such as hawks, for 
instance, surpass humans with respect to sight as they are capable of spotting 
13 Thomas Aquinas, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, lib. i, lec. 1, n. 12, 
eds. Cathala & Spiazzi (1964), 8. On this see passage also Davids (2017), 173f.
14 On the medieval topos of the sagacity of bees see Guldentops (1999) and Roling (2013b), 
esp. 412–418.
15 See, for instance, Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles, lib. ii, c. 68, ed. Leonina xiii 
(1918), 440: “[…] sicut quaedam infima in genere animalium parum excedunt vitam plan-




prey over large distances. The reason for this is that their eyes have a different 
‘complexion’ (complexio), as Albertus Magnus explains in his De animalibus.16 
And so from physiological differences result various functional differences. In 
many cases, nonhuman animals benefit from these differences in comparison 
to  humans, insofar as they have more powerful external senses than we do. 
Recognition of this sensory superiority has been a commonplace among phi-
losophers since Antiquity. In his De anima, Aristotle already mentions that our 
sense of smell is much worse than the sense of smell of many other animals, 
and in medieval encyclopedias dogs are often mentioned as an example of this 
superiority.17 Other examples are the sight of lynxes, the taste of monkeys, or 
the touch of spiders.18 In sum, there is a large variety among animal species 
with regard to their external senses.
However, perception via the external senses is not the only kind of sen-
sory cognition. Beyond that, many animals can, for instance, also imagine 
or remember things they have sensed. But imagination and memory do not 
take place at the level of the external senses: if one imagines or remembers 
a rose, one does not presently see, smell, or touch a rose. Instead, one can, 
for instance, close one’s eyes and still have a mental image of a rose. There-
fore, imagination and memory were considered to be so-called ‘inner senses’ 
( sensus interiores). The theory of internal senses was extremely influential in 
the later Middle Ages but its history is highly complicated as there was much 
disagreement about  various aspects.19 There was, first, disagreement over 
how many inner senses there are at all and, in particular, over how many of 
these are shared by human and nonhuman animals. In most cases, four in-
ner senses are mentioned: (i) common sense, (ii) imagination or phantasy, 
(iii) estimation, and (iv) memory. In addition, many authors also mention a 
16 Albertus Magnus, De animalibus, lib. xxi, tr. 1, c. 1, ed. Stadler (1920), 1323.
17 See Aristotle, De anima II.9, 421a7-13. On the dog’s sense of smell see, for instance, Isidor 
of Seville, Etymologiae, lib. xii, c. 2, §25, ed. André (1986), 111.
18 These examples were often summarised in a proverb which can be found, for instance, 
in Thomas of Cantimpré, Liber de natura rerum IV.1, ed. Boese (1973), 106: “Homo in 
quinque sensibus superatur a multis: aquile et linces clarius cernunt, vultures sagacius 
odorantur, simia subtilius gustat, aranea citius tangit; liquidius audiunt talpe vel aper 
 silvaticus: Nos aper auditu, linx visu, simia gustu, Vultur odoratu precedit, aranea tactu.” 
On ancient versions of this saying see Sorabji (1993b), 15f. On thirteenth-century views of 
the differences between human and nonhuman animals’ external senses see also Köhler 
(2014), 248–266.
19 On the medieval theory of inner senses and its history see Wolfson (1935); Klubertanz 
(1952), esp. 37–151; Harvey (1975); Kemp & Fletcher (1993); Federici Vescovino, Sorge & 
Vinti (2005); Hasse (2010); Kärkkäinen (2011); Knuutila & Kärkkäinen (2014).
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 cogitative power, though for some this was an additional power in humans, 
whereas others took this to be the human analogue of nonhuman animals’ 
estimative power. Similarly, some held that imagination and phantasy are one 
faculty, while others considered them to be different powers.20 Some authors 
also argued that there is actually only one inner sense which has different 
functions.21 Besides disagreement on the number of internal senses there was 
also much debate over where the single senses are located in the brain.22 And 
third, there was a wide range of views on how these senses function, especially 
in different species of animals.23
All of these differences are more than mere technicalities because the way 
in which one describes the inner senses determines one’s view of the cogni-
tive capacities of animals. For the moment, it suffices to highlight three points 
that are particularly noteworthy in this regard. First, just as some animals lack 
 certain external senses, so do some lack certain internal senses. Flies, shellfish, 
and worms, for instance, do not have memory according to Albertus Magnus.24 
Flies regularly return after we have chased them off because they are incapa-
ble of remembering our hurtful blows. Dogs, in contrast, have an outstanding 
memory. A popular example among ancient and medieval authors is Argos, 
the dog of Ulysses, who after many years of separation was the only one to 
recognise his master after his return.25 Thus, there are not only differences in 
number but also differences in the degree of perfection of the inner senses 
and the memory of dogs is just one example. As regards imagination, this dif-
ference was an important criterion for differentiating between ‘perfect’ and 
‘imperfect animals’ (animalia perfecta and imperfecta).26 While the former are 
capable of imagining a rose without presently perceiving a rose, the latter can 
only have a bundle of sensory impressions of a rose in their  imagination when 
20 Lisska (2016), 219, nicely calls this discussion “a historical muddle.” There was also much 
lamentation among medieval thinkers about this, as Köhler (2014), 266f., shows. See also 
Hamesse (1988).
21 This position was, for instance, held by Peter of John Olivi; see Toivanen (2013a). A similar 
view is found in Buridan; see De Boer (2014) and Lagerlund (2017).
22 On theories of brain function in particular see Sudhoff (1913) and Clark & Dewhurst 
(1996), 8–53.
23 A comprehensive overview of thirteenth-century positions is provided by Köhler (2014), 
266–374.
24 Albertus Magnus, De animalibus, lib. xxi, tr. 1, c. 2, ed. Stadler (1920), 1326; De memoria 
et reminiscentia, tr. 1, c. 1, ed. Donati (2017), 115; Metaphysica, lib. i, tr. 1, c. 6, ed. Geyer 
(1960), 8.
25 On this example see Roling (2011), 223.
26 See Köhler (2006) and (2014), esp. 329–340.
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 presently perceiving a rose. As in the case of the external senses, these differ-
ences were mostly explained by differences in the quality of the bodily organs, 
that is, the specific parts of the brain in which the inner senses reside. Conse-
quently, whether one has a good memory or a bad imagination depends on the 
bodily mixture of certain parts of the brain, and much as there are more or less 
slight differences between the individuals of one species, there are more or less 
profound differences between the inner senses of one species and another.27
A third point that is particularly relevant for theories of animal rationality 
is the role of one specific inner sense, namely, the so-called ‘estimative power’ 
(vis/virtus aestimativa) or ‘estimation’ (aestimatio). This power is definitely 
one of the, if not the, most crucial inner sense of nonhuman animals because 
its function is to judge what is perceived. For instance, it is the power that 
determines whether the thing perceived is harmful or harmless. The estima-
tive  faculty somehow tells the organism what it should do in response to a 
certain perception. The classical example of how this power works is found 
in  Avicenna, whom most scholars credit with inventing the theory of estima-
tion.28 In his Liber de anima, Avicenna introduces the estimative power by 
referring to the example of a sheep seeing a wolf. The sheep, Avicenna says, 
not only perceives the sensory ‘forms’ (formae) of the wolf, such as the wolf ’s 
colour and shape, its smell, or sound. In addition, it also perceives what, in the 
Latin, was rendered as ‘intention’ (intentio), namely, the wolf ’s harmfulness.29 
It is this intention of harmfulness which then triggers the sheep’s reaction of 
flight. And so the estimative power is essential to the sheep’s survival because 
without this faculty no reaction would be triggered.30
One might, of course, immediately ask whether the estimative power trig-
gers nothing but instinctual reactions because the sheep’s reaction of flight is 
clearly an innate response that can be found in all sheep. But this question 
is a pivotal part of many of the discussions to be considered more closely in 
27 An exemplary and detailed discussion of these differences is provided by Albertus 
 Magnus, De animalibus, lib. viii, tr. 6, c. 1, ed. Stadler (1916), 668–670.
28 For Hasse (2010), 314, this theory marks “the most successful addition to Aristotle’s faculty 
theory.” On Avicenna’s theory of estimation see further Black (1993) and (2000), 59–62; 
Hasse (2000), 127–153; Hall (2006); Pormann (2013), 102–107; López-Farjeat (2016), 63–66.
29 Note that ‘intentio’ is a technical term which is usually rendered as ‘intention’ although 
is has little to do with intentions in the modern sense of the term because the sheep 
does not literally grasp that the wolf intends to be harmful; see Crane (1998), esp. 816, and 
 Amerini (2011), esp. 558f.
30 See Avicenna Latinus, Liber de anima seu Sextus de naturalibus, lib. i, c. 5, ed. van Riet 
(1972), 86–89, and lib. iv, c. 3, ed. van Riet (1968), 34–40. For a discussion of this example 
and its reception in the Latin West see Piro (2005); Perler (2006) and (2012b).
35Animal Souls and Sensory Cognition
<UN>
Parts 2 to 5. For now, it is enough to say that all animals, no matter whether 
they are human or nonhuman and no matter whether they are big or small, 
have sensory souls. This means that they possess a number of external and 
internal senses, even though these senses differ in number, physiology, func-
tionality, and so forth. In every case, they provide cognitive access to the world 
and thus go beyond the basic functions of life provided by the vegetative soul. 
Sensory souls surely have much in common with vegetative souls. Most promi-
nently, their operations are bound to bodily organs. For instance, the sense of 
sight does not work without eyes, and the faculty of memory is situated in a 
certain part of the brain where various sensory impressions can be stored, just 
as digestion requires an intestinal tract. This corporeal foundation of sensory 
cognition is the reason why sensory souls are often characterised as material 
souls: they are material in the sense that having a sensory soul means to have 
certain bodily organs. This corporeal nature of the senses is common to both 
human and nonhuman animals and so we share many things with dogs, hors-
es, bees, and other animals.31
31 As the chart in De Leemans & Klemm (2007), 158, shows, we actually share the majority of 
powers with other animals according to the Aristotelian theory of the soul.
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chapter 6
Human Souls and the Triad of Intellectual 
Operations
As we have seen, all animals are superior to plants in that they have not only 
vegetative powers but also sensory, that is, cognitive powers. The possession of 
cognition is what establishes a psychological continuity between nonhuman 
and human animals. However, there is also a crucial discontinuity and it is this 
discontinuity that brings us closer to theories of animal rationality. In short, 
the discontinuity between humans and other animals consists in the fact 
that only the former have rational or intellectual souls. Consequently, humans 
are not simply animals but a very peculiar kind of animals, namely, ‘rational 
animals’ (animalia rationalia).1 They are, so to speak, ‘animals plus x’ with ‘x’ 
being the faculties of intellect and reason. Nonhuman animals are, in turn, 
‘animals without x’. This lack of intellect and reason is why they were often 
called ‘ irrational animals’ (animalia irrationalia) or ‘brute animals’ (animalia 
bruta), as mentioned before. The possession of a rational soul thus establishes 
what modern scholars usually call an anthropological difference because it sets 
 humans apart from all other animals.
Medieval philosophers stressed this point. In his commentary on De ani-
malibus, Peter of Spain, for instance, states that ‘humans excel any other ani-
mal by the nobility of intellect and reason’ (homo enim excellit quodlibet animal 
nobilitate intellectus et rationis).2 In his Sentences commentary, Peter of John 
Olivi defines human beings as ‘intellectual animals or animals having intellect’ 
(bestiae intellectuales seu intellectum habentes).3 On the one hand, this shows 
that the animal nature of human beings was not denied. On the other hand, 
it emphasises that something crucial is added to this animal nature, namely, 
intellectual or rational faculties. Consequently, if these faculties are subtracted 
from a human animal, one no longer has a human animal. All that remains is an 
1 ‘Animal rationale’ is simply the Latin translation of Aristotle’s Greek ‘zoon logon echon’ from 
Politica I.2, 1253a7-10.
2 Peter of Spain, Questiones super libro ‘De animalibus’ Aristotelis, lib. i, q. 4, ed. Navarro 
 Sánchez (2015), 117. See also Köhler (2008), 191.
3 Peter of John Olivi, Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum, q. 57, ed. Jansen (1924), 
338.
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animal, as Henry of Ghent points out in his Quaestiones quodlibetales.4 There-
fore, it is obviously the rational soul that defines humans qua humans and so 
‘in reality, mankind is nothing else but the rational soul’, as Thomas Aquinas 
puts it in the Summa contra gentiles.5 Since this definition of humans was usu-
ally taken for granted by medieval philosophers, one can rightly say that it was 
a fundamental ontological presupposition or a fundamental metaphysical and 
anthropological presupposition to which they subscribed.6 Yet, the most inter-
esting question is, how do the rational souls of humans compare to the sensory 
souls of nonhuman animals? If having a soul means  having  certain capacities 
or engaging in certain operations that are characteristic of this soul, what are 
the specific operations of rational souls?
In order to answer these questions one might first need to ask whether 
there is actually a difference between ‘intellect’ (intellectus) and ‘reason’ (ra-
tio) because, on the one hand, they seem to be used interchangeably, and yet, 
on the other hand, it would be superfluous to speak of intellect and reason if 
they were not distinct powers. This question seemed to puzzle medieval au-
thors, too. In the Summa theologiae, Thomas Aquinas, for example, explicitly 
addresses the question of whether intellect and reason are ‘separate powers’ 
( diversae potentiae).7 He first presents a number of opinions from other  authors 
who seem to suggest that intellect and reason are indeed distinct powers. The 
 author of the influential De spiritu et anima, for instance, says that there is a 
clear hierarchy: first come the external senses, then the internal senses, then 
comes reason and then comes the intellect. Hence, the intellect is superior to 
reason. Augustine, in contrast, employs them synonymously and so do others.
Aquinas’ tries to solve this contradiction by arguing that intellect and reason 
are not separate powers. Nonetheless, he concedes that there is a certain dif-
ference between rational and intellectual cognition, between ‘ratiocinari’ and 
‘intelligere’. While the latter means ‘to apprehend an intelligible truth per se’ 
(simpliciter veritatem intelligibilem apprehendere), the former means ‘to pro-
ceed from one intelligible object to another in order to cognise an  intelligible 
truth’ (procedere de uno intellecto ad aliud, ad veritatem intelligibilem cogno-
scendam). One could illustrate this difference by comparing it to the differ-
ence between solving a mathematical problem by intensive thinking or by 
4 Henry of Ghent, Quaestiones quodlibetales i, q. 15, ed. Macken (1979), 93: “Excepto enim eo 
quod intellectus est, non manet homo nisi bestia […].”
5 Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles, lib. iv, c. 81, ed. Leonina xv (1930), 253: “Et secun-
dum hoc, humanitas non est aliud realiter quam anima rationalis.”
6 This is how Köhler (1992), 718, and (2008), 295, puts it.
7 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae i, q. 79, a. 8, ed. Leonina v (1889), 274f.
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sudden  inspiration. If one solves the problem by intensive thinking it takes 
some time until one arrives at the solution. One might have to search for the 
right approach, take notes, and so forth. That is, one makes various steps and 
so jumps from one partial solution to another. In the case of a sudden inspira-
tion,  however, the solution immediately appears. One sees the problem and – 
in a flash of insight – knows the solution. The latter is certainly a much more 
impressive way of solving mathematical problems. In this sense, intelligere is 
somehow superior to ratiocinari. Still, both ways lead to the same result and 
both cognitive acts are brought about by one and the same cognitive power, 
according to Aquinas.
Admittedly, Aquinas’ view is only one among many. Other medieval au-
thors had (slightly) different thoughts about the distinction between reason 
and intellect.8 For the present study, however, the more decisive question is 
whether this distinction matters for the aspect of animal rationality. On the 
one hand, it seems to be negligible because neither of these faculties of the 
soul was ascribed to nonhuman animals by any of the authors covered here. 
So even if some of them held the view that there is a difference between the 
two, it remains relatively insignificant if one is looking at animals which, by 
definition, lack both of these powers. On the other hand, the distinction might 
not be entirely irrelevant insofar as there were at least some authors who as-
cribed the capacity of ‘reasoning’ (ratiocinari) to other animals, as we will see 
in Part 4. Thus, the slight inferiority of rational cognition in comparison to in-
tellectual cognition might actually imply a greater proximity to the powers and 
 operations of the sensory soul (see Chapter 33). But before dealing with these 
details we first need to see what kind of operations and capacities were usu-
ally taken to come along with the possession of a ‘rational’ or ‘intellective soul’ 
(anima rationalis; anima intellectiva). What are the typical tasks or operations 
of the higher faculties?
In most accounts there are three main intellectual operations, namely, 
(i)  universal cognition and concept formation, (ii) judging, and (iii) reason-
ing. These operations built upon each other, as, once again, Thomas Aqui-
nas points out.9 First of all, the intellect ‘apprehends the quiddity of a thing’ 
( apprehendit quidditatem rei), say, the quiddity of a rose. Apprehending the 
quiddity of a rose significantly differs from apprehending a rose via the  senses. 
8 For the full picture from Augustine to Buridan see Enders (2001); Speer (2001); Hoenen 
(2001). On the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic origins of the distinction see also briefly Sorabji 
(1993b), 74f.
9 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae i, q. 85, a. 5 co., ed. Leonina v (1889), 341. On this 
article see also the analysis by Pasnau (2002), 273.
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If one sees, smells, or touches a rose, for example, one perceives certain  features 
of a  particular thing. It is this or that rose one sees or smells or touches and 
one would not have any of these perceptions if no rose were presently there. 
Hence, sensory cognition is of present and particular things. But what if one 
 remembers or imagines a rose? In this case, one does not presently perceive a 
rose but still has a sensory impression. In fact, one can have sensory impres-
sions without presently perceiving things. But these sensory impressions are 
nonetheless the impressions of a particular thing such as of the particular rose 
one saw yesterday in the garden.
To apprehend the quiddity of a rose, however, means to abstract from any 
material and temporal conditions because the quiddity of a rose is what is 
common to all roses, not only to this or that particular rose one has perceived 
at this or that particular time and place. The colour red, for instance, does not 
belong to the quiddity of roses because there are also white or yellow roses. 
Having petals, on the other hand, seems to be part of the quiddity of roses 
because all roses have petals even if they are coloured differently. Once one 
has grasped the defining universal features of roses, one knows the universal 
‘rose’. One could also say that one has formed the concept ‘rose’. This concept is 
universal in that one can apply it to all roses no matter where they stand, what 
colour or size they have, when one has seen them, and so forth. Since this kind 
of cognition goes beyond sensation, it was usually attributed to the faculties of 
intellect and reason.
There are, admittedly, many medieval theories of how concepts are formed, 
and, likewise, there are numerous theories of what universals are.10 However, 
all of these theories suggest that the cognition of universals and the formation 
of concepts rely largely, if not entirely, on the powers of the rational soul. Many 
authors stressed that the sensory faculties play a role in this process insofar as 
they deliver the necessary material out of which concepts are formed. That 
is to say, we would be incapable of forming the general term ‘rose’ without 
having previously sensed particular roses. Nonetheless, it is the intellect that 
cognises the universal and forms the concept ‘rose’. Consequently, the intellect 
is also responsible for the second operation, the task of ‘composing or dividing’ 
(componere vel dividere) these concepts, that is, the formation of judgments.11 
Once we have acquired concepts, we can combine them with others concepts 
ad libitum. We can, for instance, form propositions such as ‘Roses are plants’ or 
‘Roses are a genus in the family of Rosaceae’. Thus, general terms or concepts 
are the building-blocks of judgments or propositions, at least according to the 
10 For an overview see, for instance, Adams (1982) and Holopainen (2014).
11 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae i, q. 85, a. 5 co., ed. Leonina v (1889), 341.
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so-called “‘building-block model’ of propositions and concepts.”12 This model 
is still influential today and it was, in one way or another, held by the majority 
of late medieval authors, too.13
According to the building-block model, it does not actually matter what 
kind of theory one holds concerning the formation of concepts because con-
cept formation is a different cognitive act than the formation of propositions. 
Therefore, someone like William of Ockham who held a different theory of 
concept formation than Aquinas nevertheless agreed that ‘to form propositions 
and to syllogise is the proper task of the intellect’ (formare autem  propositiones 
et syllogizare proprium est intellectui).14 As Ockham’s phrasing shows, this not 
only applies to the formation of propositions, that is, the act of judging, but 
also to the act of ‘syllogising’ (syllogizare). Aquinas adopts a slightly different 
terminology by saying that the third intellectual operation consists in ‘going 
from one composition or division to another, which means to reason’ (ex una 
compositione vel divisione ad aliam procedere, quod est ratiocinari).15 Still, syl-
logising and reasoning are synonymous insofar as syllogising is a prominent 
form of reasoning. If, for instance, we move from the premises ‘All roses are 
plants’ and ‘All plants have a vegetative soul’ to the conclusion that ‘All roses 
have vegetative souls’, we have syllogised as well as reasoned because our rea-
soning took the form of a syllogism, more precisely, a syllogism of the so-called 
modus Barbara. We have thus combined a certain number of propositions or 
judgments – the premises – in order to arrive (by way of dividing and com-
bining their concepts) at another judgment – the conclusion. Such reasoning, 
then, is the third element of the triad of intellectual operations.
These intellectual operations amount to more than just a mere play with 
words. They are, as Albertus Magnus points out, the foundation of human 
knowledge because they lead us to ‘the principles of arts and sciences’ (prin-
cipia artium et scientiarum).16 Thus, one could say that humans are rational 
 animals not only because they form and combine concepts and propositions 
but also because they form a whole body of knowledge which they divide into 
different fields or disciplines. This is also one of the reasons why  Aristotle’s 
12 On this model see, for instance, Glock (2010), 15–19.
13 For a brief overview of medieval theories of judging see Tachau (1993) and Perälä (2014). 
The most comprehensive and insightful studies are Nuchelmans (1973) and (1980); Perler 
(1990) and (1992).
14 William of Ockham, Quaestiones in iv Sententiarum (Report.), q. 14, eds. Gál & Green 
(1984), 288.
15 See p. 39 n11.
16 Albertus Magnus, De animalibus, lib. xxi, tr. 1, c. 2, ed. Stadler (1920), 1328.
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 logical writings played such an important role in medieval philosophy and 
 other disciplines. His logic – or the medieval teaching of his logic, more 
 precisely – begins with the study of concepts (in De interpretatione), contin-
ues with the study of judgments (in the Categoriae), and ends with the study 
of syllogisms (in the Analyticae as well as in the Topica and the De sophisticis 
elenchiis). It thus provides the foundation for and guarantees the validity of 
any other discipline because any mistake in the division or combination of 
concepts or propositions will produce erroneous conclusions.
One could, of course, argue that sensory cognition also produces some kind 
of knowledge. If I see that this petal is red, I have also acquired some knowl-
edge about it, at least in a broader sense of the term. Still, even if one accepts 
such a broader notion of knowledge, there remains a difference between the 
 knowledge deriving from the senses and the knowledge created by reason 
and intellect: while the former remains at the level of particulars, the latter is 
 universal. This also applies to statements about particulars. If one forms the 
judgment ‘This rose is a flower’, one does, on the one hand, make a statement 
about a particular rose. On the other hand, however, one employs general 
terms, such as ‘rose’ or ‘flower’. Similarly, when making statements about in-
dividuals, such as Socrates, one employs general terms because one says, for 
instance, that ‘Socrates is a human being’.
This universality is characteristic of intellectual cognition, and it was usu-
ally explained by the peculiar nature of the intellect. Unlike the powers of 
the vegetative and the sensory soul, the intellect has no organ, as Aristotle fa-
mously says in De anima III.4.17 Unlike the eyes or the intestinal tract, intellect 
and reason are not corporeal or material powers. Rather, they are immaterial. 
For many  medieval interpreters of Aristotle, this “immateriality condition” is a 
necessary condition with a view to the three operations of concept formation, 
judging, and reasoning because they all abstract from material conditions.18 
Whereas the sensory impression of a rose is material, at least to some extent, 
the  concept ‘rose’ is not.
Admittedly, this is an overly simplified account of the intellect’s immate-
riality. Many of the medieval theories were much more sophisticated than 
this account suggests and there was much debate over how this immaterial-
ity is to be understood.19 Furthermore, there were also some authors, such as 
17 Aristotle, De anima III.4, 429a19-28.
18 I borrow the expression “immateriality condition” from Black (2009), 331.
19 On some of the Islamic, Jewish, and Christian theories of the intellect see Black (2009).
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John Buridan, who doubted that there is a (necessary) connection between 
the  intellect’s operations and its nature.20 However, this was the view of a mi-
nority. The majority of authors agreed that intellect and reason are immate-
rial. For Christian authors, this view was also attractive because it was highly 
compatible with the doctrine of the immortality of the human soul. For if one 
 supposes that the human soul is immaterial, it is much easier to explain how it 
can persist after the death of the body. Again, the details of this doctrine gave 
rise to many discussions. And, especially before the thirteenth century, there 
were also some authors, such as John Scotus Eriugena and Adelard of Bath, 
who held not only that human and angelic souls are immortal but the souls of 
nonhuman animals, as well.21 Yet, as in the case of the intellect’s immateriality, 
this was not the view of a majority.
The connection between the intellect’s operations and its nature shows 
that it is not the case that the animal/human boundary can only be de-
scribed in terms of capacities. It can also be described in more general terms 
as  being largely identical with other dividing lines. First, it is identical with 
the sensory/intellectual divide because nonhuman animals have sensory 
powers while humans have intellectual faculties in addition. Since the latter 
were usually taken to be immaterial, the animal/human boundary is, second, 
 co-extensive with the divide between material and immaterial powers. Of 
course, even sensory souls are immaterial insofar as they are forms, not matter. 
And yet, sensory faculties are bound to corporeal organs and it is in this sense 
that they are material. If one takes for granted that only immaterial powers 
can provide cognitive access to universals, the animal/human boundary runs, 
third, along the lines of particularity and universality. Furthermore, immate-
rial powers survive the death of the body and so there is a fourth dividing line 
between humans and other animals, namely, the line that divides mortal from 
immortal souls. Humans, of course, stand on both sides of these divides. They 
have both sensory and intellectual, corporeal and incorporeal powers, hence 
access to both particulars and universals. Moreover, some of their powers pass 
20 On Buridan’s position see Klein (2016).
21 See John Scotus Eriugena, Periphyseon, lib. iii, c. 39, ed. Jeauneau (1999), 169–172;  Adelard 
of Bath, Quaestiones naturales q. 14, ed. Burnett (1998), 118. On Eriugena’s view see Nitschke 
(1967), 240–242; Dronke (1985), 817–822; Lauzi (2012), 208–217. The idea that nonhuman 
animals’ souls are immortal can also be found in later authors such as Nicholas of Cusa; 
see Dohm (2013). Furthermore, it is present in medieval Islamic thought; see Kruk (1995), 
31, and Druart (2016), 73.
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away at the moment of death, while some persist.22 This standing on both 
sides is why humans are a species of animals, not angels.23 Nonetheless, they 
are a very peculiar species of animals because they significantly differ from 
other animals in various regards.
22 This idea gave rise to numerous discussions on the cognitive capacities of so-called ‘sepa-
rate souls’ (animae separatae); see, for instance, Roling (2015).
23 On human cognition in comparison to angelic cognition see Roling (2008) and Iribarren 




There are obvious differences between the souls of humans and the souls 
of nonhuman animals, both with regard to their nature and with regard to 
their capacities. The cognition brought about by material sensory powers is 
different from the cognition brought about by immaterial intellectual pow-
ers. The latter can engage in concept formation, judging, and reasoning, while 
the former cannot. An animal that sees a red rose could thus be either human 
or nonhuman. A honey bee flying through the garden and looking for nectar 
has certain sensory impressions of roses just as we have certain sensory im-
pressions of roses when passing by a rose. The bee, however, does not pos-
sess the concept ‘rose’. It is capable of distinguishing roses from stones and 
other things but, according to this theory, it does not conceptualise its per-
ceptions. Moreover, it forms neither propositions nor syllogisms because 
syllogisms consist of propositions and propositions are made of concepts. 
Therefore, a bee is not a rational animal because it does not engage in rational 
cognitive processes due to the lack of rational faculties.
Like every theory, this theory does its job when providing satisfactory ex-
planations for certain phenomena. For instance, if one asks why an animal X 
exhibits a certain behaviour B, the obvious answer would be that X has certain 
(cognitive) faculties F which enable her to engage in certain (cognitive) pro-
cesses P that bring about B. If B were a behaviour that cannot be satisfactorily 
explained without reference to inferential processes, one would ascribe the 
faculties of intellect and reason to X because it is these faculties in virtue of 
which living beings can engage in reasoning. Within the Aristotelian theory of 
the soul, this ascription is entirely sound as long as X is a human animal. But 
what if X is a nonhuman animal? If a nonhuman animal shows a kind of be-
haviour that seems to be based on intellectual processes – and we shall come 
across many examples of such behaviours in the following parts – it puts the 
above-mentioned definition of the animal/human boundary to the test. In 
other words, the animal’s behaviour points to certain grey areas, that is, areas 
in which the boundary between the cognitive capacities of humans and other 
animals seems to be blurred.
Late medieval authors were well aware of the existence of such grey areas. 
For instance, in De animalibus, Albertus Magnus states that there are good rea-
sons to cast doubt on nonhuman animals’ lack of reason. He mentions the 
© Anselm Oelze, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004363779_010 
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 example of bees that get together in order to leave the hive with their king.1 
This they do, he says, ‘by foresight for the community’ (provisione communi-
tatis) and ‘not because of any individual advantage’ (non de utilitate propria). 
This kind of care for the community is hardly possible ‘without some spark 
of reason’ (sine aliqua scintilla rationis), in Albert's view.2 Similarly, there are 
many cases in which animals seem to have knowledge of how they can cure a 
certain disease from which they suffer, he says. They know, for instance, that a 
certain kind of plant is an appropriate remedy for snakebites. In other words, 
they have ‘experiential knowledge’ (experimentum), like a physician who 
prescribes aspirin against headaches. And although he cures individuals, his 
knowledge is universal because he knows that aspirin is likely to cure the head-
ache not only of this particular patient but of other patients, too. Therefore, ‘it 
is not likely that they [i.e., those nonhuman animals that know how to cure 
diseases] do not also somehow participate in reason’ (non videtur probabile, 
si non etiam utcumque ratione participant).3 Therefore, one can rightly have 
‘some doubt’ (aliqua dubitatio) that all nonhuman animals lack reason.
A similar worry is expressed by Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome. In his 
commentary on De sensu et sensato, Aquinas points out that there are some 
people who have doubts that humans are the only animals with intellectual 
faculties. The reason is that higher-developed nonhuman animals, such as 
monkeys or apes (symia) especially, engage in certain actions or do certain 
works (opera) that are ‘somehow similar to the works of reason’ (quedam 
 similia operibus rationis).4 These behaviours make people question the com-
mon definition of the animal/human boundary. Giles of Rome also seems to 
know people who harbour similar qualms because in his commentary on De 
anima he states ‘that there is doubt among some people on whether other ani-
mals, apart from humans, possess an intellect’ (quod dubium est apud quosdam, 
utrum alia animalia ab homine habeant intellectum).5 One of the sources of this 
doubt is the example of pygmies. Pygmies were usually classified as apes, that 
is, as ‘non-humans’ (non-homines). Nonetheless, they were sometimes taken to 
1 Like the majority of ancient and medieval authors, Albert believed that bees have a king, not 
a queen.
2 Albertus Magnus, De animalibus, lib. viii, tr. 6, c. 1, ed. Stadler (1916), 667.
3 Ibid.
4 Thomas Aquinas, Sentencia libri De sensu et sensato, tr. 2, c. 2, ed. Leonina XLV.2 (1985), 110: 
“Dicit autem [Aristoteles]: ‘forte’, propter quosdam qui dubitaverunt de quibusdam aliis ani-
malibus ab homine utrum habeant intellectum, propter opera quedam similia operibus ra-
tionis, sicut sunt opera symiarum et quorundam huiusmodi animalium.”
5 See Köhler (2014), 106.
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possess intellect and reason because of the human-like behaviours they show, 
as Giles explains.6 Although Giles himself does not agree with this view, like 
many other authors of his time, he acknowledges that there are various behav-
iours seen in nonhuman animals which create difficulties for the Aristotelian 
theory of the soul.
Now there are several ways to deal with such difficulties. In order to see 
more clearly what the options are, it might help to schematise the problem as 
follows. The initial point is the presupposition or fundamental anthropological 
premise that nonhuman animals Anh lack intellect and reason, that is, rational 
faculties Fr:
( )0 nh rP All A lack F .
Now we have an animal, X, and X is classified as nonhuman:
( )1 nhP X is A .
Next comes the observation that X shows a certain behaviour B:
( )2P X exhibits B.
B is a behaviour which is taken to be based on a rational process Pr, hence:
( )3 rP B is based on P .
According to Aristotelian faculty psychology, Pr requires rational faculties Fr:
( )4 r rP Engaging in P requires F .
The premises P2, P3, and P4 now lead to the following conclusion:
( ) rC X possesses F .
Given P1, this conclusion obviously clashes with the fundamental anthropo-
logical premise P0 because if all nonhuman animals lack rational faculties and 
if X is a nonhuman animal, it must lack intellect and reason like any other 
6 Ibid. On the medieval disagreement over the status of pygmies see Koch (1931); Köhler (1992); 
Thijssen (1995); Roling (2010), esp. 491–498.
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nonhuman animal. As said, there are, however, various ways to deal with this 
problem.
The first (and maybe most radical) solution to this contradiction would be 
the revision of P0. Instead of saying that ‘all nonhuman animals lack rational 
faculties’ one could simply say that ‘some or most nonhuman animals lack 
rational faculties’. This would allow for the existence of nonhuman animals 
which have rational faculties. One would, of course, need to specify which non-
human animal species are endowed with such faculties but an obvious crite-
rion for this distinction would be whether or not an animal shows behaviour 
B. If X shows B, it is endowed with intellect and reason.
If one is, for whatever reason, unwilling to ascribe intellect and reason to X, 
one can also choose another option, namely, the revision of P1. In this case, one 
would not touch the fundamental anthropological premise. Rather, one would 
change the way of classifying X. If X is a pygmy, for example, one could say 
that pygmies are human, not nonhuman animals. This is less radical a solution 
since P0 remains intact. All that changes is the classification of X based upon 
X’s showing B.
A third possibility is to doubt that X exhibits B. That is, one could argue for 
a revision of P2, or even for a rejection of this premise. The advantage of this 
option is that neither the fundamental anthropological premise nor the classi-
fication of X would need to be revised. But this option might come at the price 
of rejecting certain facts, and so it might be untenable, especially if one ob-
serves X repeatedly exhibiting B. Therefore, it seems more attractive to choose 
between two other options, namely, the revision of P3 or the revision of P4.
Revising P3 means to question the argument from analogy. As mentioned in 
Chapter 1, the argument from analogy claims that from similar effects we can 
infer to similar causes. In the context of psychology, effects are behaviours and 
causes are processes and faculties.7 A revision of P3 would cast doubt on this ar-
gument insofar as it would introduce an alternative explanation for the causes 
of some behaviour B. Take the following example from modern research in 
comparative psychology: A chimpanzee and a human child solve the so-called 
‘floating peanut task’. They thus manage to figure out that filling water into a 
narrow empty tube at the bottom of which lies a peanut will bring the peanut 
within reach as the water level rises.8 Now one might be inclined to say that 
this kind of problem solving requires reasoning (and reasoning is a rational 
process, hence requires rational faculties, a medieval philosopher would add). 
7 The causes are processes and faculties because, according to faculty psychology, processes 
are based on faculties. Therefore, one could say that faculties are primary causes of behaviour.
8 See Hanus et al. (2011).
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But one could also argue that it does not require reasoning. It might simply be 
based on a very fundamental process of association or it might be instinctual. 
This would solve the above-mentioned problem because if X’s behaviour B is 
not based on a rational process Pr then X’s exhibiting B does not lead to the 
conclusion that X is endowed with rational faculties Fr. The advantage of this 
option is that P0, P1, P2, and P4 remain intact. Still, one now has to assume the 
burden of explaining how B is brought about, if not by a rational process.
If one is unwilling (or unable) to assume this burden, one can choose an-
other option. Instead of revising P3 one could also revise P4. According to P4, 
the rational process Pr upon which the behaviour B seems to be based requires 
rational faculties Fr. Yet one might say that Pr does not require Fr. However, by 
unfastening the connection between Pr and Fr one has to face the challenge of 
explaining how other faculties, such as the faculties of the sensory soul, can 
bring about a rational process. Even if one manages to do this, one still has to 
face either of the following consequences. The first would be a degradation 
of the rational process Pr. For instance, reasoning would lose its status as an 
exclusively rational process because it would no longer take place in a rational 
faculty. Another consequence would be the upgrading of those faculties where 
Pr takes place. If this place corresponds to any of the inner senses, for example, 
the sense in question would be upgraded insofar as it would be able to engage 
in a process that was usually taken to require higher, that is, rational faculties.
As will become clear in the following parts, late medieval authors consid-
ered all of these options, but the majority of them favoured the latter two. They 
were relatively reluctant to revise the fundamental anthropological premise P0 
but they were quite open to discussing the connection between behaviour, pro-
cesses, and faculties. This means, first, that they discussed whether a rational 
process such as reasoning is necessary for bringing about a certain behaviour or 
whether an alternative, non-rational process, can bring about this behaviour, 
too. Second, if they took this process to be rational (or close to rational) they 
discussed whether it actually requires rational faculties or whether it could 
also be realised by sensory powers. And if they did not take this process to be 
rational, they tried to give an account of the analogous (cognitive) process that 
is responsible for this behaviour.9 It is in this sense that they developed theories 
of animal rationality because they discussed what it means to be rational or, 
more precisely, what kind of behaviours require rational cognitive processes, 
such as concept formation or reasoning.
9 This strategy can be identified as ‘differentialism’, while the former can be called ‘assimila-
tionism’, see Chapters 31 and 32.
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Rationality, of course, amounts to more than being capable of conceptualis-
ing or reasoning. There are a plethora of capacities without which one seems 
to be incapable of engaging in any of these operations. One of the most obvi-
ous capacities is language, and language is actually one of the most frequently 
mentioned criteria in modern debates about the animal/human boundary. In 
contrast to other animals, humans seem to be the animals that speak.10 Howev-
er, what is distinctive about language other than the formation of propositions? 
Of course, one can communicate non-verbally, and this is what many nonhu-
man animals do by making certain sounds.11 Still, one can hardly speak without 
forming and combining concepts. At least from the medieval point of view, the 
possession of intellect and reason is more fundamental than the possession 
of language. This also applies to other capacities because if they are based on 
more than sensory operations, intellect and reason come into play, as does the 
triad of intellectual operations. Thus, late medieval theories of animal rational-
ity might not end with these operations, but they definitely begin with them.
Another point that should be noted is that all of these theories are, of 
course, embedded within a broader theory of the soul. Therefore, any answer 
given to questions concerning animal rationality somehow depends on the an-
swer that is given to the following questions, some of which have already been 
touched on in previous chapters: Are vegetative, sensory, and rational souls 
different kinds of souls or are they different parts of one and the same soul? If 
the latter, how do they interact? Is there a difference between the sensory souls 
of humans and the sensory souls of nonhuman animals? Is there a difference 
between the sensory souls of different species of nonhuman animals? How 
does the lack or the possession of intellect and reason affect the operations 
of sensory powers? More generally, how does the nature or the metaphysical 
status of the soul affect its operations or capacities?12
Most, if not all, of these questions play a crucial role in theories of animal 
rationality because they establish the basic framework within which the latter 
are elaborated. Rather than discussing them separately we shall approach them 
only from the vantage point of animal rationality for two reasons. The first rea-
son is that some of these questions might not actually have an immediate im-
pact on judgments regarding the cognitive capacities of nonhuman animals. 
10 For a modern defence of this position, called ‘lingualism’, see Barth (2010).
11 On medieval views on animal communication and language see Köhler (2014), 393–489. 
In addition see Eco et al. (1989); Resnick & Kitchell (1996); Rosier-Catach (2006); Roling 
(2013a).




For instance, whether an author is a so-called ‘unitarist’ and thus claims that 
there is only one soul that has different parts or a so-called ‘pluralist’ and hence 
thinks that vegetative, sensory, and rational souls are distinct, makes a differ-
ence when it comes to questions such as ‘Does the intellect grasp particulars, 
and if so how?’ or ‘How does the conceptualisation of perceptual content work 
if the rational soul is distinct from the sensory soul?’ Still, these questions only 
occur with respect to human souls and human cognition, because in this case 
one needs to answer how the human sensory soul relates to the rational soul. 
In the case of nonhuman animals, however, this question does not occur be-
cause they do not have rational souls.
A question that arises is whether this is a plausible theory, that is, whether 
it can coherently account for the differences that exist between living beings. 
One might assume that this problem disappears once one discards the Aristo-
telian theory of the soul. And, indeed, one does not struggle with the question 
of what distinguishes sensory and rational souls if one holds that something 
like a soul does not exist at all. However, at least one fundamental problem 
always remains no matter what theory of the soul one adheres to, and this is 
a second reason for adopting such a perspective. This problem concerns the 
relation between cognition and behaviour. If one supposes that the behav-
iour of animals is (maybe not entirely, but at least partly) based on certain 
cognitive processes, then the question is what these cognitive processes are 
and how they differ between different species. This problem is what unites 
 medieval and modern theories of animal rationality, although they start from 
comparatively different psychological theories and also rely on different meth-
ods.  Medieval thinkers, for instance, put less weight on empirical observation 
of animal behaviour. Instead, they took many of their examples from the lit-
erature they used.13 Nonetheless, they asked what brings about this behaviour 
and, like modern scholars, they gave different answers to this question, as we 
shall see in the following parts.
13 On the role of observation in comparison to literary knowledge see Köhler (2008), 
267–272.
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Introduction to Part 2
As the previous part has shown, medieval thinkers considered the boundary 
between nonhuman and human animals to be identical with the boundary 
between sensory and intellectual powers. As we have seen, this boundary is 
also identical, first, with the dividing lines between materiality and immate-
riality and, second, between particularity and universality. Accordingly, non-
human animals stand on one side of the divide since they possess material 
senses by means of which they can perceive particulars. Humans, by contrast, 
stand on both sides of the divide because they are additionally endowed with 
immaterial intellectual powers which enable them to cognise universals. This, 
of course, has an impact on how different animals perceive or, as one could 
also say, on how they mentally represent the world. To give an example, a sheep 
only perceives this or that particular wolf. Humans, in contrast, also cognise 
the universal ‘wolf ’. In modern terms, we possess the concept ‘wolf ’ by means 
of which we can refer to all particular wolves. The sheep, however, lacks such a 
concept. In medieval terms, one would say that it does not grasp the ‘quiddity’ 
(quiditas) of wolf or ‘wolfness’.
There are countless medieval theories on what universals or concepts actu-
ally are, what kind of metaphysical status they have, and how they are cognised 
or acquired.1 Still, in many, if not all, of these theories the intellect is assigned a 
crucial role when it comes to the question of how universals are cognised or of 
how concepts are formed. The intellect’s prominent role usually derives from 
its immaterial nature because only an immaterial power was usually taken to 
be capable of abstracting universals from particulars. Therefore, those animals 
that lack an intellectual soul also lack the access to the realm of universals. By 
and large, one might find this argument rather unproblematic. For why should 
we ascribe universal cognition and concept formation to nonhuman animals, 
if we can convincingly account for their behaviour without such an ascription?
If one takes, for instance, Avicenna’s famous and influential example of the 
sheep and the wolf (see Chapter 5), it seems that no universals or concepts are 
needed in order to explain the sheep’s reaction of flight. Rather, according to 
Avicenna, two things are needed: first, a particular internal sense faculty, called 
‘estimation’ or ‘estimative power’ (aestimatio or vis aestimativa), and second, 
a particular kind of object, called ‘intention’ (intentio). The perception of an 
intention by virtue of estimation causes a certain bodily reaction and this is 
exactly what happens in the case of the sheep seeing a wolf. By means of its 
1 For an overview see, for instance, Adams (1982) and Holopainen (2014).
© Anselm Oelze, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004363779_011 
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external senses the sheep perceives the wolf ’s sensible ‘forms’ (formae), such 
as its colour, its shape, its smell, or its sound, but what makes it run away is the 
estimative perception of the wolf ’s intention of hostility.2
Admittedly, intentions are not clearly material objects, and their percep-
tion involves abstraction. The estimative power ‘abstracts them from matter’ 
(abstrahit eas a materia), as Avicenna says, and he also points out that, unlike 
sensible forms, intentions ‘are in themselves non-material things’ (sunt in se res 
non materiales).3 Nevertheless, they are ‘materialised’ (materiatae), ‘bound to 
the sensible form’ (ligata cum forma sensibili) or ‘mixed with sensibles’ (com-
mixtae cum sensibilibus).4 They are ‘insensible’ (insensibile) only insofar as they 
cannot be perceived by the external senses. Still, estimation is an inner sense, 
that is, a material power with a specific location in the brain.5 Therefore, the 
abstraction of intentions by virtue of estimation is not the same as the abstrac-
tion of universals by virtue of an immaterial intellect. The perception of the 
intention of hostility is different from acquiring the concept of hostility: while 
the former “is apprehended as tied to a particular perceptible form,” as Richard 
Sorabji puts it, the latter is independent of the perception of a wolf, for exam-
ple.6 So, in sum, no universals or concepts seem to be involved in the cognitive 
process that triggers the sheep’s reaction of flight.
Yet, one might object, this is only one possible way of telling the story of the 
sheep’s cognition. And even if it is the correct way of telling it, there might still 
be other cases of animal behaviour in which universal cognition plays a role. 
Indeed, many modern interpreters of Avicenna, as well as medieval thinkers 
in the Latin West, wondered whether the cognition of sheep and other nonhu-
man animals really stays within the realm of particulars or whether one must 
ascribe the capacities of universal cognition and concept formation to them, 
too. The questions they raise and the arguments they make concern various 
aspects of the problem but can be reduced to at least four questions.
A first question is the question of conceptualisation. This question is based 
on the fact that – in modern discussions – conceptualisation is often defined 
as ‘seeing some X as F’.7 Now this can be said about the sheep and the wolf. 
2 See Avicenna Latinus, Liber de anima seu Sextus de naturalibus, lib. i, c. 5, ed. van Riet (1972), 
86–89, and lib. iv, c. 3, ed. van Riet (1968), 34–40.
3 Ibid., lib. ii, c. 2, ed. van Riet (1972), 118f.
4 See ibid., 119, and lib. iv, c. 3, ed. van Riet (1968), 38. This aspect is also stressed by Perler 
(2012b), 35, and López-Farjeat (2016), 65.
5 See Avicenna Latinus, Liber de anima, lib. i, c. 5, ed. van Riet (1972), 89.
6 Sorabji (1993b), 64. On abstraction in Avicenna in general, see Hasse (2001) and D’Ancona 
(2008).
7 See, for instance, Allen & Hauser (1991), 227, and also Glock (2010), 27f.
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Because instead of saying that the sheep perceives the wolf ’s intention of 
 hostility we could also say that it perceives the wolf as dangerous or as an ani-
mal that is to be fled. Accordingly, it does not simply see a grey furry thing, but 
a wolf or a dangerous animal. Thus, the sheep conceptualises the content of its 
perception just like we do when we see wolves or sheep or trees or houses. Of 
course, it will be hard, if not impossible, to determine exactly how or as what 
the sheep conceptualises perceptual content. In other words, it is not clear 
how it mentally represents what it perceives. It might see a wolf or a danger-
ous animal or something else.8 But what matters for the moment is mainly 
whether it conceptualises at all.
What is closely linked to the question of conceptualisation is, second, the 
question of categorisation. So if one wonders how a sheep sees the world, one 
might ask whether it is capable of categorising or classifying the particular 
things it perceives. There is no doubt that humans do this, because we con-
stantly categorise and classify things: we classify ferries and cars as means of 
transportation or apples and bananas as fruits. But what about a sheep? Does 
it put wolves in the category of harmful things and fellow sheep in the class of 
harmless things? If it does, there is reason to believe that it employs universals 
or concepts to some extent because it perceives some individual X as falling 
under the general category F or under the concept F. As in the case of concep-
tualisation we do not, of course, know exactly how the sheep groups individual 
things together.9 But, as in the previous case, what matters most is whether it 
categorises things at all.
A third question that arises is the question of generalisation. Evidently, the 
sheep not only flees one wolf in particular, but wolves in general. Therefore, 
one might argue that it generalises because from the hostile nature or appear-
ance of one wolf it infers the hostility of all wolves. It thus engages in what 
Jonathan Bennett (following Mowrer) calls a “one-many generalization.”10 This 
question is even more evident with respect to another famous example, which 
is also mentioned by Avicenna, namely, the behaviour of a dog when it sees a 
stick or a stone.11 This example differs from the example of the sheep insofar 
as, unlike wolves for sheep, sticks and stones are not natural enemies of dogs. 
Nevertheless, dogs begin to perceive them as such once they have been beaten 
8 On this problem of indeterminacy of representations see Glock (1999), 179.
9 Again, see Glock (1999), 182.
10 See Bennett (1989), 104.
11 See Avicenna, Liber de anima, lib. iv, c. 3, ed. van Riet (1968), 39. This example is also used 
by later authors, such as Leibniz; see Perler (2009), 86.
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with them. Since they flee not only the particular stick or stone they have been 
beaten with, but sticks and stones in general, they seem to generalise.12
With respect to all of the examples mentioned here, one can also raise, 
fourth, the question of object identification. How does the sheep, for instance, 
know that what it sees is a wolf or a harmful thing? Maybe, it possesses some 
sort of repository of common forms or images and, when it perceives a par-
ticular thing, identifies it as wolf, for example, by matching the form of this 
 particular thing with the common form of wolf it has stored in its ‘mind’. If 
this is how the process works, the sheep possesses not only mental represen-
tations of this or that particular wolf but also a more general mental repre-
sentation of ‘wolf ’. The ascription of such general representations becomes 
even more plausible if one tries to explain how animals manage to find food or 
drink.13 For instance, a horse which is hungry and looking for grass is going to 
eat any grass it finds. It does not only eat one particular portion of grass. Thus, 
it seems to look for grass in general and its search is likely to be based on a 
general, rather than on a singular, representation of grass.
As we have seen, there is a whole range of questions concerning universal 
cognition and concept formation in nonhuman animals. Before turning to the 
individual answers that were given to these questions by various  thirteenth- 
and fourteenth-century authors, a couple of things should be noted. First, 
some of the questions that have been sketched above are tightly intertwined. 
For  instance, the question of object identification is, in some sense, a reversal 
of the questions of conceptualisation and categorisation because in all cases 
there are two things involved in the cognitive process: one general, or univer-
sal, and one particular mental representation. The only thing that is  different 
is the order of cognition, so to speak. Still, it would be wrong to reduce all of 
them to a single question because, as will become clear in what follows, they 
all cover slightly different aspects of the problem. However – and that is the 
second point worth noting – one needs to be careful with regard to how those 
questions are posed in the medieval texts. The way in which the  questions 
have been phrased above is inspired by the way in which they occur in modern 
12 In the modern discussion, generalisation seems to be taken to be less demanding than 
conceptualisation and categorisation, because even someone like Davidson, who denies 
concepts and propositional attitudes (e.g. beliefs and desires) to nonhuman animals, 
grants them the capacity of generalisation; see Davidson (1982), 326.
13 One can, of course, argue that one should avoid talking about (mental) representations 
at all, as does Glock (1999), 179. But even if one finds this argument generally convinc-
ing, it cannot be applied to medieval positions, because (most) medieval authors do take 
representations to exist, in one way or the other. On mental representations in medieval 
philosophy see, for instance, Panaccio (2010) and Klima (2015).
Introduction to Part 256
<UN>
discussions of animal cognition as well as in the secondary literature on the 
medieval debate. Medieval authors, however, did not literally speak of concep-
tualisation, categorisation, generalisation, or object identification. Neverthe-
less, they did discuss the differences between the perception of the world of 
humans and nonhuman animals, and most of what they say can be seen as a 
reply to one or more of the above-mentioned questions.
In the following, we will look at the replies of Thomas Aquinas, Albertus 
Magnus, Pseudo-Peter of Spain, Roger Bacon, John Buridan, and Peter of John 
Olivi. The order is thus not chronological, but rather follows systematic cri-
teria. While Aquinas and Albert are relatively hesitant to ascribe any kind of 
cognition to nonhuman animals that goes beyond the level of particulars, the 
other thinkers are more open in this respect. That is, they do at least consider 
some possibilities in which nonhuman animals might gain access to the level 
of universals. This is not to say, however, that Aquinas stands at one end of the 
spectrum, whereas Olivi stands at the other end. The differences are subtler. 
Furthermore, all of these thinkers have at least one thing in common: they all 
examine the way in which nonhuman animals perceive the world and they 
do this in order to find out whether the boundary between sensory and intel-
lectual or material and immaterial powers is really the same as the boundary 
between particularity and universality.
<UN>
chapter 8
Estimation, Conceptualisation, and Categorisation 
(Thomas Aquinas)
One of the most prominent medieval texts concerning the question of how 
nonhuman animals perceive the world and whether they conceptualise and 
categorise what they perceive is undoubtedly a very short passage from  Thomas 
Aquinas’ Sentencia libri De anima. Although quite short, it has garnered an 
enormous amount of attention in the secondary literature. This makes it 
sometimes hard to disentangle Aquinas’ own position from what is ascribed 
to him by modern interpreters. Of course, every claim about Aquinas’ (or any 
thinker’s) position is an interpretation in itself. So it might be impossible to 
determine what his ‘own’ view was. Nevertheless, it is worth trying to separate 
what he says from the various suggestions that have been made regarding how 
his words are to be understood. In order to better comprehend why Aquinas 
comes to talk about the cognitive capacities of nonhuman animals in his com-
mentary on Aristotle’s De anima, it will be helpful to briefly look at the context 
of his statements.
In the thirteenth lecture of the second book, Aquinas comments on the dif-
ference between so-called sensibles per se and sensibles per accidens. To illus-
trate the difference, he gives the following example. If one sees a white thing, 
the whiteness of this thing is a sensible per se. This is because white is a colour 
and colours are the proper sense objects of sight. Now it might accidentally 
be the case that the white thing one sees is also a sweet thing, say, a white 
chocolate bar. The sweetness is not a sensible per se for my sense of sight be-
cause sight only perceives colours. Nonetheless, one can perceive the sweet-
ness by sight, namely, per accidens.1 Thus, one can perceive things per accidens 
with one sense (e.g. sight) which have been perceived per se by another sense 
(e.g. taste). Obviously, it always takes at least two different cognitive powers to 
sense per accidens. Each of these powers perceives certain things per se, but 
each of them can also sense per accidens what the other has sensed per se. This 
kind of cognition is usually called ‘accidental’ or ‘incidental cognition’.
Now the combination (or cooperation) of two external senses is only one 
possible way of bringing about accidental cognition. There are also other 
1 See Thomas Aquinas, In Aristotelis librum De anima commentarium, lib. ii, lec. 13, n. 395, ed. 
Pirotta (1959), 101.
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 cognitive powers which allow us to perceive things per accidens. One of those 
powers is the intellect. If one sees something that is talking, Aquinas says, one 
also perceives – per accidens – that this thing is living because being alive is a 
necessary prerequisite for being able to talk and our intellect informs us about 
this connection.2 Besides our intellect or another external sense, there is also a 
third cognitive power able to produce accidental cognition: the so-called ‘cogi-
tative power’ (vis cogitativa). In human beings, this faculty is one of the four 
internal senses besides common sense, imagination, and memory. The cogi-
tative power plays a crucial role in the conceptualisation of perceptual con-
tent as well as in categorisation because it enables us to perceive individuals 
as members of kinds or ‘as existing under a common nature’ (ut existens sub 
natura communi), as Aquinas puts it.3 It makes us see this man or this animal 
and thus, in a way, brings together particulars and universals. To be clear, the 
cogitative power is a bodily power and thus still belongs to the realm of mate-
riality and particularity. Nonetheless, it is ‘united to the intellectual part of the 
soul’ (unitur intellectivae) and thus somehow bridges the gap between the sen-
sory and the intellectual by permitting us to observe that the particular things 
we see fall under certain universals.4 So by virtue of the cogitative power we 
see the world the way we do, namely, as a collection of objects. Of course, one 
could describe what one sees as mere collection of coloured patches. But this 
is not the way in which we usually describe our perceptions. Rather, we say 
that we see objects, such as tables, trees, or books.5 But what about the way in 
which nonhuman animals perceive the world? Do they also see tables, trees, 
or books?
According to Aquinas, nonhuman animals clearly lack the cogitative power. 
What they possess, however, is the estimative power (vis aestimativa). It is this 
power from which many accidental perceptions arise.6 For instance, if a sheep 
2 Ibid., n. 396.
3 Ibid., n. 398: “Nam cogitativa apprehendit individuum, ut existens sub natura communi; 
quod contingit ei, inquantum unitur intellectivae in eodem subiecto; unde cognoscit hunc 
hominem prout est hic homo, et hoc lignum prout est hoc lignum.”
4 The most extensive study on the cogitative power in Aquinas is still Klubertanz (1952). More 
recent studies include Barker (2007); Di Martino (2008), esp. 85–101; Tellkamp (2012b); De 
Haan (2014). Concise introductions to the history of cogitation can be found in Summers 
(1987), 198–234, and Rubini (2015), 464–475.
5 For Lisska (2006), 12, this is what makes Aquinas’ theory of perception stand out against the 
“bundle view paradigm” of the British empiricists because, in his view, Aquinas’ theory better 
accounts for our experience of sensation which “is of things rather than of sense data.”
6 This is why the theory of intentions can be interpreted as an Arabic ‘response’ to Aristotle’s 
theory of sensibles per accidens, see Di Martino (2008), 14.
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perceives the colours or sounds of a lamb, it might also perceive that what it 
hears or sees is its offspring. Thus, it sees a white thing per se, but per accidens 
it sees its offspring. Or it sees a grey, furry thing per se and a thing that is to be 
fled per accidens. In every case, this accidental perception is caused by the esti-
mative power which apprehends individual intentions, according to Aquinas.7 
The question now is what this accidental perception by virtue of estimation 
amounts to. Does it make the sheep see lambs and wolves instead of white and 
grey patches? Moreover, does it make the sheep see individuals as members 
of kinds? In other words, is it capable of conceptualising and categorising per-
ceptual contents?
In the secondary literature on Aquinas, there is a whole range of differing 
opinions regarding these questions. A first group of interpreters claims that 
Aquinas does indeed consider nonhuman animals to be capable of conceptu-
alisation and categorisation. For instance, Judith Barad thinks that “in attrib-
uting apprehension to animals, Aquinas is, in effect, indicating that they can, 
to some extent, conceptualize.”8 Mark Barker claims that “[b]y the estimative, 
an animal categorizes the object as harmful.”9 And Paul Hoffman states that 
“while he [i.e., Aquinas] thinks animals do not conceive of universals as such, 
that is, apart from particulars, they do conceive of particulars as falling under 
universals.”10
Other interpreters do not go that far but still hold that by way of grasping 
intentions “a sheep not only sees a grey patch of colour, but sees a threatening 
wolf,” as A. Mark Smith puts it.11 Cyrille Michon (adopting Michael Dummett’s 
notion of ‘proto-thoughts’) suggests that nonhuman animals’ estimative per-
ceptions amount to “proto-concepts.”12 So, in Michon’s view even if the sheep 
7 See Thomas Aquinas, In Aristotelis librum De anima commentarium, lib. ii, lec. 13, n. 397, 
ed. Pirotta (1959), 101: “In animali vero irrationali fit apprehensio intentionis individu-
alis per aestimativam naturalem, secundum quod ovis per auditum vel visum cognoscit 
filium, vel aliquid huiusmodi.”
8 Barad (1995), 117.
9 Barker (2012a), 204f. This paper is a revised part from Barker (2007) where he defends the 
general thesis that Aquinas’ denial of recognition of kinds to nonhuman animals can be 
modified to allow for such a knowledge of kinds.
10 Hoffman (2012), 164f.
11 Smith (2010), 336f. Smith is actually speaking about Avicenna’s theory of intentions but 
since Aquinas adopts Avicenna’s theory, Smith’s statement might also apply to Aquinas’ 
account. A similar interpretation can be found in Tellkamp (1999), 172; (2006), 1355; and 
(2012b), 611.




does not possess concepts, such as ‘wolf ’ or ‘grass’, it does at least see ‘enemy’ 
or ‘food’ when it sees a wolf or grass. For him, this is less then using full-fledged 
concepts, but still more than simply perceiving coloured patterns. Thus, non-
human animals are endowed with “a complex kind of knowledge,” and this 
knowledge somehow permeates their perception of the world, according to 
Jörg A. Tellkamp’s reading of Aquinas.13
A third group of scholars is even more cautious. As Robert Pasnau remarks, 
“we cannot say – at least not strictly speaking – that the sheep senses that the 
object approaching is a wolf.” The reason is that sensing wolves (instead of 
grey, furry somethings) requires the concept of ‘wolf ’. Hence, “to apprehend 
a wolf as a wolf requires the intellect” because only the intellect is capable 
of working with concepts.14 Similarly, Eleonore Stump holds that “recognizing 
what one is perceiving depends on an act of the intellect,” more precisely, on 
“the first operation of the intellect, namely, determining the quiddity or what-
ness of a thing.”15 Robert Pasnau hesitates to conclude that nonhuman animals 
do not see objects (which, in his view, is more demanding than seeing grey, 
furry things). But even if they do see objects, they “do not see them as mem-
bers of kinds.”16 So, according to Pasnau’s interpretation of Aquinas, “the sheep 
doesn’t put the wolf into the category of dangerous things but is simply able to 
perceive danger at the same time as perceiving the wolf […].”17 In sum, there is 
a wide range of interpretations regarding the nature of estimative perception 
in Aquinas. While some interpreters consider it to come close to or to be some 
kind of conceptualisation and categorisation, others are more cautious, and 
some even reject such conclusions altogether.
What militates against the interpretation of the first group is that Aquinas 
himself is quite keen to stress the difference between the estimative power 
of nonhuman animals and the cogitative power of humans. Contrary to what 
13 See Tellkamp (2006), 1351.
14 Pasnau (2002), 270.
15 Stump (1999), 379 and 391f. See also Stump (2003), 246f. Stump’s argument is actually 
more sophisticated. In her opinion, there is a difference between sensory cognition (e.g. 
seeing something) and perception (i.e., seeing something as something). While humans 
have both, nonhuman animals lack the latter. This terminology is, in a sense, mislead-
ing, however, because ‘perception’ is usually employed for the kind of (sensory) cognition 
nonhuman animals have.
16 Pasnau (2002), 271. See also Perler (2004), 60, who says that the sheep perceives the wolf 
(“Das Schaf nimmt den Wolf zwar wahr”) but does not grasp it as wolf (“es erfasst ihn 
nicht als Wolf”) and is incapable of making general statements about the wolf (“ist nicht 
in der Lage, allgemeine Aussagen über den Wolf zu machen”).
17 Pasnau (1997), 53f.
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the reading of the first group seems to suggest, estimation is not the nonhu-
man equivalent of human cogitation. It is equal to it, of course, insofar as it 
enables nonhuman animals to perceive individual intentions just as the cogi-
tative power makes humans perceive individual intentions. And in both cases, 
the perception of such intentions results in accidental cognition. Yet, what is 
different is that, according to Aquinas, estimation, in contrast to the cogitative 
power, is incapable of apprehending individuals ‘as existing under a common 
nature’ (ut existens sub natura communi). Therefore, the sheep ‘cognises this 
lamb not insofar as it is this lamb’ (ovis cognoscit hunc agnum, non inquantum 
est hic agnus) or this wolf not insofar as it is this wolf. Rather, it cognises a 
lamb ‘insofar as it is to be nursed by it’ (inquantum est ab ea lactabilis), an herb 
‘insofar as it is its food’ (inquantum est eius cibus) and a wolf insofar as it is its 
enemy.18
One could argue that seeing food instead of herbs, enemies instead of 
wolves, and things that need to be nursed instead of lambs still involves con-
ceptualising perceptual content in a way, even if the concepts which are used 
here are ‘proto-concepts’. For although the (proto-)concept ‘enemy’ is broader 
or has a wider extension than the concept ‘wolf ’, seeing an enemy is, never-
theless, a conceptualisation of perceptual content, and hence more than just 
 seeing a grey, furry thing. Furthermore, one might say that it is by means of 
such (proto-)concepts that animals categorise the things they perceive, as they 
distinguish, for instance, between edible things, harmful things, and needy 
things.
Yet, what is problematic about this reading of Aquinas is, first, that it de-
pends on attributing representations to nonhuman animals which are still 
more general than Aquinas himself seems to allow. He undoubtedly takes such 
animals to distinguish between different things and, if all goes well, not to mis-
take wolves for lambs. But he clearly says that they are incapable of grasping 
 individuals ‘as existing under a common nature’, as has been stressed above. 
 Accordingly, any representation that is superordinate to the representation of 
an individual thing seems to be denied to nonhuman animals. It does not  matter 
that they have accidental cognition because if what is perceived accidentally 
is ‘something universal’ (aliquid universale), it is the intellect from which this 
18 See Thomas Aquinas, In Aristotelis librum De anima commentarium, lib. ii, lec. 13, n. 398, 
ed. Pirotta (1959), 101: “Differenter tamen circa hoc se habet cogitativa, et aestimativa. […] 
Aestimativa autem non apprehendit aliquod individuum, secundum quod est sub natura 
communi, sed solum secundum quod est terminus aut principium alicuius actionis vel 
passionis; sicut ovis cognoscit hunc agnum, non inquantum est hic agnus, sed inquantum 
est ab ea lactabilis; et hanc herbam, inquantum est eius cibus.”
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cognition arises.19 Therefore, it makes sense to save the term ‘proto-concepts’ 
for the intentions that are perceived by the human power of cogitation.20 Sec-
ond, in a passage of the Summa theologiae, Aquinas states that the sheep flees 
the wolf ‘as if it were an enemy by nature’ (quasi inimicum naturae).21 This can 
be read as pointing to the fact that the sheep does not conceptualise the grey 
furry thing it sees – neither as ‘wolf ’ nor, more generally, as ‘enemy’.
Aquinas’ most explicit statement regarding how (or as what) nonhuman 
animals apprehend individual things is found, once more, in his commentary 
on De anima. In this text, he says that by virtue of estimation an individual 
thing is apprehended ‘only insofar as it is the end or starting point of some 
action or passion’ (solum secundum quod est terminus aut principium alicuius 
actionis vel passionis).22 So the sheep perceives the wolf only insofar as it is 
the starting point of the emotion of fear and of the action of fleeing. Thus, the 
sheep’s reaction to the wolf could be described by a simple stimulus-response 
model. According to this model, a certain reaction (e.g. flight) is triggered once 
a certain stimulus occurs (e.g. a wolf). Again, what is important to note is that 
in Aquinas’ (and Avicenna’s) theory such a stimulus is not a colour, shape, 
sound, or any other sensible form. It is not that the wolf, for example, looks 
or smells threatening or ugly to the sheep. Rather, the decisive stimulus is the 
intention of hostility that is perceived by the estimative power.23 Surely, one 
could object that it is superfluous to posit such cognitive vehicles as inten-
tions in addition to sensible forms. For why should the perception of forms be 
insufficient to trigger a reaction?24 Yet, even if one rejects the theory of inten-
tions, the  stimulus-response model as such remains the same because a reac-
tion is triggered, regardless of whether the stimulus is a sensible form or an 
insensible intention. Moreover, in both cases the stimulus is a particular, not a 
19 See Thomas Aquinas, In Aristotelis librum De anima commentarium, lib. ii, lec. 13, n. 396, 
ed. Pirotta (1959), 101.
20 This is the way in which, for instance, Davids (2017), 167f., employs this term.
21 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae i, q. 78, a. 4, co., ed. Leonina v (1889), 256: “Sed ne-
cessarium est animali ut quaerat aliqua vel fugiat, non solum quia sunt convenientia vel 
non convenientia ad sentiendum, sed etiam propter aliquas alias commoditates et utili-
tates, sive nocumenta: sicut ovis videns lupum venientem fugit, non propter indecentiam 
coloris vel figurae, sed quasi inimicum naturae; et similiter avis colligit paleam, non quia 
delectet sensum, sed quia est utilis ad nidificandum. Necessarium est ergo animali quod 
percipiat huiusmodi intentiones, quas non percipit sensus exterior.”
22 See n18 above.
23 See n21 above. This point is also stressed by Kenny (1993), 37, and Black (2000), 67.
24 This objection was raised, for instance, by John Duns Scotus, see Perler (2012b), 38f.
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 universal, and in both cases the reaction is a natural (or instinctual) reaction.25 
The sheep perceives the intention of hostility of this particular wolf and this 
intention triggers the reaction of flight.
Still, two questions can be raised here. The first concerns the instinctual na-
ture of the sheep’s reaction. Speaking of an instinctual reaction somehow im-
plies that the reaction is innate or naturally inscribed in the sheep’s behaviour. 
One might therefore get the impression that nonhuman animals come with a 
set of fixed reactions to all kinds of stimuli: sheep flee wolves but seek out oth-
er sheep and so forth.26 But what about the example of the dog that somehow 
learns to fear sticks?27 Obviously, dogs do not naturally dislike sticks. Rather, 
they begin to fear them once they have been beaten with one. In this case, the 
stimulus stays the same but the animal’s reaction changes. Moreover, this kind 
of change seems to involve what is usually called generalisation, that is, the 
capacity to make inferences of the form ‘If this stick is painful, all sticks are 
painful’.28 This gives rise to the second question, namely, whether nonhuman 
animals are capable of generalising, as the example of the dog seems to imply.
To begin with the first question, neither Aquinas nor Avicenna have prob-
lems explaining how dogs come to fear something they have not feared before. 
While the sheep’s reaction of flight when seeing a wolf arises out of ‘natural 
caution’ (cautela naturalis), the reaction of flight exhibited by a dog that has 
been beaten in the past when seeing a stick or a stone comes ‘from experi-
ence’ (per experientiam), as Avicenna puts it.29 That is to say, while the sheep’s 
estimative power always perceives the hostility of the wolf, even if it has never 
seen a wolf before, the dog’s estimation learns to associate the intention of 
25 This is why Aquinas also calls the estimative power ‘natural estimation’ (aestimative natu-
ralis). See In Aristotelis librum De anima commentarium, lib. ii, lec. 13, n. 397, ed. Pirotta 
(1959), 101.
26 Intentions are, of course, “relational properties,” as Perler (2012b), 38, puts it. This explains 
why sheep flee wolves, whereas other wolves do not.
27 See Avicenna Latinus, Liber de anima, lib. iv, c. 3, ed. van Riet (1968), 39.
28 As mentioned before, Bennett (1989), 104, calls this a “one-many generalization.”
29 See Avicenna Latinus, Liber de anima, lib. iv, c. 3, ed. van Riet (1968), 38f.: “Praeter hoc 
etiam animalia habent cautelas naturales. […] Et per istas cautelas apprehendit aesti-
matio intentiones quae sunt commixtae cum sensibilibus de eo quod obest vel prodest; 
unde omnis ovis pavet lupum, etsi numquam viderit illum nec aliquid mali pertulerit ab 
illo […]. Alius autem modus est sicut hoc quod fit per experientiam […]; unde canes ter-
rentur lapidibus et fustibus et similia.” On this passage see also Piro (2005), 134f.; Tellkamp 
(2012b), 630; Kaukua (2014), 106f.; Juanola (2015), 350–353.
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painfulness with sticks.30 Its fear of sticks is nothing other than what is called 
a case of classical conditioning in modern psychology (the most famous ex-
ample of which is Pavlov’s dog).31 In such a case, an animal is repeatedly con-
fronted with a pair of stimuli. One of these stimuli is rather neutral at first, 
whereas the second stimulus is potent in that it arouses desire or aversion in 
the animal. So when Aquinas’ and Avicenna’s dog is repeatedly beaten with a 
stick it learns that the originally neutral stimulus ‘stick’ is now always accom-
panied by the stimulus ‘pain’. Since pain is something the dog aims to avoid, 
it will begin to run away every time it perceives a stick.
Both Avicenna and Aquinas agree that the dog would not be able to estab-
lish a connection between sticks and pain if it lacked the faculty of memory 
(memoria).32 The dog needs to realise that the stick it sees now caused it pain 
the last time it saw it. However, Aquinas is rather hesitant to claim that this 
memory-based association of stimuli amounts to what Avicenna (or his  Latin 
translator, more precisely) calls ‘experience’ (experimentum). For Aquinas, 
 experience is ‘the gathering of many singulars’ (collatio plurium singularium).33 
In this sense, it cannot be found in nonhuman animals because the mecha-
nism of collation requires the cogitative power or ‘particular reason’ (ra-
tio  particularis). As was mentioned, nonhuman animals lack this power.34 
 Nevertheless, they do ‘participate in some experience but only to a very small 
degree’ (aliquid experimenti, licet parum, participare), namely, insofar as they 
‘get  accustomed’ (consuescunt) to certain things. The dog thus gets used to the 
30 One could also say that the sheep’s reaction is based on ‘inclinations that are innate, not 
learned’ (“tendencias innatas, no aprendidas”) as Juanola (2015), 350, puts it.
31 For an introduction see, for instance, Shettleworth (2010), 105–109.
32 See Avicenna Latinus, Liber de anima, lib. iv, c. 3, ed. van Riet (1968), 39, and Thomas 
Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae De veritate, q. 24, a. 3, ad 7, ed. Leonina XXII.3.1 (1973), 
687.
33 Thomas Aquinas, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, lib. 1, lec. 1, n. 15, 
eds. Cathala & Spiazzi (1964), 8: “Supra memoriam autem in hominibus, ut infra dice-
tur, proximum est experimentum, quod quaedam animalia non participant nisi parum. 
 Experimentum enim est ex collatione plurium singularium in memoria receptorum. 
Huiusmodi autem collatio est homini propria, et pertinet ad vim cogitativam, quae ratio 
particularis dicitur […]. Et, quia ex multis sensibus et memoria animalia ad aliquid con-
suescunt prosequendum vel vitandum, inde est quod aliquid experimenti, licet parum, 
participare videntur.” On the various meanings of ‘experimentum’ in Aquinas see Barker 
(2012b).
34 Roling (2011), 237, slightly misreads Aquinas when he claims that Aquinas ascribes a ratio 
particularis to nonhuman animals.
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fact that sticks cause pain and so runs away every time it perceives a stick.35 
Now since it does this every time why is this not experience proper? Appar-
ently, the dog has learned that this particular stick and that particular stick 
cause pain. From these painful encounters with individual sticks it seems to 
have acquired the experience that sticks in general are painful. This is exactly 
what the second question is about: Is the dog capable of generalising?
As far as Avicenna’s answer is concerned, there are at least two possible 
ways of interpreting his position.36 They mainly differ with regard to the way 
in which an intention such as the harmfulness or painfulness of the stick is 
perceived by an animal. One way would be that the dog receives what might 
be called a ‘stick-intention’ every time it sees a stick. The cognition of inten-
tions is thus understood as passive reception. Originally, this stick-intention is 
something like harmlessness: the dog is not afraid of sticks. Yet, after several 
painful encounters with sticks, the stick-intention changes from harmlessness 
to harmfulness. In this case, there is no generalisation involved because every 
time a dog sees a stick it perceives the particular intention of this particular 
stick, regardless of how the intention appears. Still, the cognitive process might 
also work in another way, namely, through the active ascription of intentions.37 
In this case, the dog does not perceive any intention from sticks at first, but 
only begins to ascribe the intention of harmfulness to sticks after having been 
beaten with one. This process involves generalisation since the dog, after the 
first painful encounter with a stick, ascribes harmfulness not only to the par-
ticular stick it has been beaten with, but to sticks in general.
Both readings have their strengths and weaknesses. The first reading which 
suggests that the cognition of intentions is a passive reception gains much plau-
sibility from the fact that intentions are ‘bound to the form of the sensible’ (liga-
ta cum forma sensibili) or ‘mixed with sensibles’ (commixtae cum sensibilibus), 
according to Avicenna.38 Sensible forms thus piggyback on intentions. What is 
problematic about this reading is that it cannot explain a behavioural change 
without some more or less miraculous change in the intention. As long as the 
dog does not run away when it perceives a stick-form, the correspondent inten-
tion that it perceives seems to be harmlessness. This  intention then  changes 
35 Albertus Magnus, Quaestiones super De animalibus, lib. viii, q. 3, ed. Filthaut (1955), 189, 
also accounts for such behaviour by referring to ‘the way of experience’ (via experientiae). 
On ‘experimental cognition’ (cognitio experimentalis) in nonhuman animals see also his 
De animalibus, lib. xxi, tr. 1, c. 2, ed. Stadler (1920), 1327. For an overview of thirteenth-
century accounts of experience in animals see Köhler (2014), 189–203.
36 I am grateful to Juhana Toivanen for helpful suggestions concerning these readings.
37 The active nature of the inner senses is stressed by Kaukua (2014), esp. 106–111.
38 See p. 53 n4.
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to harmfulness when the dog has been beaten with a stick while the stick-
form stays the same. How exactly this change in the intention comes about, 
though, remains rather obscure. Here the second reading seems to provide a 
more  convincing explanation: the change in behaviour is based on a change 
in estimation. The estimative power ascribes a different intention to the stick-
form because of a different experience with this form.39 The problem with this 
reading is that the estimative power is usually said to abstract intentions rather 
than to ascribe them.40 It abstracts them from the sensible forms with which 
they travel to the organs of the perceiver. Consequently, it seems incoherent to 
claim that the estimative power ascribes intentions to sensible forms.
In order to finally come to a coherent understanding of the process it is 
helpful to recall that Avicenna introduces the example of the dog and the stick 
as an instance of a particular ‘mode’ (modus) of estimative cognition, namely, 
cognition ‘by experience’ (per experientiam).41 This mode should not be con-
flated with other modes of estimative cognition, such as the mode by which 
a sheep perceives a wolf as hostile. Of course, there is at least one thing these 
modes have in common: they are cases of incidental perception. The sheep 
perceives the wolf as hostile and the dog perceives the stick as harmful. What 
is different, though, is the genesis of this perception. The sheep does not need 
to learn that wolves are hostile (and, one might add, its chances of learning 
this are rather low anyway because its first encounter with a wolf is usually 
its last). The dog, by contrast, learns to associate the stimulus ‘stick’ and the 
stimulus ‘pain’. What is crucial here is that both stimuli are sensible forms, not 
intentions. This is clear from both passages in the De anima in which Avicenna 
refers to the example of the dog. At the beginning of book iv, Chapter 1, he 
says that ‘there is a power in animals in which the forms of sensible things are 
joined together’. One proof for the existence of such a power is the behaviour 
of dogs that are afraid of sticks. This they would not do, Avicenna argues, if ‘the 
form of the stick would not be remembered in conjunction with the form of 
pain’.42 Apparently, the perception of an intention plays no role here, at least 
not at this stage of the cognitive process.
39 This then is an instance of what Kaukua (2014), 106, calls “the subject-specificity of esti-
mation.” Estimation is subject-specific in that it triggers different reactions to like stimuli 
in different individuals and species: while some dogs flee from sticks, others do not; while 
sheep flee from wolves, wolves do not.
40 See D’Ancona (2008), 56f.
41 See p. 63 n27.
42 Avicenna, Liber de anima, lib. iv, c. 1, ed. van Riet (1968), 2: “Si autem non esset in animali-
bus virtus in qua coniungerentur formae sensatorum, difficilis esset eis vita, si olfactus 
non ostenderet saporem et si sonus non ostenderet saporem, et si forma baculi non re-
memoraret formam doloris ita quod fugiatur ab eo.” It may seem strange to speak of the 
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The various steps of the cognitive process underlying the dog’s behaviour 
are described in chapter 3 of book iv.43 It begins, first, with the perception of 
sensible forms in the external senses, such as the visual perception of the stick-
form and the perception of pain. What follows is, second, a bundling of these 
forms in the common sense. The form of the stick and the form of pain are now 
joined together. The third step is the storing of this bundle of forms in the imagi-
nation. Up to this point, no intention is involved in the process. This only be-
comes relevant in the fourth step which Avicenna describes as follows: ‘An in-
tention of a comparison of how they [i.e., the forms] are related to each other 
and a judgment about them are inscribed in memory’.44 That is, the inscription 
of the intention of those forms in memory is where intentions enter the process. 
Memory is the power which ‘by itself and naturally apprehends this’, accord-
ing to Avicenna. But what about estimation? Estimation is the faculty which, 
fifth and finally, brings about the perception of the unity of forms and intentions. 
It triggers the dog’s reaction of flight as it perceives the harmfulness of the 
stick based on the conjunction of the stick-form and pain. It thus establishes 
a “causal chain between apprehension, passion, and behaviour,” as Dominik 
Perler puts it.45
What still remains to be answered is the question of whether this process 
amounts to generalisation. As has been said, the dog seems to generalise inso-
far as it flees every stick after it has had a number of painful encounters with 
individual sticks. The process of learning or conditioning seems to have estab-
lished the general rule ‘All sticks are painful’. The problem with this description 
is that Avicenna does not refer to universal entities such as ‘all sticks’, ‘every 
stick’ or ‘sticks in general’ in his account of estimative perception. Rather, he 
stays at the level of particulars. Forms are particulars insofar as the form of 
‘form’ of pain but what Avicenna has in mind here is the hurtful tactile sensation the stick 
produces in this situation. Interestingly, Albertus Magnus, De homine, eds. Anzulewicz & 
Söder (2008), 284, employs the term ‘intentio’ in this context by saying that ‘the intention 
of pain is joined together with the form of the stick’ (intentio doloris coniungitur cum 
figura baculi). However, ibid., 269, reads: ‘the dog apprehends the form of pain and flees’ 
(canis apprehendit formam doloris, et fugit).
43 Ibid., c. 3, 39. My reconstruction of this process largely accords with Kaukua (2014), 107.
44 Ibid.: “(…) et descripta fuerti in memoria intentio comparationis quae est inter illas et 
iudicium de illa.”
45 Perler (2012b), 37. Unfortunately, neither Perler nor Kaukau (2014), 106, who says that 
“an associated sensation of pain [is] coupled with a ma‘nā [i.e., an intention; A.O.], such 
as ‘harmful’ or ‘evil’,” explain where exactly this intention comes from. Kaukua at least 
stresses the active nature of the estimation in this process although he does not explicitly 
suggest that the estimative power itself brings about the intention.
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the stick that is perceived, for instance, by the sense of sight is the form of this 
particular stick. Not even humans can see sticks in general. Likewise, inten-
tions are particulars because they are linked to matter, as mentioned before. 
Although intentions are abstractions to some degree, Avicenna emphasises 
that they are not abstracted ‘from the accidents of matter’ (ab accidentibus 
materiae) and so they cannot be anything but particular.46
Nevertheless, one could argue that it is incoherent to claim that the dog’s 
reaction to the stimulus ‘stick’ involves no generalisation at all. Admittedly, the 
dog does not have to cognise general rules such as ‘All sticks are painful’. At the 
same time, it could not learn to flee from sticks if it did not engage in what is 
called ‘stimulus generalisation’ in modern research. This means that it is capa-
ble of recognising a stimulus under slightly different conditions: it recognises 
one and the same stick despite a lighting change, for example, and it perceives 
something as ‘stick’ although the shape and colour of this particular stick differ 
slightly from that of another particular stick that it has perceived before.47 Avi-
cenna does not, of course, discuss this notion of generalisation. However, his 
account of estimation could accommodate it, because stimulus generalisation 
in the sense described above does not necessarily go beyond the level of par-
ticulars. What is required is that imagination, estimation, and memory some-
how match the sensible form of the stick that is currently being received via 
the external senses with the sensible form of the stick that has been perceived 
in the past. So the dog runs away from a stick even though it has no cognitive 
access to the fact that all sticks are (or might be) painful.
Interestingly, Aquinas is more explicit than Avicenna as regards the ques-
tion of generalisation at the sensory level. In a passage of the Summa theo-
logiae he states that not only intellectual, but also sensitive powers can be 
‘ carried to something universally’ (ferri in aliquid universaliter).48 For instance, 
46 Avicenna, Liber de anima, lib. ii, c. 2, ed. van Riet (1972), 119.
47 See, for instance, Stach (2003), 1, who remarks that “[m]ost animals live in an extremely 
rich sensory environment in which stimuli hardly ever occur twice in exactly the same 
way.” Therefore, the recognition of a stimulus always requires some “perceptual abstrac-
tion,” as Deeley (1971), 63, puts it.
48 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae i-ii, q. 29, a. 6, co., ed. Leonina vi (1891), 207f.: “ Potest 
tamen aliqua potentia sensitiva, et apprehensiva et appetitiva, ferri in aliquid universali-
ter. Sicut dicimus quod obiectum visus est color secundum genus, non quia visus cog-
noscat colorem universalem; sed quia quod color sit cognoscibilis a visu, non convenit 
colori inquantum est hic color, sed inquantum est color simpliciter. Sic ergo odium etiam 
sensitivae partis, potest respicere aliquid in universali, quia ex natura communi aliquid 
adversatur animali, et non solum ex eo quod est particularis, sicut lupus ovi. Unde ovis 
odit lupum generaliter.”
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sight perceives not only one particular colour but all colours or colours in 
general. Similarly, an emotion like hatred ‘can consider something in a univer-
sal way’ (potest respicere aliquid in universali). Sheep hate wolves ‘in general’ 
( generaliter) and not only one particular wolf. The same could be said of dogs 
and sticks. For Aquinas, a thing is rejected ‘because of its common nature’ (ex 
 natura communi) and not because it is this or that particular thing. Still, the 
question is whether he really thinks that a sheep flees a wolf because it realises 
that the individual it sees shares in the common nature of wolves. Of course, 
the intention of hostility is found in all wolves and thus, so to speak, carries in-
formation about the common nature of wolves.49 Nevertheless, the intention 
itself is an individual object, according to both Avicenna and Aquinas. There-
fore, perceiving the wolf ’s intention of hostility is different from cognising that 
hostility is found in all wolves, and it is even more different from abstracting 
the universals ‘hostility’ or ‘wolf ’. In short, cognising universally is to be distin-
guished from cognising universals.
To sum up, Aquinas does, in fact, consider many cases in which animals 
grasp features that are common to several particulars. But he makes it quite 
clear that they do not cognise such features as being common or universal to 
several individuals, but rather as being features of this or that particular thing. 
Therefore, it seems rather doubtful that he ascribes the capacities of concep-
tualisation, categorisation, and generalisation to nonhuman animals. One 
could argue that he does, if one applies those terms in a relatively loose sense. 
But then the question arises: is this really helpful in order to clarify Aquinas’ 
 position? What seems more helpful is to compare his views to those of some 
other authors from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries who also dealt 
with  various questions concerning universal cognition and concept formation 
in nonhuman animals.




Intentions and Quiddities (Albertus Magnus)
Albertus Magnus is a good starting point not so much because there is a close 
biographical connection between him and Aquinas but mainly because their 
positions overlap in some respects, while they diverge in others. Like Aquinas, 
Albert considers the estimative power to bring about accidental cognition in 
nonhuman animals.1 So when the sheep sees a wolf, it receives sensory infor-
mation not only via its external senses but also via its internal senses, most 
importantly through estimation. It is this power that provides cognitive access 
to features like hostility, that is, something which is common to all wolves (at 
least from the perspective of the sheep), hence different from the particular 
shade of grey of this or that particular wolf. It has already been mentioned 
that the universality of a feature like hostility easily gives rise to the impres-
sion that the estimative power grasps something universal. Albert shares this 
impression and one of the arguments he gives in his De homine is that what 
determines the sheep’s reaction of flight ‘is acquired from every wolf ’ (accipi-
tur ab omni lupo).2 Similarly, the sheep is unafraid of every shepherd, not only 
of a particular one. Therefore, it seems to grasp a universal, something that is 
found in more than just one individual.
Although this is a plausible claim Albert ultimately denies that nonhuman 
animals grasp universals by virtue of their estimative power. It is true, he says, 
that a sheep flees every wolf but this behaviour is based on an instinctual pro-
cess rather than on rational ‘enquiry and planning’ (inquisitio et consilium).3 
While humans usually have rational control over their reactions and show 
1 On Albert’s theory of inner senses see Steneck (1974); Black (2000), esp. 63–66; Anzulewicz 
(2002); Di Martino (2008), esp. 69–84; Tellkamp (2012a).
2 Albertus Magnus, De homine, eds. Anzulewicz & Söder (2008), 294f.: “Item, quicquid uno 
modo ens accipitur ab omni sensibili eiusdem speciei, hoc videtur esse universale, sicut 
homo in una ratione accipitur a Socrate et Platone; id autem quod determinat fugiendum 
esse in ove secundum unum modum accipitur ab omni lupo, et non fugiendum esse secun-
dum unum modum ab omni pastore; ergo hoc erit universale.”
3 Ibid., 295: “Ad aliud dicendum quod aestimativa magis imitatur naturam in movendo quam 
scientiam et artem intellectus practici. Unde licet uno modo ovis accipiat inimicum in omni 
lupo, tamen non utitur inquisitione et consilio in modo fugiendi quemadmodum homo; sed 
omnis ovis fugit uno modo omnem lupum. Et hoc est quod dicit Damascenus quod ‘bruta po-
tius aguntur a natura quam agant’. Et idem dicit Avicenna quod instinctu naturae moventur 
bruta et non ad rationem apprehensi, et ideo rationem universalis non considerant.”
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some flexibility in how they respond to a given stimulus, nonhuman animals 
lack this kind of control and always react to the same stimulus ‘in the same 
way’ (uno modo). For Albert, this behavioural uniformity provides evidence for 
the fact that nonhuman animals do not actively acquire universals from the 
perception of several individuals. Yet, even if one agrees with Albert in this re-
gard, one could still ask him to further describe this perception of individuals. 
What does the sheep perceive? A wolf, an enemy, or a grey furry thing?
For Aquinas, as has been said, the estimative power makes the sheep see 
the wolf as the starting point of the emotion of fear and the action of flight.4 
Whether this amounts to more than to seeing a grey furry thing, but to less 
than seeing a wolf remains a matter of debate. Albert, by contrast, clearly ap-
pears to teach that the sheep does not simply see a grey furry thing, but a wolf 
or an enemy. Just as humans see that this black thing over there is a human 
being or a friend, ‘a sheep sees that this hairy brownish thing is a wolf and that 
that hairy thing is a dog and [by its estimation] it judges one to be friendly 
and the other one to be hostile’, Albert writes.5 Similarly, a wolf perceives this 
or that individual to be its offspring just as humans perceive this or that person 
to be the son of Dion, as he puts it in his commentary on De anima.6
It thus seems as if, in Albert’s opinion, nonhuman animals are capable of 
conceptualising the contents of their perceptions, at least insofar as they do 
not simply see coloured patterns, such as hairy brownish things, but objects, 
such as wolves or cubs. Their estimative power reaches well beyond the sur-
face of sensible forms and expands into ‘the proper essence’ (propria essentia) 
of things.7 It does not simply abstract sensible forms as the external senses, 
but ‘substantial forms’ (substantiales formae), as Albert states.8 Therefore, one 
4 See p. 61 n18.
5 Albertus Magnus, De anima, lib. 2, tr. 3, c. 5, ed. Stroick (1968), 104: “Sed secundum accidens 
sensibile est, quod propriam essentiam in sensum non imprimit nec primo nec secundo, sed 
cum sensibili proprio et communi accipitur, et non sine aestimatione vel cogitatione, sicut 
sunt intentiones, de quibus tertio gradu abstractionis diximus, sicut quod hoc album est Dia-
rii filius vel hoc nigrum est amicus vel homo vel animal, sicut videt ovis, quod hoc pilosum 
fulvum est lupus et hoc pilosum est canis, et unum aestimat amicum et alterum inimicum.”
6 See Albertus Magnus, De anima, lib. 3, tr. 1, c. 2, ed. Stroick (1968), 167: “[…] numquam contin-
git cognoscere, quod iste est filius Dionis, nisi notitia habeatur filiationis, secundum quod est 
in isto, nec umquam lupus miseretur nato suo, nisi habeat cognitionem et huius individui et 
quod hoc individuum est natus eius.”
7 See n5 above.
8 Albertus Magnus, De anima, lib. 2, tr. 3, c. 4, ed. Stroick (1968), 101f.: “Tertius autem gradus ap-
prehensionis est, quo accipimus non tantum sensibilia, sed etiam quasdam intentiones quae 
non imprimuntur sensibus […]. Et tale est, quod accipimus hunc esse filium Deonis et esse 
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might get the impression that, in his view, nonhuman animals’ perception of 
the world is not very much different from our own, because, despite their lack 
of intellectual powers, they do seem to gain cognitive access to the very es-
sences of things by way of perceiving intentions, just as we do when grasping 
the quiddity of something.9
However, one needs to be careful here. Albert draws a clear distinction be-
tween the abstraction of substantial forms and the abstraction of quiddities. 
First, there is a difference with regard to the mode of apprehension. Although 
intentions, unlike sensible forms, ‘are not imprinted into the senses’ (non im-
primuntur sensibus), their perception is, nevertheless, ‘mediated by the per-
ception of sensibles’ (mediantibus sensibilibus).10 Put differently, substantial 
forms are always apprehended in combination with material sensibles. Quid-
dities, by contrast, ‘are denudated from all appendices of matter’ (denudatas 
ab omnibus appendiciis materiae).11 They are thus entirely immaterial. Conse-
quently, there is, second, a difference with regard to the cognitive powers that 
apprehend them. While substantial forms are perceived by a material power, 
such as estimation, the apprehension of quiddities is left to the immaterial 
intellect alone.
Because of this restriction, even relatively highly-developed nonhuman ani-
mals are incapable of grasping the quiddities of things. The most prominent 
examples are pygmies with whom Albert deals at length in his commentary 
on De animalibus.12 In his opinion, pygmies show a surprisingly high degree of 
perfection and come very close to humans, both with regard to their physique 
and with regard to their cognitive capacities. They do, for instance, gather many 
things in their memories, are capable of learning, and also possess some sort of 
‘language’ (loquela), which is why ‘they seem to have something imitating rea-
son’ (videtur aliquid habere imitans rationem).13 Nonetheless, they still stand at 
 agnum vel hominem, aliud autem esse lupum vel leonem, secundum quod substantiales 
formae mediantibus sensibilibus et non separatae ab ipsis apprehenduntur.”
9 This is actually what Sobol (1993), 117, seems to suggest.
10 See Albertus Magnus, De anima, lib. 2, tr. 3, c. 5, ed. Stroick (1968), 104.
11 Ibid.: “Quartus autem et ultimus gradus est, qui apprehendit rerum quiditates denudatas 
ab omnibus appendiciis materiae nec accipit ipsas cum sensibilium intentionibus, sed 
potius simplices et separatas ab eis. Et ista apprehensio solius est intellectus, sicut est 
intellectus hominis […].”
12 On pygmies in medieval philosophy in general and in Albert in particular see Koch (1931); 
Janson (1952), esp. 84–89; Köhler (1992) and (2008), 419–443; Thijssen (1995); Friedrich 
(2009), 138–141; Roling (2010), 486–498; Salisbury (2010), 122–124.
13 Albertus Magnus, De animalibus, lib. xxi, tr. 1, c. 2, ed. Stadler (1920), 1328: “Quaedam 
autem in tantum vigent in disciplina auditus quod etiam sibi mutuo suas intentiones 
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least one step below humans on the ladder of beings because they lack the fac-
ulty of reason. Therefore, their cognitive capacities originate mainly from what 
Albert calls ‘a shadow of reason’ (umbra rationis).14 This power is superior to 
the estimative power of other nonhuman animals, but, nevertheless, accord-
ing to Albert, inferior to the human intellect.15 Its inferiority is most evident in 
regards to universal cognition because, in contrast to humans, pygmies are 
 incapable of ‘eliciting universals’ (elicere universalia). Thus, their use of signs, 
both spoken and heard, is always bound to immediate sensible impressions. 
Unlike human beings, the pygmy ‘neither argues nor talks about the universals 
of things but rather its voices are directed at the particular things about which 
it talks’ (non disputat nec loquitur de universalibus rerum, sed potius suae voces 
diriguntur ad res particulares de quibus loquitur).16
Admittedly, it is difficult to understand how this ‘language’ of pygmies really 
works. But there are at least two ways in which Albert’s description can be un-
derstood. One way is to say that the pygmy language works without universals 
or universal concepts at all. In this case, every sign refers to nothing other than 
one particular thing. So if a pygmy says, for instance, ‘baobab’, another pygmy 
will look at or go to the particular tree which they habitually call ‘baobab’. This 
pygmy will not, however, go to or look at another tree of the same species be-
cause the word ‘baobab’ refers to one particular tree only. Thus, according to 
this reading, the names (or signs) pygmies employ are not universal in mean-
ing. However, one might also read Albert as saying that pygmies do, in fact, talk 
 significant, sicut pigmeus qui loquitur, cum tamen sit irrationabile animal: et ideo quan-
tum ad animales virtutes, post hominem videtur pigmeus esse perfectius animal: et 
 videtur quod inter omnia animalia plus confert memorias suas et plus percipit de signis 
auditus, ita quod videtur aliquid habere imitans rationem, sed ratione caret.” The pyg-
mies’ capacity to speak is also mentioned in De animalibus, lib. i, tr. 1, c. 3, §44, ed. Stadler 
(1916), 17, and lib. vii, tr. 1, c. 6, §62, 521f.; Liber de natura et origine animae, tr. 1, c. 1, ed. 
Geyer (1955), 1. On Albert’s account of the language of pygmies (and of other animals) see 
especially Resnick & Kitchell (1996), 57–61; Tellkamp (2013), 214–217; Köhler (2014), 487f.; 
Toivanen (forthcoming).
14 On the origin and meaning of this idea see Köhler (2008), 434f., and (2014), 199. See also 
Roling (2011), esp. 231–233.
15 See Albertus Magnus, De animalibus, lib. xxi, tr. 1, c. 2, ed. Stadler (1920), 1329.
16 Ibid., 1328: “Ratio enim est vis animae discurrendo per experta ex memoriis accepta, per 
habitudinem localem aut sillogisticam, universale eliciens et ex illo principia artium et 
scientiarum per similes habitudines conferens: hoc autem non facit pigmeus, sed ea quae 
accipit cum auditu, non separat a sensibilium intentionibus […]. Et ideo pigmeus licet 
loquatur, tamen non disputat nec loquitur de universalibus rerum, sed potius suae voces 
diriguntur ad res particulares de quibus loquitur. Causatur enim loquela sua ex umbra 
resultante in occasu rationis.” See also Köhler (2008), 430–438.
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about many things other than universals. In this case, they are capable of ap-
plying the name ‘baobab’ universally, that is, to more than one particular tree, 
but fail to talk about ‘baobab’ as a universal. So they fail to engage in metalan-
guage, as one could put it, since they are incapable of grasping ‘the quiddities 
of things’ (quiditates rerum).17
What speaks in favour of the first reading is Albert’s statement that, unlike 
human language, the language of pygmies originates ‘from the simple imagina-
tion and not from the intellect’ (ex ymaginatione simplici et non ex intellectu).18 
Therefore, the cognitive vehicles of their language, so to speak, are particulars 
because the imagination is a material power, which entails that it is incapable 
of working with universals. What militates against the first reading, however, 
is that if pygmies really employed a particular name for each particular thing, 
their language would be rather impractical. They would need a plethora of 
words to name things, as no name could be applied to more than one thing. 
Moreover, it seems to be unlikely that they are, on the one hand, capable of 
distinguishing things of the same type from things of another type, but, on the 
other hand, incapable of employing the same name for various individuals of 
the same type.
For although in De animalibus Albert does not explicitly say that pygmies 
(and other nonhuman animals) are capable of discerning things of one type 
from things of another type, he does make a brief remark on animals’ ability 
to discern in his Quaestiones super De animalibus. In this text, he explains that 
discerning (discernere) is actually ‘a work of reason’ (opus rationis).19 Yet, he 
concedes that those animals that lack reason nevertheless engage in discern-
ing things, since camels and horses, for instance, obviously distinguish their 
offspring or parents from other members of their species. Similarly, birds dis-
cern between stones and grains, and sheep distinguish wolves from lambs or 
human beings.20 Their capacity to discern things is, of course, derived from 
their estimative power. Therefore, it is ‘a discernment between individual in-
tentions’ (discretio inter intentiones individuales) because the intentions they 
perceive are particulars, not universals. However, generality is involved insofar 
as their estimation enables them ‘to discern between singular things universal-
ly’ (discernere inter singularia universaliter). Put differently, the perception of, 
17 Ibid.: “Et ideo pigmeus nichil omnino percipit de rerum quiditatibus nec umquam per-
cipit habitudines argumentorum: et sua locutio et [corr. est; A.O.] sicut locutio morionum 
qui naturaliter stulti sunt eo quod non perceptibiles sunt rationum.”
18 De animalibus, lib. iv, tr. 2, c. 2, ed. Stadler (1916), 400.
19 Albertus Magnus, Quaestiones super De animalibus, lib. viii, q. 39, ed. Filthaut (1955), 200.
20 See ibid., 201.
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say, a ‘stone-intention’ makes a bird discern stones from grains, because when 
seeing the latter it perceives a ‘grain-intention’ and this happens in a universal 
way insofar as stones in general are distinguished from grains in general. Again, 
what is important to note is that this is something different than distinguish-
ing the universal ‘stone’ from the universal ‘grain’. And while most animals are 
capable of distinguishing universally, only humans are capable of distinguish-
ing universals.
Nonetheless, the perception of individual intentions by estimation might 
form not only the basis of nonhuman animals’ capacity of discerning in gen-
eral, but also of the language of pygmies in particular. This is because, although 
pygmies clearly lack cognitive access to universals, they might still possess the 
ability of applying names in a universal way. This could work as follows: ev-
ery time a pygmy sees, for instance, a baobab tree, it perceives a ‘baobab tree-
intention’. The perception of this intention is linked to the utterance ‘baobab’ 
and this link works in both directions so that when seeing a baobab tree the 
pygmy knows that it can inform other pygmies about this tree by saying ‘bao-
bab’. Likewise, when it hears another pygmy say the word ‘baobab’ it knows 
what the other pygmy is talking about because the utterance ‘baobab’ is linked 
to the baobab tree-intention and thus produces the representation of a baobab 
tree in its imagination.21 So, in a way, the pygmy language is based on a simple 
stimulus-response reaction: either the stimulus is an intention that triggers a 
linguistic response or the stimulus itself is a linguistic expression which then 
triggers a certain representation. This might be the reason why Albert consid-
ers the language of pygmies to be based on ‘an instinct of nature’ (instinctus 
naturae), in contrast to human language, which is based on reason.22
Thus, it seems that Albert, like Aquinas, does not ascribe universal cognition 
in terms of cognising universals to nonhuman animals, not even to such highly 
developed nonhuman animals as pygmies. However, it needs to be noted that 
he grants them a certain kind of ‘experimental cognition’ (cognitio experimen-
talis). This might seem surprising at first because experience (experimentum) 
is usually the cognition of what is common to many things. In other words, 
one is experienced if one has acquired some knowledge about certain univer-
sal aspects of things. For instance, if a physician realises that aspirin reduces 
the fever of many patients, he comes to know that aspirin is a fever-reducing 
21 This, of course, requires both a storage of intentions as well as a storage of representations 
or images of things but Albert has no doubt that pygmies and most other animals possess 
the faculties of imagination and memory.




medication, not only in one particular case but in many, if not in all cases. Ac-
cording to Albert, this kind of knowledge can also be found in nonhuman ani-
mals. In particular, he mentions the example of a weasel that has been bitten 
by a snake and treats the bite with an endive leave.23 The weasel thus seems to 
possess some kind of universal knowledge about the healing power of endive 
leaves. The question now is whether this experimental cognition amounts to 
the cognition of a universal.
Albert’s reply is pretty clear: although the weasel does participate in experi-
ence to some extent the experimental cognition it has is only ‘an experimental 
cognition in singulars’ (experimentalis cognitio in singularibus). The experi-
ence of nonhuman animals is thus different from the full-fledged experience 
of human beings because the latter involves universals, while the former does 
not.24 But is this a plausible distinction? Why is the weasel’s knowledge about 
the healing power of endive leaves less universal than the physician’s knowl-
edge about aspirin? Albert does not explicitly address this question, but his an-
swer might be something like the following: even though the weasel possesses 
universal knowledge about endive leaves in some sense, it does not acquire the 
universal ‘endive’. Rather, it simply remembers that last time it had been bitten 
by a snake the bite was healed by the treatment with an endive leave. Surely, 
this supposes that the weasel recognises several elements in this situation: the 
snake, the bite, the endive leaf, etc. More precisely, it must be capable of rec-
ognising certain similarities between those elements. Otherwise it could not 
know that the bite it has now is the same kind of bite from which it suffered 
some time ago and so forth.
Nevertheless, this process of recognition does not require (or lead to) the 
cognition of universals because the weasel simply cognises that this particular 
bite is like that particular bite and that this particular leaf is like that particular 
leaf. The physician’s knowledge, by contrast, amounts to something like the 
universal proposition ‘Aspirin always reduces fever’. So even though the effect 
23 Albertus Magnus, De animalibus, lib. xxi, tr. 1, c. 2, ed. Stadler (1920), 1327: “Quaedam 
autem animalium videntur aliquid licet parum experimenti participare. Experimentum 
namque ex multis nascitur memoriis quia eiusdem rei multae memoriae faciunt poten-
tiam et facultatem experimenti: et nos videmus quod multa animalia praeter hominem 
aliquid experimentalis habent cognitionis in singularibus, sicut quod mustela pugnans 
cum serpente vulnerata contra venenum accipit folium endiviae quae a quibusdam ros-
trum porcinum vocatur: et alia talia multa induximus in praecedentibus quae faciunt 
animalia.” Similar stories about birds are told in ibid., lib. VIII, tr. 2, ch. 2, ed. Stadler (1916), 
590; Metaphysica, lib. I, tr. 1, c. 6, ed. Geyer (1960), 10. 
24 See ibid.: “Sufficienter autem non participant experimento quia non veniunt per experi-
mentum ad universale et artem et rationem, sed tamen secundum aliquid participant 
experimento, ut iam diximus.”
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is the same – both the weasel and the physician know how to medicate a cer-
tain illness – the ways in which they (mentally) represent what they do differ: 
the physician’s knowledge involves universals, while the weasel’s does not. In 
sum, Albert also seems to stick to the view that the boundary between the cog-
nition of humans and nonhuman animals is largely identical with the bound-
ary between universals and particulars. However, this does not mean that their 
behaviour does not often resemble or come close to human behaviour.
<UN>
chapter 10
Elevated Intentions and Common Forms  
(Pseudo-Peter of Spain)
Both Aquinas and Albertus Magnus follow Avicenna in making estimation 
one of the most important internal senses in nonhuman animals, as we have 
seen. In their view, estimation brings about certain accidental cognitions, 
triggers  reactions, and is involved in distinguishing individuals. This happens 
 universally or generally insofar as, for instance, sheep flee wolves in general 
and  generally discern them from fellow sheep. However, they do not possess 
the concept or cognise the universal ‘wolf ’. For although the perception of in-
tentions is an abstractive process, it is less abstractive or less complex an ab-
straction than the abstraction of universals by virtue of intellect and reason. 
Therefore,  nonhuman animals engage in distinguishing between things of dif-
ferent types, yet they do so without actually cognising that there is something 
like a type. If they show the same reactions to the same stimuli, it happens 
because an individual stimulus, such as the intention of hostility, always trig-
gers the same reaction, such as flight. It does not happen, however, because an 
individual wolf is identified as belonging to a general type, such as the species 
of wolves.
As mentioned before, there are, of course, a number of objections which 
can be raised against such a theory. Some objections were indeed raised (at 
least implicitly) in a thirteenth-century commentary on Aristotle’s De animali-
bus. Its author is unknown, but is usually referred to as Pseudo-Peter of Spain.1 
Briefly speaking, Pseudo-Peter doubts that nonhuman animals are incapable 
of grasping the species (or kind) an individual belongs to. In fact, he thinks 
that they cognise both the species (or general substance) as well as the indi-
vidual substance of a thing. One of the arguments he presents is that a sheep 
responds to the stimulus wolf rather than to the stimulus this wolf. That is, its 
behaviour resembles the behaviour of a physician who gives the same medi-
cine to every patient suffering from the same illness. Of course, the patients 
are individuals and hence differ in various respects. One might be small and 
brown-haired, while another is tall and black-haired. Yet, what matters is that 
1 Köhler (2014), 361, dates the commentary to before 1260. I am very grateful to him for provid-
ing me with the transcriptions of several of the questions of this commentary. On the differ-
ent manuscripts see Köhler (2008), 25, n. 64. For a summary of Pseudo-Peter’s position see 
Köhler (2014), 361–364.
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they are individuals of the same kind insofar as all of them suffer from the same 
disease.2 Similarly, it does not matter for the sheep whether individual wolves 
differ slightly with regard to certain accidents. For what it knows is ‘the com-
mon form’ (forma communis) of wolf and ‘through one likeness of wolf it cog-
nises all wolves’ (per unam similitudinem lupi cognoscit omnes lupos).3 In the 
opinion of Pseudo-Peter of Spain, it is thus wrong to claim that a sheep flees 
this individual wolf. For even though it does, of course, flee an individual, it 
flees not because the wolf it perceives is this individual wolf. Rather, it flees 
because the individual is an individual of a certain kind, namely, a member of 
the species of wolves. Since the sheep responds to the general substance of the 
stimulus rather than to its individual substance, it engages in a ‘universal grasp’ 
(apprehensio universalis), according to Pseudo-Peter of Spain.4
Yet, he argues, animals also attend to the ‘discrete substance of a thing’ (dis-
creta substantia rei). As he points out, they know to differentiate between in-
dividuals of the same kind. There are cases in which they do not show similar 
responses when confronted with similar stimuli. For instance, a lion usually 
responds with aggressive behaviour to the stimulus ‘human being’, but there is 
at least one human being towards whom it is obedient, namely, its tamer. For 
Pseudo-Peter, this is evidence for the fact that the lion, on the one hand, per-
ceives its tamer as a member of the species of humans but, on the other hand, 
it cognises him as an individual person, too. This is because its cognition goes 
beyond the mere perception of accidents but can also attend to accidental fea-
tures.5 However, Pseudo-Peter is well aware of the fact that this is incompatible 
with the usual distinction between sensory and intellectual cognition. While 
2 See Pseudo-Peter of Spain, Commentum super libros de animalibus (Venetian redaction), fol. 
151va: “Sicut dictum est superius, animalibus brutis debetur mutuus aspectus cum rebus aliis, 
ut ab aliis recipiant iuvamenta et nocumenta. Ista non solum currunt a parte complexionis, 
sed circa substantiam et speciem. Unde ratione speciei ovis discernit lupum, et sic de aliis. 
[…]. Hoc idem est in medicinis, quia operantur a specie.”
3 Ibid., fol. 152rb: “Preterea omnis apprehensio intentionis, que una existens ad multa nata est 
applicari, est intentio universalis vel per modum universalis. […] Sed intentiones, per quas 
bruta cognoscunt animalia, sunt huiusmodi, ut agna per unam similitudinem lupi cognoscit 
omnes lupos.” That the sheep ‘compares the common form to the particular’ (comparat for-
mam communem ad particulare) is mentioned on fol. 153ra.
4 See ibid., 152ra-b: “Omnis acceptio speciei rei non apropriate individue substantie rei est ac-
ceptio universalis. […] Sed hec est acceptio lupi ab agna, quia lupus, non quia ille lupus.”
5 See ibid., 151vb: “Omnis substantia cognitiva, que circumscriptis accidentibus ratione speciei 
sequitur rem apprehensam et fugit et obedit vel inobediens est ei, apprehendit discretam 
substantiam rei et non solum accidentia. […] Hoc patet, quia anima agne fugit lupum ratione 
lupi, non fugit canem, ymo ratione speciei sequitur sociam; ymo ovis obedit homini quia 
homo, et leo obedit magistro ratione persone individue. Ergo fit discretio ratione speciei et 
circa speciem. H<ec> supra accidentia.” See also fol. 152vb: “Sed bruta discernunt rem a re 
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the latter is usually taken to consist in grasping substances and universal as-
pects, such as the species of an individual thing, the former ‘cognises accidents 
and not the substance’ (cognoscit accidentia et non substantiam). And since 
nonhuman animals lack intellectual powers, they also lack the cognition of 
species and substances.6
Nonetheless, he holds on to the view ‘that brute animals cognise the  species 
and substances of things’ (quod bruta cognoscunt species rerum et substantias). 
In his opinion, this is a consistent view to hold if one takes into account that, 
as according to Averroes, there are two kinds of cognition of substances: an 
intellectual one by which universal intentions – ‘the universal quiddities of 
things’  – are grasped and a sensory one by which individual intentions are 
grasped.7 So, in his view, it is possible to cognise the substance of a thing by 
way of perceiving an individual intention, but, in this case, the substance is 
grasped as connected to an individual thing. Still, the question is why this qual-
ifies as ‘universal grasp’ (acceptio universalis) because, first, what is cognised is 
an individual not a universal intention. Second, if the intention is grasped as 
connected to an individual thing, the grasp is material and, unlike the univer-
sal grasp of something, does not go ‘beyond matter’ (preter materiam).8
To this question Pseudo-Peter replies as follows. First, he argues that the 
intentions received by the senses are not simply individual intentions but 
‘elevated individual intentions’ (intentiones individuales elevatas), as he puts 
it. Unfortunately, he does not further explain how those elevated intentions 
compare to mere individual intentions, on the one hand, and to universal 
sine accidentibus, ut hominem ab asino, et discernunt hunc hominem ab illo sub accidenti-
bus. Ergo sic discernunt bruta.”
6 Ibid., 151vb–152ra: “Duplex est cognitio. Quedam est rei per principia vera eius; hec solum deb-
etur intellective anime; per hoc probat intellectum inesse homini. Unde cognoscit speciem 
non secundum quod stans vel huiusmodi. Alia est cognitio per accidentia; hec est sensitive, 
ut dicunt [Avicenna et Algazali; A.O.], quod cognoscit aliquem in quantum sedet vel huius-
modi. Sed cognitio bruti sensitiva est. Ergo solum cognoscit accidentia et non substantiam.”
7 Ibid., 152ra: “Solvit Averroes: Cognitio substantie est duplex. Una est, que cadit super quid-
ditates rerum universales, que intentiones universales ab omnibus individuis separate sunt 
et ab omnibus dependitiis accidentium. Hec intellective. Alia est cognitio, que cadit super 
intentiones individuales; hec inest brutis et multis, et hec est sensibilis virtutis, ut ipse dicit.”
8 See ibid., 152vb–153ra: “Sed contra. Averroes dicit: Virtus cognitiva duplex. Una distinguit in-
tentiones universales; hec intellectus. Alia est, que distinguit intentiones individuales; hec 
sensitiva. Hec competit bruto. Sed nulla virtus, que non habet acceptionem universalis, dis-
cernit ea. Sensitiva huiusmodi, ut dicit Averroes. Hoc di<ci>t Avicenna et Algazel in multis 
locis. […] Sed acceptio intentionis individuorum est acceptio materialis prout res in materia 
corporali. Acceptio universalis in sua puritate est acceptio preter materiam. Hec fuit virtutis 
materialis, illa intellectus.”
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 intentions, on the other hand. All he says is that they ‘differ in degree’ (dis-
tant per gradus) from those intentions that are received by the intellect. Thus, 
they ‘do not reach the level of elevation as those which are in the intellect’ 
(non attingunt elevationem, que apud intellectum).9 Second, he argues that one 
should make a distinction between two kinds of universal cognition. One kind 
is purely intellectual and totally ‘abstracts from matter and material principles’ 
(abstrahit a materia et principiis materialibus). The other kind ‘does not rise 
above material things’ (non erigitur ultra principia materialia). Still, it is by this 
kind of universal cognition that nonhuman animals have access to what he 
calls ‘the common form’ (forma communis) of a thing, such as the common 
form of lamb or wolf. Moreover, they are capable of comparing such common 
forms to the particular thing they see, namely, this lamb or this wolf.10 Thus, 
their cognition is clearly distinct from intellectual cognition but, nevertheless, 
universal in some respect.
In sum, the position of Pseudo-Peter of Spain does not differ from the views 
of Aquinas and Albert insofar as he also denies the cognition of universals in 
terms of universal quiddities to nonhuman animals. Yet, unlike Aquinas and 
Albert, he does not hold that universal cognition in such animals is restricted 
to cognising universally in the sense explained above. Rather, he emphasises 
that they engage in some sort of ‘acceptio universalis’ of individuals which is, 
however, not as abstractive as the cognition of quiddities. The individual inten-
tions that are cognised by nonhuman animals only differ in degree from those 
that are grasped by the intellect, he says, and they are ‘elevated’ in comparison 
to purely individual intentions. Yet, he also sticks to the view that there is a 
distinction between the sensory and the intellectual realm. And even though 
he seems sympathetic to saying that the distinction between those realms is 
not entirely equal to the distinction between particularity and universality, he 
still thinks that there is a difference between the cognition of universals that is 
found in humans and the kind of universal cognition one finds in nonhuman 
animals.
9 See ibid., fol. 153ra: “Dicendum, quod virtus sensitiva non accipit solum intentiones indi-
viduales, sed intentiones individuales elevatas. Iste tamen intentiones, quas accipit, non 
attingunt elevationem, que apud intellectum, sed distant per gradus.”
10 Ibid.: “Acceptio intentionis universalis duplex. Una, que abstrahit a materia et a principiis 
materialibus; hec debetur anime intellective […]. Alia est, que non erigitur ultra principia 
materialia. Unde si offeratur ei sub principiis spiritualibus res, non cognoscet . Et ista co-
niungit duo individualiter accipiendo, ut animam bovis cum corpore bovis. Alia est prout 
comparat formam communem ad particulare, ut agnam ad hanc agnam; hoc non fit sine 
materia, et hec est anime sensitive.”
<UN>
chapter 11
Vague Particulars as Universals (Roger Bacon)
The position of Pseudo-Peter of Spain might strike one as comparatively origi-
nal, if not even radical, in the sense that it ascribes a rather high capacity for 
the perception of what he calls ‘elevated intentions’ to animals. Yet, if one com-
pares his statements on universal cognition in nonhuman animals to the state-
ments of Roger Bacon, it seems as if Bacon goes even farther. At least this is the 
impression one can get from Bacon’s treatise on optics, which is better known 
as Perspectiva. One passage in particular has attracted the attention of modern 
interpreters concerned with this topic:
But it is certain that a dog recognises a man it has seen before when it 
sees him again and monkeys and many other nonhuman animals do this. 
And they distinguish things they have seen before and of which they have 
memory, and they cognise one universal from another, such as man from 
dog or from wood. And they distinguish individuals of the same species.1
Neither the beginning nor the end of this passage is particularly startling. All 
Bacon says is that dogs, as well as other nonhuman animals, are capable of 
making certain distinctions. First, they are able to distinguish between known 
and unknown individuals, as it were. For instance, they distinguish between a 
man they have met before, say, their owner, and a complete stranger. Second, 
they also manage to differentiate individuals whom they know equally well, 
such as their owner and his wife. However, in the central part of this passage 
Bacon adds that ‘they cognise one universal from another, such as man from 
dog or from wood’. Although the wording of this passage is relatively clear, the 
crucial question now is how this is to be understood. Does Bacon really want to 
say that nonhuman animals do not only cognise particulars, such as this piece 
of wood or this man, but universals, such as ‘wood’ or ‘man’, too?
One possible answer is to say that he does. If this is correct, Bacon would in-
deed hold a very radical position because his view then amounts to saying that 
the cognition of universals is not dependent on the possession of  intellect and 
reason which is why it can be found in those animals that lack those powers, 
1 Roger Bacon, Perspectiva, pars ii, dist. 3, c. 9, ed. Lindberg (1996), 246: “Sed constat canem 
cognoscere hominem prius visum cum iterum viderit eum, et simia et bestie multe sic faci-
unt. Et distinguunt inter res visas quarum habent memoriam, et cognoscunt unum univer-
sale ab alio, ut hominem a cane vel a ligno, et individua eiusdem speciei distinguunt.”
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too. By and large, this is the answer which many of Bacon’s modern interpret-
ers seem to give. For instance, Theodor W. Köhler claims that Bacon ascribes 
‘a form of universal cognition’ (“eine Form von Allgemeinerkenntnis”2) to non-
human animals. Similarly, both Peter Sobol and Bernd Roling take Bacon to say 
that dogs and other animals have cognitive access to universals, such as ‘man’.3 
If read in this way, Bacon’s statement is, indeed, “an unexpected remark,” as 
Jeremiah Hackett puts it,4 because it thwarts the expectation of many read-
ers according to which the cognition of universals is an intellectual operation. 
But maybe that is exactly the point Bacon wants to make. On the one hand, 
he clearly denies intellect and reason to nonhuman animals.5 On the other 
hand, – and in contrast to most medieval authors – he grants them a cogitative 
power (vis cogitativa). It is this very faculty by means of which they ‘cognise 
one universal from another’, in his view.6 Now since the cogitative power is 
responsible for ‘a certain collecting of many things into one’ (quaedam collectio 
plurium ad unum), one might assume that nonhuman animals gain cognitive 
access to universals by gathering  together several singulars. For instance, a dog 
acquires the universal or the concept ‘man’ after having met several men.
However, this interpretation is incompatible with what Bacon says in his 
commentaries on Aristotle’s  Metaphysics. In both commentaries, he stresses 
that only humans engage in what he calls ‘experimental cognition’ (cognitio ex-
perimentalis), that is, a ‘universal grasp of singulars’ (universalis acceptio singu-
larium) or the ‘collation of singulars to one universal’ (collatio singularium ad 
unum universale). Consequently, nonhuman animals only have a ‘grasp of sin-
gulars not under some common nature’ (acceptio singularium non sub  aliqua 
natura communi acceptorum).7 Now how can this be reconciled with what he 
says about the cognition of universals in the Perspectiva?
2 Köhler (2014), 360.
3 See Roling (2011), 245f., and Sobol (1993), 116f. Roling’s interpretation is not entirely consistent 
as he claims that there is, for Bacon, ‘a latent involvement of universals’ (“latente Einbindung 
von Universalien”) in nonhuman animal cognition but, nevertheless, a restriction ‘to the do-
main of particulars’ (“auf die Domäne der Einzeldinge”). Wood (2007), 42, in contrast, claims 
that “[n]o medieval suggests that animals can generalize.” However, she gives no interpreta-
tion of Bacon’s statement in the Perspectiva.
4 Hackett (2013), 235.
5 See Perspectiva, pars i, dist. 1, c. 4, ed. Lindberg (1996), 12.
6 See, for instance, Perspectiva, pars ii, dist. 3, c. 9, ed. Lindberg (1996), 248. On Bacon’s theory 
of internal senses see Dewender (2003), 155f., and Rignani (2006). On the claim that only very 
few medieval authors ascribed cogitation to nonhuman animals see Köhler (2014), 320–325.
7 See Roger Bacon, Questiones supra libros prime philosophie Aristotelis i, ed. Steele (1930), 
8f., and Questiones altere supra libros prime philosophie Aristotelis i, ed. Steele (1932), 
17–19. On those passages see also Hackett (2008), 127.
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The easiest way to resolve the tension between these passages would be to 
say that Bacon changed his mind over time. While in his Metaphysics commen-
tary, written at some point between 1237 and 1250, he still believed that non-
human animals cannot engage in the cognition of universals, he substantially 
revised this view when writing the Perspectiva, at some point in or after 1260.8 
This is, however, merely speculative and calls for further explanation for why 
he changed his mind. Another option would be to argue that his statements 
in the Perspectiva are based on his realism about universals and his theory of 
so-called ‘species’.9 As he explains in De multiplicatione specierum, the latter 
are produced by singulars and universals alike.10 Therefore, one might assume 
that the way in which they are cognised is also similar. Yet even if this is cor-
rect it is not said that universal species can be cognised without intellectual 
faculties. Moreover, the tension with regard to what he says in his Metaphysics 
commentary still remains.
Accordingly, it makes sense to consider a third option. This option consists 
in saying that the sense in which Bacon applies the term ‘universal’ in the Per-
spectiva is a very special sense. More precisely, the universal Bacon is talking 
about in the Perspectiva is a so-called ‘vague particular’ (particulare vagum). 
That is to say, the dog does not form the concept ‘man’ after having met several 
men. Neither does it grasp the universal ‘man’ in terms of grasping the quiddity 
of man. Rather, it manages to discern between different kinds of particulars, 
namely, particulars which it knows very well, such as its owner or the neigh-
bour’s cat, from individuals of the same species which it has never seen before, 
such as a strange man or a strange cat. Now the perception of such strange or 
unknown individuals is vague insofar as the dog knows almost nothing about 
them. While his owner is this particular man for him or while the neighbour’s 
cat is this particular cat, a strange man is just some man and a strange cat is 
just some cat. In other words, the dog distinguishes known from unknown 
particulars.
But then why are the latter called universals? In order to answer this ques-
tion adequately it is necessary first to understand the context in which Bacon 
discusses the cognitive capacities of animals. This context is the distinction 
between three modes of seeing – a distinction he adopts from Alhacen’s De 
aspectibus. This was one of the main sources for Bacon’s own treatise on optics 
8 On the chronology of Bacon’s writings see Hackett (1997), esp. 316f.
9 On Bacon’s realism see Maloney (1985).
10 See Roger Bacon, De multiplicatione specierum, pars i, c. 2, ed. Lindberg (1983), 40–42.
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and so he adopts several of Alhacen’s terms and distinctions.11 According to 
Alhacen, the first mode of seeing consists in perceiving things ‘by the sense 
[of sight] alone’ (solo sensu), that is, without the help of any other faculties of 
the soul.12 In this case, one perceives light and colours universally but no dis-
tinction is made between distinct colours, let alone between distinct objects. 
The reason is that such distinctions require what Alhacen calls ‘the power of 
discerning’ (virtus distinctiva). It is by means of this power that we are capable 
of distinguishing between all kinds of things, and this is what constitutes the 
second mode of seeing.13
In Bacon’s words, ‘this mode of cognition is not only about light and colour, 
but about all things in which we distinguish a universal from a particular and 
particulars from each other’.14 However, he specifies what he means by ‘uni-
versal’ in this context by explaining that it is a ‘vague particular’ (particulare 
vagum). A vague particular is, for instance, some colour or some man, which 
needs to be distinguished from particulars that are not vague, such as this co-
lour or this man.15 In Bacon’s view, the distinction between vague and non-
vague particulars is based on memory and works ‘by a comparison of things 
we see to those things we have already seen before’ (per comparationem rei vise 
ad eandem prius visam). For once we remember that we have seen the man 
we currently see before us, we no longer simply see some man, that is, a vague 
particular, but this man, namely, the concrete person we have seen before.16
The crucial point of Bacon’s explanation now is that this kind of cognition 
is found at the level of the sensory soul. For many Latin perspectivists, this was 
11 On the reception of Alhacen in the Latin West see Lindberg (1976), 104–121; Smith (2001), 
lxxx–xciv.
12 See Alhacen, De aspectibus, lib. ii, c. 3, ed. Smith (2001), 98.
13 Ibid., 100f.
14 Roger Bacon, Perspectiva, pars i, dist. 10, c. 3, ed. Lindberg (1996), 154: “Et hic modus cogni-
tionis non solum est circa lucem et colorem, sed circa omnes res in quibus distinguimus 
universale a particulari et particularia ab invicem.”
15 See ibid.: “Sed non excluditur particulare vagum, nam illud est ita commune sicut suum 
universale, et convertitur cum eo, ut aliquis color, aliqua lux, aliquis homo, aliquis bos. 
Cognoscere igitur universalia ab invicem et a particularibus, et particularia ab invicem 
per comparationem rei vise ad eandem prius visam, recolendo quod prius fuerit visa et 
nota videnti, facit hic secundum modum comprehendi per visum.”
16 Bacon’s description very much reminds one of Averroes’ account of memory because, 
according to Averroes, “to remember something is not primarily to recognize it as past ob-
ject of perception but to comprehend it as this particular thing,” as Black (1996), 173, puts 
it. However, Bacon very likely adopted the theory of vague particulars not from Averroes 
but from Avicenna. On Avicenna’s theory and its reception in the Latin West see Black 
(2011). On vague particulars in Bacon see also Maloney (1985), esp. 812.
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doubtful because the second mode of seeing was usually referred to as ‘cogni-
tion by knowledge’ (cognitio per scientiam).17 And since ‘knowledge’ was con-
sidered to require intellectual powers, the second mode of seeing was taken to 
depend on intellect and reason.18 Bacon, however, rejects this view. One of the 
strongest points in support of his argument is the cognition of nonhuman ani-
mals. For even though such animals lack an intellectual soul, they nevertheless 
engage in the second mode of seeing: dogs and many other animals obviously 
discern things they have seen before or ‘of which they have memory’ (quarum 
habent memoriam) from those things they have not seen before. This they do 
by virtue of the cogitative power which Bacon takes to be identical with Alha-
cen’s virtus distinctiva.19
Since Bacon explicitly states that this distinction extends to both particulars 
and universals it is, of course, correct to say that he takes nonhuman animals 
to possess ‘some form of universal cognition’, as Köhler put it.20 Still, one needs 
to specify what is meant by ‘universal cognition’ in this context. Obviously, the 
dog does not cognise the universal ‘man’ if universal here means the quiddity 
or the universal essence of man. As Bacon stresses in his commentary on the 
Metaphysics, the dog is incapable of acquiring the universal ‘man’ through the 
repeated perception of several individual men. But it does cognise the univer-
sal ‘man’ if universal is understood as a “generic universal,” as Jeremiah Hackett 
calls it.21 This might seem like a terminological form of cosmetic repair. Still, 
it makes sense to speak of universals here for a couple of reasons. First, seeing 
some man is much closer to cognising the universal ‘man’ than is seeing this 
man. The cognition of this man is much more concrete than the cognition of 
some man. This is why Bacon states that a vague particular is ‘as general as its 
universal and can be converted with it’ (est ita commune sicut suum universale, 
et convertitur cum eo).22 Second, Aristotle also applies the term ‘universal’ in 
17 See Roger Bacon, Perspectiva, pars ii, dist. 3, c. 9, ed. Lindberg (1996), 246.
18 See Bacon, Perspectiva, pars ii, dist. 3, c. 9, ed. Lindberg (1996), 246.
19 On Alhacen’s influence on Bacon regarding the cogitative power see Summers (1987), 161; 
Tachau (1988), 9–11; Dewender (2003), 155; Rignani (2006), 1227f.
20 See n2 above.
21 See Hackett (2008), 130. One could also argue that what Bacon has in mind here is nothing 
but the kind of ‘first universal’ (proton katholou) of which Aristotle speaks in Analytica 
Posteriora ii.19, 100a16. Consequently, one could also speak of ‘primitive universals’, ‘rudi-
mentary concepts’, or ‘pre-predicative sub-universals’, as do some interpreters of Aristo-
tle; see Steiner (2005), 68f.
22 See n15 above. Bacon is not the only one who claims that vague individuals are convert-
ible with universals. Maierù (2011), 361–363, mentions a number of authors who worked in 
Paris at about the same time and who held the same views concerning vague individuals.
87Vague Particulars as Universals
<UN>
this sense at the beginning of the Physics.23 This passage has puzzled (and still 
puzzles) many interpreters but it does provide some grounding for a theory of 
universals as vague particulars.
Nevertheless, there still remains a chasm between the sensory and the in-
tellectual realm, thus between human and nonhuman animals because, in 
the end, the dog will never cognise anything other than particulars, no matter 
what degree of precision its cognition has. Its cognition of particulars amounts 
to more than a simple act of recognition because it is capable of discerning 
individuals of one kind from those of another kind or one individual of a kind 
from another individual of the same kind. Yet, like Aquinas and Albertus Mag-
nus, Roger Bacon thinks that it does not apprehend individuals ‘under some 
common nature’ (sub aliqua natura communi).24 Therefore, his position is ob-
viously less radical than it might seem at first glance.
23 See Aristotle, Physica I.1, 184a24-b14.
24 See n7 above. Therefore, I find it rather misleading to say that, according to Bacon, “ani-
mals can distinguish universal classes from one another” or “recognize and distinguish 
universal categories and individuals,” as Sobol (1993), 116, puts it.
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chapter 12
Universal Desire and Experience (John Buridan)
In the previous chapters, the discussion of universal cognition and concept 
formation in nonhuman animals has largely centred on the question of how 
these animals perceive what they presently perceive. That is to say, the ques-
tion was, for instance, how a sheep perceives a wolf or how a dog perceives a 
stick. More precisely, it has been asked whether their perception of the world 
involves conceptualisation, categorisation, and generalisation. A further ques-
tion that has been mentioned in the introductory section to this part concerns 
the way in which nonhuman animals identify objects. This question has al-
ready been touched on by some of the authors discussed above. For instance, 
Pseudo-Peter of Spain considers the possibility that sheep identify individual 
wolves by using a common form of wolf. Yet, what is common to all these ex-
amples is that they focus mainly on how a present stimulus is (mentally) rep-
resented by the cogniser: as a coloured pattern, as an object, as a member of 
a kind, and so forth? But what about those situations in which no stimulus is 
present?
Take the example of a donkey that is looking for food. In this situation, the 
animal has a particular desire. But how does it find what it desires? In other 
words, how does it (mentally) represent the object or thing it is looking for? 
Would we not be inclined to say that the donkey’s search for food is based on 
a universal or general mental representation of food rather than on a particu-
lar representation? Admittedly, the donkey might be looking for the particular 
piece of bread its owner had put in its jacket in front of its eyes a few minutes 
ago. In this case, its search is likely based on the mental representation of this 
particular piece of bread just like our search for the car key, for example, would 
be based on a mental representation of this particular key. But suppose the 
donkey simply looks for any piece of bread. Then its search is likely based on a 
general representation of bread just like our search for any key would be based 
on a general representation of key. One could, of course, raise an immediate 
objection to this argument, namely, that any kind of search is based on the 
representation of a particular thing. If one is looking for any key one might 
still have a particular key in mind and then look for objects which are very 
similar to this particular key. In this case, the success of the search does not 
require a general mental representation. Instead, it depends on the capacity 
to cognitively establish similarities between a particular thing that is mentally 
represented and a thing that is ‘out there’ in the world, so to speak.
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How did late medieval authors dealt with such cases? Did they ascribe gen-
eral mental representations to nonhuman animals or did they try to find alter-
native explanations? One might immediately assume that a good place to look 
for an answer is medieval commentaries on Aristotle’s De motu animalium, 
because in this text Aristotle examines the physiological as well as the psycho-
logical processes underlying the movements of animals. In Chapter 7, in par-
ticular, he describes how we are usually moved towards something drinkable:
“My appetite says, I must drink; this is drink, says sensation or imagina-
tion or thought, and one immediately drinks. It is in this manner that 
animals are impelled to move and act, the final cause of their movement 
being desire; and this comes into being through either sensation or imag-
ination and thought.”1
The process described here apparently involves three main stages. There is, 
first, the stage of appetite, that is, the stage in which we feel thirst. This is, sec-
ond, followed by the identification of what could assuage our appetite, name-
ly, a drink. Third, there is the action of assuaging the appetite: the action of 
drinking.2 For the present purpose, the first and second stages are the most 
interesting stages because in those stages mental representations come into 
play (supposing that they come into play at all). However, Aristotle himself 
neither says anything about the nature of the mental representation involved 
here nor makes explicit whether his description applies to all animals.3 All he 
says is that the identification of what is searched for happens by ‘sensation or 
imagination or thought’. This, however, leaves open how the mental represen-
tation on which the search is based looks like and who has it. Even if one were 
to argue that it is the faculty of imagination which guides the search in non-
human animals, the above-mentioned question concerning the generality of 
such representations still remains, and it is rarely discussed in medieval com-
mentaries on De motu animalium.4 Nevertheless, there are other texts contain-
ing discussions of the example of an animal that is looking for drink or food 
which attend to the aspects of particularity and universality.
1 Aristotle, De motu animalium 7, 701a32-36, tr. Forster (2006), 463.
2 For a detailed discussion see Labarrière (2004), 204–214.
3 The latter aspect is also stressed by De Leemans (2005), 144f. See also De Leemans & Klemm 
(2007), 169.
4 John Buridan, for instance, simply takes the example to illustrate that we sometimes do 
things without waiting for an intellectual judgment about whether or not this is a good thing 
to do; see John Buridan, De motibus animalium, eds. Scott & Shapiro (1967), 545. This is also 
what Labarrière (2004), 212, takes to be the original function of this example.
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One philosopher who pays some attention to this question is John Buridan. 
In one version of his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, for example, he states 
that ‘a horse or a dog desires in a universal mode when being hungry or thirsty’.5 
This is no trivial claim, since the appetite Buridan is talking about is a ‘sensitive 
appetite’ (appetitus sensitivus). This appetite is ‘extended and material like the 
senses’ (extensus et materialis sicut sensus). Therefore, Buridan argues, univer-
sality seems to be nothing exclusively intellectual, but can be found at the level 
of sensory powers, too. But is it actually true that sensitive desire or appetite is 
universal? For Buridan, nonhuman animals are a good example in this context. 
For instance, if a horse is looking for food or water it does not desire this or 
that particular portion of water or oats but just any portion. In other words, it 
desires ‘indifferently’ (indifferenter). Of course, there might be cases in which 
a horse or another animals looks for some particular thing. But, usually, its 
desire is indifferent or universal. Admittedly, to claim that indifference is the 
same as universality might seem odd. For present purposes, however, the more 
important question is what the universality Buridan is talking about amounts 
to. More precisely, the question is: is the animal’s appetite based on a mental 
representation, and if so, can one infer from the universal nature of the appe-
tite to the universal nature of that representation?
At first glance, it seems that, in Buridan’s view, one cannot make such an in-
ference. One sign of this is that a desire is also universal if the agent (or thing) 
having this desire has no cognition at all. Buridan gives the example of fire 
which has the ‘desire’ to burn things. Since this happens indifferently, too – fire 
burns any inflammable thing just as a horse usually eats any edible thing  – 
the fire’s desire can be said to be ‘in a universal mode’ (modo universali) as 
well.6 Consequently, no cognition is needed in order to have a universal desire. 
Hence, no mental representation is involved either. Otherwise, a non-cognitive 
agent like fire could not be said to desire in a universal mode. This point is 
emphasised by Buridan in his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Here 
he says that such appetites ‘are not mediated by cognition’ (non sunt mediante 
5 John Buridan, Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis (secundum ultimam lec-
turam), lib. i, q. 7, eds. Streijger & Bakker (2015), 66: “Tertio, quia appetitus sensitivus ita est 
extensus et materialis sicut sensus; et tamen equus et canis per famem et sitim appetunt 
modo universali. Non enim hanc aquam vel avenam magis quam illam sed quamlibet indif-
ferenter; ideo quodcumque eis praesentetur, bibunt eam vel comedunt.” For other texts in 
which Buridan mentions this example, see Pluta (2002a), 31–40.
6 See ibid.: “Et etiam intentio, potentia vel appetitus ignis ad calefaciendum est modo univer-
sali, scilicet non determinate ad hoc lignum, sed a quodlibet lignum calefactibile indiffer-
enter, licet actus calefaciendi determinatur ad certum singulare; et ita etiam potentia visiva 
est modo universali ad videndum.”
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cognitione).7 However, one ought to be careful regarding the connection be-
tween the universal nature of appetites and the nature of mental representa-
tions because, as has been said, Buridan’s point is that no cognition is needed in 
order to have a desire. That is, cognition does not necessarily precede a desire. 
But it is possible, of course, that cognition comes along with a desire, namely, in 
those agents which do have cognitive powers, such as horses or humans. And 
so if their desire is universal must not their mental representations be, too?
According to Olaf Pluta, this is indeed the conclusion one must draw. In 
his opinion, “Buridan clearly affirms that animals, and dogs in particular, can 
refer to things universally [and] [t]his also means that they can mentally rep-
resent a particular bowl of water as a member of the class or universal category 
‘water’.”8 Of course, representing a particular as a member of a class or univer-
sal category is not entirely the same as having a universal representation of a 
thing, as we have seen above. Yet, for Pluta, “Buridan maintains that animals 
are capable of universal reference in the realm of conceptual knowledge.”9 
‘Conceptual knowledge’ means both “the ability to represent mentally an in-
dividual object of sensation as a member of a class or universal category, or, 
conversely, to signify a plurality of individual objects by a single mental entity.” 
The latter meaning is what is at issue in the present chapter. For even if one 
holds that the horse does not need the concept of water for finding water, it still 
seems to need “a single mental entity” by means of which it can cognitively 
refer to or identify “a plurality of individual objects,” as Pluta puts it.
From a systematic perspective, Pluta’s point is fairly reasonable. However, 
it is also fairly reasonable to doubt that his interpretation is the only possible 
(let alone correct) interpretation of Buridan. Two main points militate against 
Pluta’s interpretation. The first is more general and systematic in nature and 
concerns the actual inference from the universality of desire to the universal-
ity of mental representations. According to Pluta, it is correct to make such 
an inference. The question is, however, whether it is necessary to make this 
7 John Buridan, In Metaphysicen Aristotelis Quaestiones, lib. i, q. 7, Paris (1518), fol. 7rb: “Sed est 
dubitatio de appetito sensitivo quomodo actus appetendi sit circa universale cum actus sen-
tiendi <non> sit circa universale. Ad hoc videtur mihi dicendum quod talis appetitus magis 
sunt naturales quam animales, ut sitis et fames, et non sunt mediante cognitione, immo im-
mediate a natura propter carentiam nutrimenti. Sed ad persequendum obiectum appetitus 
exigitur sequens cognitio vel memoria, non tamen ideo quod ille appetitus fiat mediante 
cognitione illa vel memoria. Modo tales appetitus naturales non sunt actus distincti ab illis 
potentiis appetitivis naturalibus: ideo sunt circa universalia sicut dictum est quod omnes 
potentiae sunt circa universalia.” On the addition of ‘non’ see Klein (2016), 102, n. 248.




 inference in order to coherently account for the behaviour of nonhuman ani-
mals in Buridan’s theory. One could, for instance, argue that since the appetite 
of a horse (i.e. of a cognitive agent) is very much the same like the appetite of 
fire (i.e. of a non-cognitive agent), there is no cognition involved in the case 
of the horse just as there is no cognition involved in the case of fire. In short, 
the horse has a universal appetite for water since it is going to take any por-
tion of water. But it does not have a universal mental representation of water 
because its appetite can be assuaged without cognition, just as fire needs no 
cognitive powers in order to burn something. In modern animal psychology, 
the methodological principle behind this kind of argument is generally known 
as ‘Morgan’s Canon’. According to this principle, one should avoid explaining 
animal behaviour by referring to higher psychological processes if it can also 
be explained by lower processes.10 If one takes the appetite of fire to be such a 
lower process, one can apply Morgan’s Canon to the appetite of the horse and 
thus explain it without reference to any kind of cognition.11
One might, of course, reject this explanation by saying that the horse has 
cognitive powers and will thus use them to find nutrition, hence possesses 
certain mental representations of what it seeks. Still, there is some reason to 
doubt that those mental representations are as universal as Pluta takes them 
to be. The reason is that Buridan does not actually aim to provide evidence for 
universal mental representations at the level of the sensory soul. Rather, his 
aim is to show that “the materiality of sense is not the ground of the singular-
ity of sensitive cognition,” as Peter King has put it.12 That is to say, Buridan has 
no doubt that sensitive cognition is singular. What he doubts is rather that 
the singularity of sense perception can be proven with reference to the mate-
rial nature of the senses.13 In his view, all powers – no matter whether they 
are material or immaterial – ‘are about universals’ (sunt circa universalia). The 
reason is simply that all of them are indifferent with regard to their objects: 
sight indifferently perceives all colours and the desire to eat something is indif-
ferent towards edible things. Yet, this being about universals does not amount 
10 The original formulation of this principle is found in Morgan (1894), 53: “In no case may 
we interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise of a higher psychical faculty, if it can 
be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one which stands lower in the psycho-
logical scale.” For a recent critical discussion see Starzak (2014), 12–32.
11 Biard (2012), 59, seems to go in this direction by saying about Buridan’s theory that 
“l’appétit n’est pas le sens en tant que puissance cognitive, qui quant à lui appréhende 
toujours telle chose matérielle singulière.”
12 King (2001), 12.
13 The most recent and thorough reconstruction, analysis, and discussion of Buridan’s argu-
ment is provided by Klein (2016), esp. 95–105.
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to cognising universals but rather resembles what has been called cognising 
universally in previous chapters of this part (see Chapters 8 and 9). One could 
also say that all powers are universal under the aspect of intentionality.14 Still, 
this does not pave the way for the passage from universal appetite to universal 
mental representations. But is this to say that Buridan denies universal cogni-
tion to nonhuman animals entirely?
If one looks at his commentary on the Prior Analytics it seems as if the con-
trary is the case because in one passage of this commentary he brings up the 
famous example of the dog that begins to fear sticks or stones and he argues 
that the dog’s reaction of flight is based on what he calls an ‘experimental 
judgment’ (iudicium experimentale). Why Buridan ascribes a judgment to the 
dog here is the subject of Chapter 17. For the moment, it suffices to concen-
trate on the aspect of experience, because this is where universal cognition 
comes into play. According to Buridan, the dog behaves like a human being 
that  experiences fire as hot and learns to stay away from it. For instance, an 
inexperienced child who sees a fire A and touches it it will sense that this fire is 
hot. It might have the same experience with another fire B. But after a couple 
of painful encounters with fires the child might finally arrive at the conclusion 
that any fire, or fire in general, is hot. Thus, if it then sees some fire C it will – by 
 experience – judge this to be hot and stay away. Similarly, the dog stays away 
from sticks because it knows by experience that sticks are (or can be) painful.15
As discussed in the previous chapters, this can be taken as evidence for the 
fact that the dog is endowed with the capacity of generalisation, because it 
seems to know that sticks in general are painful. Buridan, however, seems to 
favour a more conservative conclusion here. The first thing he emphasises is 
that the principles providing the basis for such experimental judgments are 
14 See King (2001), 12, n. 30, who suggests that “the intentional nature of desire introduces a 
kind of opacity (intentionality produces intensionality): the horse wants some-water-or-
other, which cannot be identified with any particular water, but is such that any particular 
water satisfies it.”
15 See John Buridan, Quaestiones in Analytica Priora, lib. ii, q. 20a, ed. Hubien [undated 
typescript]: “Verbi gratia, si tu ad sensum cognovisti quod ignis A erat calidus, et postea 
idem de igne B, et sic de multis aliis, tu postea videns ignem C, et non tangens ipsum, judi-
cabis per memoriam de aliis et propter similitudinem quod ille ignis C est calidus; et hoc 
non est, proprie loquendo, judicium per sensum, quia non tangis ipsum, nec solum per 
memoriam, quia memoria proprie non est nisi prius cognitorum et tamen ipsum ignem 
C numquam alias vidisti nec cognovisti; sed hoc judicium vocatur ‘experimentale’. Et non 
solum homines, immo aequaliter brutae hujus modi judicio utuntur; unde propter hoc 
canis timet lapidem si aliquis laesit ipsum. Et omnia praedicta principia sunt singularia, 
et sunt principia in arte vel in prudentia, et non in scientia speculativa vel demonstrativa.”
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‘singular principles’ (principia singularia). That is to say, the dog’s reaction is 
based on the principle that this particular stick is painful because that par-
ticular stick it has sensed before had been painful, too. In other words, it is 
incapable of fully abstracting from various particular encounters with sticks 
and so it does not arrive at the universal principle ‘All sticks are painful’.16 Sec-
ond, Buridan also remarks that the faculty that judges in this situation is not 
the intellect, but the estimative power, which is why nonhuman animals have 
such cognition.17 Admittedly, this argument might be taken to be insufficient 
because it rests on the assumption that the estimative power cannot access 
the realm of universals. Although this was taken for granted by Buridan and 
most other medieval thinkers, one could ask for some evidence for the fact 
that estimative perception is restricted to particulars. The easiest way to ad-
dress this objection is to refer to ‘Morgan’s Canon’ once again. So as long as one 
can coherently account for the dog’s behaviour without reference to universal 
principles or generalisation, one should stick to this explanation. But is Buri-
dan able to give such an explanation?
The short answer is ‘yes’, because according to Buridan if one judges by expe-
rience that a given fire C is hot, one judges ‘by memory of other [fires] and be-
cause of [some] similarity” (per memoriam de aliis et propter similitudinem).18 
Put differently, in order to see that this particular fire C is hot, I do not need 
to see that all fires are hot. Rather, it suffices to see that this fire C is similar to 
that fire A or B. Likewise, the dog need not realise that all sticks are hurtful. 
Instead, it only needs to recognise that the thing it sees is similar to what it 
has seen before, just as Albertus Magnus’ weasel recognised snake bites and 
endive leaves (see Chapter 8). The recognition of similarities might, of course, 
require some degree of abstraction because a given fire or stick A is not entirely 
identical to another fire or stick B. However, this kind of abstraction need not 
go as far as the abstraction of the concept of fire or stick. Whether it must 
lead to the abstraction of some sort of common form or some general men-
tal representation of stick is worthy of consideration. But as has been shown 
above, Buridan seems to be rather reluctant to grant such representations to 
 nonhuman animals.
16 This is also stressed by Klein (2016), 178. Similarly, Pluta (2015), 276, notes that this kind of 
knowledge “is, however, particular in the sense that it refers to a particular sensation and 
memory or associates a series of particular sensations and memories.”
17 See John Buridan, Summulae de demonstrationibus 8.5.4, ed. de Rijk (2001), 128f.: “Et non 
fit hoc per intellectum, quia sic faceret iuvenis catulus vel caniculus, licet non habens 
intellectum; sed hoc iudicat virtus aestimativa.”
18 See n15 above.
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chapter 13
General Mental Representations  
(Peter of John Olivi)
In contrast to Buridan, Peter of John Olivi seems explicitly to allow for mental 
representations that go beyond the level of particularity in nonhuman ani-
mals. In his commentary on the Sentences, he also discusses the example of 
thirst. In this context, he points out that there is a difference between the so-
called ‘species’ we acquire when we perceive something and those species by 
means of which we imagine, remember or think of something. For instance, if 
there is a glass of red wine standing in front of me, the species I perceive is the 
species of this particular glass of red wine. In other words, I mentally represent 
this particular glass of wine and so the mental representation I have in this 
moment is of a very particular individual. The situation is different, however, 
if I feel the desire or intention to drink some wine when there is no particular 
glass in sight. In this case, I mentally represent wine ‘in general or universally’ 
(in generali seu in universali), according to Olivi.1
As Juhana Toivanen emphasises, it is important to distinguish between uni-
versality and generality here. The wine I imagine is not universal wine because 
the mental representation of wine which I have in my imagination “does not 
represent the universal essence” of wine. In other words, I do not mentally 
represent ‘wineness’ or the quiddity of wine. Rather, the mental representa-
tion I have is the representation of what Toivanen calls “generic” or “general” 
wine.2 It is generic or general in the sense that it enables me to find any glass 
of wine. If, instead, I were to mentally represent a particular glass of wine, my 
search would only be successful if I found this particular glass. Thus, it seems as 
if Olivi holds the view that general mental representations are required if one 
tries to find something that is not currently being perceived.
1 See Peter of John Olivi, Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum, q. 36, ed. Jansen (1922), 
634: “[...] tum quia quando hoc intendimus vel praecogitamus, nunquam hoc praecogitamus 
per species per quas res videri possunt, sed solum per species memoriales per quas res ab-
sentes possumus imaginari vel rememorari vel recogitare. Et ita non oportet quod visio rei 
praecedat rei, quia aliquando hoc non intendimus nisi in generali seu in universali; utpote 
volens videre asinum vel emere vinum non oportet quod praecogitem in particulari hunc vel 
illum asinum vel hoc vel illud vinum, sed sufficit quod in generali.”
2 Toivanen (2013a), 323f.
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Still, two questions can be raised with regard to Olivi’s explanation. The first 
question is whether his account of general mental representations applies to 
nonhuman animals too since the example he gives obviously concerns human 
beings. According to Juhana Toivanen, this question is legitimate, but from 
the context it is clear that what Olivi says about the nature of human mental 
representations in such situations also applies to the representations of other 
animals because the process described here takes place at the level of the sen-
sitive soul.3 Of course, one could object that there might be a fundamental 
difference between sensory cognition in humans and nonhuman animals: 
while we acquire universal mental representations by virtue of our intellect, 
nonhuman animals do not, and so the general representation of wine in our 
imagination might be some kind of derivative representation of the universal 
representation of wine we have in our intellect whereas this is not the case for 
other animals.
This is exactly where the second question arises, namely the question of 
how one can conceive of general mental representations in those animals that 
do not have intellectual powers. In order to answer this question, it will be 
helpful to adopt the above-mentioned distinction between universal and gen-
eral mental representations. The crucial point is in what sense they differ from 
singular representations. As has been said, having a universal representation 
consists in representing the quiddity of a thing which is common to all things 
of the same kind. A universal representation is usually taken to be immaterial 
because it abstracts from the material circumstances that make a thing this 
particular thing. Having a singular representation, by contrast, means to repre-
sent such a particular thing only. Singular representations might, of course, be 
necessary for acquiring universal representations, depending on one’s theory 
of concept formation. Nevertheless, they are the exact opposite of universal 
representations, so to speak.
General representations are in some sense half-way between universal and 
singular representations because, on the one hand, they are material represen-
tations, like singular representations, but on the other hand, they are unlike 
singular representations in that they represent more than just one particular 
thing. As an illustration of what such a general representation might look like, 
one can, once more, turn to the example of red wine: while my universal rep-
resentation of red wine is a totally abstract and immaterial representation and 
my singular representation a totally concrete and material representation, my 
general representation might be something like a patchwork made of several 
singular representations of red wine. It is thus material (like my singular and 
3 See Toivanen (2013a), 323.
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unlike my universal representation), but not singular (like my universal and 
unlike my singular representation).4 Admittedly, it remains unclear to some 
extent whether this is what Olivi has in mind when speaking of general rep-
resentations, especially because he does not explicitly make a terminological 
distinction between general and universal representations in this passage. But 
supposing that he accepts this distinction, he would be a good – and, among 
the thinkers covered in this part, a relatively unique – example of a medieval 
philosopher who grants general mental representations to nonhuman animals. 
To be clear, Olivi does not stand out from other authors insofar as he does not 
cast doubt on the lack of intellectual powers in nonhuman animals either. As 
regards the aspect of universal cognition and concept formation, however, he 
does provide an interesting explanation of how nonhuman animals can, nev-
ertheless, reach beyond the level of mere particularity in some sense.
As has become clear in this part, many other thinkers had an interest in 
this question, too, as they obviously wondered whether the lack of intellect 
and reason really implies that nothing but particulars can be perceived. While 
some were rather sympathetic to making this connection, others considered 
in what sense this connection might be too strict. In the end, none of them as-
cribed the cognition of universals in terms of quiddities to nonhuman animals 
and none of them held that nonhuman animals engage in concept formation 
as we do by virtue of intellect and reason. Nonetheless, all of them paid atten-
tion to whether the distinction between particular and universal cognition is 
as clear-cut as it seems to be or whether there are shades of grey, so to speak. 
In the following part, we shall examine whether such nuances also exist with 
respect to the second intellectual operation, namely, judging. Because if non-
human animals are incapable of forming concepts, the question is then: are 
they nevertheless capable of forming judgments?
4 A very similar description of such representations is given by Sorabji (1993b), 63. Although he 
does not talk about Olivi, but Avempace (who deals with Galen) in this context, the issue is 
the same. However, it is rather unlikely that Avempace’s account somehow influenced medi-
eval thinkers in the Latin West. For a very concise discussion of Avempace’s position see also 
Druart (2016), 78f. A complete translation of the passage in question can be found in Druart 
(1980), 76. I have also profited from an unpublished paper on medieval Islamic theories of 






Introduction to Part 3
Nonhuman animals are capable of doing many things. They recognise people, 
other members of their species, or nonliving beings. They discriminate be-
tween individuals and members of different kinds, and they are able to see 
similarities between various objects. None of the thinkers covered in the previ-
ous part cast doubt on their ability to do this. However, many of them stress 
that nonhuman animals do not recognise and distinguish between things by 
using general terms or concepts. That is, sheep or dogs do not actually under-
stand that there is something like kinds or categories, and when a sheep sees 
a wolf it does not, strictly speaking, perceive the wolf as falling under the con-
cept of wolf. Moreover, many thinkers emphasise that sheep and other animals 
do not detect similarities to the extent that they cognise universals in terms 
of quiddities. This, they maintain, remains the privilege of intellect and rea-
son and thus sets humans apart from other animals. To be sure, some of them 
hold that other animals have an idea of kinds as well. Some of them also grant 
them some sort of general mental representations. Still, no thinker went so 
far as claiming that the cognition of universals and concept formation can be 
achieved by the sensory powers, which , according to Aristotelian psychology, 
we share with other species.
It therefore seems impossible that nonhuman animals can engage in judg-
ing because, according to what is sometimes called the “building-block model” 
(see Chapter 6) judgments are propositions. Propositions, in turn, are made of 
general terms or concepts.1 So any being which lacks concepts, also lacks the 
capacity to form propositions or to have “propositional attitudes,” as Donald 
Davidson famously put it.2 Propositional attitudes include all kinds of atti-
tudes, from beliefs and opinions to hopes and fears. Quite often, such attitudes 
are summarily called ‘thoughts’. In every case, they have a propositional struc-
ture, in the view of Davidson and other modern philosophers because to have, 
for instance, a belief means to ‘believe that X’. Now one can, of course, criticise 
this account of judgments for various reasons. But this does not detract from 
the fact that the medieval thinkers covered by this study took judgments to 
be propositions and propositions to be made of concepts.3 Thus, the sheep 
1 On this model see, for instance, Glock (2010), esp. 15–19.
2 See Davidson (1982). A concise summary of Davidson’s account provides Wild (2013), 90–104.
3 For a brief overview of medieval theories of judging see Tachau (1993) and Perälä (2014). The 
most comprehensive and insightful studies are still Nuchelmans (1973), (1980); Perler (1990), 
(1992).
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cannot strictly speaking judge that this wolf is hostile or that this lamb is its 
offspring unless it forms such concepts as ‘wolf ’, ‘hostile’, ‘lamb’, ‘offspring’, and 
so forth.4
This makes it all the more surprising that various thinkers nevertheless 
ascribed the capacity to ‘judge’ (iudicare) to nonhuman animals in various 
respects: sheep judge wolves to be dangerous, dogs judge sticks to be pain-
ful, or swallows judge straws to be useful, to name just a few examples. The 
crucial question, of course, is whether the term ‘judging’ is applied to nonhu-
man animals in the same sense in which it is applied to cognitive processes 
in humans. Did medieval authors ascribe judgments in terms of propositions 
to other animals? Or did they have a broader concept of judging which also 
covers non-propositional forms of judgments? Or were other animals said to 
judge only in a metaphorical way of speaking? And if both human and nonhu-
man animals are capable of judging, what is the difference between the way in 
which humans judge and the way in which sheep, dogs, swallows, or other ani-
mals judge? Do such nonhuman animals judge deliberately or instinctually? 
Are they capable of reflecting on their own judgments and of discriminating 
between correct and incorrect judgments, for instance?
These are just some of the questions that will be addressed in this part. As 
in the previous part, examples will be given for answers to each of these ques-
tions. But it is important to note that not each and every thinker covered in 
the following discussion provides answers to each and every question. Rather, 
they mostly focus on single aspects, which are determined by their specific 
motivation for discussing the capacity of judging in nonhuman animals. The 
structure of this part therefore follows once more a systematic, rather than a 
chronological arrangement. It will begin with a brief chapter on the idea of 
sensory judgments as found in Aristotle and further developed in Avicenna’s 
theory of estimation (Chapter 14). Chapters 15–17 deal with how this idea was 
received by thirteenth- and fourteenth-century thinkers in the Latin West, 
namely, Thomas Aquinas, Albertus Magnus, John Buridan, and Peter of John 
Olivi. All of them claim that nonhuman animals are capable of judging in a 
way, but all of them also hold different views on what this capacity amounts to. 
But not every author accepted such a concept of judging. Most prominently, 
William Ockham’s secretary Adam Wodeham argue for a narrower concept. 
His interesting debate with Gregory of Rimini will be the topic of Chapter 18.
4 A relatively early but illuminating discussion of this argument is found in John Blund’s early 
13th-century Tractatus de anima, c. 19, §§258 and 260, eds. Callus & Hunt (2013), 140.
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chapter 14
The Idea of Sensory Judgments
In order to understand how medieval authors came to say that, for instance, 
the sheep judges the wolf to be hostile although it lacks the concepts of wolf, 
hostility, and so forth, it is necessary to look briefly at the ancient and early 
medieval roots of the idea that there exist not only intellectual judgments but 
also “judgments of sense.”1 What does it mean to say that the senses judge? Ac-
cording to Aristotle, the external senses are “distinction-making faculties,” as 
Martha Nussbaum puts it.2 That is, they distinguish between different kinds of 
sensibles. For instance, our sense of sight distinguishes yellow from green and 
our sense of taste bitter from sweet. The task of discrimination is not solely a 
sensory task, of course, because both the intellect and the power of imagina-
tion make certain distinctions, too. But each of these powers distinguishes dif-
ferent objects. While the external senses discern sensible things, the intellect 
discerns concepts and the imagination discriminates phantasms. Admittedly, 
there is a substantial difference between distinguishing concepts and distin-
guishing colours or flavours. The former is a much more complicated cognitive 
operation, one might say, and no sense could ever perform this task because it 
has no access the realm of concepts. Still, the basic operation of distinguishing 
is the same and this is why Aristotle calls the intellect, the imagination, and the 
sensory powers ‘distinguishing’ or ‘discerning faculties’ (kritika).3
One could object that distinction-making is not the same as judging be-
cause distinction-making can be found in non-living beings as well. Take, for 
instance, a magnet. It clearly distinguishes various things, such as iron and 
gold. However, nobody would grant the magnet cognitive powers, let alone 
the capacity of judging. Similarly, sensory discriminations need not qualify as 
judgments. Therefore, on this argument, one should refrain from translating 
the Greek term ‘krinein’ as ‘judging’.4 This is a legitimate objection indeed, but 
with respect to medieval theories it misses the point for a very simple reason: 
in the Latin translations of Aristotle, the term ‘kritika’ was usually rendered 
1 I borrow this expression from the very valuable study by Summers (1987). Similarly, Garceau 
(1968), 241–251, speaks of the “jugement des sens.” On the medieval reception of this idea see 
also Tachau (1993).
2 Nussbaum (1985), 232.
3 See Aristotle, De motu animalium, c. 6, 700b19-22.
4 See, for instance, Tellkamp (1999), 141–144,; Davids (2017), 151. See also Summers (1987), 21–28.
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with ‘iudicativa’ and the corresponding verb ‘krinein’ with ‘(di)iudicare’.5 Thus, 
even if one argues that ‘judging’ is not a good English translation of the original 
Greek term, it does not do away with the fact that Latin authors were used to 
speaking of ‘judgments’ in this context, even long before Aristotle’s writings on 
psychology were translated into Latin. For instance, Augustine already points 
out that the external senses as well as the so-called ‘inner sense’ (sensus inte-
rior) ‘judge somehow about corporeal objects’ (de corporibus quodam modo 
iudicare), both in human and nonhuman animals.6
The idea of judgments by the inner senses was fleshed out in particular by 
Avicenna, in connection with his theory of estimation, which became high-
ly influential in the Latin West, as we saw in the previous part. According to 
Avicenna, both ‘the common sense and the external senses discern in a way 
and judge because they say that this moving thing is black and this red thing 
is sour’.7 That is to say, our senses do not simply receive sensory inputs, but 
they also discern and combine what they perceive. The faculty of estimation 
is especially relevant in this context and it is even more relevant for explain-
ing nonhuman animal behaviour. Avicenna calls it the ‘ruler’ (domina) of the 
animal soul, and he stresses that what it does is ‘delivering a judgment’ (iudi-
cans iudicium).8 Why does it make sense to speak of judgments here, especially 
since Avicenna emphasises that an estimative judgment differs from an intel-
lectual one in that the former is ‘not definite’ (non definitum)? Moreover, since 
he also stresses that the estimation is ‘a more excellent judge in animals’ (excel-
lentior iudex in animalibus), on the one hand, but prone to error, on the other 
hand? For instance, if one sees a yellow liquid, he says one can easily believe it 
5 In the Aristoteles Latinus, De motu animalium (transl. Morbeka), c. 6, 700b19f., ed. De Lee-
mans (2011), 55, the above-quoted passage thus reads: “Et enim fantasia et sensus intellectui 
eundem locum habent: iudicativa enim omnia.”
6 Augustine, De libero arbitrio, lib. ii, 5.12, §§49–50, ed. Green (1970), 245. On Augustine’s ac-
count of an inner sense and the role it plays in nonhuman animal cognition see Brittain 
(2002), 288–295; Heller-Roazen (2007), 131–141. On the history of the idea of (common) sense 
judgments see also Heller-Roazen (2008).
7 Avicenna Latinus, Liber de anima, lib. iv, c. 1, ed. van Riet (1968), 6: “Sensus vero communis et 
sensus exteriores discernunt aliquo modo et diiudicant: dicunt enim hoc mobile esse nigrum 
et hoc rubicundum esse acidum.”
8 Ibid., 8: “Et haec virtus [i.e., aestimatio; A.O.] sine dubio consistit in nobis; quae est domina, 
iudicans in animali iudicium non definitum sicut iudicium intellectuale, immo iudicium 
imaginabile coniunctum cum singularitate et forma sensibili, et ex hac emanant quamplures 
actiones animalium.” On estimation and estimative judgments in Avicenna see Black (1993), 
227ff.; Black (2000), 61; Di Martino (2008), 36f.; Tellkamp (2013), 211.
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to taste sweet and thus to be honey although it is not honey, but bitter tasting 
bile.9 But if this can only be corrected by an intellectual judgment, why should 
one call estimative judgments ‘judgments’ and not simply ‘perceptions’?
The main reason that it makes sense to speak of judgments here is that, ac-
cording to Avicenna, the estimative power elicits intentions. In other words, it 
turns the raw material delivered by the senses into meaningful information.10 
For instance, when a sheep sees a wolf, it primarily perceives sensory forms: 
the wolf ’s colour, its odour, its shape, and so forth. But this means nothing to 
the sheep unless the estimative power somehow evaluates these pieces of sen-
sory information and then tells the sheep whether what it sees is, for example, 
something dangerous or harmless. That is, the estimative power informs the 
sheep about whether it needs to run away or not. Surely, the sheep’s reaction 
of flight is instinctual, as has been said in Part 2. It is incapable of not running 
away in a situation in which it has perceived a wolf. Still, the theory of estima-
tion can plausibly explain why there are different reactions to similar stimuli, 
because wolves obviously look the same both to sheep and to other members 
of their own species. That is to say, if a wolf sees a wolf, and if a sheep sees a 
wolf there seems to be no difference with regard to how the sensory raw sen-
sory material appears. But there is an obvious difference as to what meaning 
is given to this raw material. While the sheep judges a wolf to be dangerous, a 
wolf will judge another wolf to be friendly.
Still, two objections could be raised against the argument that estimative 
judgments are rightly called judgments. First, one could object that the argu-
ment fails to give reasons for why it is not only the estimative power but also 
other internal, as well as external senses that are said to judge despite the fact 
that the latter, in particular, do not deliver anything but the raw material men-
tioned above. Second, one might argue that the term ‘judgment’ is simply ap-
plied here in a very broad sense. One could even say that it is only employed by 
analogy. And so to ascribe the capacity of judging to nonhuman animals means 
to speak metaphorically, if not anthropomorphically. However, what lurks be-
hind each of these objections is the view that judgments are propositions. As 
mentioned in the introductory section, this view is not originally a modern 
position but was also prevalent during the medieval period.  Nevertheless, as 
9 See ibid., c. 3, ed. van Riet (1968), 35f.: “Dicemus ergo quia aestimatio excellentior iudex 
est in animalibus, quae iudicat ad modum adinventae imaginationis cum non est certa, 
et hoc est sicut id quod accidit homini cum putat mel sordidum quia simile est stercori: 
aestimatio enim iudicat ita esse et anima sequitur ipsam aestimationem, quamvis intel-
lectus improbet.”
10 This is also how Tellkamp (2016), 116, describes the function of the inner senses.
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we will see in the following chapters, various medieval authors did not refrain 
from speaking of judgments when talking about sensory operations. This is not 
to say, though, that they were uncritical of the ambiguity of this terminology. 
But instead of abandoning it, many of them resorted to scrutinising the various 
differences that exist between sensory and intellectual judgments.
<UN>
chapter 15
Natural Judgments (Thomas Aquinas)
The ascription of judging to nonhuman animals gains its plausibility from the 
idea of sensory judgments that has been sketched above. The question is, how-
ever, what distinguishes human from nonhuman forms of judging apart from 
the fact that only human judgments are predicative judgments? According to 
Aquinas, the kind of judgment one finds in nonhuman animals is a ‘natural 
judgment’ (iudicium naturale).1 But what does it mean to say that the sheep 
delivers a natural judgment when running away from a wolf? Does it mean 
that the sheep’s reaction of flight is just as natural a process as, for instance, the 
falling of a stone? No, Aquinas says. Because a stone is a non-living thing, and 
hence lacks any kind of cognitive powers. Its falling downwards is not triggered 
by any cognitive process, let alone by some kind of judgment.2 Nevertheless, 
there is some similarity between a stone and a sheep. As the stone cannot not 
fall down to earth, the sheep cannot not run away when seeing a wolf, as we 
have seen. This is why Aquinas emphasises that the sheep’s judgment is not 
a free judgment. And this is actually one of the main differences between the 
judgments of humans and those of nonhuman animals. But what does this dif-
ference amount to concretely?
As we have seen, the sheep’s judgment about the wolf ’s hostility derives 
‘from natural estimation’ (ex naturali aestimatione).3 In other words, the sheep 
judges ‘by natural instinct’ (ex naturali instinctu).4 When the sheep sees a wolf 
it does not pause for a moment and cogitate about what would be the best 
thing to do. Rather, it immediately judges that it should flee because this is the 
judgment that has been ‘instilled [to it] by nature’ (a natura inditum), as Aqui-
nas holds.5 In contrast, because they are endowed with the freedom of choice 
1 See, for instance, Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae Ia, q. 83, a. 1, co., ed. Leonina v (1889), 
307: “Iudicat enim ovis videns lupum, eum esse fugiendum, naturali iudicio, et non libero, 
quia non ex collatione, sed ex naturali instinctu hoc iudicat. Et simile est de quolibet iudicio 
brutorum animalium.”
2 See ibid.: “[...] quaedam agunt absque iudicio, sicut lapis movetur deorsum; et similiter om-
nia cognitione carentia. Quaedam autem agunt iudicio, sed non libero; sicut animalia bruta.”
3 Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae De veritate, q. 24, a. 2, ed. Leonina XXII.3.1 (1973), 
686: “Sed hoc iudicium est eis ex naturali aestimatione, non ex aliqua collatione [...].”
4 See n1 above.
5 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae Ia, q. 59, a. 3, co., ed. Leonina v (1889), 95: “Quaedam 
vero agunt quodam arbitrio, sed non libero, sicut animalia irrationalia, ovis enim fugit lupum 
© Anselm Oelze, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004363779_020 
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(liberum arbitrium) humans are capable of making a decision about what they 
should do before doing something. Prior to acting we can measure one option 
against another. We arrive at our judgments ‘by comparison’ (ex collatione), 
and so our judgments are not “‘one-way judgments’ which lead to ‘one-way ac-
tions’,” as Dominik Perler put it.6 Rather, we are free to arrive at very different 
judgments about one and the same thing. Such differences are possible not 
only between members of the human species but within the lives of individu-
als. Some people find roses beautiful, while others find them disgusting. And 
similarly one and the same individual might judge that roses are beautiful at 
one time but find them less beautiful at another time. Nonhuman animals, by 
contrast, do not have the choice between different judgments about one and 
the same thing. All members of one species judge in the same way about like 
stimuli. In other words, they judge as they have been ‘programmed’ to judge.7
This point is also stressed by those interpreters of Aquinas who describe the 
natural judgments of nonhuman animals as “associative judgments.”8 ‘Associa-
tive’ here does not mean that a sheep freely associates with the wolf whatever 
it likes to associate with it. It does not associate harmfulness with one wolf, but 
harmlessness with another. Instead, its judgment is associative in the sense 
that seeing a grey, furry thing is automatically (or instinctually) associated 
with perceiving harmfulness. Technically speaking, the perception of sensible 
forms such as colours, shapes, and so forth is linked to the estimative percep-
tion of certain intentions. These intentions do differ, of course. Not all sensible 
forms are linked to the same intentions. The form of a wolf is linked to different 
intentions than the form of a blade of grass. Moreover, intentions are relational 
features in the sense that wolves are not perceived as harmful by all animal 
species. While sheep are scared of wolves, lions are not. But depending on the 
nature (or genetic ‘programme’) of its species, an animal perceives a sensible 
form as associated with a particular intention. It does not freely form a pred-
icative judgment about this or that thing in the way we would.9
However, one could raise two questions here. First, is it really correct to say 
that humans are free to judge? For would we not also instinctually run away 
ex quodam iudicio, quo existimat eum sibi noxium; sed hoc iudicium non est sibi liberum, 
sed a natura inditum.”
6 Perler (2006), 87.
7 I borrow this idea from Pasnau (2002), 269.
8 Perler (2012b), 37; Davids (2017), 196.
9 This is also stressed by Frede (2001), 170, who says that estimation “works purely by in-




when encountering a wolf? Second, is it true that nonhuman animals are not 
free at all? After all, if they are not, what is the difference between sheep and 
stones, apart from cognition? To the first question Aquinas would possibly 
reply that humans’ judgments do indeed resemble nonhuman animals’ judg-
ments in various situations. Although we do not have an estimative power, in 
his opinion, we do, nevertheless, sometimes react in an instinctual manner. 
This is particularly obvious in the behaviour of human infants, as Aquinas ob-
serves. A child usually takes its mother’s breast without any kind of teaching. 
It does this instinctually.10 Similar instinctual behaviours might be found in 
adults, too. Still, what makes the difference between our instincts and those 
of a sheep is that we are capable of correcting our judgments by virtue of our 
intellect. So if we judge, for instance, that we should flee from a wolf, we could 
correct this judgment if someone told us that wolves are much more afraid of 
us than we are of them. Or, if we saw a wolf in a zoo our intellect would tell 
us that we need not be afraid of it because it cannot escape its enclosure and 
hence can do us no harm. In other words, we are in a position to “penetrate” 
our emotions by our intellectual judgments.11 Thus, for any kind of judgment 
we deliver there exists at least the possibility of being corrected.
This point is also important with respect to the question of error. While we 
are usually capable of realising that we have delivered an erroneous judgment, 
nonhuman animals lack this capacity, according to Aquinas’ theory. ‘They 
do not judge about their own judgment’ (nec iudicant de suo iudicio), as he 
expresses it.12 In modern terms one could say, they do not have second-order 
judgments.13 This implies two things: first, they do not judge about their judg-
ments in the sense that they deliver a judgment like ‘This is a judgment’. In 
other words, they do not know that they are actually judging because they lack 
a meta-cognitive level. This is not to say that they lack all awareness of their 
‘inner life’, so to speak. By virtue of their common sense they do, for instance, 
register whether or not they are seeing at the moment. But this is possible only 
because their common sense is located on a higher level than their external 
10 See Thomas Aquinas, Commentum in ii Sententiarum, dist. 20, q. 2, a. 2, ed. Mandonnet 
(1929), 515: “Ad quintum dicendum, quod alia animalia non prosequuntur conveniens et 
fugiunt nocivum per rationis deliberationem, sed per naturalem instinctum aestimativae 
virtutis: et talis naturalis instinctus est etiam in pueris; unde etiam mamillas accipiunt, 
et alia eis convenientia, etiam sine hoc quod ab aliis doceantur.” On this passage see also 
Klubertanz (1952), 159, and Tellkamp (2013), 629f.
11 See Perler (2012b), 33f., as well as id. (2006a), 86f.
12 Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae De veritate, q. 24, a. 1, ed. Leonina XXII.3.1 (1973), 
686.
13 This is also how Davids (2017), 196f., reads this passage.
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senses. In the case of estimative judgments, however, there is no higher power 
that allows them to judge about the judgments of their estimation. This also 
entails a second point, namely, that they do not judge about their judgments 
in the sense of evaluating their own judgments. They cannot step back and 
judge whether the judgment they have delivered previously is right or wrong. 
In modern terms one could say that they do not grasp the truth-conditions of 
their judgments. Consequently, they cannot correct their own judgments.
One might doubt whether nonhuman animals’ judgments are incorrigible, 
because if one takes the example of the dog that learns to fear sticks, one could 
argue that the dog can also be trained not to fear sticks anymore. And so the 
dog seems to be capable of correcting its previous judgment about the stick’s 
painfulness. Aquinas does not explicitly consider this possibility, but he is clear 
that many animals can be trained to react to a certain stimulus in a certain way. 
So a human trainer can change the way in which an animal naturally judges 
concerning certain stimuli.14 Of course, Aquinas does not say that all animals 
can be trained. For instance, those animals that lack the sense of hearing, such 
as bees, are immune to teaching because they cannot understand the signs 
of a trainer.15 Moreover, it seems unlikely that sheep can be taught not to fear 
wolves anymore although it is theoretically possible that one could teach a 
sheep to suppress its natural impulse of flight when seeing a tame wolf, for 
example. However, teaching is not based on the correction of a first-order judg-
ment by a second-order judgment. It is not that a dog learns to judge that its 
previous judgment about a stick was an incorrect judgment. Rather, its previ-
ous judgment about the stick, say, ‘This is painful’, is substituted by another 
judgment about the stick such as ‘This is harmless’. Such a substitution of 
14 See Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae De veritate, q. 24, a. 2, ad 7, ed. Leonina 
XXII.3.1 (1973), 687: “[...] sed in brutis est iudicium naturale determinatum ad hoc quod id 
quod uno modo proponitur vel occurrit, eodem modo accipiatur vel fugiatur. Contingit 
autem ex memoria praeteritorum beneficiorum vel flagellorum ut bruta aliquid appre-
hendant quasi amicum, et prosequendum vel sperandum; et aliquid quasi inimicum, et 
fugiendum vel timendum: et ideo post flagella, ex passione timoris, quae inde eis insurgit, 
inducuntur ad obediendum nutui instructoris.”
15 See Thomas Aquinas, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, lib. i, lec. 1, 
n. 12, eds. Cathala & Spiazzi (1964), 8: “Inter ea vero, quae memoriam habent, quaedam 
habent auditum et quaedam non. Quaecumque autem auditum non habent, ut apes, vel 
si quod aliud huiusmodi animal est, licet prudentiam habere possint, non tamen sunt 
disciplinabilia, ut scilicet per alterius instructionem possint assuescere ad aliquid faci-
endum vel vitandum: huiusmodi enim instructio praecipue recipitur per auditum: unde 
dicitur in libro De sensu et sensato, quod auditus est sensus disciplinae.” Apparently, Aqui-
nas does not consider the possibility of teaching via other senses such as sight.
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 judgments leads to a change in the dog’s reaction, and this openness to change 
is what sets cognitive agents apart from non-cognitive beings such as stones. 
Stones will always fall to earth unless there is some external hindrance. We 
cannot teach a stone to not fall. Animals, in contrast, are at least potentially 
capable of changing their reactions, even though this will require some very 
intense training and might not always be successful.16
Furthermore, according to Aquinas, nonhuman animals are superior to 
non-cognitive things as they even have ‘some sort of choice’ (quodam arbitri-
um) or ‘some likeness of free choice’ (quaedam similitudo liberi arbitrii).17 But 
how is this choice to be understood? Briefly speaking, he thinks that nonhu-
man animals possess some likeness of free choice because all of their actions 
need to be preceded by a judgment. That is to say, they will not do anything, 
unless they judge that they should do it. However, one needs to be careful here, 
because Aquinas is not suggesting that they are free to choose whatever seems 
to be the best option, as has been shown. Rather, they are free to the extent 
that they show what he calls an ‘indifference towards acting and not acting’ 
(indifferentia ad agere et non agere).18 That is, they are not determined to act if 
they do not judge at all.19 Again, this is why they are quite free in comparison 
to stones, for example. But in comparison to human beings, they possess only 
a likeness of freedom because ‘their judgment is naturally determined to one 
16 For an overview of thirteenth-century views of animal learning see Köhler (2014), 230–240.
17 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae Ia, q. 59, a. 3, co., ed. Leonina v (1889), 95, as well 
as Quaestiones disputatae De veritate, q. 24, a. 2, ed. Leonina XXII.3.1 (1973), 686: “Et simili-
ter est in eis quaedam similitudo liberi arbitrii, in quantum possunt agere vel non agere 
unum et idem, secundum suum iudicium, ut sic sit in eis quasi quaedam conditionata 
libertas: possunt enim agere, si iudicant esse agendum, vel non agere, si non iudicant. Sed 
quia iudicium eorum est determinatum ad unum, per consequens et appetitus et actio ad 
unum determinatur [...].” See also ibid., q. 23, a. 1, ed. Leonina (1973), 653.
18 Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae De veritate, q. 24, a. 2, ad 3, ed. Leonina XXII.3.1 
(1973), 686: “[...] quamvis sit indifferentia ad agere et non agere in bruto, considerata ipsa 
actione secundum seipsam, tamen considerato ordine eius ad iudicium, a quo provenit 
quod est determinatum ad unum, etiam ad ipsas actiones obligatio quaedam derivatur, 
ut non possit in eis inveniri ratio libertatis absolute. Tamen, dato quod in eis esset libertas 
aliqua, et iudicium aliquod, non tamen sequeretur quod esset in eis libertas iudicii, cum 
iudicium eorum sit naturaliter determinatum ad unum.”
19 Therefore, the translation by Ramelow (2013), 211, is misleading because it says that non-
human animals “can act if they judge that they should act or they cannot act if they judge 
against it.” [my translation from the German; A.O.]. According to the Latin, however, they 
do not have the capacity to judge either for or against something, as Ramelow insinuates. 
Rather, what Aquinas wants to say here is that they need not act unless they judge that 
they should act. However, they cannot judge on how to act.
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thing’ (iudicium eorum sit naturaliter determinatum ad unum), as Aquinas puts 
it. Unlike us, they do not have the capacity to deliberate about what would be 
the best thing to do. Even in the above-mentioned cases in which they have 
learned to react in a way that differs from their natural instincts, they are deter-
mined to have only one reaction. Once the dog has been taught to fear sticks, 
it cannot not fear sticks.
But what about a situation in which an animal is confronted with, for in-
stance, a piece of food and an enemy at the same time? Would it not be forced 
to deliberate about what is more important – eating or fleeing? Although Aqui-
nas does not discuss such a case, it is rather unlikely that he would grant an 
animal the capacity of deliberation in this situation, because the comparison 
of different options would require the cogitative power at least, if not intellect 
and reason.20 Aquinas, however, grants nonhuman animals neither of these 
faculties. Therefore, he would presumably argue that the animal behaves ac-
cording to the judgment that is naturally stronger in this situation, namely, the 
judgment that it needs to flee the enemy. This implies that there is some sort 
of ‘hierarchy’ of natural judgments, according to which fleeing enemies is pri-
oritised above eating food, for example. But even from a modern perspective, 
there is nothing fundamentally wrong with such a hierarchy because although 
most people nowadays would not claim that God has created this hierarchy, 
they would agree that, depending on the situation, some instincts are stron-
ger than others. Thus, from the fact that an animal favours fleeing over eating 
one cannot infer that it has judged that fleeing is more important than eating. 
Rather, it follows a natural impulse.
Still, it is misleading to say that Aquinas takes nonhuman animals to be 
subject to “total determinism,” as Stephen Loughlin suggests, because total de-
terminism is rather what applies to non-cognitive things, such as stones.21 As 
has been said, the stone’s falling down is not the result of an act of judgment, 
whereas nonhuman animals’ actions are based on judgments. Therefore, ani-
mals can be said to possess at least ‘some freedom’ (aliqua libertas), in the view 
of Aquinas.22 To be sure, their freedom is a likeness of freedom rather than free-
dom proper. Nevertheless, they are not merely subject to the laws of nature as 
stones are. In short, their capacity of delivering natural judgments does not lift 
their cognition to the level of human cognition, but it enables them to interact 
with different things in ways which are not open to non-cognitive beings, and 
in this sense they are similar to us.
20 For a different reading of Aquinas see Rubini (2015), 472.
21 Loughlin (2001), 49.
22 See n18 above.
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chapter 16
Erroneous Judgments and Differences in 
Estimation (Albertus Magnus)
As we have seen, Thomas Aquinas’ theory of natural judgments relies heavily 
on the Aristotelian idea of sensory judgments, as well as on Avicenna’s theory 
of estimation. The same could be said about Albert’s account of judging in 
nonhuman animals because he also thinks that they engage in judging in the 
sense that they interact with the world by virtue of their external and inter-
nal senses, most importantly, by virtue of estimation. It is, nevertheless, worth 
looking at Albert’s account for a moment, because in some places he focuses 
on different aspects than Aquinas does. The first interesting aspect is the possi-
bility of error.1 Of course, this aspect is not totally absent from Aquinas’ theory, 
as we have seen in the previous chapter. But Albert’s statements on error in 
nonhuman animals shed more light on the nature of their judgments. The sec-
ond interesting aspect concerns the question of whether the capacity of judg-
ing varies among different species of animals.
As regards the aspect of error, Albert provides a strange but illuminating 
example. In his Quaestiones super De animalibus, he discusses why wolves are 
less timid in the field than in the forest. His answer is as short as it is simple: in 
the forest, wolves often mistake trees for human beings, therefore, they often 
get frightened. In the field, by contrast, they cannot fall prey to this error, which 
is why they are much braver there.2 This might seem like a strange example, 
because wolves usually live in the woods. However, for the purpose of the 
present chapter the consistency of this example is not what matters. Rather, 
what matters is that wolves are said to err because they mistake trees for hu-
man  beings.3 More precisely, they ‘estimate’ (aestimant) that what they see is a 
1 On this question see also Oelze (forthcoming b).
2 Albertus Magnus, Quaestiones super De animalibus, lib. viii, q. 32, ed. Filthaut (1995), 199: “Ad 
quartum dicendum, quod quia lupus est animal timidum, ideo frequenter aestimat arbores 
esse homines, sed cum est in campo, tunc melius potest undique respicere et sibi praecavere 
et ideo audacior est extra silvam quam in silva.” On wolves in Albertus Magnus’ works see 
Anzulewicz (2013b).
3 There are a number of similar examples in medieval texts. For instance, in his treatise on 
the soul, an anonymous master of arts states that donkeys are much more afraid of water 
than of lions since they become frightened when seeing their own reflection in the water, 
see  Anonymous, De anima et de potenciis eius, ed. Gauthier (1982), 46. Similarly, a medieval 
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 human being and not a tree. Albert, of course, employs this term because the 
wolf ’s erroneous judgment is brought about by its power of estimation in this 
situation. But if one leaves aside the particularly medieval theory of estima-
tion for a moment, the example turns out to be very similar to the example 
famously used by Norman Malcolm and Donald Davidson in their discussion 
on whether nonhuman animals can think.
Their example is the following:4 a dog chases a cat through a garden. The cat 
heads towards an oak tree but, at the very last moment, jumps onto a nearby 
maple tree. The dog misses this manoeuvre and so it stops at the oak tree and 
begins to bark up the wrong tree. In order to explain the dog’s behaviour, most 
people would probably say that the dog erroneously thinks or believes that the 
cat climbed up the oak tree. For why should it bark up the oak tree if it did not 
think or believe that the cat was sitting up there? Now, the way in which we are 
inclined to express the dog’s belief or thought is a typical propositional judg-
ment of the form ‘X believes/thinks that F’. According to Davidson, we thus 
ascribe what he calls “propositional attitudes” to the dog.5 But Davidson is 
skeptical about whether we are right to attribute such attitudes to nonhuman 
animals. In short, his “lingualist master-argument,” as Hans-Johann Glock calls 
it, runs as follows:6 thought requires concepts and concepts require language. 
Consequently, if a creature lacks the capacity for language it lacks both con-
cepts and any kind of thoughts, no matter whether those thoughts are desires, 
beliefs, hopes, or anything else of this sort.
Davidson’s argument for the language-dependence of thought is, of course, 
much more intricate, and it has given rise to various objections. But suffice it 
to say that it also has consequences for the ‘capacity’ of erring. Since the dog 
has no propositional attitudes, it also lacks the capacity to realise that it is mis-
taken about something. In short, if the dog is incapable of having the belief 
‘The cat is sitting in this tree’ it is likewise incapable of falsifying or confirm-
ing this belief. Interestingly, this is exactly what seems to apply to estimative 
judgments, as well. If the wolf ’s estimative power judges that this thing over 
there is a human being and not a tree there is no obvious way to correct this 
error because, like Avicenna, Albert thinks that the correction of false sensory 
 judgments (e.g. by imagination or estimation) requires the intellect.7 This is 
 bestiary tells the story of a dog that mistakes its own reflection for another dog, see Clark 
(2006), 147.
4 See Malcolm (1972), 13; Davidson (1982), 319.
5 Davidson (1982), 318f.
6 See Glock (2010), 15. See also Wild (2013), 90–104.
7 See, for instance, Albertus Magnus, De animalibus, lib. xxi, tr. 1, c. 3, ed. Stadler (1920), 1331: 
“Sed in omnibus hiis non movetur nisi ex fantasmate: et ideo frequenter errat sicut et alia 
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quite plausible for the following reason: imagine the wolf ’s estimation judges 
that X is a human being at time t1. Now at t2 it delivers a different judgment, 
namely, the judgment that X is a tree. No matter why it judges differently about 
X at t2 (but let us, for the sake of the argument, suppose that it does), it is 
incapable of registering that it judges differently at t2 because, like any other 
sensory power, estimation cannot reflect on its own acts. Therefore, it seems 
impossible for it to correct its own judgments. Maybe one could say that it can 
alter its judgments, but the only way in which judgments can be corrected is by 
the aid of the intellect.8
But what about highly-developed nonhuman animals, such as pygmies, 
which have what Albert calls ‘a shadow of reason’? Are they as prone to error 
as other animals? In short, the answer is: they are. The possession of a shadow 
of reason does not prevent them from making mistakes. The main reason for 
this is that this shadow of reason lacks a connection with the intellect. None-
theless, pygmies and apes in general usually outdo other species of nonhuman 
animals in judging whether something is harmful or helpful, according to Al-
bert. In particular, they seem to have developed a sense for the needs of others. 
That is, they not only deliver judgments about what is good or bad for them but 
their judgments also extend to what is good or bad for other members of their 
own species, if not even for the members of other species.
In order to illustrate this, Albert mentions the example of an infant ape that 
points out its mother’s breasts to another young ape.9 It seems not only to care 
for its own well-being but also for the well-being of others. From a modern 
animalia quia sicut diximus in antehabitis, ubi fantasticum intellectui non coniungitur, fre-
quens incidit error [...].”
8 Therefore, I disagree with Tellkamp (2016), 119f., who claims that “[s]ince animals do not 
possess concepts, Albert does not relate truth and falsehood to propositions, but rather to in-
tentiones produced by phantasy.” It is true that an animal’s estimative perceptions are either 
true or false but the animal itself does not know what the truth-conditions for its estimative 
judgments are, as Tellkamp (2013), 207, claims.
9 Albertus Magnus, De animalibus, lib. xxi, tr. 1, c. 3, ed. Stadler (1920), 1331: “Videtur autem 
genus symiarum prae ceteris animalibus brutis aestimare de nocivo et conferente ex sensu 
et ymaginatione et memoria. Aliis enim aestimationem habentibus de sibi conferentibus 
et nocentibus, et illa persequentibus vel fugientibus, symia aestimat de conferentibus sibi 
et aliis animalibus: et ideo videns parvulum exhibet parvulo ubera, non propria, sed matris 
quae peperit eum si permittatur: puero enim exhibet ubera feminarum si permittatur: et hoc 
alia non faciunt animalia: et in hoc cognoscitur symia melioris esse aestimationis quam aliud 
animal. Et haec in exterioribus convenientia etiam interiorem significat convenientiam: quia 
sicut diximus, aestimativa ipsorum similior est rationi quam aestimativa aliquorum aliorum 
animalium.” According to Janson (1952), 89, the example of an infant ape helping another 
member of its species is quite original in medieval ape lore.
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 perspective, one could say that apes thus engage in social cognition.10 Accord-
ing to some scholars, they even have what is called a ‘theory of mind’. This 
means that they are capable of ascribing mental states, such as intentions and 
desires, to others. The infant ape could be taken to do this because, by offer-
ing its mother’s breasts to another member of its species, it somehow shows 
awareness for and understanding of the latter’s needs and desires. Of course, 
there is a great deal of debate in contemporary research over whether apes 
have a theory of mind or not.11 But, for Albert, the behaviours of apes clearly 
show that there is a great deal of similarity or ‘conformity’ (convenientia) be-
tween us and them – not only as regards physiology but also with a view to 
psychology. Their power of estimation is much more similar to reason than 
the estimative power of other animals, he claims. Thus even though they are 
not immune to making mistakes, their estimative judgments are, in his view, 
superior to the judgments of other animals.
10 See Tomasello & Call (1997), esp. part ii.
11 The most important contributions to this debate include Premack & Woodruff (1978); 
Tomasello & Call (1997), 311–341; Povinelli & Giambrone (1999); Call & Tomasello (2008).
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chapter 17
Reflective and Experimental Judgments  
(Peter of John Olivi, John Buridan)
As seen, both Thomas Aquinas and Albertus Magnus very closely adhere to 
Avicenna’s theory of estimation and the idea of estimative judgments. Both of 
them attend to a number of aspects concerning estimative judgments, includ-
ing the question of whether such judgments are entirely instinctual or wheth-
er they can be changed, if not corrected. Two other authors, namely, Peter of 
John Olivi and John Buridan, also address these questions but take them fur-
ther. Olivi, in particular, wonders whether nonhuman animals are capable of 
reflecting on what would be the best thing to do in a certain situation. Buridan, 
for his part, focuses on how they acquire certain judgments over time through 
learning or experience.
The question of reflection has already been mentioned in connection with 
Aquinas insofar as we have asked how Aquinas could explain the behaviour of 
an animal that is confronted with a situation in which it must choose between 
pursuing a piece of food and fleeing an enemy (see Chapter 15). Aquinas could 
readily answer this question, we have said, by pointing to some sort of ‘natural 
hierarchy’ of estimative judgments. In other words, the animal does not reflect 
on whether it should eat or flee because reflection usually requires the cogita-
tive power which nonhuman animals lack. Rather, the judgment that it should 
flee is naturally stronger than the impulse to eat, because running away from 
an enemy is more important for survival than eating is. Of course, without eat-
ing it will not be able to flee in the long run. But in the particular situation in 
which it can only flee or eat, fleeing is to be preferred. The animal itself, how-
ever, does not gain this insight. This is because, first, it lacks the appropriate 
cognitive power, and second, because it is incapable of grasping the reason for 
which something should be done or not be done.1
For Olivi, even the simplest estimative judgments require the ‘apprehension’ 
(apprehensio) of at least three aspects. For instance, when a sheep judges that 
this wolf is hostile, it first apprehends what Olivi calls the ‘ratio inimicitiae’. 
In short, this means that it grasps the feature of hostility. But the grasp of this 
1 See, for instance, Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae Ia, q. 59, a. 3, co., ed. Leonina v (1889), 
95, where he explains that nonhuman animals fail to grasp, for instance, the “ratio universa-
lis” of goodness. Thus, they do not understand why something is good or bad.
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feature is not sufficient for triggering a reaction of flight, according to Olivi. In 
his view, the sheep also needs to apprehend that the grey, furry thing it sees 
is exactly what has this feature. Moreover, third, it also needs to have an un-
derstanding of itself as being the ‘goal’ (terminus) of the wolf ’s hostility. Thus, 
every judgment about what is to be done in a certain situation also involves 
an awareness of these three aspects at least.2 For Olivi, this applies even to 
relatively simple situations, such as the sheep’s encounter with a wolf. In this 
case, there are not that many options for the sheep: it can either flee or remain. 
But what about more complex situations, such as the above-mentioned choice 
between fleeing and eating?
Olivi considers a relatively similar example: a dog or a snake is attacked by 
another animal. The problem now is that neither the dog nor the snake can 
protect its whole body against the attacker’s bites and blows. Therefore, they 
have to decide what is the most important part to save: the head or something 
else? They both protect the head instead of another part of the body because 
both judge that the head is a more important part of the body than the tail or 
the rear quarters. For Olivi, this shows that they possess ‘some general power’ 
(aliqua communis potentia) by means of which they can compare two extreme 
options with each other.3 One extreme option consists in protecting no part 
at all. The other option is to save at least one part or some parts. Of course, if 
the animal chooses the latter option, other parts of its body might be severely 
wounded. However, this is still better than being wounded everywhere. So, in 
2 See Peter of John Olivi, Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum, q. 64, ed. Jansen (1924), 
603: “Quando enim ovis aestimat lupum sibi esse inimicum, oportet quod apprehendat il-
lam rem quam sibi iudicat inimicam; apprehendere enim solam rationem inimicitiae non 
est apprehendere lupum sibi esse inimicum. Unde etiam ultro duo praedicta oportet quod 
simul apprehendat se tanquam terminum illius hostilis respectus.” On this passage see also 
Toivanen (2013a), 284, On Olivi’s theory of animal actions in particular see Toivanen (2011).
3 Peter of John Olivi, Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum, q. 62, ed. Jansen (1924), 
587f.: “Ergo sicut illam appetitivam oportet dominari omnibus membris et sensibus quos ad 
suos actus applicat vel ab eis retrahit: sic oportet unam iudicativam sibi assistere quae de 
omnibus actibus eorum iudicet et eorum delectationes vel dolores advertat et alteram alteri 
praeferat vel praeferandum ostentat. Praeterea, quando canis vel serpens pro conservatione 
capitis exponit aliud membrum aut pro conservatione totius exponit aliquam partem, tunc 
praefert totum parti et caput alteri membro. Ergo oportet in eis esse aliquam communem po-
tentiam quae in simul ambo extrema et mutuam eorum comparationem et unius ad alterum 
praeferentiam ostendat, quamvis non cum illa plenitudine et altitudine reflexivi iudicii cum 




short, the animal reflects on what is the best thing to be done and it engages in 
this reflection by virtue of its common sense.4
Still, Olivi stresses that nonhuman animals’ ‘reflective judgment’ (iudicium 
reflexivum), as he calls it, does not have the same ‘completeness and altitude’ 
(plenitudo et altitudo) as the reflective judgments of the human intellect.5 But 
how is this to be understood? One possible reading would be that nonhuman 
animals cannot reflect on just any kind of issue. Rather, their inner sense makes 
them reflect only on what is immediately relevant for their survival or well-
being. Moreover, one could argue that their reflective judgments arise from 
instinct much more than they arise from deliberation. This is also a possible 
objection to Olivi’s theory, because it is hard to tell from the outside whether 
a dog’s or a snake’s reaction in protecting a certain part of the body derives 
from instinct or from some process of reflection. Even humans, one could say, 
instinctually protect their heads, for example, when attacked by somebody. 
However, Olivi could reply to this objection by maintaining that this is exactly 
the reason why he takes those judgments to be inferior to intellectual judg-
ments: they do not arise from a full-fledged process of reflection. Nevertheless, 
the animals’ inner sense ‘notifies a preference’ (ostendat praeferentiam) for a 
certain way of acting, as he puts it, and this is at least similar to what the intel-
lect does when judging that option A is better than option B.
This might still not prove an entirely satisfying answer because what would 
be the difference between a natural hierarchy of instinctual judgments and 
an instinctual preference for a certain reaction? Olivi might say that there is 
no significant difference. However, in the passage in which he discusses the 
reflective judgments of nonhuman animals he points out that their judgments 
about what they should do also depend on whether a certain action would give 
them pleasure or pain.6 Naturally, they will try to avoid pains. But they cannot 
know whether something will give them pleasure or pain unless they have al-
ready experienced a similar thing or situation. So if they remember that this or 
4 According to Olivi, there is a unity, rather than a multiplicity of inner senses. Thus, esti-
mation, for example, is not a distinct inner sense but a particular kind of operation of the 
 common sense. On this theory see Toivanen (2007) and (2013a), 247–265. Olivi shares this 
position with Buridan, see De Boer (2014) and Lagerlund (2017).
5 In another passage he adds that nonhuman animals do not judge “with full affirmation” (ple-
na affirmatione), see Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum, q. 57, ed. Jansen (1924), 
327.
6 See n3 above. To what extent this might involve self-awareness is discussed by Toivanen 
(2013b), 375.
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that action has given them pain before, they are likely to judge that they should 
refrain from doing it. This judgment, however, arises from experience rather 
than from instinct. But do nonhuman animals judge by experience at all?
While Olivi does not explicitly discuss this question, John Buridan addresses 
it, as we have already seen in Chapter 12. In short, his view is that delivering an 
‘experimental judgment’ (iudicium experimentale), as he calls it, is not a par-
ticularly human capacity. But what exactly is an experimental judgment? Buri-
dan gives the following example:7 if you see a fire and touch it or come close to 
it, you will perceive that the fire is hot. The same will happen with a second fire 
and, maybe, a third and so forth. But after a while you no longer need to touch 
fire in order to find out that it is hot. Rather, you will judge by experience that it 
is hot.8 But why is this not simply a judgment by memory, one could ask, since 
my judgment that some fire C is hot derives from my memory of fires A and B, 
and so there seem to be good reasons to believe that all we need is memory.
To be clear, Buridan does not deny that memory plays a role here. However, 
like many other thinkers (as we will see more clearly in Part 5) he has a rela-
tively narrow definition of memory. Strictly speaking, memory is nothing but 
the recognition of something. That is to say, if one sees fire A one can remem-
ber this fire to be hot only if one has seen (and touched) this particular fire A 
before. By contrast, if one judges by experience one judges with respect to a 
given fire C that one has not seen before. Admittedly, experience is based on 
memory to some extent because the experimental judgment that fire C is hot 
relies on the memory of the encounters with fires A or B. But there is an addi-
tional element involved, namely, the capacity to cognise similarities which has 
already been mentioned in Chapter 12. When seeing a given fire C one cannot, 
strictly speaking, remember that it is hot because this supposes that one has 
seen fire C before. Instead, one realises that, for instance, the shape, the colour, 
and the smell of C is similar to the shape, the colour, and the smell of A and B. 
This then provides the basis for applying the memory of A and B to C. And so 
7 This example has already been discussed in Chapter 12. For a discussion see also Pluta (2015), 
276f.
8 See John Buridan, Quaestiones in Analytica Priora, lib. ii, q. 20a, ed. Hubien [undated type-
script]: “Verbi gratia, si tu ad sensum cognovisti quod ignis A erat calidus, et postea idem de 
igne B, et sic de multis aliis, tu postea videns ignem C, et non tangens ipsum, judicabis per 
memoriam de aliis et propter similitudinem quod ille ignis C est calidus; et hoc non est, pro-
prie loquendo, judicium per sensum, quia non tangis ipsum, nec solum per memoriam, quia 
memoria proprie non est nisi prius cognitorum et tamen ipsum ignem C numquam alias 
vidisti nec cognovisti; sed hoc judicium vocatur ‘experimentale’.”
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one judges by experience that fire C is hot even though one has neither seen 
nor touched this particular fire before.9
This form of judgment is not an exclusively human capacity, according to 
Buridan. In his view, other animals are capable of judging by experience, as 
well. To return to a previous example, dogs that begin to fear sticks or stones 
after they have been beaten with them detect the similarities (shape, colour, 
etc.) between stone C and stones A or B. And by remembering the painful-
ness of A and B they judge that C is likely going to be painful, too.10 Now one 
might ask whether this requires the formation of the concept ‘stone’ because 
it seems an experimental judgment amounts to something like ‘Stones are 
hurtful’. However, as explained in Chapter 12, one needs to be careful here. Be-
cause even though it seems as if the dog delivers a universal judgment about 
the painfulness of stones, Buridan is keen to emphasise that the judgment is 
particular, not universal because the dog does not come to its judgment about 
the painfulness of a stone C by abstracting from its encounters with stones A 
and B.11 Rather, it spots the similarities between A, B, and C and then applies 
its memory of A and B to C.
Now, one could argue that spotting similarities is or involves some sort of 
abstraction because A is not identical with B or C. But for Buridan (as for the 
other thinkers covered in this study), the cognition of similarities does not nec-
essarily involve the formation of concepts or the cognition of universals, as 
seen in Part 2. Of course, in humans it does (or might) lead to concept forma-
tion and universal cognition, at least if one holds that intellectual abstraction 
is based on sensory cognition. But this is not the case in nonhuman animals 
because by definition they lack intellectual powers and thus only judge by 
their senses.12
9 Someone like Aquinas could not readily account for such a cognition because “the recog-
nition of a commonality as shared by several individuals” requires the cogitative power, 
as Barker (2012b), 62, notes.
10 See John Buridan, Quaestiones in Analytica Priora, lib. ii, q. 20a, ed. Hubien [undated 
typescript]: “Et non solum homines, immo aequaliter brutae hujus modi judicio utuntur; 
unde propter hoc canis timet lapidem si aliquis laesit ipsum.”
11 Ibid.: “Et omnia praedicta principia sunt singularia, et sunt principia in arte vel in pruden-
tia, et non in scientia speculativa vel demonstrativa.” See also Klein (2016), 178, and Pluta 
(2015), 276.
12 See John Buridan, Summulae de demonstrationibus 8.5.4, ed. de Rijk (2001), 128f.: “Et non 
fit hoc per intellectum, quia sic faceret iuvenis catulus vel caniculus, licet non habens 
intellectum; sed hoc iudicat virtus aestimativa.”
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chapter 18
The Ascription of Judgments and the Problem  
of Anthropomorphism (William of Ockham,  
Adam Wodeham, Gregory of Rimini)
The thinkers discussed in the previous chapters all accepted the following as-
sumption: one can ascribe judgments to nonhuman animals in the sense in 
which one can ascribe judgments to sensory powers. To be clear, they did not 
hold that there is no difference between sensory and intellectual judgments. As 
we have seen, they all emphasised that the sensory judgments of nonhuman 
animals are in many ways inferior to the intellectual judgments of human be-
ings, mostly because they are instinctual judgments. And even if some degree 
of learning, reflection, or experience might be involved, as some maintained, 
they stressed that his does not reach the level of intellectual learning, reflec-
tion, or experience. Despite these differences, they held that it makes sense to 
speak of judgments in nonhuman animals. Thus, they obviously employed a 
relatively broad concept of judging because they took it for granted that acts 
of judgment can occur at the level of both the intellectual and the sensory 
 powers. However, this relatively broad concept of judging was discussed criti-
cally by authors of the fourteenth century. In this last chapter, we shall look at 
three of them, namely, William of Ockham, Adam Wodeham, and Gregory of 
Rimini.
To begin with Ockham, there is an interesting passage in his Sentences com-
mentary in which he expresses surprise at the idea that sensory powers engage 
in judging. Judging, he says, is ‘a determinate complex act’ (actus complexus 
terminative). That is to say, it is a cognitive operation ‘that presupposes the 
apprehension or formation of something complex’ (praesupponit apprehen-
sionem sive formationem complexi). Apparently, what Ockham has in mind 
here is the above-mentioned ‘building-block model’. According to this model, 
judgments are propositions and propositions are built of concepts. In order to 
judge ‘that X is F’, one needs to possess the concepts ‘X’ and ‘F’, and one needs 
to know how to arrange them in a certain order. In brief, this is what is meant 
by the phrase that judging is a complex act. And so if one attributes the ability 
of judging to sensory powers, one grants them ‘complex cognition’ (cognitio 
complexa).1
1 William of Ockham, Quaestiones in librum tertium Sententiarum (Reportatio), q. 2, eds. Kelley 
& Etzkorn (1982), 85: “Mirabile est quomodo sensus potest iudicare, cum iudicare sit actus 
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But Ockham also thinks that nonhuman animals, human children, and 
mentally disabled people engage in judging because they differentiate be-
tween useful and harmful things.2 So even those creatures which do not (yet) 
have intellectual powers or whose intellectual powers are seriously impaired 
have the capacity to cognise whether something is good or bad for them. Shall 
we therefore grant them complex cognition? No, Ockham says, because the 
way in which they judge is very different from the way in which fully ratio-
nal human beings judge.3 In his opinion, the difference is the following: in a 
healthy human adult the act of judging is preceded by an act of apprehension, 
more precisely, by a complex apprehension. Only then comes the judgment 
which is brought about by the intellect. In other words, humans usually per-
ceive something at first before they judge about what they perceive or have 
perceived. Thus, perception and judgment are distinct cognitive acts. They are 
not only numerically distinct but they are also distinct in that different cogni-
tive powers are at work, namely, the senses in the first instance, and the intel-
lect in the second.
In nonhuman animals, human children, or mentally disabled people, the 
situation is different. When they judge they cannot judge in addition to or 
 independently from the perceptions they have because this would require (in-
tact) intellectual faculties. Since they lack those faculties (or since those fac-
ulties are not properly working as in the case of the mentally disabled) their 
act of judging is simply the same as the act of apprehension, as Ockham says. 
And the apprehension they have is only a ‘non-complex apprehensive act’ (ac-
tus apprehensivus incomplexus).4 So, in Ockham’s view, the ascription of judg-
ments to such beings does not necessitate the ascription of complex cognition. 
As long as one makes clear that judging is not a separate, complex intellectual 
act here, there is no problem with this ascription. However, one might criticise 
Ockham’s argument by saying that he introduces a sort of double standard. On 
the one hand, he employs a relatively narrow concept of judgments as com-
plex cognitive acts. On the other hand, he calls non-complex apprehensions 
judgments, too. Although Ockham himself does not address this objection, it 
complexus terminative et praesupponit apprehensionem sive formationem complexi, quod 
non potest fieri per potentiam sensitivam. Unde ponendo iudicium in sensu, oportet ponere 
quod sensus habeat cognitionem complexam formaliter vel aequivalenter [...].”
2 William of Ockham, Quaestiones in librum quartum Sententiarum (Reportatio), q. 14, eds. 
Wood & Gál (1984), 314: “Ad aliud dico quod sensitiva habet iudicium. Patet in brutis, pueris, 
fatuis etc., qui iudicant inter nociva et convenientia, sed non habent actum iudicandi distinc-
tum ab actibus apprehensivis incomplexis, sicut intellectus habet.”
3 For a brief discussion of those differences see also Perler (2008), 158f.
4 See n2 above.
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was exactly this point that gave rise to the famous debate between his secre-
tary Adam Wodeham and Gregory of Rimini.
The debate between Adam Wodeham and Gregory of Rimini emerged in a 
particular context, namely, the question of how to explain sensory illusions.5 
The main problem can be illustrated by the following example: if we stand 
aboard a ship we might take the trees on the nearby coast to be moving. But, 
in fact, it is not the trees that are moving but the ship. Since we do not imme-
diately notice the latter, we are, at least for a while, mistaken about the former. 
The crucial question is where our misperception actually comes from. Should 
we blame our sense of sight or our intellect? In Wodeham’s opinion, it is the 
intellect that errs in this case because the intellect delivers an ‘incorrect judg-
ment’ (iudicium erroneum) about the moving trees.6 That is, strictly speaking, 
our impression that the trees are moving is not a sensory illusion because it 
originates from an intellectual error. However, there is a strong objection that 
can be raised against this view, as Wodeham concedes. Imagine there is a dog 
standing aboard the ship, too. Would we not say that the dog also falls prey to 
the illusion that the trees are moving? Maybe the dog would even be terrified 
by the moving trees and run away, Wodeham says. This seems like very strong 
evidence for the fact that the perception or ‘apparition’ (apparitio) of the mov-
ing trees is not an intellectual but a ‘sensory act’ (actus sensitivus) because the 
dog has no intellect, according to the common view.7
Wodeham gives the following reply. On the one hand, he notes, there are 
good reasons to believe that the dog has ‘simple visual perceptions’ (visiones 
simplices). It is endowed with a visual apparatus by which it can see most of 
the things we see. So if we see the trees on the nearby coast, a dog standing 
next to us is very likely going to see these trees, as well. But does the dog make 
judgments about the trees like we do? Ockham’s suggestion was to say that 
nonhuman animals judge insofar as their judgments coincide with their per-
ceptions. Consequently, the dog’s judgment about the moving trees is not a 
5 This debate has already been reconstructed and analysed by Reina (1986); Tachau (1993), 665; 
Michon (2001), 326f.; Perler (2006), 89–94. See also Perler (2014a) who reconstructs Ockham’s 
position.
6 See Adam Wodeham, Lectura secunda in primum librum Sententiarum, prol., q. 4, §7, ed. 
Wood (1990), 97: “Sed illa apparitio non est visio sed iudicium erroneum causatum mediante 
visione.”
7 Ibid., §8, 98: “Contra: illa apparitio qua apparet homini quod arbores moveantur est actus 
sensitivus. Sed, per te, nullum iudicium quo assentitur aliquid esse aliquale, vel aliqualiter 
se habere, est actus sensitivus. Igitur. Maior probatur, quia etiam brutis apparent arbores il-




cognitive act that is distinct from its act of seeing, according to Ockham. How-
ever, as has been said, one might criticise this suggestion since it introduces a 
broader concept of judging. But could we also ascribe judgments to dogs and 
other nonhuman animals in terms of complex cognitive acts?
According to Wodeham, there are at least two problems with such an ascrip-
tion. The first could be called the epistemological problem. This problem arises 
from the fact that all we can observe is the dog’s behaviour. That is, we can 
watch the dog sitting aboard the ship, looking at the trees and, maybe, running 
away. However, we cannot look into the dog’s head, so to speak. Thus, apart 
from the fact that the dog sees something (and even this might be taken to be 
uncertain to some degree), we cannot really know what the dog actually sees, 
nor can we really know that its reaction of flight is based on a ‘complex objec-
tive judgment’ (iudicium complexe obiective). In short, we can only read the 
dog’s behaviour or the ‘effects and movements’ (effectus et motus), as Wodeham 
puts it, but we cannot read the cognitive processes or the mental states that are 
(or might be) the causes of its behaviour.8 And so if we ascribe the same men-
tal states or cognitive processes to the dog which we take to be responsible for 
our behaviour, we might fall prey to what is usually called anthropomorphism. 
In short, from human-like behaviour we infer human-like cognition.
Anthropomorphism is not necessarily wrong, but it definitely leads to a 
second problem. This could be called the metaphysical problem or problem of 
classification. The problem here is that if we do decide to ascribe judgments in 
terms of complex cognitive acts to the dog, we are obliged to attribute ‘practi-
cal reason’ (ratio practica) to it too, according to Wodeham. Since only ratio-
nal animals possess practical reason, the dog would then qualify as a ‘rational 
animal’ (animal rationale). Hence the ascription of judgments would shift the 
common metaphysical boundary between human and nonhuman animals 
because dogs (and, maybe, other nonhuman animals, too) would qualify as 
rational animals.9
Of course, one could try to cope with both problems. But if one considers the 
epistemological problem to be unsolvable or the changes in the classification 
of animals to be unacceptable, one needs to give an alternative  explanation 
8 See ibid., 99: “[...] concedo quod in brutis sunt visiones tales simplices, ad quas natum es-
set sequi iudicium illud quo complexe [formato] obiective ipsis competeret. Sed utrum eis 
conveniat, scire non possumus, nisi coniciendo ex effectibus et motibus sequentibus tales 
visiones simplices.”
9 See ibid.: “Sed si hoc movere deberet, esset consequenter in eis ponenda ratio practica, id est 
dictamen practicum de eligendis et respuendis, prosequendis et fugiendi. Sic enim agunt si 
dictamen haberent. Et tunc non video quare non debeant animalia rationalia appellari.”
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for the dog’s behaviour which coherently accounts for the dog’s movements 
without referring to judgments.10 Yet, what would such an explanation look 
like? For Wodeham, such an explanation would centre on what he calls ‘simple 
apprehensions’ (apprehensiones simplices). The dog perceives, for instance, the 
trees on the shore and ‘immediately’ (statim) reacts to this perception (or ap-
prehension). So it does not perceive the trees at first and then takes time to 
deliberate about whether what it sees is harmful or harmless. Rather, its per-
ception immediately triggers a reaction (e.g. of flight), and this reaction comes 
‘from natural instinct’ (ex instinctu naturae), according to Wodeham.11
Two things are important to note here. First, like Ockham, Wodeham claims 
that there is no separate act of judging in other animals. Even if one said that 
the dog errs about the movement of the trees like we do, we are still better 
off than the dog because we can correct our error. While the dog runs away 
 frightened, we can reflect on whether what we perceive (or seem to perceive) 
makes sense or not because our perceptions and our judgments do not (nec-
essarily) coincide. Yet, unlike Ockham, Wodeham does not think that judg-
ing and perceiving coincide in nonhuman animals. In his opinion, simple 
apprehensions should not qualify as acts of judgments at all. If one does call 
them judgments, nonetheless, one applies the term in an equivocal sense, he 
says.12 This terminological rigour is undoubtedly one of the strengths of Wode-
ham’s theory because it avoids an anthropomorphic way of speaking, if not 
an anthropomorphic fallacy, because we cannot infer that the same cognitive 
10 According to Perler (2006), 91f., Wodeham’s search for an alternative explanation that 
avoids the ascription of judgment to nonhuman animals is also motivated by the fact that 
he holds a theory according to which the content of judgments is a so-called ‘complexe 
significabile’ which is “expressed by a full-fledged sentence.” However, this cannot fully 
explain Wodeham’s animosity because Gregory of Rimini also subscribes to this theory. 
Nevertheless, he grants nonhuman animals a form of judgment that has no complexe sig-
nificabile as its content. On the complexe significabile see also Nuchelmans (1973), 227–
237, and (1980), 104–106.
11 See Adam Wodeham, Lectura secunda in primum librum Sententiarum, prol., q. 4, §8, 
ed. Wood (1990), 99f.: “Id est non solum non libere prosequuntur ac fugiunt proficua et 
nociva, sed nec deliberant nec iudicant aliquid iudicio complexo obiective conveniens 
exsistere vel nocivum de fugiendo vel [proficuum de] prosequendo. Sed statim ad simpli-
cem apprehensionem istius quod est nocivum fugiunt et illius quod est conveniens pro-
sequuntur. Et si talis prosecutio conveniat omnibus individuis alicuius speciei naturaliter, 
tunc sufficit prima apprehensio simplex ad illam prosecutionem et fugam, quod tantum 
fit de re praesente. [...] sed hoc est ex instinctu naturae.” On the difference between sim-
ple and complex apprehensions see also Perler (2006), 90.




 processes underlie the dog’s behaviour from the simple fact that its behaviour 
resembles our own. This problem, of course, is well known to modern philoso-
phers. As mentioned in Chapter 12, it has given rise to ‘Morgan’s Canon’, which 
holds that one should not explain animal behaviour by higher psychological 
processes (e.g. judging) if it can also be coherently explained by lower psycho-
logical processes.13 It appears that Adam Wodeham anticipates this principle 
as he says that one can account for the dog’s behaviour by reference to simple 
apprehensions. But is this explanation satisfactory?
For Adam’s counterpart, Gregory of Rimini, it is not satisfactory for several 
reasons. On the one hand, Gregory agrees with Wodeham as far as the episte-
mological problem is concerned. So he agrees that we do not have immediate 
access to other animals’ mental states, especially if we cannot communicate 
with them by language. For instance, whether they have ‘complex cognition’ 
(notitia complexa) is not ‘naturally’ (naturaliter) known to us, as he puts it. All 
we can do is to observe their behaviour and then try to give an explanation of 
whether it is ‘likely’ (probabiliter) or not that complex cognition is what has 
caused this behaviour.14 On the other hand, however, that is exactly the point 
where Gregory starts to disagree with Wodeham because in his view Wode-
ham’s theory can only account for those cases of animal behaviour in which an 
animal always shows the same response to the same stimulus. Maybe the dog 
aboard the ship is such a case. But what about those cases in which an animal 
reacts differently to one and the same stimulus?
Gregory gives the example of an animal that sees a piece of bread. Accord-
ing to Wodeham’s theory, the animal’s reaction to this stimulus would always 
be the same. But that is not the case, Gregory states because quite often we 
can see that one and the same animal goes for the bread at this particular time 
while at a later point it does not. This kind of behaviour cannot be explained 
with reference to simple apprehensions that immediately lead to instinctual 
reactions, because instinctual reactions usually remain the same. Instead, one 
must suppose that every time the animal sees some bread it judges whether or 
not it should eat it. If its judgment at time t1 is different from the judgment at 
time t2 its behaviour will be different, too.15
13 See p. 92 n10.
14 Gregory of Rimini, Lectura in primum et secundum Sententiarum, dist. 1, q. 3, eds. Trapp & 
Marcolino (1981), 304: “Et hic dico quod, quamvis istud non possit nobis plene naturaliter 
esse notum, probabiliter tamen ex his, quae percipimus, possumus arguere quod talem 
notitiam habeant.”
15 See ibid.: “Quod primo convinci potest, quia, sicut videmus, aliquando brutam, apprehen-
dit aliquod sensibile, ut puta panem, et movetur ad ipsum; aliquando vero apprehendit 
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Like the authors we have examined in the previous chapters, Gregory does 
not claim that this kind of judgment is an intellectual, propositional judgment. 
Rather, it is a non-propositional ‘sensory judgment’ (iudicium sensibile) or a 
“low-level judgment,” as Dominik Perler put it.16 Gregory mentions at least two 
differences between sensory and intellectual judgments.17 First, sensory judg-
ments do not involve universals but only particulars. Hence, nonhuman ani-
mals can only judge about this or that particular bread, but not about bread 
in general, for example. Second, they cannot judge about ‘insensible things’ 
(insensibilia), but only about what they perceive by their senses and what 
has practical relevance for them in this moment. When they perceive a piece 
of bread they have to judge whether it is something they should eat or not. 
They cannot, however, judge about the ontological status of bread, its chemi-
cal structure, or other theoretical matters. In this sense, their judgements rank 
lower on the scale of possible acts of judging. And so even if we would have to 
classify these animals as ‘rational animals’ (animalia rationabilia) by ascribing 
them the capacity of judging (as Wodeham claimed) we could still stress that 
humans ‘are called rational in the proper sense of the term’ (proprie rationalis 
appellatur).18 For Gregory, this is still better than denying them the capacity of 
judging, because their sensory judgments are more than just an instinctual re-
action that is automatically triggered when a particular stimulus is perceived. 
Like human judgments, the judgments of nonhuman animals can vary and this 
is how one can account for the fact that they sometimes react differently to the 
same stimulus: they simply judge differently about the same thing.
At first glance, this seems to make a pretty strong case against Wodeham’s 
theory.19 Nevertheless, Wodeham defends his explanation with the following 
argument. If we observe animals behaving differently towards the same thing, 
idem, et non movetur ad ipsum. Ergo motus iste, cum sit per appetitum animalem et talis 
appetitus sequatur apprehensionem, praesupponit praeter simplicem apprehensionem 
sensibilis iudicium quo iudicatur illud utile vel necessarium aut tale vel tale.”
16 Perler (2006), 96.
17 Gregory of Rimini, Lectura in primum et secundum Sententiarum, dist. 1, q. 3, eds. Trapp & 
Marcolino (1981), 305: “Nec valet ratio cuiusdam doctoris [i.e., Adam Wodeham; A.O.], qui 
dicit quod secundum hoc in talibus animalibus esset intellectus practicus et deberent ta-
lia animalia appellari rationabilia. Non enim haec sequuntur loquendo de huiusmodi ad 
sensum, in quo dicimus hominem esse rationalem et habere practicum intellectum, quia 
homo non tantum singularia iudicia sed et universalia, nec tantum circa sensibilia sed et 
circa insensibilia habet iudicia, et ex talibus ratiocinatur et proprie rationalis appellatur.”
18 Ibid.




he claims, this is because they have different memories of the same things. 
That is to say, while a certain thing is remembered as pleasant by one animal, 
another member of the same species might remember this thing as harmful 
because it has experienced it differently in the past. This then creates differ-
ent responses to like stimuli.20 For instance, some dogs run away from sticks, 
whereas others rejoice in retrieving them. But can this argument really refute 
Gregory’s objection?
Indeed, it seems that this defence only applies to cases in which different 
individuals of the same species (e.g. dogs) react differently to the same stimu-
lus (e.g. sticks). If, however, one and the same animal constantly changes its 
reaction, like in the example of eating bread, it is rather unlikely that a change 
in memory is responsible for this. Only a difference in judgment can account 
for this difference in behaviour, Gregory argues. Wodeham does not find this 
argument convincing, by contrast, because even humans do not always act on 
the basis of judgments, as he tries to show with the following example. If my 
head is itching, I may shave it because I remember shaving to be a pleasant 
remedy in this case. But this action is not the result of a ‘complex apprehen-
sion’ (apprehensio complexa). Rather, I do this without ‘any deliberation or pre-
vious judgment’ (sine omni deliberatione vel iudicio praevio).21 This could also 
be applied to the animal that sees a piece of bread: if it is hungry, it goes for 
the bread, but if it is satiated it ignores it, just as I do not shave my head unless 
it itches.
Regardless of whether one finds Wodeham’s arguments convincing or not, 
his debate with Gregory of Rimini nicely shows how very different explana-
tions can be given for the same kind of animal behaviour (which is something 
20 See Adam Wodeham, Lectura secunda in primum librum Sententiarum, prol., q. 4, §8, ed. 
Wood (1990), 100: “Ubi autem unum individuum speciei fugit aut prosequeretur praesens 
vel absens quod aliud individuum [eiusdem speciei nec] prosequeretur [nec fugit], hoc 
est ex memoria et imaginatione poenae vel delectationis alias ex consimili obiecto prove-
niente, ita quod ibi etiam nulla est talis compositio obiectiva. Sed ad positionem appre-
hensionis rei praesentis cum imaginatione vel memoria simplici poenae vel delectationis 
praehabitae, statim prosequitur vel fugit.”
21 See ibid.: “Nec est hoc inconveniens bruto, cum etiam in nobis experiamur, cum ad solam 
positionem simplicium apprehensionum multa frequenter facimus sine omni alia delib-
eratione vel apprehensione complexa, sicut scalpimus caput cum sentimus pruriginem 
et fricamus barbam. Et alios multos gestus et motus habemus sine omni deliberatione 
vel iudicio praevio. Item, licet forte ad hoc quod virtuose diligamus aliquid, praesuppo-
nitur iudicium vel deliberatio, tamen ad hoc quod absolute diligamus, frequenter sufficit 
simplex apprehensio. Quare igitur non eodem modo ad hoc quod brutum appetatur vel 
appetat?”
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we shall return to in Part 6). Moreover, it illustrates that some medieval authors 
had no problem with ascribing the capacity of judging to nonhuman animals, 
while others, like Wodeham, took this to involve a sort of deflation of the con-
cept of judging and an anthropomorphic way of speaking. To be clear, none of 
the other authors covered in this part denied that there are significant differ-
ences between the way in which we judge and the way in which nonhuman 
animals judge. Most importantly, they agreed that the judgments of nonhu-
man animals do not have a predicative structure. But they were sympathetic 
to the idea that such sensory judgments are a form of judgments too and, as 
has been shown, they range from very basic natural judgments in Aquinas to 
more complex forms, such as Olivi’s reflexive judgments. What remains to be 
seen is whether nonhuman animals can also combine various judgments and 
form syllogisms or arguments. In other words, the question is whether they can 
engage in the third intellectual operation: reasoning. This question will be the 






Introduction to Part 4
Reasoning or syllogising is what comes third in the triad of intellectual opera-
tions. Once we have formed concepts and once we have arranged these con-
cepts in a certain order, that is, in a judgment or in a proposition, we can take 
a number of judgments and arrange them in a certain order as well. The result 
is what is usually called a syllogism. And, briefly speaking, the process of ar-
ranging propositions in such a way that they form a syllogism can be called 
reasoning. From a modern perspective reasoning might seem like a broader 
concept than syllogising. And so one might say that reasoning is not necessar-
ily syllogistic. But for the medieval authors we are concerned with, ‘syllogising’ 
(syllogizari) and ‘reasoning’ (ratiocinari) are largely synonymous and thus of-
ten used quite interchangeably. The crucial question, however, is whether they 
saved those terms for describing certain cognitive processes of human beings 
or whether they considered the possibility that nonhuman animals engage in 
reasoning too.
The present part sets out to explore their views on animal reasoning.1 At 
first glance, this might seem to be an odd aim. Although, as we have seen in the 
previous part, many of the authors covered here ascribe certain types of judg-
ments to nonhuman animals, it seems questionable whether those judgments 
could feature as parts of a syllogism, because they do not consist of general 
terms or concepts. In other words, they are not, strictly speaking, propositions. 
It seems doubtful, therefore, that nonhuman animals are capable of reasoning 
at all. Despite such doubts, the question of whether other animals reason too 
was taken to be a serious question by various medieval philosophers since they 
knew of several cases in which dogs, cats, apes, or other nonhuman animals 
at least appeared to reason. By and large, these cases could be summarised as 
 examples of problem solving. The examples are puzzling insofar as  problem 
solving seems to involve some cognitive flexibility and intelligence. If one 
 observes an animal solving a problem, one is usually inclined to say that it 
does not do this by instinct, but by reasoning because, like us, it first seems 
to  analyse the situation and then tries to figure out how to deal with it. We 
are often impressed by animals’ capacity for problem solving because the way 
in which they do this appears to be very human-like. But what is even more 
 fascinating than the behaviour itself is the question of what brings it about. 
1 For a comprehensive overview of animal reasoning from Antiquity to the early modern era, 
see Roling (2011). See also Köhler (2014), 375–389.
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What kind of cognitive processes underlie it? Is it really reasoning that is 
 involved or do nonhuman animals employ very different cognitive strategies 
for solving problems?
In the following chapters, we will see that there is a whole spectrum of an-
swers to those questions among various thirteenth- and fourteenth-centuries 
authors. They range from the position that those animals that lack intellectual 
faculties are totally incapable of reasoning to the view that the lack of intel-
lect and reason does not make reasoning entirely impossible. We shall begin 
with authors who are sympathetic to the former view such as Thomas Aqui-
nas, Gregory of Rimini, and John Duns Scotus (Chapter 19). Roger Bacon who 
comes next also goes in this direction, but his arguments are somewhat differ-
ent as he develops alternative explanations for seemingly rational behaviour 
in nonhuman animals (Chapter 20). Chapters 21 and 22 will finally reconstruct 
and discuss the views of Albertus Magnus, John Buridan, and Nicole Oresme 
who seem to leave more room for reasoning in nonhuman animals.
<UN>
chapter 19
Quasi-Reasoning (Thomas Aquinas, Gregory  
of Rimini, John Duns Scotus)
Thomas Aquinas addresses the question of whether or not nonhuman animals 
reason in connection with the famous example of Chrysippus’ dog, which was 
originally formulated by the Stoic logician of the same name.1 Like most other 
Stoics, Chrysippus was relatively skeptical about, if not even hostile to, the idea 
of animal rationality.2 His actual intention was not to make a case for the ratio-
nality of dogs. Rather, he simply aimed to illustrate a certain type of syllogism, 
namely, the so-called disjunctive syllogism. And so he told the story of a hunt-
ing dog that chases an animal but then loses sight of it and comes to a fork with 
three paths. Since the dog cannot see where the animal went it sniffs around 
the first and then around the second path, before finally taking the third way 
without sniffing. The dog in the example thus seems to employ a syllogism of 
the form ‘The animal took either A or B or C, so if it did not take A or B it must 
have taken C’. As has been stated, Chrysippus simply took this to be a good il-
lustration of a disjunctive syllogism. However – and quite ironically, one could 
say – his example became one of the most widespread examples of animal 
reasoning, especially through the Outlines of Pyrrhonism in which Sextus Em-
piricus turned this example against the Stoics’ denial of animal intelligence 
and made it a proof of their rationality.3
Thomas Aquinas, like many other medieval authors, likely knew this ex-
ample through writings of the Church fathers, such as Basil of Caesarea’s and 
Ambrose of Milan’s Hexaemeron.4 But what matters here is not so much how 
this example was handed on from one generation to the next but rather how 
1 On the origin, history, and reception of this example, see Floridi (1997). A recent philosophi-
cal analysis and discussion provides Rescorla (2009).
2 On the Stoics’ position see Dierauer (1977), 205–238; Sorabji (1993b), 20–28; Steiner (2005), 
77–92.
3 See Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.14, §69, tr. Bury (1933), 41–43.
4 See Basil of Caesarea, Homiliae ix in Hexaemeron IX.4, ed. Migne (1886), 198B-C: “Et quidem 
canis expers rationis est attamen sensum rationi haud imparem habet. Quae enim mundi 
sapientes per multum vitae otium desidentes vix invenerunt, videlict ratiocinationum am-
bages, haec ab ipsa natura edoctus canis perhibetur.” Ambrose of Milan, Hexaemeron libri sex 
VI.4, §23, ed. Migne (1882), 265D-266B. On the reception among Christian writers in particu-
lar see Moretti (2005) and Lauzi (2012), 217–219.
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someone like Aquinas interpreted it. Aquinas mentions the example of the 
dog in the Summa theologiae when he asks whether nonhuman animals are 
capable of making a ‘choice’ (electio). In his opinion, the dog’s behaviour is a 
good example for ‘the astonishing sagacities in the works of animals’ (mirabiles 
sagacitates in operibus animalium).5 This view, of course, very much depends 
on the fact that the dog ‘takes the third path without further exploration’ (per 
tertiam viam incedit non explorando), as Aquinas puts it. He thus stresses the 
fact that the dog takes the third path without sniffing at it, as he did with the 
other two. Now, one could object that it is unlikely that the dog would not 
sniff at the third path, too, and thus that the example is flawed from the very 
beginning. Despite this objection, it is significant that the majority of thinkers 
accepted the case as a plausible description of canine behaviour. The key mat-
ter of debate, then, is whether or not such an animal takes the third path by 
syllogising.
According to Aquinas, the dog takes the third path ‘as if using a disjunctive 
syllogism’ (quasi utens syllogismo divisivo). This means that it looks as if the 
dog reasoned in this situation. But actually it employs neither a disjunctive 
syllogism nor any other kind of rational argument, Aquinas argues. The rea-
son simply is that dogs lack intellect and reason, therefore they cannot engage 
in reasoning. But how else can one account for the dog’s behaviour? Aquinas 
gives the following reply: like many other nonhuman animals, the dog has ‘a 
natural inclination to certain most orderly processes’ (inclinatio naturalis ad 
quosdam ordinatissimos processus).6 Admittedly, this might seem like a rel-
atively obscure description of what is going on in the dog’s head while it is 
standing at the fork in the road, but Aquinas’ idea is that the dog’s behaviour 
is based on a comparatively complex cognitive process. However, this process 
is an orderly process only by virtue of ‘the highest art’ (summa ars), that is, the 
5 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae i–ii, q. 13, a. 2, co., ed. Leonina vi (1891), 99: “Et hoc eti-
am sensui manifestum videtur, apparent enim mirabiles sagacitates in operibus animalium, 
ut apum et aranearum et canum. Canis enim insequens cervum, si ad trivium venerit, odo-
ratu quidem explorat an cervus per primam vel secundam viam transiverit, quod si invenerit 
non transisse, iam securus per tertiam viam incedit non explorando, quasi utens syllogismo 
divisivo, quo concludi posset cervum per illam viam incedere, ex quo non incedit per alias 
duas, cum non sint plures. Ergo videtur quod electio brutis animalibus conveniat.”
6 Ibid., 100: “Et ex hoc contingit quod in operibus brutorum animalium apparent quaedam 
sagacitates, inquantum habent inclinationem naturalem ad quosdam ordinatissimos pro-
cessus, utpote a summa arte ordinatos. Et propter hoc etiam quaedam animalia dicuntur 
prudentia vel sagacia, non quod in eis sit aliqua ratio vel electio. Quod ex hoc apparet, quod 
omnia quae sunt unius naturae, similiter operantur.”
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divine creator. One could perhaps compare this to the processes of a complex 
machine, say, a computer. The computer calculates and solves all kinds of diffi-
cult tasks, but it does this only because this is how it has been constructed and 
programmed by a rational human being. Hence, the computer itself would not 
qualify as a rational being in the strict sense of (faculty and process) rational-
ity. Similarly, the dog manages to find the right path, because this is how it has 
been programmed, so to speak, by the divine creator. Still, the natural inclina-
tion from which arises the ‘orderly process’ in which the dog engages makes 
this a very different process than the syllogistic reasoning that brings about 
the choice of a human being.7 In this sense, the dog is closer to a machine than 
to a human.
One might find this comparison inappropriate for two reasons. First, it might 
be thought to be anachronistic. Second, it seems to turn Aquinas into a Carte-
sian who considers nonhuman animals to be soulless machines.8 But neither 
is the case. As far as the charge of anachronism is concerned, it is important to 
note that Aquinas himself draws a comparison between cleverly constructed 
machines and nonhuman animals. His point is that many things, including, 
for instance, arrows or clocks, ‘are moved by reason’ (moventur a ratione). But 
this does not mean that they are rational beings themselves.9 Rather, an arrow 
is brought into motion by a rational agent, and so if it hits its target this is be-
cause the human being that launched it is a good archer and not because the 
arrow itself is capable of moving into the right direction. It is only ‘as if ’ (ac si) 
the arrow itself knew where to go to. Similarly, clocks display the time because 
this is how they have been constructed by some rational human craftsman. 
But what about animals? In contrast to arrows or clocks, they do have bodily 
organs and sensory powers by which they move. So in this respect they are def-
initely superior to non-cognitive beings, which is something Aquinas does not 
deny. Admittedly, Descartes did not deny that nonhuman animals have certain 
7 This is exactly the argument Michel de Montaigne criticises in his Essais II.12, 168: “Je dy 
donc, pour revenir à mon propos, qu’il n’y a point d’apparence d’estimer que les bestes facent 
par inclination naturelle et forcée les mesmes choses que nous faisons par nostre choix et 
industrie.” On this see also Wild (2006), 79.
8 This is what Barad (1995), 12, insinuates in her interpretation of this passage.
9 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae i–ii, q. 13, a. 2, ad 3, ed. Leonina vi (1891), 99f.: “[...] in 
omnibus quae moventur a ratione apparet ordo rationis moventis, licet ipsa quae a ratione 
moventur rationem non habeant: sic enim sagitta directe tendit ad signum ex motione sagit-
tantis, ac si ipsa rationem haberet dirigentem. Et idem apparet in motibus horologiorum et 
omnium ingeniorum humanorum quae arte fiunt. Sicut autem comparantur artificialia ad 
artem humanam, ita comparantur omnia naturalia ad artem divinam.” Descartes also com-
pares animals to clocks, see Wild (2006), 161.
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cognitive capacities either. But, in his view, the possession of these capacities 
does not justify the ascription of a soul to their possessor.10
Aquinas obviously disagrees on this point.11 Nevertheless, he emphasises 
that ‘just like artificial things compare to human art, so do all natural things 
compare to the divine art’.12 In other words, every creature owes its design and 
functionality to the divine creator. But there are, of course, crucial differences 
in design and functionality. Most importantly, only human beings are endowed 
with intellect and reason, as well as with will. Because of this, only humans are 
capable of reasoning and only they can make a choice, according to Aquinas.13 
Thus, the dog at the fork does not reason freely. It does not arrange premises 
and conclusions and it does not come to a decision by ruling out two of three 
options, as we would. Rather, it owes the capacity to find the right path without 
sniffing to the divine creator, just as an arrow owes its capacity to hit the target 
to the archer or as a calculator owes its capacity to solve various mathematical 
problems to a clever engineer. To be clear, this does not necessarily make these 
beings inferior to rational human beings. As we all know, calculators usually 
calculate much more quickly than we do. Similarly, many animals might have 
fewer difficulties in solving certain problems even though they do not possess 
intellect and reason.14 Nevertheless, how they do this is very different from 
how we do it.
In Aquinas’ view, another sign of this difference is that all members of a 
nonhuman animal species act alike. There is a uniformity in their behaviour: 
all swallows build their nests in the same way and, similarly, all spiders con-
struct their webs in a very similar manner.15 Many, if not all, of the things ‘they 
10 For a thorough analysis of Descartes’ position see Wild (2006), 135–210. See also Cotting-
ham (1978).
11 On the differences between Descartes and Aquinas in this context see also Davids (2017), 
192f.
12 See n9 above.
13 Floridi (1997), 43, obviously misreads Aquinas here as he states that Aquinas “held that the 
episode [of Chrysippus’ dog; A.O.] proved that animals too have the capacity of choosing.” 
On this misinterpretation see also Davids (2017), 191.
14 This point is not made by Aquinas but by Basil of Caesarea and Ambrose of Milan; see 
n4 above.
15 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles, lib. ii, q. 82, co., ed. Leonina xiii (1918), 
513: “In animabus autem brutorum non est invenire aliquam operationem superiorem 
operationibus sensitivae partis: non enim intelligunt neque ratiocinantur. Quod ex hoc 
apparet, quia omnia animalia eiusdem speciei similiter operantur, quasi a natura motae 




do as if they were moved by nature’ (quasi a natura motae), as Aquinas states. 
But why does he say that they act ‘as if they were moved by nature’? Why does 
he not simply say that they are moved by nature? Aquinas himself does not 
explain why he has chosen this particular phrasing. But the most likely expla-
nation is that he is aiming, once more, to stress the difference between cog-
nitive and non-cognitive beings. Non-cognitive beings are entirely moved by 
nature. If a stone falls to earth, this happens not because the stone cognitively 
responds to a certain stimulus. Rather, it happens because of certain natural 
forces. Similarly, an arrow does not fly because some cognitive power has trig-
gered its movement. Rather, it moves because a cognitive agent has set it into 
motion. Nonhuman animals, by contrast, do (most of) the things they do be-
cause they perceive something and then react to what they perceive. The dog 
does not take the right path because of the laws of gravity or because a human 
being pushes it in this direction. Instead, its behaviour is based on a cognitive 
process. Nevertheless, this process is different from the process that occurs in 
a human being in that it is not a rational process. Hence, even though it some-
times looks as if other animals reason, they can not be credited with that ca-
pacity, according to Aquinas.
Like Thomas Aquinas, Gregory of Rimini and John Duns Scotus also think 
that nonhuman animals do not actually engage in reasoning. For Gregory, the 
behaviour of dogs shows, on the one hand, that having ‘complex cognition’ 
(notitia complexa) is nothing exclusively human. In his view, these dogs ‘judge’ 
(iudicant) that their prey must have taken the remaining path. But, on the oth-
er hand, they only ‘judge as if they reasoned’ (quasi arguentes iudicant). So, like 
Aquinas, Gregory thinks that the cognitive process that makes the dog take 
the remaining path does not qualify as reasoning.16 It might seem somewhat 
incoherent to claim that Gregory belongs to Aquinas’ camp, especially because 
we have seen him attacking Adam Wodeham’s attempt to account for animal 
behaviour on the basis of simple stimulus-response models before (see Chap-
ter 18).17 Nevertheless, his phrasing is quite clear when it comes to the question 
16 See Gregory of Rimini, Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarum, dist. 3, q. 1, eds. 
Marcolino & Trapp (1981), 305: “Tertio, idem probatur ex experientia quae de canibus ve-
naticis fertur, videlicet quod, cum ferram fugientem insequuntur, si ad bivium veniant, 
odorant unam viarum, in qua, si non percipiant odorem fugientis, subito absque alterius 
viae odoratione per alteram pergunt. Quod non videtur aliunde contingere, nisi quia iudi-
cant feram non transisse per illam quam odorati sunt, et ex hoc quasi arguentes iudicant 
transisse per aliam.” The opposite view is held by William of Ockham, Quaestiones in li-
brum quartum Sententiarum (Reportatio), q. 14, eds. Wood & Gál (1984), 315.
17 Adam Wodeham also mentions the syllogising dog in his Lectura secunda in primum li-
brum Sententiarum, prol., q. 3, §2, ed. Wood (1990), 67.
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of reasoning. For even though he thinks that nonhuman animals have complex 
cognition, he holds that this does not amount to a syllogistic process. Further-
more, he shares Wodeham’s doubt that we cannot naturally know what kind of 
cognition other animals have. All we can do is to observe their behaviour and 
to infer what kind of cognitive process is likely to underlie this behaviour.18
This epistemological caveat is also stressed by John Duns Scotus. As he 
points out, there are many cases in which the behaviour of humans and non-
human animals looks very much the same. The example he gives is the follow-
ing: if a human being has to make a choice between two different paths, she is 
likely to take the shorter one. This decision results from a syllogistic argument 
of the form ‘By taking the shortest path I arrive much faster at my destination; 
this one is shorter, therefore, I take it’.19 So, in short, our behaviour is based on 
what Scotus calls a ‘discourse of reason’ (discursus rationis). But what about 
a dog, for instance? If seen from the outside, the dog’s behaviour is relatively 
similar to our own behaviour because if it has to make a choice between two 
paths, it usually takes the shorter one, too. However, the cognitive process in-
volved in this situation is (or might be) very different. Whereas humans take 
some time to deliberate on what would be the better option to choose, the dog 
chooses the shorter path ‘by sensitive appetite alone’ (ex solo appetitu sensi-
tivo), as Scotus puts it.20 So even though there is no significant difference in 
behaviour, there is, in Scotus’ view, a crucial difference with regard to what 
brings about this behaviour.
Two objections could be raised against Scotus’ explanation. First, if we say 
that the dog chooses the shortest path by some very simple sensory mecha-
nism why should we assume that the analogous human mechanism is much 
more sophisticated? Maybe humans also choose the shortest path by some 
18 Gregory of Rimini, Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarum, dist. 3, q. 1, eds. Mar-
colino & Trapp (1981), 304: “Et hic dico quod, quamvis istud non possit nobis plene natu-
raliter esse notum, probabiliter tamen ex his, quae percipimus, possumus arguere quod 
talem notitiam habeant.”
19 See John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, lib. i, q. 3, §10, 
eds. Andrews et al. (1997), 89: “[...] bruta multa faciunt ex cognitione eodem modo quo 
fierent ab homine cognoscente per discursum rationis; ergo videntur habere similem cog-
nitionem. Antecedens patet: sicut homo syllogizans argueret ‘per breviorem viam per-
venitur ad intentum, haec est brevior, ergo etc’. et ex tali discursu breviorem eligeret ad 
aliquid obtinendum, similiter videtur canis eligere prosequendo leporem, et sic in aliis.”
20 Ibid., §11: “Ad hoc dicitur quod licet similiter agant quaedam, sicut homo ex deliberatione 
ageret, non tamen oportet quod similem cognitionem habeant. Nam illud, quod eligi-




sort of instinct? Second, if all we can do is to observe animal behaviour, how 
can we be so sure that we draw the right conclusions about the underlying cog-
nitive processes? Maybe dogs and other nonhuman animals reason as well. To 
the first objection Scotus would possibly respond that the discourse of reason 
is something we can experience by introspection. If we monitor what is going 
on in our head when we choose a path, we are likely to see that we are reason-
ing in this situation. Moreover, other people might tell us that they usually rea-
son in such a situation, and so we might conclude that we reason too because 
we belong to the same species of animal. Finally, Scotus might also refer to 
the teleological aspect of the possession of reason. Since we possess intellect 
and reason, he could say, it is unlikely that we do not use them. Otherwise it 
would be unclear why we have them at all, since ‘nature does nothing in vain’, 
as a popular Aristotelian saying has it.21 There is no guarantee that we always 
use them, and Scotus does not doubt that many cognitive processes such as 
sensory perception do not require intellectual faculties. Nevertheless, we have 
them; therefore, we must use them often.
Nonhuman animals, by contrast, do not have such faculties, as Scotus would 
reply to the second objection. Consequently, they cannot engage in reason-
ing. All they have is a certain number of external and internal senses, and so 
if they do something, it is not rational discourse that is behind this behaviour 
but sensation. Now, one could say that this is not a very convincing argument 
because it rests on the metaphysical assumption that nonhuman animals lack 
certain faculties of the soul. But why should we agree to this premise? Unless 
we accept that God created both human and nonhuman animals and gave in-
tellect and reason only to the former, Scotus’ argument does not work. On the 
one hand, that is a very strong objection indeed. But on the other hand, Scotus 
could defend his view without referring to the metaphysical premise, namely, 
by referring to Morgan’s Canon. As we have seen in Chapters 12 and 18, this 
modern methodological principle recommends favouring explanations that 
refer to low-level cognitive processes over explanations that refer to higher-
level processes as long as the former can coherently account for an animal’s 
behaviour.22 With this principle, Scotus could easily defend his argument that 
dogs find the shortest path by sensitive appetite while we find it by reasoning.
21 See Les Auctoriates Aristotelis, ed. Hamesse (1974), n. 168, 188: “Natura nihil facit frustra, 
unde non deficit in necessariis, nec abundat in superfluis.” This sentence was commonly 
evoked by medieval Aristotelians. Note, however, that Scotus does not mention it in the 
present context.
22 See p. 92 n10.
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Still, the question is whether this explanation also applies to other cases of 
animal behaviour. Maybe there are cases in which sensory appetite is too sim-
ple a mechanism in order to account for what an animal does. So the question 
is, how can one coherently explain more complex behaviours, especially, if one 
aims at saving the metaphysical premise according to which only humans pos-
sess intellect and reason? Not only Scotus, but also Aquinas and Gregory of 
Rimini might have answers to these questions. But since they do not address 
them explicitly, answering them on their behalf would be rather speculative. 
Therefore, it is much more promising to look at another thinker of the same 
period, namely, Roger Bacon who is explicitly concerned with complex animal 




Quasi-Reasoning and Cogitation (Roger Bacon)
In comparison to other medieval accounts of animal reasoning, Bacon’s ac-
count is quite comprehensive in addition to being original. As with the case 
of universals and concepts, the context of his discussion is Alhacen’s theory of 
different modes of vision (see Chapter 11). The main question is whether non-
human animals have only what is called ‘cognition by sense alone’ (cognitio 
solo sensu) or whether they also possess ‘cognition by knowledge’ (cognitio per 
scientiam) and ‘cognition by syllogism’ (cognitio per sillogismum). The latter 
kinds of cognition in particular give rise to some questions, Bacon says, be-
cause if one applies the terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘syllogism’ in the way in which 
they are usually applied in logic, natural philosophy, and metaphysics, one 
cannot employ them for the cognition of nonhuman animals. The reason is 
that knowing and syllogising are usually taken to be intellectual operations. 
Hence, those animals that lack intellect and reason cannot engage in knowing 
and syllogising.1
Quite obviously, this argument rests on the assumption that the possession 
of intellectual powers is what distinguishes us from other animals. But how 
can we know that this definition of the animal/human boundary is correct? As 
said before, we cannot look into their heads. Therefore, the only way to test this 
definition is to compare the behaviour of humans and nonhuman animals. If it 
turns out that we can coherently account for the behaviour of nonhuman ani-
mals without referring to intellectual powers, there is no reason to revise the 
common metaphysical premise substantially. But if there are cases in which 
such an explanation reaches its limits, a revision of this premise might be re-
quired. In particular, such cases involve animals that manage to solve certain 
problems because problem solving seems to require the capacity to reason. 
There are undoubtedly many situations in which animals solve problems by 
instinctual actions or because of some peculiar physical feature: in the broad 
sense of the term, swallows, for example, solve the problem of finding shelter 
by building a nest. But if we see nonhuman animals dealing with novel situa-
tions, the question is whether this can be explained by instinct alone.
1 See Roger Bacon, Perspectiva, pars ii, dist. 3, c. 9, ed. Lindberg (1996), 246: “Et si accipiamus 
‘scientiam’ et ‘sillogismum’ sicut in logicalibus et naturalibus et metaphysicis, ut est in usu 
vulgi philosophantium, necesse est quod sit anima rationalis, quia sillogismus et scientia 
pertinent ad eam solam, ut accipiuntur in dictis scientiis.”
© Anselm Oelze, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004363779_026 
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Bacon presents a whole range of examples of this sort, but the most illumi-
nating one is the following. He claims to have once observed a cat that tried to 
catch fish which were swimming in a large stone container. However, the cat 
had a hard time grabbing ahold of one of them, because they always escaped 
its claws in the water. Nevertheless, it found a way to solve this problem: it sim-
ply pulled the stopper out of the container, waited for the water to drain out, 
and then took the fish from the dry ground.2 This is a very clear illustration of 
problem solving in a nonhuman animal. The cat has a certain goal, encounters 
certain obstacles while trying to reach this goal, but finally manages to over-
come these obstacles. Still, the most decisive question is: by virtue of what 
cognitive process does the cat actually do this? More precisely, one needs to 
ask whether this cognitive process is the same as the one by which we would 
solve the very same or a similar problem.
The simplest explanation for the cat’s behaviour would be that it results 
from pure chance: the cat accidentally pulls out the stopper, and so in fact 
neither analyses the situation nor understands anything about the (causal) re-
lations between claws, fish, water, stone containers, and stoppers. Rather, it 
continues to try to catch the fish and then pulls the stopper out by chance 
without actually intending to. In modern research, one would try to falsify such 
an explanation through empirical testing. This would involve, for instance, 
confronting the cat with this problem again and again to see whether it always 
pulls out the stopper. In addition, one would confront it with other problems, 
as well, especially those that require more planning and strategic acting and 
thus cannot be solved by pure chance. If it manages to solve these problems 
too, the explanation that it pulled the stopper out of the stone container by 
accident would become more and more unlikely. Instead, one would then be 
inclined to say that the cat found the solution to this problem by some form of 
reasoning, which one would need to further specify.
While Bacon does not consider the explanation that the cat accidentally 
pulls out the stopper, he discusses at some length another possible explana-
tion, namely, the theory that the cat’s behaviour is based on a process of rea-
soning. This explanation is quite appealing as the cat obviously has a certain 
aim – it aims to catch the fish – and ‘because of this aim which resembles a 
conclusion it gathers many things in its cogitation which resemble premises’, 
2 Ibid., 248: “Atque vidi murilegum qui desideravit pisces natantes in magno vase lapideo, et 
cum non potuit propter aquam deprehendere eos, abstraxit clepsedram et deduxit aquam 




as Bacon puts it.3 In fact, we can easily describe the cognitive process underly-
ing the cat’s behaviour in terms of a syllogistic argument. This argument has a 
number of premises, such as, ‘If there is no water in the container, one can grab 
the fish from the dry ground’ and ‘If one pulls the stopper out the water drains 
out’. This leads to the conclusion ‘Therefore one must pull out the stopper’, and 
that is exactly what the cat does. This argument is not a theoretical, but what is 
usually called a practical syllogism, that is, a syllogism in which the conclusion 
is an action. Nevertheless, the conclusion is the result of an inferential process, 
and so the cat obviously has ‘cognition by syllogism’.
There is, however, a serious problem with this explanation, as Bacon points 
out. In his view, it is wrong to call this kind of cognition ‘cognition by syllogism’ 
because ‘the disposition of an argument in a certain form and the distinction 
between the conclusion and the premises pertain to nothing but the rational 
soul’.4 And since nonhuman animals do not have rational souls, they are inca-
pable of forming and arranging syllogisms. It is only, he says, ‘as if they were 
by themselves inferring a conclusion from premises’ (ac si arguerent apud se 
conclusionem ex premissis).5 That is, he shares the view of Thomas Aquinas, 
Gregory of Rimini, and John Duns Scotus, who all hold that nonhuman ani-
mals cannot actually reason (see Chapter 19). And like them, he defends the 
metaphysical premise according to which nonhuman animals lack intellectual 
faculties: ‘they use sense alone because they do not have an intellect’, as he 
states in another passage of the Perspectiva.6 Therefore, they only seem to rea-
son or they ‘quasi-reason’, as others call it. So, like Chrysippus’ dog, Bacon’s cat 
does not actually run through a syllogistic argument; hence its action of pull-
ing out the stopper is not actually the result of an inferential process.
But this explanation seems to beg the question. It takes for granted that the 
cat cannot reason simply because it lacks a rational soul. But was not the cat’s 
success in problem solving what gave rise to doubts about this metaphysical 
premise? Consequently, it seems unsatisfying to argue that the cat does not 
reason because it lacks reason. However, one can maintain this premise as long 
3 Ibid., 250: “[...] propter igitur hunc finem qui assimulatur conclusioni, multa colligit in sua 
cogitatione que premissis simulantur.”
4 Ibid.: “Propter quod equivocatur hic, vel magis est vitium translationis, que non habet vocab-
ulum proprium ad hunc modum cognoscendi. [...] Sed de argumento, oportet considerare 
quod dispositio argumenti in figura et distinctio conclusionis premissis non pertinent nisi ad 
animam rationalem.”
5 Ibid: “Et sic est de infinitis in quibus bruta animalia cogitant multa per ordinem respectu 
unius rei quam intendunt, ac si arguerent apud se conclusionem ex premissis.” 
6 See Perspectiva, pars i, dist. 1, c. 4, ed. Lindberg (1996), 12: “[...] bruta animalia utuntur solo 
sensu, quia non habent intellectum.”
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as one can give a coherent alternative explanation for the cat’s behaviour. That 
is exactly what Bacon tries to do. But unlike Scotus, he does not refer to a ‘sen-
sitive appetite’. Nor does he refer to ‘natural inclination’, like Thomas Aquinas. 
Instead, he argues that even though cats and other nonhuman animals cannot 
properly reason, they can engage in what he calls ‘a certain collection of many 
things into one by natural industry and by instinct of nature’ (quedam collectio 
plurium ad unum ex naturali industria et instinctu nature).7 This might seem 
like a half-hearted compromise between an instinctual process, on the one 
hand, and reasoning, on the other hand. This is the case not only because Ba-
con emphasises the role of natural industry and instinct here, but also because 
he adds that the many things ‘resemble premises’ and the one thing ‘resembles 
a conclusion’. Therefore, one could rightly argue that his theory is just another 
version of the theories of Thomas Aquinas, Gregory of Rimini, or John Duns 
Scotus. However, there is a crucial difference between the latter theories and 
Bacon’s explanation.
The main difference is that Bacon ascribes the ‘power of cogitation’ (virtus 
cogitativa) to nonhuman animals. As mentioned in Part 2, Aquinas and most 
other medieval thinkers usually denied that this power can be found in other 
animals. They had no doubt that cogitation is a corporeal power located in the 
brain, but they took this to be an exclusively human faculty. Bacon, by con-
trast, makes cogitation the central point of his theory of animal cognition.8 
One might be inclined to think that this is a mere technicality, but it is actu-
ally more than that. The cogitative power is not just any inner sense, but a 
very peculiar faculty by virtue of which those beings who possess it can engage 
in what Bacon calls a ‘discourse’ (decursus; discursus). Such a discourse takes 
place when animals aim at a particular thing and then ‘cogitate in an orderly 
way’ (cogitant per ordinem) about how to get there.9 The fishing cat is just one 
example among many, according to Bacon, since many animals “work on a 
means to ends basis,” as Jeremiah Hackett put it.10 Still, the question is, how 
shall we understand the difference between cogitation and instinct, on the one 
hand, and reasoning, on the other?
7 Roger Bacon, Perspectiva, pars ii, dist. 3, c. 9, ed. Lindberg (1996), 248: “Sed quedam col-
lectio plurium ad unum ex naturali industria et instinctu nature (que plura assimulantur 
premissis, et quod unum sit simile conclusioni, quia colligitur ex eis) bene potest reperiri 
apud bruta.”
8 On Bacon’s account of cogitation and animal cognition see also Sobol (1993), 114–117; 
Wood (2007), 39–45; Roling (2011), 244–246; Hackett (2013), 234–237; Köhler (2014), 371–
373; Toivanen (forthcoming).
9 See n5 above.
10 Hackett (2013), 239.
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As regards instinct, the most obvious difference from reasoning is found in 
the fact that the cat’s response to the stone container is different from a sheep’s 
response to a wolf. While the sheep instinctually flees wolves, it seems absurd 
to say that the cat has an instinct to pull out stoppers. Rather, pulling out the 
stopper is one step among others in order to achieve a certain end and the cat 
can make this step by virtue of the cogitative power. However, cogitation dif-
fers from reasoning in several respects, according to Bacon. First, the cogitative 
discourse is not arranged in particular modes and figures, like syllogistic argu-
ments. It does not follow the rules of traditional logic in which every syllogism 
belongs to a certain type of argument. Second, the cat (and any other nonhu-
man animal) cannot deliberately distinguish between the beginning and the 
end of its cogitation. In other words, it cannot distinguish between premises 
and conclusions. Third, it also lacks what, in the modern discussion, is usually 
called ‘meta-cognition’, that is, it has no awareness of the fact that a mental 
discourse is going on in its head.11 In short, cogitation lacks many classical fea-
tures of reasoning.
There are several reasons why one might not be entirely content, if not 
totally unhappy, with these distinctions. Most importantly, one might object 
that it remains somehow unclear how cogitation is going to work if it lacks 
the above-mentioned features, especially, the second. For how can the cat ar-
rive at the desired end if it is incapable of distinguishing means from ends? At 
first glance, this seems to be a serious problem indeed. But it derives from an 
overestimation of what cogitation amounts to. What Bacon has in mind here 
is a relatively simple inferential process that takes place at the sensory level. 
Unsurprisingly, he adopts this idea from Alhacen. In De aspectibus, Alhacen 
argues that by the so-called ‘virtus distinctiva’ (which Bacon equates with the 
cogitative power) we can engage in some very basic inferential cognition.12 
He gives the example of a child that is offered a green apple and a red apple. 
11 Roger Bacon, Perspectiva, pars ii, dist. 3, c. 9, ed. Lindberg (1996), 250: “Sed decursum sue 
cogitationis non disponunt in modo et figura, nec ex deliberatione distingunt ultima a 
primis. Nec percipiunt se huiusmodi discursum facere, quia ex solo instinctu naturali sic 
decurrit cogitatio eorum.”
12 This is also noted by Dewender (2003), 155. However, like Smith (2010), 342, he wrongly 
claims that this power is identical with the so-called ultimum sentiens in the forepart of 
the brain. As Köhler (2014), 378, points out, in the thirteenth century Adam of Whitby 
also adopted the idea of a virtus distinctiva. According to Adam, nonhuman animals do 
not have reason but ‘a power similar to reason by which they discern, cogitate, act intel-
ligently as well as quasi-reason and deliberate’.
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 Without further ado, Alhacen says, the child chooses the red apple because 
this apple looks much nicer and riper than the green one, and hence promises 
to be tastier.13 Now the cognitive process that makes the child choose the red 
apple differs from a full-fledged argument, according to Alhacen. First, it dif-
fers because the child ‘does not reason by composing and ordering premises’ 
(non arguit per compositionem et ordinationem propositionum). Second, the 
child reasons ‘without any need for words’ (sine indigentia in verbis).14 And, 
third, its ‘argumentation’ (argumentatio) takes place ‘in a very short amount 
of time’ (in tempore valde parvo) which is why it usually goes unnoticed.15 The 
child, Alhacen claims, would not even understand what reasoning is if some-
one explained to it that it reasoned. Nevertheless, its choice is the result of 
‘sensory reasoning’, as one might call it.16
For Bacon, it is clear that this kind of cognitive process cannot only be found 
in pre-rational human beings but also in nonhuman animals. In his view, the 
example of the cat, as well as other examples of animal behaviour, provide suf-
ficient evidence for that. Admittedly, his argument is not entirely waterproof 
because one could still say that, both in the case of the cat and in the case 
of the child, it is we who describe their cognition as some sort of inferential 
process. But, in fact, they do not reason at all. To this objection, Bacon could 
respond as follows: it is absolutely right to stress that what is going on in the 
cat or the child is not strictly speaking an inferential process, let alone reason-
ing, since reasoning is a much more complicated operation which requires in-
tellectual powers. Nonetheless, mere instinct is too simple an explanation for 
such behaviour. Therefore, we need to find an operation that takes place at a 
level in between instinct and reason. In his view, the operations of the cogita-
tive power meet this criterion because, on the one hand, they are much closer 
to the operations of reason than the operations of other inner senses. On the 
other hand, cogitation is a corporeal power that is distinct from the faculties 
of intellect and reason. Therefore, one can ascribe it to other animals without 
violating the common definition of the animal/human boundary.
This compatibility of cogitation with the common metaphysical premise ac-
cording to which nonhuman animals lack intellect and reason is  undoubtedly 
13 See Alhacen, De aspectibus, lib. ii, c. 3, §38f., ed. Smith (2001), vol. 1, 108. Bacon reproduces 
this example almost literally in Perspectiva, pars i, dist. 10, c. 3, ed. Lindberg (1996), 156, 
and in Questiones altere supra libros prime philosophie Aristotelis i, ed. Steele (1932), 8.
14 Alhacen, De aspectibus, lib. ii, c. 3, §28, ed. Smith (2001), vol. 1, 104.
15 See ibid., §26, 103.
16 On this idea see Sabra (1978). On the analogy between sensory and intellectual reasoning 
see also briefly Tachau (1993), 668.
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one of the strengths of Bacon’s theory because it allows him to account for 
relatively complex behaviours without substantially revising this premise. At 
the same time, he also avoids a deflation of the concept of reasoning since 
this is reserved for the operations of the rational soul. Still, for his theory to be 
more convincing, he would need to spell out more clearly how the cogitative 
discourse works. Perhaps one could assist him by referring to modern theories 
of non-linguistic thinking. In short, such theories claim that we can ascribe 
thoughts to pre-linguistic children as well as to non-linguistic animals.17 An 
example of such non-linguistic thought would be the sort of calculation we 
make when thinking about whether some object, say our wardrobe, fits be-
tween two other objects, such as our bookcase and the bed.18 In this situation 
we do not really calculate. We do not take measures of the wardrobe and the 
space between the bookcase and the bed and then reason that, since the space 
measures only 55 inches and our wardrobe measures 65 inches, it will not fit. 
Rather, we simply try to visually imagine whether or not it will fit (although we 
often realise in the end that it would have been much smarter to take measure-
ments). It seems that many nonhuman animals can also engage in this kind of 
very simple imagistic thinking, although they do not have the slightest idea of 
the rules of logic.
Within the framework of medieval theories of cognition one might be in-
clined to say that thinking is an intellectual operation. However, the cogitative 
power can be interpreted as a “faculty of thought” too as, for instance, David 
Summers has suggested.19 Undoubtedly, cogitative thought is different from 
intellectual thought, particularly for those animals in whom there is no con-
nection between the cogitative faculty and the intellectual powers, as there is 
in human beings. Nonetheless, the cogitative power might, for instance, enable 
the cat to mentally represent and rearrange images of dry stone containers 
and fish lying on the ground without presently seeing such things.20 In order 
to make this situation real, the cat need not know anything about premises, 
conclusions, modes, figures, rules of inference, and so forth. It must, of course, 
somehow understand that pulling out the stopper is a means by which one can 
17 The most famous and influential theories are those by Bermúdez (2003) and Tomasello 
(2014). Against such theories see Barth (2010).
18 See Bermúdez (2003), 36.
19 Summers (1987), 198.
20 Here one could see a parallel to what Arabic logicians called ‘poetic syllogisms’. These syl-
logisms contained at least one premise or conclusion with figurative statements and were 
intended to convince less capable people in the realm of religion; see Schoeler (2005) and 




empty the container. But this ‘understanding’ is as unconscious as the child’s 
‘understanding’ of the ripeness and taste of apples.21 This is also why Bacon 
emphasises that animals’ cogitation works instinctually to some extent. But 
since it consists in a ‘collection of many things into one’, as he puts it, it is 
superior to a basic instinctual reaction. Therefore, it provides an explanation 
of how nonhuman animals can engage in problem solving or other complex 
behaviours even though they do not possess intellect and reason.
21 One could also put it as does MacIntyre (1999), 24f., who says that animals act for reasons 




Imperfect Argumentations and Practical Syllogisms 
(Albertus Magnus)
Thomas Aquinas, Gregory of Rimini, John Duns Scotus, and Roger Bacon all 
tried to account for comparatively complex behaviours in nonhuman ani-
mals. As we have seen, they gave different explanations for what brings about 
such behaviours. According to Aquinas, it is a natural inclination. According 
to  Gregory of Rimini, it is a kind of complex cognition. For Scotus, sensory 
 appetite is the source and, for Roger Bacon, it is cogitation by virtue of which 
such animals solve problems. Despite these differences, their explanations all 
converge on one point: they all agree that the cognitive processes underly-
ing those behaviours cannot be called reasoning. In their view, reasoning is a 
 prerogative of intellectual powers. And since they were – for whatever  reason – 
rather reluctant to ascribe such faculties to nonhuman animals, they also de-
nied them the capacity of reasoning. But as this and the following chapter will 
show, there were also authors who did not refrain from literally ascribing this 
capacity to other animals.
The first of these is Albertus Magnus. To be clear, Albert also subscribes to 
the metaphysical premise according to which the possession of intellect and 
reason is what marks the dividing line between humans and other animals. 
Despite this clear division, he considers the possibility that at least some highly 
developed nonhuman animals, such as monkeys and pygmies, come very close 
humans, not only with regard to physiology but also with regard to cognitive 
capacities. As mentioned in previous chapters, Albert supposes that the genus 
of monkeys or apes (genus symiarum) in general and the species of pygmies in 
particular are characterised by a relatively strong power of estimation.1 They, 
for instance, care for other members of their species (see Chapter 16), and pyg-
mies even have some kind of language, according to Albert (see Chapter 9). 
1 See Albertus Magnus, De animalibus, lib. xxi, tr. 1, c. 3, ed. Stadler (1920), 1331: “[...] et in hoc 
cognoscitur symia melioris esse aestimationis quam aliud animal.” See also ibid., 1332: “[...] 
et ideo pro certo aestimativam haec animalia habent lucidiorem omnibus aliis animalibus: 
propter quod melius aestimant de fantasmatibus quam alia animalia et melius eliciunt in-
tentiones acceptas cum fantasmatibus quam aliqua aliorum animalium, ita quod videntur 
aliquid habere rationi simile.” On Albert’s account of primates see, for instance, Janson 
(1952), 84–89, and Roling (2010), 494–496.
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The strength of their estimative power is also crucial for the question of rea-
soning. As far as monkeys are concerned, Albert claims that they do not reason 
in the sense of forming ‘practical syllogisms’ (sillogismi operis). However, they 
engage in what he calls ‘imperfect argumentation’ (argumentatio imperfecta).2 
But what does that mean?
Usually, ‘in the theoretical disciplines’ (in contemplativis), imperfect argu-
mentations are incomplete syllogisms such as enthymemes and examples.3 
What characterises those types of syllogisms is that they lack a certain number 
of premises. While a complete syllogism consists of at least two premises, en-
thymemes and examples have only one premise. In an enthymeme, one im-
mediately jumps from a premise such as ‘All humans are rational animals’ to a 
conclusion like ‘Socrates is a rational animal’. What is missing here is the prem-
ise ‘Socrates is a human being’. Once we add this premise, we have a complete 
syllogism. So we can easily restore incomplete arguments by adding the neces-
sary premises. But, if we do not do this, we run the risk of drawing erroneous 
conclusions. Take, for instance, the conclusion ‘Brunellus is a rational animal’. 
This we inferred from the premise ‘All humans are rational animals’. Yet, how 
can we be sure that Brunellus is a human being? In fact, Brunellus is a donkey. 
Therefore, the premise ‘Brunellus is a human being’ is false. But this we fail to 
see as long as we ignore this premise. Now does Albert want to say that mon-
keys often draw such erroneous conclusions?
In short, the answer is no. The point Albert wants to make is that “[t]he 
imperfect argumentations of primates are analogous to exempla and en-
thymemes,” as Jörg A. Tellkamp puts it.4 But why are nonhuman primates’ 
imperfect argumentations not actual enthymemes or examples but only anal-
ogous to such incomplete forms of syllogising? The first and most important 
reason is that even incomplete syllogisms involve universals.5 For instance, the 
2 Ibid., 1331: “[...] et est in talibus animalibus non sillogismus operis, sed argumentatio 
imperfecta.”
3 Ibid.: “Et sicut in contemplativis entimema et exemplum sunt argumentationes imperfectae, 
quarum tamen imperfectio perficitur per reductionem ad sillogismum: ita in istis animalibus 
sunt imperfecti sillogismi operum qui non habent nisi fantasticam aestimationem de opera-
bili vel appetibili et appetitum facientem impetum ad opus.”
4 Tellkamp (2016), 121. See also briefly id. (2013), 218–220.
5 See Albertus Magnus, De animalibus, lib. xxi, tr. 1, c. 3, ed. Stadler (1920), 1331f.: “Sed in hoc 
differentia est quod entimema procedit ex ea quae est sub universali prout est in pluribus 
vel in omnibus. Fantastica autem aestimatio non est nisi ex eo quod videtur tantum: et ideo 
frequenter decipitur sicut ex sophismate accidentis: quia non procedit nisi ex hiis quae hic 
et nunc videntur, reputans similiter fugienda vel persequenda quibus idem accidit accidens 
secundum hic et nunc.”
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premise ‘All humans are rational animals’ involves the general terms ‘human’ 
and ‘rational animal’. However, even comparatively highly developed nonhu-
man animals fail to form concepts, Albert says (see Chapter 9). All they have, 
in his view, is ‘a fantastic estimation’ (fantastica aestimatio). By means of this 
faculty, they can only grasp particulars, that is, things which are ‘here and now’ 
(hic et nunc). Of course, they not only perceive these particulars as being of 
a certain colour or as having a certain shape, but also as being dangerous or 
harmless, desirable or undesirable. So if a monkey sees a banana, it does not 
simply perceive a yellow curved thing, but it sees something edible. Still, it 
perceives only this or that banana, and hence cannot form a premise like ‘All 
bananas are yellow’. The second reason why such imperfect argumentations 
are only analogous to enthymemes or examples is that their estimative per-
ceptions concern only practical matters. This means that most nonhuman pri-
mates only attend to things if they have some more or less immediate practical 
relevance for them. Finding a banana or fleeing a predator is something that 
matters. Theorising about mortality or rationality does not matter.
Despite these differences, Albert says that such animals have ‘imperfect 
practical syllogisms’ (imperfecti sillogismi operum).6 Unfortunately, he does 
not give an example of such a syllogism. But a situation in which it plays a role 
could look as follows. A monkey sees a yellow curved thing. By tasting it, the 
monkey finds out that this yellow curved thing tastes sweet. It then develops 
a desire for sweet yellow curved things. The next time it sees a yellow curved 
thing it goes for it. Admittedly, this is a relatively simple situation which does 
not seem to involve any kind of complex behaviour. Nevertheless, one could 
say that it involves an imperfect practical syllogism insofar as the monkey in-
fers from the sweetness of one particular yellow curved thing to the sweetness 
of another yellow curved thing and so transfers its desire for the first yellow 
curved thing to the second.
This explanation of the cognitive process meets the criteria mentioned 
above. First, there are no universals involved in this process, because the mon-
key infers from the sweetness of this yellow curved thing to the sweetness of 
that yellow curved thing.7 Second, its inference, if one may say so, is entirely 
practical. It does not theorise about the notions of curvedness or yellowness 
6 See n3 above.
7 Tomasello (2014), 13, who gives a very similar example with bonobos and figs remarks that 
the bonobo’s inference that what it sees is sweet is “based on a categorization of the encoun-
tered fig as ‘another one of those’ and the natural inference that this one will have the same 
properties as others in the category.” As seen in Chapter 9, Albert does not clearly ascribe the 
capacity of categorisation to nonhuman animals. Still, he might agree with Tomasello that 
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but eats a yellow curved thing if it sees one. This kind of inferential process 
is, however, relatively prone to error, as Albert stresses. The reason is that it is 
entirely based on sensory information.8 If a monkey sees a yellow curved thing, 
it immediately concludes that it is sweet. But it might err because it cannot 
be sure that this yellow curved thing is the same kind of thing as that yellow 
curved thing it has tasted before. Thus, it falls prey to the same kind of error we 
make when mistaking bile for honey. In our case, this error also derives from 
a malfunction of our inner senses. But in contrast to other animals, we can 
correct such errors via our intellect (see Chapter 16). Monkeys cannot do this, 
which is a further reason why their argumentations are imperfect.
There is, however, one species of nonhuman primates that is superior to oth-
ers, namely, pygmies. As mentioned in Chapters 9 and 16, pygmies are superior 
not only because they possess a better faculty of estimation but also because 
they have what Albert calls ‘a shadow of reason’ (umbra rationis). This shadow 
of reason is a separate power which excels estimation: it does not simply elicit 
intentions but generates some kind of experience, according to Albert.9 Since 
the pygmy ‘shares in experience to a small degree’ (experimenti parum partici-
pat), Albert maintains that it can form practical syllogisms in the sense that it 
reasons inductively. Still, the conclusions it draws by induction are not perfect 
because they do not reach the level of universals.10 That is to say, even the rea-
soning of pygmies does not involve conclusions of the form ‘All X are F’ which 
 a primate needs to perceive certain similarities between two things in this situation. Oth-
erwise, the inference would not work.
8 See Albertus Magnus, De animalibus, lib. xxi, tr. 1, c. 3, ed. Stadler (1920), 1331: “Sed in om-
nibus hiis non movetur nisi ex fantasmate: et ideo frequenter errat sicut et alia animalia 
quia sicut diximus in antehabitis, ubi fantasticum intellectui non coniungitur, frequens 
incidit error [...].” See also n5 above.
9 See Albertus Magnus, De animalibus, lib. xxi, tr. 1, c. 2, ed. Stadler (1920), 1329: “Virtus 
autem illa animae quam umbram rationis quamdam vocavimus superius, innominata 
quidem est a philosophis, sed circumloquendo cognoscimus quod haec vis aliquid poten-
tiae addit super aestimativam. Cum enim aestimativa brutorum iudicet de intentionibus 
quae cum sensibilibus accipiuntur, ista plus facit quoniam res fert huiusmodi intentionis 
ad memoriam et elicit expertum et utitur illo postea ad quae confert.” On the concept of a 
shadow of reason see Resnick & Kitchell (1996), 59f.; Köhler (2008), 434f., and (2014), 199; 
Toivanen (forthcoming).
10 Albertus Magnus, De animalibus, lib. xxi, tr. 1, c. 3, ed. Stadler (1920), 1332: “Inductionis 
autem aliquid videtur participare pigmeus in hoc quod experimenti parum participat 
secundum sillogismum operativum quem practicum Graeci vocant, sed perfecte non in-
ducit, quando non progreditur usque ad universalis acceptionem.” This peculiarity is also 
stressed by Köhler (2014), 388, but he does not discuss how it is to be understood.
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is also why they are altogether incapable of using examples (exempla).11 But if 
they in fact fail to do this, one could rightly ask whether it makes sense to say 
that pygmies use inductions because induction usually involves generalising. 
We recognise, for instance, that this human being is mortal and from this we 
infer that all human beings are mortal. So if pygmies fail to draw such general 
conclusions, it seems questionable whether they actually use inductive infer-
ences or practical syllogisms at all.
One way to address this question would be to say that, by participating in 
experience, pygmies come much closer to the level of universals than other 
species of nonhuman animals. Certainly, they neither form concepts nor grasp 
universals. Nevertheless, by virtue of their shadow of reason they gather some 
sort of general information about different kinds of things. Moreover, they 
might make fewer mistakes than monkeys, for instance. While monkeys sim-
ply go for any yellow curved thing, pygmies might come closer to us as they 
are able to realise that not all yellow curved things are necessarily sweet. The 
monkey will also notice that a particular yellow curved thing is sweet, while 
another one is not. But the pygmy is more capable of learning from this ex-
perience. Still, the question remains whether the claim that pygmies reason 
in the sense that they use practical syllogisms is justified. Could it be instead 
that Albert simply employs a much broader notion of reasoning than those 
thinkers we have been looking at before? And is it on the basis of this broader 
notion that he can easily ascribe inferential capacities to pygmies, if not even 
to monkeys, too?
Two points are important to note here. First, it seems indeed as if Albert’s 
ascription of reasoning to pygmies is based on a comparatively broad con-
cept of reasoning. Even though pygmies have the same cognitive capacities 
as mentally disabled humans (moriones), according to Albert, they differ in 
one important respect: while mentally disabled human beings suffer from an 
abnormal ‘lack of the use of reason’ (privatio usus rationis), pygmies have ‘a 
lack of reason by nature’ (privatio rationis ex natura).12 This means that their 
souls have a different nature than the souls of human beings and so they will 
11 See De animalibus, lib. xxi, tr. 1, c. 3, ed. Stadler (1920), 1332: “Exemplo autem haec ani-
malia nullo modo utuntur: eo quod exemplum fieri non potest sine aliqua rationis col-
latione.” See also Roling (2011), 233.
12 Albertus Magnus, De animalibus, lib. xxi, tr. 1, c. 2, ed. Stadler (1920), 1328: “Et ideo pigme-
us nichil omnino percipit de rerum quiditatibus nec umquam percipit habitudines argu-
mentorum: et sua locutio et [corr. est; A.O.] sicut locutio morionum qui naturaliter stulti 
sunt eo quod non perceptibiles sunt rationum. Sed in hoc est differentia quod pigmeus 
habet privationem rationis ex natura, morio autem habet per accidens ex melancolia vel 
alio accidente non privationem rationis, sed potius privationem usus rationis.”
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never attain the level of (normal) human cognition. Mentally disabled humans 
at least have the potential for this. The pygmy ‘neither cognises the quiddities 
of things nor the form of argumentations’, Albert says, and this is something 
unchangeable, it seems, because one cannot ‘heal’ the pygmy’s lack of reason. 
Therefore, pygmies are naturally closer to nonhuman than to human animals.13
Second, Albert is keen to stress that no other nonhuman animal species 
comes as close to our human species as this one. Nonhuman primates in gener-
al are ‘likenesses of humans’ (similitudines hominis), he maintains, not only be-
cause their physiology resembles ours, but also because their cognition is very 
human-like.14 And pygmies in particular are ‘almost midway’ (quasi medius) 
between humans and other animals, especially because of their experimental 
cognition.15 As seen above, this participation in experience is also the reason 
why they can engage in practical syllogising, in Albert’s view. Thus, he would 
presumably agree with Roger Bacon that cats, for instance, cannot reason. But 
pygmies rank much higher on the ladder of beings than cats since they possess 
‘something similar to reason’ (aliquid rationi simile), as Albert puts it.16 Surely, 
there is a crucial difference between reason and the faculty they have: intellect 
and reason are immaterial faculties, whereas the shadow of reason belongs to 
the sensory, that is, the material soul. Nonetheless, the latter can bring about 
certain basic forms of reasoning. Those forms do not, of course, involve general 
terms and they remain entirely related to practical matters. Still, they have a 
syllogistic structure and lead to certain actions. In this sense, the pygmies’ rea-
soning is not quasi-reasoning but reasoning in the true (though basic) sense 
of the term.
13 Ibid., 1329: “[…] magis tamen secundum naturam vicinus est bruto quam homini ut patet 
per antedicta: quoniam expertum magis est ad universale et contemplationem, quam ad 
particulare et motum.”
14 Albertus Magnus, De animalibus, lib. xxi, tr. 1, c. 3, ed. Stadler (1920), 1332: “Et haec est 
causa quod haec genera animalium similitudines hominis vocantur [...].” On the history 
of this concept see Janson (1952), 73–89.
15 Albertus Magnus, De animalibus, lib. xxi, tr. 1, c. 2, ed. Stadler (1920), 1329: “Pycmeus 
[sic!] igitur secundum praeinducta quasi medius est inter hominem divinum intellec-
tum habentem et alia muta animalia in quibus nichil divinae lucis esse deprehenditur, 
in quantum experimentali cognitione utitur per umbram rationis, quam prae ceteris ac-
cepit animalibus [...].” According to Janson (1952), 85, this is “the earliest conception of a 
‘missing link’, the earliest attempt to bridge the chasm between mankind and the rest of 
the animal world.” On this see also Köhler (2008), 419f. Salisbury (2011), 122, claims that 
this idea is not found before the twelfth century but this is wrong as, for instance, Isidor 
of Seville states that symia are endowed with a “similitudo rationis humanae,” see Isidor of 
Seville, Etymologiae, lib. 12, c. 2, ed. André (1986), 115.




Material Souls and Degrees of Reasoning  
(John Buridan, Nicole Oresme)
Despite various differences, all of the thinkers we have examined so far – in-
cluding Albert – agreed that there is at least one crucial difference between 
human and nonhuman animal souls. In their view, only human beings have 
rational souls or, more precisely, only humans possess immaterial intellectual 
faculties. For many of them, this lack of immaterial faculties is the main reason 
why nonhuman animals cannot reason. Even someone like Albertus Magnus, 
who ascribes certain basic forms of reasoning to nonhuman primates, leaves 
no doubt that these forms lack many features of intellectual reasoning, most 
importantly, universals or concepts, for universal cognition and concept for-
mation usually require immaterial faculties (see Part 2). Consequently, those 
authors struggled with the question of how there can be human-like opera-
tions in souls whose nature is quite different from the nature of human souls. 
But what happens if one questions this difference? What if human and nonhu-
man souls are very much the same?
In the fourteenth century in particular, these questions were raised and ad-
dressed by authors such as John Buridan and Nicole Oresme. Both of them 
explicitly sympathised with the view that all souls, regardless of whether they 
belong to a human or a nonhuman animal, are ‘material forms’ (formae mate-
riales). To be clear, neither Buridan nor Oresme declared this to be their own 
original position. Rather, they noted that it goes back to Alexander of Aphro-
disias.1 Nevertheless, both tried to find arguments in support of Alexander’s 
view.2 This is not an easy task because the view that the souls of both human 
and nonhuman animal are material forms gives rise to various puzzles. For 
instance, in the field of theology, the question is how one can defend the im-
mortality of the human soul if it is, as Buridan puts it, ‘extended, deduced 
from the potency of matter, generated, and corruptible like the soul of a dog 
or a donkey’.3 In psychology, this gives rise to the question of how one can 
1 On the medieval reception of Alexander see Pluta (1996).
2 The most recent and comprehensive reconstruction of Buridan’s arguments is Klein (2016).
3 See, for instance, John Buridan, Quaestiones de anima (2nd compilation), Paris, Bibl. Nat., 
Cod. lat. 15888, f. 70ra, as quoted in Pluta (1996), 95f.: “In hac materia sunt tres opiniones 
magis famosae. Una fuit Alexandri, quod anima intellectiva humana est forma materialis, 
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 coherently account for many of the obvious differences that exist between the 
cognitive powers of humans and nonhuman animals. For even if one says that 
many nonhuman animals act quite human-like, one cannot deny that humans 
excel other animals in many respects. But how does one account for many of 
the obvious differences in cognition if there is no obvious difference with re-
gard to the souls’ nature?
According to Buridan and Oresme, there is a relatively simple answer to this 
question. In their view, the rational souls of humans differ from the souls of 
other animals with regard to material complexion and complexity. The soul of 
a donkey is less complex a material form than the soul of a human being.4 This 
affects the soul’s operations, and so the cognitive operations of a donkey’s soul 
are less complex than those of a human soul. The cognitive capacities of don-
keys, in turn, excel those of less developed animals, such as shellfish. Hence, 
material differences produce all kinds of cognitive differences across the ani-
mal kingdom. However, all species differ only ‘gradually’ (gradatim) from each 
other, as Nicole Oresme points out.5 In brief, the more complex the soul of an 
animal, the closer its capacities are to those of the human species. But still the 
question is, how close do other animals actually come to us? In particular, can 
they can reason as we can?
For Buridan, at least highly developed animals, such as nonhuman primates 
(simia), ‘are capable of reasoning to some extent’ (quodammodo rationabiles). 
But dogs and other nonhuman animals also ‘reason and syllogise’ (ratiocinan-
tur et syllogizant), although they reason not ‘as subtly and completely’ (ita 
extensa et deducta de potentia materiae, generabilis et corruptibilis, ut est anima canis aut 
asini.” For Aquinas, for instance, only nonhuman animals’ souls are educed from matter; see 
Davids (2017), 63–67. On possible sources of Buridan’s version of the Alexandrian doctrine 
see Hoenen (1993).
4 See ibid.: “Et dicebat hoc non debere negari propter magnam subtilitatem hominis vel eius 
ratiocinationem, quoniam hoc dicebat provenire ex nobilitate complexionis corporis hu-
mani vel ex nobilitate animae humanae super alias animas [...].” Actually, it is not entirely 
correct to say that the human soul is more complex because ‘complexio’ simply refers to the 
material composition of the soul. Thus, a difference in complexion does not necessarily im-
ply a difference in complexity. However, Buridan points to the ‘nobility’ (nobilitas) of the 
human soul which could refer to its complexity.
5 Nicole Oresme, Expositio et quaestiones in Aristotelis De anima, lib. iii, q. 4, ed. Patar (1995), 
335: “Et ideo videmus <quod> aliqua animalia imperfecta et modicae cognitionis nec discur-
runt, sicut conchae marinae et talia huiusmodi. Et alia sunt perfectioris cognitionis, et alia 
adhuc perfectioris, et ita gradatim intantum quod aliqua videntur discurrere et habere noti-
tias similes cognitionibus humanis, sicut sunt simiaeae [sic] aut talia animalia; tamen adhuc 
quantum adhoc homo superexcedit omnia alia animalia.”
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subtiliter ac complete) as humans and nonhuman primates.6 The example he 
gives in this context is similar to the one presented by John Duns Scotus (see 
Chapter 19): a dog wants to go to its master, but since there is a pit blocking the 
road it cannot take the most direct way. Therefore, it takes a detour in order 
to get to its master even though this way is much longer. While Scotus argues 
that the dog finds its way by means of a sensory appetite, Buridan claims that 
the dog ‘reasons and syllogises that falling into the pit is not good, therefore 
[one should make a detour]’. Thus, the dog does not follow its natural instinct 
but makes some sort of rational decision. Both its behaviour and the cognitive 
process triggering this behaviour resemble, and may even be the same as, the 
behaviour and cognition of a human being.
There is obviously at least one serious objection that can be raised against 
Buridan’s theory, namely, the objection that his description of the dog’s cogni-
tion is unnecessarily anthropomorphic. Even if one agrees that a human being 
would take a detour on the basis of reasoning, one cannot infer from our hu-
man cognition to the cognition of nonhuman beings. Even though dogs and 
other animals might be clever animals too it seems strange to say the dog’s so-
lution to the above-mentioned problem is the result of syllogising. One could 
even argue that it is incoherent to make such a claim because, as we have seen 
in Chapter 12, Buridan denies the capacity of concept formation to nonhuman 
animals. Consequently, it seems inconsistent to claim that the dog forms a 
premise such as ‘Falling into the pit is not good’ because this presupposes the 
capacity to form and arrange concepts such as ‘pit’, ‘good’, ‘falling’, and so forth.
It seems that Buridan would actually agree with this. He would agree that 
the dog does not actually form premises and conclusions like we do, primarily 
because it does not possess concepts such as ‘pit’ or ‘good’ and so forth. Hence, 
if we describe or formalise the dog’s reasoning in the same way in which we 
would describe our reasoning, we do indeed anthropomorphise its cognition. 
But the actual point Buridan wants to make here is that it is similarly flawed to 
argue that the dog’s soul is essentially different from our soul. For how could 
this be proven? If we try to prove it by referring to the things we can do in 
6 See ibid. and John Buridan, Quaestiones de anima (2nd compilation), Paris, Bibl. Nat., Cod. 
lat. 15888, f. 70ra, as quoted in Pluta (1996), 95f.: “[...] sicut dicemus simiam <esse> ingenio-
sam super cetera animalia et quodammodo esse rationabilem, immo et canes et alia anima-
lia ratiocinantur et syllogizant, quamvis non ita subtiliter ac complete sicut homo vel simia. 
Quod apparet, quia, si canis videt dominum suum et vult ire ad ipsum et in directa linea 
inveniat magnam foveam, non intrabit in illam, sed quaerit aliam viam, licet longiorem, quod 
non faceret, nisi ratiocinaretur et syllogizaret, quod non est bonum cadere in foveam et ce-
tera.” On this see also Pluta (2015), 281–283.
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comparison to the things dogs can do, we are likely to fail because any differ-
ence can be explained by some material difference, as noted above. Therefore, 
Buridan makes a suggestion which could be summarised as follows: instead of 
denying the capacity of reasoning to other animals, one could speak of differ-
ent degrees of reasoning. While our reasoning is quite ‘subtle and complete’, the 
reasoning of dogs is less so. Nonetheless, the dog is reasoning, and the degree 
of subtleness or completeness of its reasoning depends on the complexion 
and complexity of its soul. This also applies to other animals: monkeys, for in-
stance, are even smarter than dogs, whereas shellfish are comparatively dumb.
Like Buridan, Nicole Oresme also states that some of the higher animals 
‘seem to think and seem to have cognitions similar to human kinds of cog-
nition’ (videntur discurrere et habere notitias similes cognitionibus humanis). 
And like Buridan (and Albert), he stresses the particular position of primates 
(simiae).7 Because of their human-like ‘physiognomy’ (physiognomia), he says, 
their psychology is very likely to be human-like, too. However, man’s excep-
tional position remains uncontested insofar as only humans possess the ca-
pacity to communicate by language. In Oresme’s view, this has a huge impact 
on the capacity of reasoning, because without linguistic vehicles one cannot 
reason properly. From what he says in this connection, it is not entirely clear 
whether he actually thinks that nonhuman primates can ‘reason’ (ratiocinari) 
because he says that ‘if they could speak, they would reason like humans’ (si 
possent loqui, ratiocinarentur sicut homines).8
This passage could, on the one hand, be understood to mean that language 
is a necessary prerequisite for reasoning. Consequently, creatures without 
language cannot reason. On the other hand, one could also read Oresme as 
claiming that if nonhuman primates had language, their reasoning would be 
as perfect as human reasoning. Nonetheless, they do engage in reasoning even 
though their reasoning is inferior to human reasoning in the sense that it is a 
non-linguistic form of reasoning. No matter which reading is to be preferred, 
it is clear that neither the position of Nicole Oresme nor that of John Buridan 
comes at the price of giving up man’s exceptional position. Man’s standing on 
top of the ladder of beings (or animals, more precisely) remains undisputed. 
7 See n5 above.
8 See Nicole Oresme, Expositio et quaestiones in Aristotelis De anima, lib. iii, q. 4, ed. Patar 
(1995), 335: “Unde, quia exterior figura quodammodo est signum dispositionis interiorum, 
ita de physiognomia: inde est quod in quibusdam illa animalia quae magis accedunt ad si-
militudinem hominis quantum ad figuram sunt maioris industriae, sicut dicebatur de simeis 
intantum quod videtur aliquibus quod, si possent loqui, ratiocinarentur sicut homines, qua-
mvis tamen in quibusdam ita perfecte.”
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But unlike the other thinkers covered in this part, they do not consider this 
special position to depend upon the immateriality of the human soul. Instead, 
they argue that cognitive superiority is a matter of material complexity. This 
argument might strike one as problematic since it seems to blur the lines be-
tween humans and nonhuman animals. For if we say that other animals reason 
too we give up human privilege with respect to this power. Reasoning is no 
longer a peculiar human capacity then, or reasoning is at least no longer what 
makes humans a peculiar species of animals.
To this Buridan and Oresme would possibly respond that human reasoning 
is still a peculiar form of reasoning for many of the above-mentioned reasons: 
it is linguistic, more subtle, etc. Furthermore, humans reason about all kinds 
of matters, practical as well as theoretical, while the reasoning of dogs, non-
human primates, and other animals is mainly practical and relatively simple. 
Nonetheless, it counts as a form of reasoning because all reasoning, regard-
less of whether it takes place in a human or in a nonhuman soul, is ‘material 
reasoning’, as one could call it. Reasoning (or proper reasoning at least) is not 
dependent on the immaterial nature of certain faculties. This theory creates 
serious theological problems, as has been mentioned, because it could poten-
tially threaten the special status of human beings, especially as regards the 
immortality of their rational souls. But as far as psychology is concerned, it has 
an obvious strength: it can easily account for many human-like behaviours in 
nonhuman animals because most, if not all, kinds of human capacities can, in 
one way or another, be found in other animals, too.
As we have seen in this part, one can also give alternative explanations for 
such behaviours. One can, for instance, say that they are brought about by 
some natural inclination or by sensitive appetite, as Thomas Aquinas and John 
Duns Scotus claim. Or one can, like Roger Bacon and Albertus Magnus, argue 
that they are the results of processes taking place in the cogitative power or in 
some ‘shadow of reason’. Regardless of which explanation one prefers, it has be-
come clear that they constitute different ways of dealing with the behaviours of 
those animals that by definition lack the faculties of intellect and  reason. As we 
have seen, there are at least some late medieval thinkers for whom this lack does 
not necessarily imply the incapacity to engage in reasoning,  despite the differ-
ences that exist between the reasoning of human and nonhuman animals. This 
does not mean that these thinkers present a more coherent account of animal 
rationality than others. It simply means that they chose a different approach. 
We shall take up the differences that exist between their approaches in Part 6.
Before that, we will, however, examine another aspect of animal rational-
ity, namely, prudence. Unlike concept formation, judging, and reasoning, 
 prudence is not a part of the triad of intellectual operations. Nonetheless, it 
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gave rise to very similar questions because, on the one hand, prudence seems 
to require intellect and reason, since acting prudently usually means to act 
with foresight or planning. But, on the other hand, nonhuman animals exhibit 
various kinds of prudent behaviours, for example, insofar as they store food for 
the future. Hence, the question is: Can they be prudent at all and, if so, are they 






Introduction to Part 5
The previous parts have examined those cognitive capacities that are part of 
the triad of intellectual operations, namely, universal cognition or concept for-
mation, judging, and reasoning. All of these operations are intellectual in that 
they were usually taken to depend on the possession of intellect and reason. 
Nonhuman animals which, by definition, do not possess these faculties can-
not, therefore, engage in any of these operations. However, it has become clear 
that various questions and doubts can be and have been raised concerning this 
definition, because it is not always so obvious that nonhuman animals, espe-
cially the more highly developed species, do not form concepts, judgments, or 
syllogisms. The ways in which late medieval thinkers dealt with those doubts 
and questions differed and the different strategies they choose will be the sub-
ject of the next part. But before that we shall look at a fourth cognitive capac-
ity, namely ‘prudence’ (prudentia). This choice is in need of an explanation 
because prudence does not belong to the triad of intellectual operations. Since 
it does not, one could ask why prudence is more important or interesting a ca-
pacity to look at than, for instance, language or self-awareness. As we shall see, 
however, prudence is an integral part of late medieval theories of animal ratio-
nality. Moreover, it has much in common with the modern notion of animal 
intelligence and so establishes an interesting parallel between past and present 
theories.
A good example for the role prudence plays in late medieval discussions is 
Thomas Aquinas’ account of reasoning that we have examined in  Chapter  19. 
In contrast to other authors like John Buridan, Nicole Oresme, or Albertus 
Magnus, Aquinas denies the capacity of reasoning to nonhuman animals. 
In his view, the dog that has the choice between three different paths only 
‘quasi-syllogises’ when choosing the third way. Prima facie it looks as if the 
dog reasons, but actually it does not engage in a rational thought process. 
Rather, its behaviour is driven by natural instinct. The interesting point for the 
present study is that even though Aquinas does not ascribe reasoning to dogs 
and other animals, he nevertheless states that they are ‘prudent’ (prudentia).1 
He emphasises that this does not mean that they possess ‘reason’ (ratio) or 
1 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae i-ii, q. 13, a. 2, ad. 3, ed. Leonina vi (1891), 100: “Et ex hoc 
contingit quod in operibus brutorum animalium apparent quaedam sagacitates, inquantum 
habent inclinationem naturalem ad quosdam ordinatissimos processus, utpote a summa 
arte ordinatos. Et propter hoc etiam quaedam animalia dicuntur prudentia vel sagacia, non 
quod in eis sit aliqua ratio vel electio.”
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‘choice’  (electio). ‘Reason is fully and perfectly found only in humans’, as he 
clearly says in the Quaestiones disputatae De veritate, and this is also the reason 
why nonhuman animals lack ‘free choice’ (liberum arbitrium).2 Freely choos-
ing something requires reasoning, insofar as one needs to weigh one option 
against another and at best chooses the most appropriate or the most rational. 
Nonetheless, nonhuman animals have what Aquinas calls ‘a certain likeness 
of reason’ (aliqua similitudo rationis), namely, prudence or ‘natural prudence’ 
(prudentia naturalis), more precisely. By virtue of prudence they come very 
close to humans. In a sense, their nature ‘touches’ (attingit) the superior nature 
of humans.
This kind of argument is somewhat familiar from modern accounts of ani-
mal cognition where even those who argue that nonhuman animals are non-
rational, often agree that they show all kinds of intelligent behaviours. This 
kind of argument seems to do justice to the evolutionary kinship of humans 
and other animals without actually threatening the animal/human boundary. 
The problem with this argument, however, is that it remains unclear what it 
means to say that someone (or something) is intelligent. Are computers intelli-
gent because they run complex programmes? And is my cat intelligent because 
it steals cheese from my plate when I am not watching? Intelligence thus needs 
to be defined more clearly. Otherwise, it is just a catch-all term for all sorts of 
(cognitive) achievements that one does not want to call ‘rational’ for whatever 
reason. The same thing applies to prudence because it too seems to be a catch-
all term for astonishing behaviours of nonhuman animals. Now Aquinas could, 
of course, defend the ascription of prudence by referring to Aristotle. In the 
famous opening passage of the Metaphysics, Aristotle states that some animals 
‘are prudent’ (prudentia sunt).3 And everyone who read and commentated on 
the Metaphysics in the Middle Ages was clearly familiar with this statement. 
However, it remains unclear what it means to say that an animal is prudent.
In fact, there was a relatively distinct definition of prudence in the Middle 
Ages which largely reflected the ancient notion. John Buridan, for instance, 
refers to Seneca: ‘If you are prudent, like Seneca says, you arrange present 
2 Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae De veritate, q. 24, a. 2, co., ed. Leonina XXII.3.1 
(1973), 686: “Ratio autem plene et perfecte invenitur solum in homine; unde in eo solum 
liberum arbitrium plenarie invenitur. Bruta autem habent aliquam similitudinem rationis, 
in quantum participant quamdam prudentiam naturalem, secundum quod natura inferior 
attingit aliqualiter ad id quod est naturae superioris […].”
3 Aristoteles Latinus, Metaphysica (tr. Moerbeka), lib. i, c. 1, 980b20-23, ed. Guillemin-Diem 
(1995), 11: “Animalia quidem igitur natura sensum habentia fiunt, ex sensu autem quibusdam 
quidem ipsorum memoria non infit, quibusdam vero fit. Et propter hoc alia quidem pruden-
tia sunt […].”
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 matters, provide for the future, and recall past things’.4 Similarly, John Duns 
Scotus says that ‘prudence includes foresight concerning future events from 
memory of past events’.5 The following example might help to illustrate how 
this is to be understood: imagine you recently moved to a new neighbourhood. 
Almost everything is new to you and you are not yet familiar with the local 
facilities and utilities. One late afternoon you sit at your desk and begin to read 
a fascinating book. You entirely forget about the time but after several hours 
you begin to feel hungry. Hence, you stop reading, walk to the kitchen, but all 
that you find is an empty fridge. You therefore walk to the supermarket but un-
fortunately it closed fifteen minutes ago. That night you go to bed hungry and 
promise yourself to be more provident in the future. Next time you carefully 
check whether the fridge is well-stocked before sitting down to read a book 
and, if not, you go to the supermarket early. In short, you take measures in the 
present to ensure that what has happened to you in the past will not happen 
again in the future. If you manage to do this, you act prudently, according to the 
classical ancient and medieval definition.
Thus, prudence is a capacity which has at least two different cognitive com-
ponents: memory and foresight.6 In modern animal psychology one would say 
that it includes mental time travel. One can mentally go back and forth in time. 
The question is whether this is the case in nonhuman animals as well.7 At first 
glance, it seems to be. The classical example which was used by ancient and 
medieval writers in this context is the behaviour of ants. Ants store food for 
the coming winter during summer months, and so they behave prudently be-
cause they provide for the future.8 But do ants really anticipate that the winter 
is coming? Are they capable of foreseeing a future drought? And do they re-
member past scarcities of food? In short, are ants endowed with the necessary 
4 John Buridan, Summulae de demonstrationibus 8.5.4.4, ed. De Rijk (2001), 128: “Nam, sicut 
dicit Seneca, ‘si prudens es, praesentia ordina, futura praevide, praeterita recordare’.”
5 John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, lib. i, q. 3, §2, eds. 
Andrews et al. (1997), 87: “[…] prudentia includit providentiam de futuris ex memoria 
praeteritorum.”
6 On the connection between memory, foresight, and prudence see Summers (1987), 266–268.
7 For modern research on this question see Cheke & Clayton (2010).
8 The locus classicus for this example is Prov 6:6. Patristic authors often referred to ants as 
moral role models. See, for instance, Basil of Caesarea, Homiliae ix in Hexaemeron, lib. ix, 
c. 3, ed. Migne (1886), 194C, and Ambrose of Milan, Hexaemeron, lib. vi, c. 4, §16, ed. Migne 
(1882), 262D. It is also mentioned by Isidor of Seville, Etymologiae, lib. xii, c. 3, §9, ed. André 
(1986), 131, as well as in some versions of the Physiologus, see tr. Curley (2009), 20–23. On its 
occurrence in ancient texts, see Dickerman (1911), esp. 124f.
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cognitive components of prudence and, if they are, how do these compare to 
the human capacity to remember the past and anticipate the future? Answer-
ing these questions is crucial for determining whether nonhuman animals can 
be prudent because if they lack the necessary cognitive components, it seems 
questionable to say that they can act prudently. The lack of intellect and reason 
plays a decisive role in this context, since the recollection of the past and the 
anticipation of future events require intellectual powers.
The thinkers that will be covered in this part – Albertus Magnus, Thomas 
Aquinas, Roger Bacon, Bonaventure, Peter of John Olivi, Giles of Rome, and 
John Duns Scotus – disagreed on what the lack of intellectual powers amounts 
to with regard to prudence and its cognitive components. On the one hand, as 
we shall see, they agreed that many nonhuman animal species are capable of 
remembering but incapable of recollecting things. Moreover, most of them held 
that other animals do not actually anticipate future events. But, on the other 
hand, they came to different conclusions with regard to prudence: while some 
of them (e.g. Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas) held that nonhuman ani-
mals possess some sort of prudence even though they partly lack the necessary 
cognitive components, others (e.g. Giles of Rome and John Duns Scotus) ar-
gued that to ascribe prudence to other species is to speak metaphorically, that 
is, prudence cannot be had without intellectual powers. Their discussion thus 
delivers some interesting insights into the criteria that guided them in ascrib-
ing or denying certain cognitive capacities to nonhuman animals.
<UN>
chapter 23
Memory vs. Recollection (Albertus Magnus)
Memory is an essential component of prudence insofar as acting prudently 
means to provide for the future by remembering past events. Knowing that I 
must buy bread for tonight’s dinner, I try to be at the supermarket early because 
I remember the supermarket’s opening hours from my last unsuccessful visit. 
Remembering something does not seem to be an exclusively human capacity. 
Indeed, there seems to be no scarcity of examples of memory in nonhuman 
animals. In Chapter 11, we have already come across Roger Bacon’s statement 
that dogs, monkeys, and many other species distinguish things that are en-
tirely new to them from things they have seen before, that is, ‘things of which 
they have memory’ (res quarum habent memoriam).1 Memory is, however, not 
restricted to mammals or highly developed species: birds and insects return to 
their nests or houses and they could not do this without remembering where 
those nests or houses are. According to Augustine, even fish have memory, 
otherwise they would not swim to the surface of the water when somebody 
passes by a pond. In his view, they do this because they remember that previ-
ous passers-by have pitched food into the water.2 Observations like these were 
then given a physiological (or neurobiological) explanation within the theory 
of inner senses. For instance, Avicenna and Averroes explained that memory is 
among those inner sense faculties that we share with other animals. According 
to this theory, most animals are capable of remembering things because there 
is a certain part of their brain (the rear part, as most thinkers claimed) in which 
the impressions of things that have been perceived in the past are stored. Both 
Avicenna and Averroes emphasised, however, that not all animals are capable 
of actively ‘recalling’ (recordare) these impressions. And so there seems to be 
a difference between memory in terms of recognition and recollection, that is, 
the deliberate search for a past impression.3
1 Roger Bacon, Perspectiva, pars ii, dist. 3, c. 9, ed. Lindberg (1996), 246.
2 See Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, lib. iii, c. 8, §12, ed. Migne (1887), 284. On his account 
of memory in nonhuman animals and its Stoic origins see Brittain (2002), 282–288, and Van 
Dusen (2014), 184–193.
3 See, for instance, Avicenna Latinus, Liber de anima seu Sextus de naturalibus, lib. iv, c. 3, ed. 
van Riet (1968), 40: “Memoria autem est etiam in aliis animalibus. Sed recordatio quae est in-
genium revocandi quod oblitum est, non invenitur, ut puto, nisi in solo homine.” On memory 
and recollection in Avicenna and Averroes see Gätje (1988); Black (1996); Di Martino (2007) 
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The Arabic thinkers who developed the theory of inner senses in some 
 detail were not the first to note this difference. It is already present in Aris-
totle,  especially, in his treatise De memoria et reminiscentia which became 
known as a part of the so-called Parva naturalia in the Latin West.4 One of the 
first to comment on this work was Albertus Magnus who wrote a paraphrase 
(as   second book of De sensu et sensato) around the beginning of the second 
half of the thirteenth century.5 Of course, this is not the only work in which 
 Albert is concerned with memory but it is the one in which he discusses in the 
 greatest detail the differences that exist between memory (memoria) and rec-
ollection (reminiscentia).6 As regards memory, Albert agrees with large parts 
of the tradition, according to which this is a capacity we share with other ani-
mals. The evidence for this is, for instance, that many animals return to places 
where they have been before: birds return to their nests, sheep return to their 
stables, and vultures return to those spots where they have found a corpse be-
fore. They could not do this without memory, because memory is the faculty 
‘that makes return the sensible impression of something that has been sensed 
before and is now absent’, as Albert puts it in De animalibus.7
Still, three points need to be noted here. First, not all animals are capable of 
storing sensory impressions. Flies, for instance, are incapable of remembering 
the blows we deal out in order to chase them off, as Albert observes. Therefore, 
they frequently return to us. Furthermore, unlike other animals, they do not 
have fixed dwellings because they would not remember where those dwellings 
and (2008), 123–138; Bloch (2007), 145–166. On the reception of their theories in the Latin 
West see Coleman (1992), 328–362; Di Martino (2006); Müller (2015a); Black (forthcoming).
4 On the reception of Aristotle’s theory of memory and recollection in the Latin West see 
Bloch (2007), 137–228. On medieval theories of memory in general see Yates (1969), 63–113; 
 Carruthers (1992); Coleman (1992), 80–537; Bloch (2014); Müller (2015b). On thirteenth- 
century theories of memory in nonhuman animals in particular see Köhler (2014), 153–189.
5 A critical Latin edition of this commentary has been published by Silvia Donati as volume 
7/2 of the Editio Coloniensis.
6 The second important text is the relatively comprehensive collection of questions on mem-
ory in De homine, eds. Anzulewicz & Söder (2008), 297–312. On Albert’s account of memory 
and recollection see Coleman (1992), 416–421; Anzulewicz (2005); Bloch (2007), 179–195; Mül-
ler (2015b), 109–120, and (2017). Albert’s views on memory in nonhuman animals are recon-
structed by Köhler (2014), 153–189.
7 See Albertus Magnus, De animalibus, lib. xxi, tr. 1, c. 2, ed. Stadler (1920), 1326: “[…] memoria 
est quae facit ex prius per sensum accepto redire in absens sensibile, sicut videmus vultures 
saturatos recedere a loco cadaveris, et postea iterum redire ex memoria loci et cadaveris: et 
hoc modo ad caulas revertuntur greges, et aves ad nidos et huiusmodi.” See also De memoria 
et reminiscentia, tr. 1, c. 2, ed. Donati (2017), 117. 
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were or what they looked like.8 There are also other tiny animals that are not 
endowed with memory, such as worms and shellfish.9 The reason for a lack of 
memory is not, however, the size of an animal. There are many relatively small 
animals that can store past impressions. A prominent example is bees: they 
lack the sense of hearing, hence are incapable of being taught because instruc-
tion usually requires hearing. Nonetheless, they do have memory; otherwise, 
they could not find their hives.10 The reason for an incapacity to store past im-
pressions is the bodily complexion of an animal rather than its size. That is, the 
organs of flies are too watery and too cold or contain too much soil. This ‘im-
mobilises the animal spirit’ (immobilitat spiritus animalis) which transmits the 
sensory forms that are perceived through the external senses. Consequently, 
the capacity of memory is seriously impaired or even totally lacking in such 
animals.11
Whether or not ants belong to this class on Albert’s view is unclear. On the 
one hand, there seems to be no passage in which he explicitly ascribes memory 
to them. For this reason, some modern interpreters claim that he takes them 
to lack memory.12 On the other hand, there is no passage in which he explicitly 
denies memory to them either. And since he argues that those animals which 
return to fixed dwellings are endowed with memory, it is likely that ants pos-
sess memory too, in his view, because like bees they have nests to which they 
return.13
A second point worth noting concerns the question of whether those ani-
mals that store sensory impressions possess an awareness of the temporal as-
pects that are connected with these impressions. When we remember our last 
shopping trip, we might also remember what the grocery store looked like: we 
might recall its colour, its shape, its arrangement, and so forth. When we do 
this, we are aware of the fact that the image in front of our ‘inner eye’, so to 
8 See Albertus Magnus, De animalibus, lib. XXI, tr. 1, c. 2, ed. Stadler (1920), 1326: “Quae-
cumque autem animalium non persequuntur nisi praesens sensibile et ex prius accepto 
non revertuntur ad absens sensibile, scimus memoriam nullam prius acceptorum habere, 
sicut sunt muscae quae cum abiguntur, revolant immemores ictus prius accepti. Videmus 
etiam quod certum domicilium non custodiunt, et videmus quod non nisi praesens sen-
sibile persequuntur.” See also ibid., c. 8, 1345.
9 See Albertus Magnus, De memoria et reminiscentia, tr. 1, c. 1, ed. Donati (2017), 115.
10 See Albertus Magnus, De animalibus, lib. xxi, tr. 1, c. 2, ed. Stadler (1920), 1327.
11 Albertus Magnus, Metaphysica, lib. i, tr. 1, c. 6, ed. Geyer (1960), 8. On this see also Roling 
(2013), 413f.
12 See, for instance, Anzulewicz (2009), 44.
13 For this argument see Albertus Magnus, Metaphysica, lib. i, tr. 1, c. 6, ed. Geyer (1960), 9. 




speak, is an image of the grocery store we have seen yesterday or a week ago. In 
short, we know that what we are currently recalling is an image of something 
we have seen in the past. The question is, do nonhuman animals also know 
this? Albert’s answer to this question is twofold. On the one hand, he agrees 
with Aristotle that all animals that are capable of remembering also ‘sense 
time’ (sentiunt tempus).14 The reason for this is simply that memory consists 
in storing past perceptions. If a vulture perceives a corpse, stores this percep-
tion, and later remembers it, it remembers something from the past, just as 
we remember something from the past when we recall how the grocery store 
looked yesterday.
There is, however, an important difference between our perception of time 
and the vulture’s, according to Albert. We perceive time ‘in itself ’ (in se), where-
as the vulture or any other nonhuman animal perceives time ‘not in itself ’ (non 
secundum se).15 One might say that we have a direct perception of time. We 
know that time is ‘a number of motions’ (numerus motus), as Albert puts it. 
When recalling an image of the grocery store, for example, we know that a cer-
tain number of hours or days have passed since we have seen this store. Non-
human animals, by contrast, do not know this. Their perception of time is indi-
rect or ‘obscure’, as Albert says, because ‘they sense the past through the images 
of past things that are in them’. This means that they only have  perception of 
time insofar as they store the impressions of things that they have perceived 
in the past. They certainly notice that what they remember is not currently 
there; otherwise, sheep would run away frightened just by remembering a wolf. 
Thus, it is not the case that they do not perceive the past at all. However, they 
notice the past only by recognising something. For instance, they realise that 
the stable to which they are currently returning is the stable in which they 
lived ‘in the past’ (in praeterito). Their perception of the past is thus linked to a 
particular object and its function is to recognise this object.
This leads to a third important point, namely, the above-mentioned differ-
ence between memory and recollection. To recognise an object means to re-
member that one has seen this object before. When we stand in front of the 
14 Albertus Magnus, De memoria et reminiscentia, tr. 1, c. 2, ed. Donati (2017), 116.
15 Ibid., 116f.: “Sentitur enim tempus dupliciter, in se scilicet, secundum quod est numerus 
motus, et sic rationabilia sola sentiunt et cognoscunt tempus; alio autem modo sentitur 
tempus in temporali et non secundum se. Et tunc sentitur sub determinata differentia 
temporis secundum quam adiacet rei temporali. Et hoc est obscure percipere tempus, et 
sic sentitur in praeterito quando res praeteriit, sicut oves et caprae revertuntur ad caulas, 
cognoscentes caulas ubi habitaverunt in praeterito […]. Sentiunt enim praeteritum per 
picturam praeteritorum quae sunt in ipsis.” On this see also Köhler (2014), 207.
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grocery store we will remember that we have been to this grocery store before, 
and in the same way sheep remember their stable. Hence, they are capable 
of what Latin authors called ‘memorari’. Yet remembering something is differ-
ent from recollecting something. Recollection or reminiscentia, as Albert puts 
it, with explicit reference to several Greek and Arabic philosophers, is ‘the 
search for something that has been forgotten by memory’ (investigatio obliti 
per memoriam).16 This kind of investigative process ‘is not simply the  repeated 
grasp of things perceived before’ (non simpliciter est iterata acceptio prius 
 acceptorum), as when the image of the grocery store suddenly comes to our 
mind, fades away, and then comes back again after a while.17 Rather, recollec-
tion is when we have forgotten what the grocery looks like, what its name was, 
or where it is located and then, by browsing through our memories and by way 
of association and inference, finally recall the look, name, and address of the 
store. Obviously, this process is much more complex than standing in front of 
the store and recognising it. It is actually ‘a quasi-syllogistic discourse’ (quasi 
decursus syllogisticus) because one jumps from the memory of one thing to 
another. It is ‘not truly a syllogism’ (non tamen est vere syllogismus), as Albert 
explains, because it does not involve universals. Nevertheless, its complexity 
renders it beyond the capacity of nonhuman animals.18
One might immediately raise the following objection: recollection is a pro-
cess that takes place in the faculty of memory, and this faculty is shared by 
human and nonhuman animals. Hence, there is no reason to suppose that 
nonhuman animals cannot engage in recollection. In particular, it seems im-
plausible to defend this claim with a view to highly developed nonhuman ani-
mals, such as pygmies. Pygmies engage in certain simple syllogistic processes, 
as we have seen in Chapter 21, and so they should actually be capable of recol-
lection as well.
16 Albertus Magnus, De memoria et reminiscentia, tr. 2, c. 1, ed. Donati (2017), 124: “Ponemus 
igitur primo sententias Averrois et Avicennae et Alexandri et Themistii et Alfarabi, qui 
omnes concorditer dicunt quod reminiscentia nihil aliud est nisi investigatio obliti per 
memoriam.”
17 See ibid., c. 2, 127.
18 See Albertus Magnus, De homine, eds. Anzulewicz & Söder (2008), 302,25: “[…] quaedam 
inventio exigitur ad reminiscentiam et quasi decursus syllogisticus.” And id., De memoria 
et reminiscentia, tr. 2, c. 6, ed. Donati (2017), 135: [...] “sed etiam in hoc differunt, quod me-
moriam participant multa aliorum animalium ab homine, quae tamen potentiam habent 
cogitativam, sed reminisci nullum, ut ita dicam, participat nisi homo. Causa autem huius 
est, quod reminisci cum sit investigatio per memoriam, est sicut syllogismus quidam a 
principio procedens. Non tamen est vere syllogismus, quia procedit per se ex particulari-
bus in res et non in cognitionem aliquam factam per principia [...].”
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To this objection Albert could give the following reply. Recollection is in-
deed a bodily process, that is, a process that takes place in a bodily organ.19 This 
we know from the fact that we sometimes experience pains when recollecting 
something: in some moments, we literally rack our brains when trying to recall 
something. However, recollection is a cognitive process in which the power 
of memory is assisted by the cogitative power (virtus cogitativa, virtus distinc-
tiva) insofar as the cogitative power is responsible for the syllogistic part of the 
process. Since nonhuman animals, including pygmies, lack this power, in the 
opinion of Albert, they cannot recollect.20 Furthermore, recollection requires 
‘an act of reason’ (actus rationis), as Albert states in his De homine because to 
recollect something means to search for it deliberately and intentionally.21 Ac-
cordingly, one could say that the power of reason thus primes an act of recol-
lection, and so nobody can engage in recollection without reason.
One might still be unhappy with this answer, because it seems obvious that 
vultures, for example, recollect the image of a corpse just as we recollect the 
image of the grocery store. Otherwise, they could not return to the place where 
they found the corpse a few hours or days ago. They must somehow actively 
and deliberately recall the image of the corpse and its location in order to get 
there. This is not, however, how the process works, according to Albert. In his 
view, the vulture’s remembering the corpse is not brought about by recollec-
tion, but is triggered by ‘natural instinct’ (instinctus naturalis).22 This can be 
understood as follows: when the vulture is hungry, its appetite brings about 
19 See Albertus Magnus, De memoria et reminiscentia, tr. 2, c. 7, Donati (2017), 135: “Ex his 
autem quae diximus, quod reminiscentia est cum deliberatione syllogizante, non debet 
aliquis credere, quod reminiscentia accidat solum secundum intellectum separatum. 
Cum enim reminiscentiarum finis sit acceptio praeteriti sub metro certo vel incerto, 
oportet quod sit reminiscentia motus et passio corporea, et reminiscibilitas est secun-
dum dispositiones corporeas complexionales bona vel mala.” According to Anzulewicz 
(2005), esp. 178–182, Albert nonetheless allows for an intellectual memory, especially in 
his theological works. On the bodily nature of memory and the question of post-mortal 
memories see Roling (2015).
20 Ibid., c. 1, 124: “Tertium autem est quod Arabes vocant virtutem distinctivam, quae est 
componens omnia haec et attribuens rei omnibus modis quibus attribui possunt per sim-
ile et contrarium et per locum et tempus et aliis modis, ut eliciatur secundum intentum 
quod cecidit in oblivione, sicut inferius monstrabimus. Et quoad hoc solum reminiscentia 
solis rationabilibus convenit.”
21 See Albertus Magnus, De homine, eds. Anzulewicz & Söder (2008), 308f.
22 See Albertus Magnus, De homine, eds. Anzulewicz & Söder (2008), 309: “Ad obiectum con-
tra dicendum quod inquisitio non est memoriae, quia inquisitio est actus rationis; sed per 
metaphoram et similitudinem attribuitur ei, eo quod ipsa conferendo intentiones deve-
nit in imagines et per iudicium imaginum devenit in rem. Et hoc fit in brutis potius per 
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a desire for food. This then causes to appear the representation of the corpse, 
since what is stored in the vulture’s memory is not only the representation of 
the dead animal, but also the intention of, say, desirability which moves the 
appetite.23 So the difference between us and the vulture is that we can recol-
lect (or deliberately try to remember) the image of the grocery store anytime 
we want, regardless of whether or not we are hungry. The vulture, by contrast, 
cannot deliberately recollect a representation of its feeding ground. Instead, 
the feeling of hunger triggers the recurrence of the image of the food or the 
feeding ground. As long as it is saturated, it will not remember these.24 Very 
likely, this is also the reason why other nonhuman animals, such as apes and 
pygmies, do not recollect even though they are capable of reasoning to some 
extent: like any other nonhuman animal they lack the capacity to deliberately 
start an act of recollection.
In summary, for Albert, human memory differs from the memory of other 
animals in two crucial respects. First, nonhuman animals have a different per-
ception of time. They do not perceive time in itself, as a certain number of 
hours or days which have passed. Second, they are incapable of recollecting 
things. If they remember something, the memory of this object is not brought 
about by deliberation and a quasi-syllogistic process, but is triggered by other 
powers of their souls, such as appetite. This is not to say, however, that there 
are two kinds of memory. If we remember the image of the grocery store, this 
basically happens in the same faculty as it happens in nonhuman animals. 
What is different is how we come to remember things. Memory in other ani-
mals always requires the impulse of another power of the sensory soul and 
this impulse cannot be controlled voluntarily. By contrast, we do not need to 
wait for such an impulse but can try to remember whenever, wherever, and 
whatever we want.
modum instinctus naturalis quam per modum deliberationis, ut supra patuit.” A similar 
passage is ibid., 302.
23 From De homine, eds. Anzulewicz & Söder (2008), 304, it is clear that both images (imag-
ines) and intentions (intentiones) are stored in memory.
24 Therefore, it seems a good idea to translate instinctus naturalis as ‘natural impulse’ (“Na-
turimpuls”) in this context, as does Köhler (2014), 177.
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chapter 24
Incomplete and Complete Memory (Thomas 
Aquinas, Roger Bacon)
As we have seen, Albert construes the difference between memory in human 
and nonhuman animals along the lines of the distinction between memory 
(memoria) and recollection (reminiscentia): while humans can both remember 
and recollect, other animals lack the capacity of recollection. Another version 
of this distinction is found in Thomas Aquinas and Roger Bacon. They claim 
that the memory of nonhuman animals is an incomplete or imperfect memory, 
whereas humans are endowed with perfect or complete memory. The question 
is whether this distinction essentially differs from Albert’s distinction. For Al-
bert, there are not different kinds of memory: all animals possess memory, no 
matter whether they are human or nonhuman, but there is a difference in how 
their memory works. Since human memory is assisted by the cogitative power 
and the faculties of the rational soul, it goes beyond mere recognition. Aqui-
nas and Bacon, in contrast, seem to suggest that there are different kinds of 
memory, namely complete and incomplete memory.
Bacon discusses the question of whether all animals are endowed with 
memory in his question-commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphys-
ics. In the latter, he argues that ‘memory is twofold’ (duplex est memoria). One 
type of memory functions ‘in connection with sense’ (cum sensu); the other 
one goes ‘beyond sense’ (post sensum). Bacon does not explicitly say that the 
former is sensory and the latter intellectual. But he is clear about the fact that 
nonhuman animals lack the kind of memory that goes beyond sense. This 
is the reason why their memory is ‘imperfect’ or ‘incomplete’ (imperfecta or 
 incompleta) in comparison to the ‘complete memory’ (memoria completa) pos-
sessed by humans.1 The difference between the two is that in the case of com-
plete memory there is ‘an interruption in time’ (interruptio temporis), as Bacon 
puts it. While complete memory can operate apart from the present percep-
tion of something, incomplete memory requires ‘the presence of a sensible 
1 Roger Bacon, Questiones altere supra libros prime philosophie Aristotelis (Metaphysica i–iv), 
ed. Steele (1932), 13: “[…] duplex est memoria; quedam est cum sensu, et hec est imperfecta, 
et hec est communibus animalibus; alia est, que est post sensum, et est cum interruptione 
temporis, et est completa, et hec est in solis hominibus.”
© Anselm Oelze, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004363779_031 
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 license.
chapter 24176
<UN>
thing’ (presentia sensibilis).2 This sounds like an implausible claim, for why 
should one speak of memory at all if the object which is perceived is present? 
Is this not mere sense perception?
One way of making sense of Bacon’s statement is to say that what he has in 
mind here is a classical case of recognition. While we can recall the image of 
the grocery store at any time and independent of whether we are currently see-
ing it, a dog, for instance, cannot recall the image of its master unless its master 
is standing in front of it. Its memory is “simultaneous with sensory perception,” 
as Rega Wood puts it in her interpretation of Bacon’s position.3 When standing 
in front of its master, the dog can synchronise the image of what it currently 
sees with the image of what it has seen in the past. If these images match, 
recognition occurs. This synchronisation does not take place in the case of 
sensory perception because in this case there is only one image, namely, the 
image of what is presently seen. In the case of memory, there is one more im-
age, namely, the image of what was seen in the past. This kind of memory is, 
however, incomplete as it requires the presence of two images, one past and 
one present. Complete memory does not require two images. For complete 
memory, it suffices that there is only the image of an object seen in the past. We 
can, for instance, recall the image of the grocery store without presently seeing 
it, while the dog cannot do this.
If one now compares Bacon’s account of memory with Albert’s, two ques-
tions arise. The first question is whether the incomplete memory Bacon 
ascribes to nonhuman animals is less complex than the memoria Albert at-
tributes to them. The second question is whether complete and incomplete 
memory are actually two different kinds of memory in the sense of two differ-
ent faculties. As far as the first question is concerned, it might seem at first as if 
Bacon’s memoria incompleta is less complex than Albert’s memoria because it 
does not go ‘beyond sense’, as seen above. That is, the dog cannot actively recall 
the image of its master. This is, however, a capacity that Albert did not ascribe 
to nonhuman animals either because to recall something actively means to 
recollect something, and this requires the assistance of rational faculties, to 
some extent. As we have seen, this creates certain problems. For instance, how 
does one explain how vultures return to a corpse? If they cannot recollect the 
image of the corpse and its location, how can they get there?
2 See Roger Bacon, Questiones super quatuor libros Physicorum ii, ed. Delorme (1928), 125: “[…] 
dicendum quod hujusmodi animalia memoriam completam non habent, que est per dis-
cretionem et deliberationem partium temporis; unde non conferunt presens ad preteritum 
sicut homo, set solum habent memoriam incompletam, que est cum presentia sensibilis.”
3 Wood (2007), 43.
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The suggestion was that the appearance of the corpse’s image is triggered by 
another bodily impulse, say, appetite. If the vulture is hungry, the image of the 
corpse shows up in its faculty of memory and the imagination, and it can then 
use this image to return to the place where it found the corpse before. This 
explanation could also be given by Bacon because, like Albert, he endorses Avi-
cenna’s theory of inner senses. According to this theory, the faculty of memory 
is linked to and has certain interactions with other powers of the sensory soul. 
Hence, even though nonhuman animals cannot recollect, their memory can 
be activated by the operations of other senses.
From this theory it also follows that incomplete and complete memory are 
not different faculties. Rather, the power of memory is basically the same in all 
animals. In contrast to nonhuman animals, however, humans possess an addi-
tional operation called ‘recollection’. This process does not require a separate 
faculty (a ‘faculty of recollection’, so to speak), but takes place in the faculty of 
memory with the assistance of other powers, especially, the rational faculties. 
This point is particularly stressed by Aquinas who, like Bacon, ascribes ‘imper-
fect memory’ (memoria imperfecta) to nonhuman animals.4 The explanation 
for this imperfection is that only humans can browse through their memories 
by some sort of ‘reasoning’ (ratiocinatio).5 However, memory itself is a power 
of the sensory part of the soul, and reminiscentia is ‘a corporeal process’ (cor-
poralis passio). But ‘because of the connection to the intellect’, the sensory 
powers of human beings can engage in such a process. Hence, their memory 
is ‘nobler and more powerful’ (nobilior et virtuosior) than in other animals.6 
Perhaps one could say that intellect and reason somehow ‘upgrade’ the sen-
sory powers of humans. Their memory is thus superior to the memory of other 
animals as it brings about acts of recollection in addition to simple memories 
or recognition. This does not mean, however, that nonhuman animals entirely 
lack memory. Rather, their power of memory is limited to remembering, and 
in this sense it is incomplete or imperfect in comparison to human memory.
4 See Thomas Aquinas, Sentencia libri De sensu et sensato, tr. 2, c. 1, ed. Leonina XLV.2 (1985), 
104.
5 See Thomas Aquinas, In secundum librum Posteriorum analyticorum Aristoteles expositio, c. 
15, lec. 20, ed. Leonina i (1882), 400b–401a: “[…] et dicit quod cum multa sint talia animalia 
habentia memoriam, inter ea est quaedam differentia. Nam in quibusdam eorum fit ratioci-
natio de his quae remanent in memoria, sicut in hominibus; in quibusdam autem non, sicut 
in brutis.”
6 Thomas Aquinas, Sentencia libri De sensu et sensato, tr. 2, c. 8, ed. Leonina XLV.2 (1985), 132f.: 
“Sic ergo patet quod reminiscencia est corporalis passio nec est actus partis intellective, set 




Foresight and Provision (Albertus Magnus, 
Bonaventure)
Memory is only one of two cognitive components necessary for prudence. The 
other essential component is ‘foresight’ (providentia) because to act prudently 
also means to do something in the present with a view to the future. For in-
stance, we go to the grocery store today in order to buy things for tomorrow’s 
lunch. Of course, we do not strictly speaking foresee the future. Rather, we an-
ticipate that we will run out of food soon, and this is why we try to stock up on 
groceries. Still, it is unlikely that we would do this if we had not some sense of 
the existence of a future time. We would not store groceries today if we did not 
suppose that there exists something like tomorrow. Yet, do other animals also 
have this kind of anticipation of the future?
As mentioned in the introduction to this part, there are many examples of 
foresightful behaviour in nonhuman animals. Most prominently, ants collect 
grain in the summer and store it for the winter months. But do they really do 
this because they anticipate the coming winter? Are they even capable of dis-
tinguishing the present from the future? These questions were discussed by 
several thinkers, and in the following we shall look at the answers of some of 
them, namely Albertus Magnus, Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, Roger Bacon, 
and Peter of John Olivi.1
Albert deals with the question of what was usually called ‘providentia’ or 
the capacity of ‘providing for the future’ (providere in futurum) in various of 
his writings. Like most other ancient and medieval thinkers, he often refers 
to the famous example of the ant, but he also devotes some attention to oth-
er animals, such as certain species of aquatic animals, which exhibit certain 
 behaviours that seem to be based on this capacity.2 Octopuses, for instance, 
frequently ambush other animals, particularly shellfish, as Albert explains 
in De animalibus, and this seems to require foresight. For what the octopus 
does in order to outsmart its prey is to grab a small piece of rock or a stone, 
hide itself near the closed shellfish, and then wait for the shellfish to open its 
shell. Once this happens, the octopus places the stone inside the shell and 
1 The views of Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, and Roger Bacon as well as some other 
thirteenth-century positions are also discussed by Köhler (2014), 203–214.
2 For a brief summary of Albert’s position see Köhler (2014), 206f.
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then sucks out the interior. Similarly, cuttlefish seem to foresee what is going 
to happen as they tie themselves to rocks before a storm is coming in order to 
stay safe in troubled waters.3 In both cases, one can rightly ask whether those 
animals would be  capable of hunting in such a manner or avoiding certain 
dangers without anticipating future events. The same question could be raised 
about the  behaviour of ants: why would they store food during the summer 
months if they did not somehow anticipate that there is going to be less food 
in winter?
On the one hand, Albert admits that such behaviours seem to be based on 
foresight. Ants seem to store food because they are driven by ‘an anticipation 
of and worry about future scarcities’ (praemeditatio et sollicitudo futurorum 
defectuum). On the other hand, he points to the consequences of this explana-
tion: if one accounts for such behaviours by foresight, one must ascribe some 
‘light of reason’ (lumen rationis) to such animals because the anticipation of 
future events is usually considered to require the power of reason. This is, how-
ever, clearly opposed to the view that nonhuman animals lack reason. Surely, 
as Albert points out, one could argue like Pythagoras and claim that there is 
the same kind of soul in all animals. Within this theory there is no problem 
with the explanation of similar behaviours in different species, because they 
all share the same set of cognitive capacities.4 But how do we then explain 
the obvious differences that exist? How can one explain that many nonhu-
man animals, as smart as they might be, nevertheless differ from humans in 
many regards? There are many species of nonhuman animals whose members 
always do things ‘in the same way’ (uno modo): all ants store grain in the same 
way and swallows built their nests in the same way. Humans, by contrast, often 
3 See Albertus Magnus, De animalibus, lib. xxi, tr. 1, c. 6, ed. Stadler (1920), 1337f., for the ex-
ample of the octopus and ibid., 1340, for the example of the cuttlefish. Similar stories are told 
by Basil of Caesarea, Homiliae in Hexaemeron VII.3 and VII.5, ed. Migne (1886), 154A-B and 
159A.
4 See Albertus Magnus, De animalibus, lib. viii, tr. 6, c. 2, ed. Stadler (1916), 672: “Adhuc autem 
opera providentiae inveniuntur in quibusdam, sicut formicae et apes thesaurizant cibos: et 
hoc non videtur posse fieri nisi cum praemeditatione et sollicitudine futurorum defectuum: 
et constat quod talis praemeditatio non est sine aliquo rationis lumine, quod secundum 
praecedentis bruta non habent. Videtur autem etiam valde difficile de hiis invenire rationem, 
quoniam cuius est actus et operatio, illius est potentia eiusdem actus et operationis, et cum 
operationes insint, videbitur difficile esse reddere modum, quo modo non insint brutis po-
tentiae operationum illarum. Et propter haec forte et hiis similia Pythagoras omnibus unam 




differ in how they do things.5 These differences can hardly be explained by 
Pythagoras’ theory.
Albert, therefore, tries to come up with a theory that can account for the 
foresightful behaviour of nonhuman animals without ignoring the differences 
that exist between different species, in particular between human and nonhu-
man species. According to this theory, ants store food not because they make 
some ‘conjecture about the future’ (coniecturatio futuri). Rather, they are driven 
‘by the avidity for the food that is presently there’ (ex aviditate cibi praesentis).6 
In other words, there is some sort of innate mechanism in an ant that makes it 
collect food. Certainly, its ‘present acts are directed at future times’ (actus prae-
sentes ordinati sunt ad futura) because it collects food today and eats it tomor-
row, but it does not have what Albert calls a ‘cognition of future states’ (cognitio 
futurorum). Unlike humans, who buy bread knowing that they are going to run 
out of bread in the near future, the ant collects and stores grains without being 
cognitively aware of a future lack of food. It is incapable of imagining a future 
period or a future state, and so its behaviour is based on ‘the imagination of 
present things’ (imaginatio praesentium).7
Although this theory can account for the ants’ behaviour without jeop-
ardising the animal/human boundary, one might still be dissatisfied. First, 
one could object that it does not explain why there is more collecting activity 
during the summer than during the winter months. Second, one might have 
doubts that it can account for the foresightful behaviours of other animals, 
such as the octopuses’ hunting behaviour. Albert is well aware of these prob-
lems and provides the following reply. Although it seems as if various animals 
anticipate future events and thus possess the capacity of foresight, it is, in 
fact, some present stimulus which triggers a particular reaction. Ants perceive 
an increase in  humidity or a decrease in temperature, and this immediately 
5 Albert points to this fact in De anima, lib. iii, tr. 1, c. 2, ed. Stroick (1968), 168. On this argu-
ment see also Di Martino (2008), 109, and Anzulewicz (2009), 44.
6 See Albertus Magnus, De animalibus, lib. viii, tr. 6, c. 2, ed. Stadler (1916), 673: “Providentiae 
autem opera quaedam eorum participant sine omne praemeditatione futurorum, sed na-
turae instinctu: et quando congregant, non coniecturant futurum temporis defectum, sed 
ex aviditate cibi praesentis: propter quod etiam quaedam animalia sicut apes plus multo 
congregant quam sufficiat ad nutrimentum per unam hyemen: et hoc faciunt, ut dictum est, 
ex cibi praesentis aviditate sine futuri coniecturatione.” See also Anzulewicz (2009), 49f.
7 Albertus Magnus, Quaestiones super De animalibus, lib. viii, q. 23, ed. Geyer (1955), 196: 
“ Dicendum, quod formica grana colligit. […] Nec tamen grana colligit, quia cognitionem 
 futurorum habeat, sed actus praesentes ordinati sunt ad futura, et ideo ex imaginatione prae-
sentium faciunt aliqua, quae ordinantur ad futura.”
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triggers the  reaction of collecting grain.8 Similarly, cuttlefish respond to the 
presence of certain vapours that occur before a storm and octopuses respond 
to the present movements of shellfish.9 Thus, according to Albert, the fore-
sightful  behaviour or ‘provision’ (provisio) which is found in many nonhuman 
animals is based on ‘the sensory perception of something that is nearby and 
either useful or harmful’ (a sensu conferentia aut nocentis vicini) rather than 
on ‘a precognition by the estimative power’ (praecognitio aestimationis).10 This 
explanation is concise insofar as it can account for the foresightful behaviour 
of nonhuman animals without actually attributing foresight to them.
As Bonaventure points out, it is also concise in another respect, namely, 
with respect to free choice. Foresightful actions usually originate ‘from an act 
of deliberation and precognition’ (ex actu deliberationis et praecognitionis). In 
other words, when we act with foresight, we deliberate on what would be the 
best thing to do in order to achieve a certain goal.11 For instance, we decide that 
going to the grocery store now is better than going there later because it will 
soon close. Consequently, attributing foresight to nonhuman animals means 
attributing free choice too. And unless one changed the premise  according 
to which they lack intellect and reason, this would also mean detaching free 
choice from the possession of rational faculties. A theory which explains the 
foresightful behaviour of nonhuman animals by referring to natural pow-
ers – such as ‘natural instinct’ (instinctus naturalis) and ‘natural sagacity and 
8 See Albertus Magnus, De memoria et reminiscentia, tr. 1, c. 2, ed. Donati (2017), 117: “[…] 
formicae colliguntur in domibus suis praesentientes pluvias in futuro. Sed tamen minus 
sentiunt bruta futurum quam praeteritum. Sentiunt enim praeteritum per picturam 
praeteritorum quae sunt in ipsis. Futura vero non praesentiunt nisi signo aliquo prae-
senti, sicut vapore vel calore vel aliquo huiusmodi.”
9 See Albertus Magnus, De animalibus, lib. xxi, tr. 1, c. 6, ed. Stadler (1920), 1340.
10 Ibid.: “[…] istae tamen providentiae sunt omnium animalium et causantur a sensu con-
ferentis aut nocivi potius quam a praecognitione aestimationis. […] Provisio autem quae 
est a sensu conferentia aut nocentis vicini, non negatur alicui animali. Omnia enim visu 
vel auditu aut certe odoratu aut gustu aut tactu nociva vicina fugiunt et conferentia vicina 
persequuntur.”
11 See Bonaventure, Commentarius in secundum librum Sententiarum, d. 25, pars 1, a. unicus, 
q. 1, ed. Collegium S. Bonaventurae (1885), 594: “Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod liberi arbitrii 
est providere; dicendum quod providentia quaedam provenit ex actu deliberationis et 
praecognitionis, quaedam provenit ex instinctu naturali. Prima est libertatis arbitrariae et 
reperitur in solis rationalibus; secunda vero est naturalis sagacitatis et industriae; natura 




 industry’ (naturalis sagacitas et industria) – can, however, help us to avoid this 
consequence.12
To be clear, the connection between foresight, reason, and free choice is 
not entirely dissolved. Rather, the argument is that the individual animal lacks 
the capacity for foresight. Yet nature – that is, the divine creator – acts with 
foresight, as Bonaventure says, because nature has given this sagacity to the 
animal. This argument is in fact very similar to the argument made by Thomas 
Aquinas in his discussion of the capacity of reasoning (see Chapter 19): nonhu-
man animals do not reason but only ‘quasi-reason’, he argued. But they have 
been created or designed by a rational being, namely, God. As the next chapter 
on his discussion of foresight shows, this argument can also be applied to this 
capacity.
12 For Roling (2011), 239, n. 62, this natural sagacity is the ‘counterpart’ to human foresight 
because it excludes the use of reason. He also points to the similarity between Bonaven-
ture’s and Giles of Rome’s position.
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chapter 26
Quasi-Foresight and Quasi-Hope (Thomas Aquinas)
Like Bonaventure, Aquinas also begins with the assumption that acts of fore-
sight are usually based on deliberation and free choice. Thus, they are distinct 
from the preventive behaviour of nonhuman animals because they are based 
on a ‘judgment of the intellect’ (iudicium intellectus). In order to illustrate this 
point, Aquinas gives the example of a person who has a fever but feels the 
desire to drink a glass of white wine. In this case, her intellect will judge that 
it is better to stay away from wine because the consumption of an alcoholic 
beverage would aggravate the fever. Consequently, she will not give in to her 
desire, because she is capable of anticipating its bad consequences.1 Other 
animals do not have this capacity. If they have a bodily desire, there will be 
no intellectual judgment preventing them from doing whatever they desire. 
Surely, they do have a sense of what is good or bad for them. They cognise 
the ‘ratio convenientis et nocivi’, as Aquinas puts it. This means that they sense 
whether something is, for instance, harmful and thus to be avoided. Yet, unlike 
our knowledge about the harmfulness of things which is based on intellectual 
judgments and ‘rational enquiry’ (inquisitio rationis), their cognition of harm-
fulness derives from estimative judgments which are nothing but instinctual 
responses to certain stimuli, as we have seen in Chapter 15.2 Therefore, they 
might do something without anticipating its consequences. A sheep might, for 
instance, eat too much grass because it has no intellect which tells it that eat-
ing too much grass is likely to cause colic.
Besides intellectual judgments, nonhuman animals also lack what Aqui-
nas calls a ‘notion of the future’ (ratio futuri).3 This means that even if certain 
1 See Thomas Aquinas, Sentencia libri De anima, lib. iii, c. 9, ed. Leonina XLV.1 (1984), 246: 
“[…] non solum cognoscunt quod in presenti est, set considerant preteritum et futurum, quia 
intellectus quandoque ab aliquo concupiscibili retrahere iubet, propter considerationem 
futuri, sicut cum febrienti, ex iudicio intellectus videtur esse abstinendum a vino ne febris 
incalescat.”
2 See Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super Sententiis iii, d. 26, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4, ed. Moos (1933), 815: 
“[…] sicut animalia cognoscunt rationem convenientis et nocivi non per inquisitionem ratio-
nis, ut homo, sed per instinctum naturae qui dicitur aestimatio; ita etiam cognoscunt aliquid 
futurum est, sine hoc quod cognoscant rationem futuri, non conferendo praesens ad futu-
rum, sed ex instinctu naturali, secundum quod aguntur ad aliquid agendum vel ex impulsu 
naturae interioris vel exterioris.”
3 On Aquinas’ position see also Köhler (2014), 208–210.
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animals, such as ants, seem to anticipate certain events or provide for the fu-
ture this is not because they have ‘an imagination of the future’ (ymaginatio 
futuri). Instead, such animals show a certain foresightful behaviour because 
‘they imagine present acts which are directed at a certain goal by virtue of 
natural instinct rather than by an apprehension’ of this goal.4 This lack of ap-
prehension is a crucial point which needs to be spelled out more clearly. Aqui-
nas admits that it seems implausible to claim that animals do not somehow 
apprehend future states, because they often seem to anticipate future events 
and humans even observe their behaviour for predicting the future. Sailors, for 
example, watch the movements of dolphins because when dolphins come to 
the surface of the water, this is a sign of approaching storms. Similarly, rain is 
likely to come soon if ants are seen to be storing as much grain as they can in 
their dry houses.5 This is also the case when crows cry more frequently than 
usual.6 Thus, it seems as if various animal species clearly know what is going to 
happen. But how is this possible if they only grasp present things?
To this question Aquinas gives a reply which is similar to the one given by 
Albertus Magnus. In his opinion, dolphins, ants, or crows do not actually fore-
see future events but simply react to present stimuli. Such stimuli not only cause 
these animals’ behaviour, but also cause those things they seem to foresee. For 
instance, an increase in humidity causes a storm, and even as it is doing so 
it makes the ants immediately store the grains they have collected.7 Because 
of this double causation, as one could call it, the observation of animals’ be-
haviour can in fact provide a basis for predictions about future weather con-
ditions, Aquinas argues, even though the animals themselves do not actually 
anticipate future events.8
4 Thomas Aquinas, Sentencia libri De anima, lib. ii, c. 29, ed. Leonina XLV.1 (1984), 194: “quod 
autem operantur propter finem quasi providentes in futurum, non contingit ex hoc quod ha-
beant aliquam ymaginationem illius futuri, set ymaginantur actus presentes qui ordinantur 
ad finem ex naturali inclinatione magis quam ex apprehensione.”
5 See Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super Sententiis iii, d. 26, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4, ed. Moos (1933), 815: 
“Unde ex eorum operibus homines possunt aliquid scire de hujusmodi futuris, sicut nautae 
praesciunt tempestatem futuram ex motu delphinorum ad superficiem aquae ascenden-
tium; et formicae veniente pluvia reponunt granum in cavernis.” The example of dolphins is 
presumably inspired by Isidor of Seville, Etymologiae XII.6.11, ed. André (1986), 189.
6 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae ii-ii, q. 95, a. 7, ad 2, ed. Leonina ix (1897), 325. As 
Hünemörder (1988), 203, observes, Aquinas takes this example from Isidor too; see Etymolo-
giae XII.7.44, ed. André (1986), 259.
7 The idea of a natural sensitivity to changing weather conditions is also found in earlier au-
thors such as Basil of Caesarea, Homiliae ix in Hexaemeron IX.3, ed. Migne (1886), 194B–195A.
8 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae ii-ii, q. 95, a. 7, co., ed. Leonina ix (1897), 325: “Re-
spondeo dicendum quod motus vel garritus avium, vel quaecumque dispositiones  huiusmodi 
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To this argument one might object that our observation of such behaviours 
does not involve foresight either. We are as incapable of foreseeing the future 
as other animals since all we do is to interpret certain signs in the present. We 
observe the ants now, and from this we infer what is likely going to happen 
later. This inference is, however, based on past observations. That is, in the past 
we have observed a correlation – not a causal relation! – between the behav-
iour of ants and changes in the weather pattern. And so we do not actually 
foresee the future, but only make predictions based on past observations.
Aquinas completely agrees with this point. Nonetheless, he stresses that 
making predictions requires the capacity of distinguishing between past, pres-
ent, and future states. In his view, nonhuman animals lack this capacity. When 
ants rush to store their grains, they do not do this because they have noticed 
that there is a correlation between increasing humidity and rainfalls. Rather, 
they simply react to the present increase in humidity without making any pre-
dictions about the future. Unlike us, they cannot interpret present phenomena 
as signs of future events, mainly because they have no notion of the future. 
However, there are some cases in which nonhuman animals seem to make pre-
dictions, as Aquinas concedes.
In a passage from the Summa theologiae he gives the example of a dog that 
tries to catch a hare.9 As long as the hare is far away, the dog does not try to 
catch it, Aquinas says, because it has no hope of doing so. But once the hare 
starts coming closer, the dog attacks because now it hopes to catch it. Since 
hope is always directed at a future good, this example indeed seems to show 
that the dog does something in the present in order to achieve something in the 
future. For Aquinas, however, the dog’s hope is only ‘quasi-hope’, as one could 
call it, because, in his view, the dog starts its attack on the hare only ‘as if in the 
hope of catching it’ (quasi sub spe adipiscendi). So, just as the dog’s reasoning 
about the escape of the deer is only ‘quasi-reasoning’, the dog’s hope of catch-
ing the hare is only ‘quasi-hope’. But this gives rise to the question of why the 
in rebus consideratae, manifestum est quod non sunt causa futurorum eventuum: unde ex 
eis futura cognosci non possunt sicut ex causis. Relinquitur ergo quod si ex eis aliqua futura 
cognoscantur, hoc erit inquantum sunt effectus aliquarum causarum quae etiam sunt caus-
antes vel praecognoscentes futuros eventus.”
9 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae i-ii, q. 40, a. 3, co., ed. Leonina vi (1891), 267: “[…] 
dicendum quod interiores passiones animalium ex exterioribus motibus deprehendi pos-
sunt. Ex quibus apparet quod in animalibus brutis est spes. Si enim canis videat leporem, 
aut accipiter avem, nimis distantem, non movetur ad ipsam, quasi non sperans se eam posse 
adipisci: si autem sit in propinquo, movetur, quasi sub spe adipiscendi.” This passage is also 
analysed by Hünemörder (1988), 203f.; Roberts (1992), 294; Loughlin (2001), 52–54; Miner 
(2009), 218f.; Perler (2011), 70f., and (2012a), 81; Köhler (2014), 214.
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dog does not really hope. Why should it attack the hare without the actual 
hope of catching it?
In Aquinas’ opinion, there are two main reasons for why the dog does not 
actually hope for something. The first is that the dog does not apprehend the 
point of time at which it might catch the hare as a future point of time. It be-
haves only ‘as if it foresaw the future’ (ac si futurum praevidet), according to 
Aquinas. Prima facie, this seems to be an incoherent claim because it cannot 
explain why the dog does not always attack the hare. But, for Aquinas, there 
is a simple explanation: instead of hope and foresight it is ‘natural instinct’ 
(instinctus naturalis) which moves the dog. This can be understood as follows: 
when the dog perceives that the hare is far away, no offensive reaction is trig-
gered. But when the hare comes closer, the dog reacts by launching an attack. 
It does not make any predictions about the hare’s movements nor does it hope 
to catch the hare. Rather, its senses simply respond to what they presently per-
ceive. One might compare the dog’s senses to a motion detector. As long as no 
object appears within the detector’s radius, no spotlight is turned on. Similarly, 
no offensive reaction is triggered in the dog as long as the hare moves outside 
a certain radius.
In Chapter 19, we discussed the strengths and weaknesses of such a compar-
ison. One of the weaknesses mentioned was that it seems to reduce nonhuman 
animals to soulless machines. This is misleading insofar as Aquinas clearly 
considers all animals to be ensouled beings, while he does not attribute souls 
to artificial beings. Still, there is an important parallel between the two: just as 
a machine, say, a motion detector, has been designed and programmed by an 
intelligent, rational being, say, a human engineer, the dog has been ‘designed’ 
and ‘programmed’ by an intelligent, rational being as well, namely the ‘divine 
intellect’ (intellectus divinus).10
This is the second reason why the dog’s behaviour is not based on actual 
foresight and hope: while our will, that is, the ‘appetite of an intellectual na-
ture’ (appetitus naturae intellectivae), ‘is moved by an apprehension of the in-
tellect to which it is linked’ (movetur ex apprehensione intellectus coniuncti), 
the sensitive appetite of nonhuman animals ‘follows the apprehension of the 
separate intellect’ (sequitur apprehensionem intellectus separati).11 This does 
10 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae i-ii, q. 40, a. 3, co., ed. Leonina vi (1891), 267: “[…] 
quamvis bruta animalia non cognoscant futurum, tamen ex instinctu naturali movetur 
animal ad aliquid in futurum, ac si futurum praevideret. Hujusmodi enim instinctus est 
eis inditus ab intellectu divino praevidente futura.”
11 Ibid.: “Ut enim supra dictum est, appetitus sensitivus brutorum animalium, et etiam ap-
petitus naturalis rerum insensibilium, sequuntur apprehensionem alicuius intellectus, 
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not mean that the dog lacks cognition; it definitely sees, hears, or smells the 
hare and its perceptions are necessary for triggering its reaction. Still, this reac-
tion is not the result of rational deliberation or free choice.12
Yet even if one accepts that the dog’s behaviour is not based on deliberation 
one might still say that its behaviour involves foresight insofar as ‘its appetite 
is moved by something future’ (movetur eius appetitus in aliquod futurum), as 
Aquinas puts it.13 This is true, but only in the sense that appetites or ‘present 
acts are directed towards a goal’ (actus presentes ordinantur ad finem).14 That is, 
the dog’s attack is directed towards the goal of catching the hare, but the dog it-
self is neither cognitively aware of the fact that it has this goal nor does it grasp 
that a goal is something that, hopefully, will be achieved in the future. Thus, 
the dog’s behaviour is not, strictly speaking, goal-directed, to use Fred Dretske’s 
terminology. In the opinion of Dretske, there is an important difference be-
tween behaviour that is directed towards a goal and behaviour that is directed 
by a goal.15 In order to illustrate this difference, he refers to Davidson’s famous 
example of a heat-seeking missile which moves towards a particular target.
According to Davidson, an “uninformed observer might be justified in at-
tributing a desire and beliefs to the missile; but he would be wrong.”16 He 
would be wrong, Davidson explains, because the missile “moves as it does be-
cause it was designed and built by people who had the very desire and beliefs” 
that it move in such a way. The missile itself has neither desires nor beliefs, and 
everybody would agree that if people die from its impact, it is not the missile 
which is to blame but those people who constructed and launched it, because 
the missile is not an intentional being. Thus, it “may be driven toward a goal by 
 sicut et appetitus naturae intellectivae, qui dicitur voluntas. Sed in hoc est differentia, 
quod voluntas movetur ex apprehensione intellectus coniuncti: sed motus appetitus 
naturalis sequitur apprehensionem intellectus separati, qui naturam instituit; et similiter 
appetitus sensitivus brutorum animalium, quae etiam quodam instinctu naturali agunt.”
12 According to Perler (2012a), 81, n. 24, Miner claims that Aquinas attributes hope to ani-
mals absolutely. This, however, is not correct because, on the one hand, Miner (2009), 
218f., rightly points out that “[i]n the case of hope, there is no explicit terminological dif-
ferentiation” between the hope of humans and nonhuman animals. On the other hand, 
he stresses that “for human hope to be rational, the apprehension of something as pos-
sible or impossible requires deliberation.”
13 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae i-ii, q. 40, a. 3, co., ed. Leonina vi (1891), 267: “[…] 
tamen ex his quae videt animal in praesenti, movetur eius appetitus in aliquod futurum 
vel prosequendum vel vitandum.”
14 See n4 above.
15 See Dretske (1988), 124–127.
16 Davidson (1982), 323.
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certain cybernetic mechanisms, but it is not goal-directed,” as Dretske puts it, 
because it is entirely unaware of the fact that it has a goal.17 Again, one needs 
to be careful in comparing a dog to a missile. As mentioned before, there are 
crucial differences between living beings and artefacts, according to Aquinas. 
But as regards the cognitive awareness for the existence of goals and future 
states they do not differ that much because neither a dog nor a missile knows 
that it is moved by a certain goal, which is why, in comparison to humans, a dog 
only has ‘quasi-hope’ and ‘quasi-foresight’.
17 Dretske (1988), 126.
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chapter 27
Operating for and towards the Future (Roger Bacon, 
Peter of John Olivi)
The question of whether certain nonhuman animals’ behaviours are goal- 
directed in some sense was discussed and spelled out even more clearly by 
Roger Bacon and Peter of John Olivi. In his commentary on four of the books 
of Aristotle’s Physics, Bacon remarks that foresight is no trivial topic, because it 
is intimately linked to the question of rationality. The reason is that ‘the cogni-
tion of future things’ (cognitio futurorum) is one of the most eminent cognitive 
operations. Therefore, it is likely to require eminent cognitive powers: intel-
lect and reason.1 But how shall one deal with the foresightful behaviours of 
nonhuman animals? Birds build nests and ants store grain, and so they seem 
to ‘ anticipate’ (precognoscunt) the coming season. If this anticipation depends 
upon intellect and reason, it follows that they are endowed with such faculties.2
The problem with such a conclusion is that it obviously runs counter to the 
common definition of the animal/human boundary. So one must either revise 
this definition or come up with an alternative explanation for foresightful be-
haviour in nonhuman animals. Since there are many arguments and authori-
ties which validate the common definition of the animal/human boundary, 
the revision of this definition is not an option, according to Bacon.3 Instead, 
he suggests drawing a distinction between three kinds of cognition of future 
things.4
First, there is God’s cognition of future things. As God is the first cause of 
everything, he knows present, past, and future things alike by some sort of 
1 See Roger Bacon, Questiones supra libros quatuor Physicorum ii, ed. Delorme (1928), 121: 
“ Major etiam sic potest confirmari; nobilissima cognitio a nobiliori virtute emanat; set 
 nobilissima cognitio est futurorum, quia difficilius, subtilius, et magis arduum est cognoscere 
futura quam alia, ergo cognitio futurorum ab intellectu erit.”
2 See ibid.: “[...] set hujusmodi animalia per cognitionem temporis futuri hujusmodi opera-
tiones faciunt, ergo hujusmodi animalia suas operationes ab intellectu vel ratione faciunt. 
Minor patet; ad quid enim aves facerent nidos nisi precognoscerent estatem futuram? In 
hyeme enim pulli vivere non possunt; similiter formica grana colligit in estate, ex quibus in 
hyeme quam precognoscit futuram nutriatur.”
3 See ibid., 122.
4 See Roger Bacon, Questiones supra libros quatuor Physicorum ii, ed. Delorme (1928), 123f. On 
this distinction see also Köhler (2014), 211.
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‘ introspection’ (inspectus). Second, there is man’s cognition of future things, 
and this is based on ‘industry, deliberation, and perspicacity’ (industria, delib-
eratio, et perspicacitas). For instance, if astronomers make predictions about 
future events they infer many things from a close observation of the stars 
which influence the earthly sphere. Both kinds of cognition require intellect 
and reason.
Yet, there is also a third kind of cognition of future things, and this is the sort 
of cognition of the future that is found in many nonhuman animals. Unlike 
God or human beings, they do not cognise future things by virtue of intellect 
and reason, but ‘by natural instinct or industry alone’ (solo nature instinctu, vel 
industria).5 But what does this instinctual cognition amount to? Bacon here 
draws a distinction that is very similar to the one Fred Dretske employs above. 
In his view, humans ‘act towards and for the future’ (agunt ad futurum pro fu-
turo), and this is what we mean when we say that they ‘provide’ (providunt) for 
the future. Nonhuman animals, by contrast, do not act with foresight because 
‘they only operate towards the future and not for the future’ (solum ad futurum 
et non pro futuro operantur). This means that they do things from which they 
will profit in the future but they do this without discerning the gap between 
the present and the future.6 This argument, however, might occasion some 
doubts. For why would ants collect grains during the summer and store them 
for the winter if they did not conceive of the present and the future ‘as distinct 
[times]’ (ut diversa)? They would hardly do so, it seems, if they did not under-
stand that what they collect now is to be kept for later. Therefore, they must be 
capable of discerning different periods of time, and thus act with foresight.7
5 See ibid., 124: “Tertio modo est cognitio futurorum solo nature instinctu, vel industria et 
hec cognitio est in animalibus brutis, de quibus loquimur hic, ad regimen vite sue et con-
servationem, et propter sui in sua simili specie continuationem; et hujusmodi futurorum 
 cognitio non est ab intellectu vel ratione, ut visum est.” Bacon makes a similar point in the 
Questiones altere supra libros prime philosophie Aristotelis i, ed. Steele (1932), 16f. See also 
Wood (2007), 43f.
6 See Roger Bacon, Questiones supra libros quatuor Physicorum ii, ed. Delorme (1928), 124: “Ad 
cujus intelligentiam notandum quod quedam animalia agunt ad futurum pro futuro, ut ho-
mines, et hujusmodi animalia provident; alia sunt que solum ad futurum et non pro futuro 
operantur, ut animalia bruta, de quibus loquimur, et istis non attribuitur providere. Et nota 
quod agere ad futurum non pro futuro, est agere aliquid in presenti vel facere quo agens in 
futuro indiget vel indigebit, non tamen futurum precognoscit nec differentias temporis dis-
cernit, et sic agunt animalia bruta.”
7 See ibid.: “Set contra hoc potest sic obici: hujusmodi animalia bruta ut formice aut accipiunt 
presens et futurum ut unum, aut ut diversa. Non ut unum, quia sic non colligerent grana in 
estate nec in loco ad conservandum reponerent, cum non indigerent, si estatem presentem 
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Instead of rejecting this objection out of hand, Bacon tries to take it seri-
ously and makes the following suggestion. In fact, nonhuman animals discern 
between the present and the future, but they do not do this ‘in an essential 
way or essentially’ (modo essentiali vel essentialiter) but only ‘in an accidental 
way or accidentally’ (accidentali vel accidentaliter).8 In order to illustrate this 
difference, he gives the following example: the vegetative soul is responsible 
for nourishing as well as providing for the generation of a living being. Yet, by 
taking care of generation it not only guarantees the survival of an individual 
being, but also secures the continuation of an entire species. This, however, 
happens accidentally. That is, the vegetative soul does not essentially intend to 
take care of the continuation of living beings in their entirety. Similarly, ants 
try to survive, but without essentially cognising that what they presently col-
lect will help them to survive in the future: ‘their cognition and intention are 
accidental’ (cognitio et intentioni eorum est accidens), Bacon says. The ants do 
not collect grain in the present because they reckon that they are likely to run 
out of grain in the future. And so even though they seem to care for the future, 
they actually only care for the present.
The same point was stressed by Peter of John Olivi. According to Olivi, many 
animals obviously ‘aim at future things’ (futura indendant), for instance, when 
they desire to eat something to get rid of hunger. They are hungry now and 
wish to be full later, which means that they desire to be in a certain state in the 
near future. Still, they ‘do not fully discern’ (non plene discernantur) between 
present and future states, as Olivi makes clear. Rather, they treat future states 
et hyemem futuram pro eodem acciperent, ergo manifestum est quod presens et futurum 
accipiunt ut diversa; set sic non possunt accipere nisi distinguendo et discernendo unum ab 
altero, et si sic, ergo providere et deliberare possunt.”
8 Ibid., 125: “Ad hoc dicendum quod hujusmodi animalia bruta presens et futurum accipiunt ut 
diversa, modo tamen accidentali vel accidentaliter, et non modo essentiali vel essentialiter; 
set sic accipere ad providendum et deliberandum non sufficiunt, quod per hoc exemplum 
potest fieri manifestum: anime vegetative duo sunt opera, scilicet nutrire et generare; veg-
etativa enim decindit semen per istam autem decisionem fit continuatio esse universalis; set 
vegetativa hoc non intendebat essentialiter, set solam generationem: quod autem ex genera-
tione hujusmodi continuatio accidat, hoc intentioni vegetative accidit. Similiter formice in 
presenti estate grana colligunt sui conservationem intendentes essentialiter, et non tamen 
quia hyems sit futura cognoscunt: unde sicut in estate propter conservationem presentem 
nutrimento utuntur et grana comedunt, sic similiter illam collectionem granorum propter 
presentem conservationem faciunt; nisi enim hoc facerent, sui statim corruptionem fieri 
estimarent; et ita si ex hujusmodi collectione granorum accidit conservatio et regimen sue 
vite in futuro, hoc cognitioni et intentioni eorum est accidens, et ita presens et futurum es-
sentialiter accipiunt ut enim unum, tamen accidentaliter ut duo.”
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or things ‘as if they were presently correlated and connected to those things 
which they presently sense and do’ (sunt quasi praesentialiter correlata et con-
nexa iis quae praesentialiter sentiunt et agunt).9 To give an example, a dog that 
is used to getting a bone for dinner, is capable of thinking of this bone before 
dinner time. However, when it imagines the bone, this act of imagination does 
not include the information that the bone is something it is going to receive in 
the future. In this respect, the dog’s cognition differs from the cognition of its 
master, because its master is well aware of the difference between the present 
and the future. Of course, the dog will not go for a bone where there is no bone. 
But when there is a bone it will try to get it and it will not waste time reflecting 
on the fact that it is going to eat the bone in a second. Thus, Olivi agrees with 
the other philosophers that there is a difference  between the way in which 
humans and nonhuman animals perceive time. Only the latter can clearly dis-
tinguish between the present and the future, for example, and so only humans 
can act with foresight in the true sense of the term.
9 See Peter of John Olivi, Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum, q. 155, ed. Jansen 
(1926), 322: “Praeterea, anima bruti non potest appetere [Toivanen (2013a), 315, suggests to 
read apprehendere here] aeternitatem, quia nec potest ipsam cognoscere. Licet enim aliqua 
futura indendant ac per consequens et praecogitent, puta, pullos habere de ovis vel refectio-
nem ex cibo: non tamen possunt futura praecogitare sub plena ratione futurae aeternitatis, 
immo nec nisi prout futura sunt quasi praesentialiter correlata et connexa iis quae praesen-
tialiter sentiunt et agunt. Et idem est de recordatione praeteritorum. Non enim potest praet-
eritio et futuritio plene apprehendi, nisi plene sciantur non esse actu et plene discernantur 
a praesenti, sicut non ens actu ab ente actu. Bruta autem hoc non possunt, quia nec appre-
hendunt illa, nisi prout quasi praesentialiter se offerunt in specie et actu imaginationis.” On 
this passage see also Toivanen (2013a), 315f.
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chapter 28
Imperfect or Particular Prudence (Albertus 
Magnus, Thomas Aquinas)
Acting prudently, as has been repeatedly stressed, means to do something in 
the present for the future by means of experience from the past. Memory and 
foresight are thus essential cognitive components of prudence. As the previous 
chapters have shown, nonhuman animals do not fully possess these capaci-
ties, according to various later medieval thinkers. Although many animals are 
capable of  remembering things, nonhuman species are incapable of what was 
usually called recollection. Hence, their memory is incomplete or imperfect in 
comparison to human memory, as, for instance, Thomas Aquinas and Albertus 
Magnus put it. With the component of foresight, it is even worse because all of 
the authors under consideration argued that other animals do not anticipate 
future states or events. All they do is to react to present stimuli. Admittedly, 
their behaviours are often directed towards the future. But this does not mean 
that they actually discern between the present and the future. Rather, they pro-
vide for the future without really knowing that they will profit from their pres-
ent operations. In both cases, the lack of intellect and reason is what causes 
the deficiency, or even lack, of recollection and foresight. The question now is 
what conclusions should be drawn from this for the prudence of nonhuman 
animals. Can they be prudent if they do not, or not fully, possess memory and 
foresight?
One possible answer to this question was given by Albertus Magnus. For 
Albert, it is clear that memory is a necessary prerequisite of prudence. Un-
less there is a storage of sensible forms and insensible intentions, there is no 
prudence, he argues. Consequently, those animals which possess sensory pow-
ers but lack memory, are ‘imprudent’ (imprudentia). All other animals can be 
called ‘prudent’ (prudentia) at least to the extent that they possess ‘a control of 
life from memory’ (regimen vitae ex memoria).1 One might assume that Albert 
says this simply because he is trying to cope with the famous statement at the 
1 See Albertus Magnus, Metaphysica, lib. i, tr. 1, c. 6, ed. Geyer (1960), 9: “Quibusdam vero ex 
sensu secundum actum facto fit memoria prius acceptorum sensibilium. Et cum memo-
ria non tantum sit thesaurus et coacervatio formarum sensibilium prius acceptarum, sed 
etiam intentionum convenientis et inconvenientis, boni et mali, amici et inimici et huius-
modi cum sensibilibus ab aestimativa acceptorum, sicut in libro De memoria et reminiscentia 
© Anselm Oelze, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004363779_035 
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beginning of the Metaphysics in which Aristotle claims that there is memo-
ry in some animals, but not in others and thus that this is also the case with 
prudence.2 Yet, Albert’s account of “animal prudence,” as Summers calls this 
capacity, is much more than just a literal adoption of Aristotle’s text because 
Albert is well aware of the deficiency of both memory and foresight in nonhu-
man animals.3 Therefore, he needs to explain how there can be prudence if the 
lack of intellect and reason affects a creature’s cognitive components.
In his Metaphysics commentary, Albert solves this problem by saying that 
we can call nonhuman animals prudent but ‘not according to the perfect mea-
sure of prudence’ (non secundum perfectam prudentiae rationem). If we talk 
about prudence in bees, for instance, we do not talk about ‘an active habit in-
volving true reason’ (activus habitus cum ratione vera) which aims at gathering 
whatever is useful or harmful for life.4 In other words, what one finds in them 
is prudence ‘in a certain respect’ (secundum quid) rather than prudence ‘in 
an absolute sense’ (simpliciter), as he puts it in his commentary on Aristotle’s 
Ethics.5 In order to illustrate this difference, he refers to the example of the 
reflection of light or sound. If we look at a ray of sunlight that is reflected by 
a wall, we still see a ray of sunlight but this ray is less intense than the unre-
flected ray. The same applies to prudence in human and nonhuman animals: 
in comparison to humans, nonhuman animals possess a weaker form of pru-
dence. But in what sense is the prudence of nonhuman animals weaker than 
that of humans?
According to Albert, there are two main differences between human and 
nonhuman prudence.6 First, there is a difference with regard to the mental 
representations that are involved in prudent behaviour, or, more precisely, in 
the cognitive processes underlying such behaviour. While humans employ not 
only particulars but also universals, other animals do not go beyond the level 
 probavimus: propter hoc quidem alia prudentia sunt animalium habentia regimen vitae ex 
memoria, alia vero solo sensu vigentia sunt imprudentia.”
2 See p. 165 n3.
3 On “animal prudence” see Summers (1987), 270.
4 See Albertus Magnus, Metaphysica, lib. i, tr. 1, c. 6, ed. Geyer (1960), 9: “Dico autem memoran-
tia prudentia non secundum perfectam prudentiae rationem, quae est activus habitus cum 
ratione vera eorum quae in nobis sunt, ad vitam conferentium.”
5 See Albertus Magnus, Super Ethica commentum et quaestiones, lib. vi, lec. 10, ed. Kübel (1987), 
462: “Dicendum quod in brutis non est prudentia simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Unde dicit 
Commentator, quod est in eis quaedam resonantia prudentiae. Fit autem resonantia ex soni 
reflexione; unde reflexum procedit in debilius esse sicut lumen defectibilius.” See also Roling 
(2011), 232.
6 On these differences see also Köhler (2014), 140f.
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of particulars. Even if they grasp insensible intentions, such as the harmfulness 
or usefulness of an object, they sense a particular, as has been shown in Part 
2. Moreover, they do nothing without immediate sensory input. For instance, 
sheep do not run away as long as there is no sensory stimulus, such as a wolf, 
triggering a reaction.7 Similarly, memory and apparently foresightful behav-
iour requires certain present stimuli such as an appetite or the perception of a 
certain change in the environment, as we have seen in the previous chapters. 
And in this sense nonhuman prudence is weaker than human prudence.
The second difference is the cognitive power (virtus) that is involved in this 
process. Human prudence derives from the intellectual part of the soul, where-
as the prudence of nonhuman animals is based on the powers of the sensory 
part.8 Therefore, there is no (or less) flexibility and variability in the operations 
of nonhuman animals. Put differently, prudent actions in nonhuman animals 
are restricted to a certain set of operations which are given to them by nature, 
and this set is the same for all members of a species. All ants are prudent in 
the same way, for example, not only because they all store grain for the future, 
but also because they do so in much the same way. Similarly, certain aquatic 
animals, as well as serpents and creeping animals, are prudent in that they 
ambush prey.9 They are prudent in the same way as other members of their 
species because their predatory behavior is carried out in much the same fash-
ion. Humans, of course, also engage in the same prudent behaviors as other 
members of their species. But they stand in contrast to nonhuman animals 
in that their prudent actions take different forms. Whereas all octopuses hunt 
using a small array of techniques, human hunting assumes a far greater range 
of forms, from the use of sticks or spears to the use of high-powered rifles. 
7 See Albertus Magnus, Super Ethica commentum et quaestiones, lib. vi, lec. 10, ed. Kübel (1987), 
462f.: “Debilitatur autem prudentia in brutis ab eo quod est in nobis, dupliciter: et quantum 
ad formam moventem et quantum ad virtutem moventem. Quantum ad formam, quia pru-
dentia est in nobis formis simplicibus et universalibus separatis ab individuantibus; unde 
procedit quodam syllogismo accipiens particulare sub universali. Sed bruta accipiunt for-
mas, quibus diriguntur in opere, quae sunt intentiones nocivi et conferentis, cum materia et 
non abstrahunt ab individuantibus; unde etiam eorum operatio semper incipit a sensibus, 
sicut patet, quia ovis non fugit lupum, nisi quando videt eum.”
8 See Albertus Magnus, Super Ethica commentum et quaestiones, lib. vi, lec. 10, ed. Kübel (1987), 
463: “Quantum autem ad virtutem moventem, quia homo operatur secundum partem ani-
mae, quae est dominativa sui actus; unde etiam diversi diversimode operantur. Sed princi-
pium operationis brutorum est anima, inquantum est natura quaedam, et ideo omnia similia 
speciei habent easdem operationes.” This is also mentioned in De animalibus, lib. viii, tr. 6, 
c. 1, ed. Stadler (1916), 666.
9 See Albertus Magnus, De animalibus, lib. xxi, tr. 1, c. 7, ed. Stadler (1920), 1343.
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In short, there is a certain uniformity in the prudent behaviour of nonhuman 
animals and diversity in the prudent actions of humans. Nonetheless, both hu-
man and nonhuman animals behave prudently in one way or another.
Like Albert, Thomas Aquinas also holds that prudence can be found in other 
animals, and he agrees that their prudence is a weaker form of human pru-
dence or ‘imperfect prudence’ (prudentia imperfecta), as he calls it. It is imper-
fect mainly because whatever nonhuman animals do is done without the help 
of intellect or reason.10 Therefore, only humans are capable of ‘deliberating by 
virtue of reason’ (ex ratione deliberare) about what should be done for achiev-
ing a certain end. All other animals, in contrast, do not go through a delibera-
tive process, but rather make a judgment ‘by virtue of some instinct of nature’ 
(ex quodam naturae instinctu). They are endowed with the power of ‘natural 
estimation’ (aestimatio naturalis), and by virtue of this power they judge about 
what should be fled or sought for the sake of survival.11 These judgments dif-
fer, however, from the judgments of humans, as we have seen in Chapter 15, 
because we do not only judge by our external and internal senses, but we also 
form judgments by intellect and reason. In contrast to sensory judgments, in-
tellectual judgments have a predicative structure, and thus they are not instinc-
tual or ‘natural judgments’ (iudicia naturalia). Consequently, our prudence is 
different from the prudence of nonhuman animals in that we have more than 
just ‘natural prudence’ (prudentia naturalis).12
10 See Thomas Aquinas, Sentencia libri De sensu et sensato, tr. 2, c. 1, ed. Leonina XLV.2 (1985), 
103f.: “Ita etiam in progressu ab animalibus ad homines quedam inveniuntur in quibus 
aliqua similitudo rationis appareat: cum enim prudencia sit propria virtus hominis (est 
enim prudencia recta ratio agibilium, ut dicitur in vi Ethicorum), inveniuntur quedam 
animalia quamdam prudentiam participare non ex eo quod habeant rationem, sed ex eo 
quod instinctu naturae moventur per apprehensionem sensitivae partis ad quedam opera 
facienda, ac si ex ratione operarentur.”
11 See Thomas Aquinas, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, lib. i, lec. 1, 
n. 11, eds. Cathala & Spiazzi (1964), 7f.: “Dicitur autem prudentia aliter in brutis animali-
bus, et aliter hominibus inesse. In hominibus quidem est prudentia secundum quod ex 
ratione deliberant quid eos oporteat agere; unde dicitur sexto Ethicorum, quod prudentia 
est recta ratio agibilium. Iudicium autem de rebus agendis non ex rationis deliberatione, 
sed ex quodam naturae instinctu, prudentia in aliis animalibus dicitur. Unde prudentia 
in aliis animalibus est naturalis aestimatio de convenientibus prosequendis, et fugiendis 
nocivis, sicut agnus sequitur matrem et fugit lupum.” For similar passages see Quaestiones 
disputatae De veritate, q. 25, a. 2, corp., ed. Leonina XXII.3.1 (1973), 733; Sentencia libri De 
anima, lib. ii, c. 29, ed. Leonina XLV.1 (1984), 190. See also Deeley (1971), 61; Manzanedo 
(1989), 107; Roling (2011), 236f.
12 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae ii-ii, q. 45, a. 15, co., ed. Leonina viii (1895), 
363: “Praeterea, prudentia magis convenit naturae humanae quam naturae brutorum 
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Aquinas also calls such natural prudence ‘particular prudence’ (prudentia 
particularis) because, like Albert, he thinks that it differs from the ‘universal 
prudence’ (prudentia universalis) of humans in two important respects. First, 
the prudent operations of nonhuman animals are based on the cognition of 
particulars, whereas the prudent actions of humans might also (and most of-
ten do) include or even lead to the cognition of universals. Second, human pru-
dence is universal insofar as it is not limited to particular operations. We can 
make prudent decisions when providing for future meals, for instance, but we 
can also be prudent in numerous other cases; that is, we can use our prudence 
quite flexibly or universally. This capacity is not found in other animals. Their 
prudence is restricted to those actions which are given to them by nature, such 
as the ants’ provision for the winter.13 For this reason, such prudence is natural 
and particular.
With respect to the differences between human and nonhuman prudence, 
one might ask whether it makes sense to call nonhuman animals prudent at all. 
Why should we take their behaviour to be prudent if the cognitive  processes 
underlying this behaviour significantly differ from those processes underlying 
our prudent actions? Aquinas shows some awareness of this problem when 
he writes that there is only a ‘likeness of prudence’ (similitudo prudentiae) 
in nonhuman animals.14 In other words, ants and other nonhuman  animals 
 animalium. Sed bruta animalia habent quasdam naturales prudentias; ut patet per Phi-
losophum, in viii de Historiis Animal. Ergo prudentia est naturalis. […] Ad tertium di-
cendum quod in brutis animalibus sunt determinatae viae perveniendi ad finem: unde 
videmus quod omnia animalia eiusdem speciei similiter operantur.” See also Quaestiones 
disputatae De veritate, q. 15, a. 1, ed. Leonina XXII.2 (1972), 480.
13 See Thomas Aquinas, Sentencia libri De sensu et sensato, tr. 1, c. 1, ed. Leonina XLV.2 (1985), 
13f.: “Circa primum considerandum est quod prudencia est directiva in agendis, et uni-
versalis quidem prudencia est directiva respectu quorumcunque agendorum, unde non 
est in aliis animalibus nisi in solis hominibus, qui habent rationem universalium cog-
noscitivam, et in aliis autem animalibus sunt quedam prudencie particulares ad aliquos 
determinatos actus; sicut formica que congregat in estate cibum de quo vivat in hyeme. 
Predicti autem sensus, maxime auditus et visus, proficiunt animalibus ad huiusmodi pru-
dencias particulares et hominibus ad prudenciam universalem ad hoc quod aliquid bene 
fiat […].” See also Hünemörder (1988), 201; Di Martino (2008), 99.
14 See Thomas Aquinas, Sentencia libri De sensu et sensato, tr. 2, c. 1, ed. Leonina XLV.2 (1985), 
104: “Pertinet autem ad prudenciam, ut prudens dirigatur per eam in his quae imminent 
sibi agenda ex consideratione non solum presencium, set etiam preteritorum […]. Unde 
et in aliis animalibus in quibus invenitur prudencie similitudo participata, necesse est 
esse non solum sensum presencium, sed etiam memoriam preteritorum. Et ideo philoso-
phus dicit in principio Methaphisice quod quibusdam animalibus ex sensu memoria fit, 
et propter hoc prudencia sunt.”
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are  prudent only insofar as they are capable of remembering the past and in-
sofar as they have ‘a certain anticipatory power with regard to their own life’ 
( quandam potentiam provisivam circa propriam vitam). But since their pru-
dence does not originate from rational faculties, it is just prudence ‘by a cer-
tain likeness’ (per  quandam similitudinem).15 Still, he would not go as far as 
saying that other animals are totally devoid of prudence. Rather, he points to 
the structural differences that exist between the prudent behaviours of differ-
ent animal  species. In this sense, both Albert and Aquinas acknowledge that, 
despite all differences, at least some nonhuman animals are prudent, as well.
15 Thomas Aquinas, Sententia libri Ethicorum, lib. vi, lec. 6, ed. Leonina XLVII.2 (1969), 
353: “Ille enim qui potest bene speculari singula quae pertinent ad se ipsum dicitur esse 
prudens et tali conceditur sivi attribuitur prudentia. Et inde est quod per quandam simili-
tudinem homines dicunt quasdam bestias esse prudentes, quaecumque scilicet videntur 
habere quandam potentiam provisivam circa propriam vitam, non quidem ex ratione, 
quod proprie ad prudentiam pertinet.” See also Manzanedo (1989), 106.
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chapter 29
Prudence by Analogy (Giles of Rome, John Duns 
Scotus)
Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas have answered the question of whether 
other animals are prudent in the following way: they are prudent, but there are 
crucial differences between human and nonhuman prudence, most of all that 
our prudence derives from the operations of intellect and reason. The prudent 
behaviour of nonhuman animals, by contrast, is based on the operations of 
sensory powers and, in many cases, it is their instincts which make them be-
have prudently. Thus, they do not recollect past experiences and on the basis 
of this recollection deliberate about what should be done in the present in 
order to profit in the future. While we remember the last time we went to the 
grocery store and found it closed and, therefore, conclude that we should go 
to the supermarket earlier next time, the ant collects and stores grains simply 
because this is how it has been ‘programmed’ by the divine creator, so to speak. 
Nonetheless, ants can be called prudent because they provide for the future 
and so will profit later from what they do now.
The argument that nonhuman animals can be called prudent even though 
their prudence differs from human prudence in various respects, was heavily 
criticised by other authors, especially Giles of Rome and John Duns Scotus. 
Both of them explicitly discuss the question of prudence in their commentar-
ies on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Giles immediately rejects the view that there is 
not ‘prudence properly speaking’ (prudentia proprie dicta) in nonhuman ani-
mals, but instead some substitute for prudence, namely ‘some natural sagacity 
or natural instinct’ (quedam sagacitas naturalis sive quidam instinctus natu-
ralis), by virtue of which they engage in prudent behaviour.1 This is a rough 
sketch rather than a minute account of Albert’s and Aquinas’ position but both 
1 Giles of Rome, Questiones metaphisicales (Venice 1501), fol. 8ra: “Ad istam questionem 
 respondent breviter aliqui et dicunt quod prudentia inventa in brutis non est prudentia pro-
prie dicta: sed prudentia que invenitur in brutis nihil aliud est quam quedam sagacitas natu-
ralis sive quidam instinctus naturalis per quem agunt bruta ea que agunt. Et hoc declarant 
per exemplum: sicut formica existens in estate habens memoriam famis preterite in hieme 
congregat fructum et ea ex quibus possit vivere in hieme: et similiter hirundo facit nidum 
suum quadam sagacitate naturali.” Note that Giles’ commentary has not yet been edited. I, 
therefore, rely on my own transcription of the 1501 print from Venice. Large parts of this ques-
tion have also been transcribed by Köhler (2014), 146–148.
© Anselm Oelze, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004363779_036 
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of them do indeed claim that in nonhuman animals natural instinct takes over 
the work which is done by intellect and reason in human beings. For Giles, it is 
absurd to claim that prudence is nothing but natural instinct because then we 
are obliged to attribute prudence to all animals since all of them are obviously 
endowed with natural instinct: there is no animal which does not instinctually 
flee an unpleasant object, for instance, and so all animals react instinctually in 
one way or another.2
Albert and Aquinas could, of course, reply that this is not a proper descrip-
tion of their view. It takes more than simple avoidance behaviour for prudence, 
because prudent behaviour involves memory and is at least directed at the 
 future. But Giles (as well as Scotus) rejects the claim that ants, for example, use 
their memory when collecting grain during the summer for the coming winter. 
If the ants’ provision were really based on a memory of the past winter, one 
could hardly explain why even those ants which are born during the summer 
and thus have not yet experienced the cold season still collect and store grain 
for the future. Apparently, this cannot be accounted for by referring to memory 
of the past.3
It is difficult to tell how Albert and Aquinas would reply to this argument. 
They might stress two points here. First, they might stress that even if ants do 
not use memory in this particular case, they usually use memory ‘in place of 
reason’ (loco rationis) because, like bees and many other animals, they have 
fixed dwellings to which they return and where they store their food.4 Second, 
the role of memory and foresight must not be overemphasised in the case of 
2 See ibid.: “Sine dubio istud quod isti dicunt non habet veritatem. Quoniam si prudentia in 
brutis esset sagacitas nature cum sagacitas et instinctus nature insint omnibus animalibus 
brutis quecumque sint illa: tunc omnia bruta animalia essent prudentia: et hoc non est 
verum. Quod enim omnibus brutis insit sagacitas naturale patet: quoniam non est aliquid 
brutum animal in mundo quod si pungatur quod non retrahat se.”
3 See Giles of Rome, Questiones metaphisicales (Venice 1501), fol. 8ra: “Et quod ipsi dicunt quod 
formica memor famis in hieme congregat in estate falsum est. Nam si modo nasceretur for-
mica et esset estas: modo congregaret non propter famem preteritam sed propter naturalem 
instinctum.”; John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis i–v, lib. 
i, q. 3, §5, eds. Andrews et al. (1997), 87f. The same point is also made by Adam Wodeham, 
Lectura secunda in primum librum Sententiarum, prol., q. 4, §8, ad 1, ed. Wood (1990), 99f. On 
Giles and Scotus see also Roling (2011), 239f.; Köhler (2014), 146–151.
4 See Albertus Magnus, Metaphysica, lib. i, tr. 1, c. 6, ed. Geyer (1960), 9: “Sed non habentia 
rationem veram memoria utuntur loco rationis et ordinant aliquo modo suae vitae commo-
dum per quandam civilitatis et felicitatis similitudinem, sicut est videre in apibus et gruibus 
et multis huiusmodi animalibus; sed tam apes quam grues vigent solum memoria. Cuius 




nonhuman prudence, because what really matters is that animals manage to 
do things in the present from which they will profit in the future, and this is 
what prudence is about.
Giles admits that ants use memory in collecting and storing grain because, 
unlike many other animals, they act ‘naturally’ (naturaliter) but not ‘uniformly’ 
(uniformiter). If an ant finds a good place for collecting grain it will, by virtue 
of its memory, return to this place as long as some grain is left there. Another 
ant, however, will not necessarily walk to the very same place. Hence, there is 
no uniformity in this regard mainly because every ant relies on its own memo-
ry.5 Scotus also agrees with this.6 Still, he and Giles disagree with authors like 
Albert and Aquinas on whether it makes sense to attribute prudence to ani-
mals like ants. Unlike Albert and Aquinas, they think that a behaviour cannot 
qualify as prudent behaviour if it is based on something like imperfect memory 
and quasi-foresight. Hence, it does not make sense to speak of something like 
‘imperfect prudence’, in their view. They do, of course, admit that we often call 
other animals prudent, especially when we are astonished by what they do or 
how they do something. But we then employ the term ‘prudence’ only ‘meta-
phorically’ (metaphorice) or ‘by way of analogy’ (similitudinarie).7 To be clear, 
5 Giles of Rome, Questiones metaphisicales (Venice 1501), fol. 8rb: “Quedam enim sunt in eis in 
que bruta feruntur naturaliter et semper uniformiter sicut dicit philosophus in 2° phisicorum 
quod aranea facit telam naturaliter et semper uniformiter: et hirundo nidum: [...] aliqua vero 
sunt in brutis in que bruta non feruntur naturaliter nec semper uniformiter sed in talibus 
convenit error et difformitas: sicut patet quod una formica congregat in illo loco et alia for-
mica in alio loco. Non enim omnes formice congregant in eodem loco et in talibus in quibus 
bruta non agunt uniformiter egent aliqua regula que dirigat ipsa bruta in tales operationes et 
illa regula est memoria. Videmus enim quod una formica congregat unum granum frumenti 
in uno loco et alia granum frumenti in eodem loco et non in alio et hoc est quia illa formica 
habet memoriam de loco in quo posuit primum granum. Videmus etiam quod formica vadit 
iterum ad acervum a quo accipit primum granus. Et istud est quia habet memoriam quod 
inde accepit primum granum. Unde ipsa memoria est prudentia in brutis.”
6 See John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis i–v, lib. i, q. 3, §6, 
eds. Andrews et al. (1997), 88: “Prudentia autem sicut in nobis est habitus consiliativus, non 
de fine sed de his quae sunt ad finem, non circa necessaria sed contingentia, ita et in illis est 
circa illa quae possunt sic et aliter facere. Puta quod congreget vel reponat in hoc loco vel 
illo, et ex hoc cumulo vel illo – ex memoria loci ubi primum granum reposuit, et cumuli unde 
primum sustulit –, et quod aranea magis facit telam in loco ubi maior copia muscarum, vel 
hirundo facit nidum ubi est difficilior accessus.” Note that Scotus, unlike Giles, does not think 
that spiders and swallows build their webs and their nests uniformly.
7 John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis i–v, lib. i, q. 3, §5, eds. 




Giles and Scotus do not argue that one should totally refrain from  calling other 
animals prudent. But, in their view, this is just a way of speaking, which has 
 little, if not nothing, to do with the actual cognitive capacities that underlie 
our own prudent actions. In this respect, one could say that their concept of 
prudence is more demanding than the notion employed by Albert and  Aquinas 
because while they think that prudence necessarily requires the powers of in-
tellect and reason, Albert and Aquinas say that prudence can, to some extent, 
be found in those animals that lack those faculties, and so, in their view, there 
is prudence on both sides of the animal/human boundary.
However, one should not make the mistake of claiming that one account 
(e.g. the theory of Albert and Aquinas) is clearly superior to another account 
(e.g. the explanation of Scotus and Giles). Rather, one should pay attention to 
the fact that they all start from the same premise: all of them deny the facul-
ties of intellect and reason to nonhuman animals, and so they agree that in 
this sense only humans are rational animals. However, they disagree on the 
question of what this denial of intellect and reason amounts to. While Scotus 
and Giles argue that this establishes a clear line between us and nonhuman 
animals, Albert and Aquinas take this line to be less clear as far as prudence is 
concerned. Thus one could say that they choose a different explanatory strat-
egy. As we have seen in Parts 2 to 4, similar explanatory differences can also be 
found with regard to other rational capacities. We shall now take a closer look 






Introduction to Part 6
The previous parts have examined various later medieval theories of animal 
rationality. Such theories, it has been said, mainly arose from the grey areas 
of the Aristotelian model of the soul and its implicit definition of the animal/
human boundary. According to this definition, humans are rational animals. 
They are rational, first and foremost, because they are endowed with rational 
faculties, namely, intellect and reason. Second, they are rational because these 
faculties enable them to engage in rational or intellectual processes such as 
concept formation, judging, and reasoning. It is this triad of intellectual op-
erations that shapes the way in which humans perceive and interact with the 
world. In many cases, humans behave rationally because their behaviour is 
based on a rational cognitive process. For instance, before taking our dog out 
for a walk we have reasoned that it is a good thing to do so because otherwise 
it might ruin the carpet. Theories of animal rationality, however, concern the 
question of whether this is something only we can do. Why should one assume 
that our dog cannot do this? Why should one assume that it is completely non-
rational? If it is non-rational how can one explain that it gets excited about all 
sticks, and so seems to generalise? Or that it falls prey to sensory illusions, and 
so seems to judge? Or that it takes a detour in order to get around an obstacle, 
and so seems to reason?
It is questions like these to which theories of animal rationality try to pro-
vide an answer, and since late medieval thinkers obviously dealt with such 
questions it makes sense to say that they developed such theories. What re-
mains to be seen, however, is how their theories compare to the theories of 
our own age. The commonly accepted narrative has it that later medieval theo-
ries differ radically from contemporary theories of animal rationality. Many 
would even say they differ to such a degree that there is no medieval analogue 
or predecessor of contemporary theories of this kind at all. Whether or not 
this is the case will be the subject of this last part. It will begin by sketching 
the differences that exist (Chapter 30), among the most important of which 
surely is that later medieval theories were developed within the framework 
of Aristotelian psychology. Although Aristotle’s model of the soul is no longer 
seriously defended by anyone in contemporary animal psychology, there is a 
certain continuity between later medieval and contemporary theories in the 
sense that they usually deal with the question of how to describe the cognitive 
processes that underlie a certain behaviour (Chapter 31). Apparently, this can 
be done in many different ways which is why there exist not just one, but many 
theories of animal rationality. In other words, there are different answers to the 
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question of whether those cognitive processes are radically different or quite 
similar in human and nonhuman animals. Those who claim that they are radi-
cally different are called ‘differentialists’ in contemporary animal philosophy. 
‘Assimilationists’, by contrast, are those who focus on the similarities rather 
than the differences. To be clear, assimilationists and differentialists agree that 
there are both differences and similarities. Still, they disagree on whether the 
former outweigh the latter or vice versa.
This disagreement is something one can also find among later medieval au-
thors (Chapter 32). As various examples show, they adopted different strate-
gies when trying to account for the cognitive processes that underly a certain 
behaviour. While some considered those processes to be radically different, 
others stressed the similarities that exist between human and nonhuman ani-
mal cognition. This in itself is not much of a surprise because there is hardly 
any topic on which later medieval thinkers spoke with one voice. What is sur-
prising is that some of them seriously considered the option of what could be 
called ‘rationality without reason’ (Chapter 33). This means that they in some 
sense dissolved the link between faculty and process rationality that usually 
characterises the medieval concept of rationality. For instance, they claimed 
that a process, such as reasoning, that was usually taken to require a rational 
faculty, can also be engaged in without this faculty.
There are, of course, important differences between rationality with and 
without reason but what is interesting to see is that the latter very much re-
sembles the kind of practical and domain-specific rationality that is attributed 
to nonhuman animals in the contemporary debate. Besides the richness of the 
theoretical landscape in the later Middle Ages that is often ignored, this par-
ticular theoretical option establishes an interesting connection between later 
medieval and contemporary theories of animal rationality. Yet, before we can 
begin to closely examine this connection and the parallels between the theo-
ries of different periods it is necessary to briefly look at the differences that ex-
ist between thirteenth- and fourteenth-centuries theories and contemporary 
theories of animal rationality.
<UN>
chapter 30
Medieval and Contemporary Theories:  
The Differences
Later medieval and contemporary theories of animal rationality differ in vari-
ous respects. One of the most obvious differences certainly is that they were 
developed in different contexts. By and large, these contexts are academic 
ones. However, one must not ignore that life in medieval academia was not 
exactly the same kind of life many people use to live in modern universities. 
With regard to natural philosophy and to what we nowadays call psychology, 
it is important to note that large parts of the academic discourse on animals in 
medieval universities arose from the Aristotelian commentary tradition (see 
Chapter 4). There is hardly any scholar in the later Middle Ages who did not 
have contact with Aristotelian philosophy in one way or another. This is not 
to say that commentaries on Aristotle’s writings were the only place where 
this discourse took place. As many of the examples mentioned in the previ-
ous parts have shown, questions concerning the differences between human 
and nonhuman animal cognition also came up in theological treatises or other 
writings which were not primarily concerned with any of Aristotle’s ideas. Nev-
ertheless, those ideas influenced later medieval authors’ views, and so one can 
come across elements of Aristotelian psychology also in works on, say, Trini-
tarian theology. The modern discourse on animals and their cognitive capaci-
ties also spans various disciplines, such as philosophy, psychology, biology, and 
ethology. Yet, it has not been as influenced by something like the Aristotelian 
commentary tradition as was the later medieval discussion.
A second difference is that this discourse has now developed into a subject in 
its own right. There is, of course, not a single discipline that is solely concerned 
with animal cognition these days, but the latter has now become a stand-alone 
topic of scientific and philosophical enquiry like many other topics in contem-
porary scholarship. In the later Middle Ages, the situation was different insofar 
as the discussion on nonhuman animals and their cognitive capacities did usu-
ally not begin as such. Take the example of Adam Wodeham’s and Gregory of 
Rimini’s debate over animals’ capacity of judging (Chapter 18). It is very illumi-
nating in this context, as it is carried out in two theological treatises, namely, 
their commentaries on Peter Lombard’s Sentences. It actually began as a de-
bate over the kind of knowledge of God humans can have but then gradually 
developed into a debate over the nature and origin of  sensory  illusions. In this 
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context, Adam Wodeham introduces the dog aboard the ship as an  argument 
against the position that sensory illusions originate from  erroneous intellec-
tual judgments (which is actually the view he wants to defend). The dog is thus 
used as an explanans for the sensory nature of  illusions  because the argument 
runs as follows: (P1) dogs lack intellect and reason; (P2) dogs fall prey to optical 
illusions; therefore, (C) optical illusions have sensory rather than rational or 
intellectual origins. However, in the course of the discussion, the dog’s behav-
iour and its cognition are successively turned into the explanandum and give 
rise to a debate over whether nonhuman animals are capable of judging and 
should be called rational.
A similar case is Roger Bacon’s account of animal cognition (chapters 11 and 
20). The context is not theological but physical or, more precisely, optical and 
the question in this case is whether certain modes of vision originate from 
the sensory or the rational part of the soul. Like Adam Wodeham, Roger Ba-
con introduces nonhuman animals as an explanans in the first place. What he 
wants to show is that these modes of vision (which, in the Latin translation 
of Alhacen’s De aspectibus, are called ‘by sense alone’, ‘by knowledge’, and ‘by 
syllogism’) do not require rational powers. The argument runs like this: (P1) 
the three modes of vision can be found in many nonhuman animal species; 
(P2) nonhuman animals lack the rational part of the soul; therefore, (C) the 
three modes of vision originate from the sensory soul. Although this is a very 
straightforward argument, Bacon has to explain how nonhuman animals can 
actually engage in more complex cognition, such as ‘vision by knowledge’ or ‘by 
syllogism’, and so his argument turns into an examination of those processes 
on which such cognition is based in nonhuman animals. Nonhuman animals 
and their cognition now become the explanandum. As has been shown, Bacon 
suggests that there is a cogitative power in such animals which is something 
that was usually denied to them because it was commonly considered to be a 
rational faculty. So a discussion about optics turned into a discussion about 
animal rationality.
In both cases, there is an interesting transformation going on. Nonhuman 
animals are introduced because they are supposed to prove the sensory char-
acter of a particular cognitive phenomenon. One could say, they function as 
a sort of litmus test (see Chapter 4). The crucial point now is that this would 
not work without a very strong anthropological presupposition, namely, the 
premise that nonhuman animals lack rational faculties. The concept of  faculty 
 rationality (which is based on the idea of Aristotelian faculty psychology) 
 obviously plays a fundamental role here. This establishes a third difference 
 between later medieval and contemporary theories of animal rationality.
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Still, in the course of this study it has become clear that this concept came 
under attack. The more nonhuman animals were used as litmus tests on dif-
ferent occasions, the more it was debated whether those tests actually proved 
what they were supposed to prove. It did not simply suffice to stipulate that 
nonhuman animals lack rational powers. Rather, it became necessary to 
 explain how they can actually engage in various kinds of cognition, both sim-
ple and more complex, if they do not have these powers. And so they gave rise 
to a debate over the link between behaviours, faculties, and processes within 
Aristotelian faculty psychology (see Chapter 7). The general question was, first, 
whether one and the same behaviour is based on one and the same cognitive 
process and, second, whether this process always requires one and the same 
faculty. Although it might seem that this question is only relevant within this 
particular theoretical framework, it is actually something that brings us to the 
commonalities between later medieval and contemporary theories of animal 
rationality because both deal with very similar (if not the same) kinds of prob-
lems in the end.
<UN>
chapter 31
Medieval and Contemporary Theories: 
The Commonalities
One of the main problems both medieval and contemporary theories deal 
with is the question of what kind of process underlies a certain behaviour. We 
observe the behaviour of something – a machine, a plant, a human, or nonhu-
man animal – and wonder what it is that brings about this behaviour. For in-
stance, plants and animals grow. Yet, is it the same kind of process that makes 
all living beings grow? Or, to give another example, robots and humans can 
raise their arms, but is what is going on in the robot when it moves its arm 
the same kind of process that is going on in humans when we raise our arm? 
Another example (which has already been mentioned in Chapter 7) would be 
this: we confront a chimpanzee and a human child with a transparent tube at 
the bottom of which lies a peanut. As the tube is quite long and narrow, neither 
the chimpanzee nor the child manage to grab the peanut with their fingers. 
Yet, after a while both begin to fill water into the tube until the rising water 
level brings the peanut within reach. So both the chimpanzee and the child 
manage to find the right tool for getting the peanut.1 Now does this mean that 
the cognitive processes guiding their behaviour are basically the same? One 
could go on endlessly with this list of examples and questions but in each and 
every case the fundamental question would be the same: What kind of process 
underlies the behaviour?
Quite often, we are inclined to think that similar behaviours are based on 
similar processes. As said before, this inclination is expressed by what is called 
the ‘argument from analogy’ (see Chapter 7). This argument suggests that there 
is an analogy between the behaviours we observe and the processes underlying 
those behaviours. However, this argument gives rise to various – and some-
times rather serious – questions. One of these questions, with a more ethical 
impetus in this case, would be this: if a robot manages to raise its arm like we 
do and if a chimpanzee succeeds in finding the right tool like a human infant 
does why don’t we grant the robot and the ape the same kind of rights we grant 
to our fellow humans? Surely, this question only arises when we assume that 
there is a link between cognitive capacities and moral status but usually we 
1 On this so-called ‘floating peanut task’ see Hanus et al. (2011).
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make this assumption and so did later medieval thinkers.2 And even if one 
does not care about the argument’s ethical implications another question re-
mains: are we just as smart as robots or chimpanzees? Is it really the same 
kind of process that makes us and robots raise our arms or that makes us and 
chimpanzees find the right tool?
In order to find an answer to these questions both medieval and contem-
porary scholars try to look at the processes underlying behaviours as closely 
as they can. Now one might think that contemporary scholars have a serious 
advantage in this regard for at least three reasons. First, they have the help of 
evolutionary biology and genetics. Both strengthen a principle that supports 
the argument from analogy, namely, the so-called ‘principle of continuity’. Ac-
cording to this principle, there is more psychological continuity between dif-
ferent beings the more they are related to each other from an evolutionary 
perspective.3 This relation can be determined by studying the physiology of 
different beings but genetics provide a fundament that is even stronger. Con-
sequently, similar behaviours in closely related species, say humans and great 
apes, are likely to originate from similar cognitive processes because the latter 
take place in very similar physiological structures. Of course, there is no guar-
antee that similarity in structure always leads to similarity in cognition. Still, 
the evolutionary perspective adds a new dimension to the study of similarities 
in behaviour that medieval theories lack.
Second, contemporary theories seem to have the upper hand as they can 
rely on a huge body of empirical findings. Comparative psychology and etholo-
gy are relatively young disciplines, but within decades they have multiplied the 
number of systematic studies and refined the methods with which behaviour 
is studied.4 Medieval thinkers, in contrast, mainly drew on anecdotal material. 
In many cases, they did not even make observations themselves but simply 
reproduced examples of animal behaviours they found in the literature.5 The 
2 On this connection in contemporary philosophy see the contributions to Petrus & Wild 
(2013), esp. Glock (2013). An overview of animal ethics in the Middle Ages provides Oelze 
(forthcoming a). The connection might seem to be less evident with regard to robots or ma-
chines but the intensified research in things like autonomous cars has given rise to a con-
troversial debate over the moral status of such artificial beings; see, for instance, Wallach 
& Allen (2008). Interestingly, a forerunner of this debate can already be found in the early 
modern period; see Cheung (2010).
3 See, for instance, De Waal (1999), esp. 258f.; Tomasello (2014), 15. For a critical evaluation see 
Sober (2000) and (2005).
4 For a short history of this development see Wynne (2007).
5 On the role of observation in comparison to literary knowledge in the later medieval debate 
over animal cognition see Köhler (2008), 267–272.
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nineteenth-century pioneers of evolutionary animal psychology and ethol-
ogy, Charles Darwin and George Romanes, did of course rely on anecdotes, 
as well. But during the twentieth century their comparatively lax standards 
have been replaced by those of international and interdisciplinary empirical 
research which is hardly comparable to nineteenth-, let alone thirteenth- and 
fourteenth-centuries studies on animal cognition.
Third, modern research in animal cognition is no longer obliged to rely on 
the observation of behaviour alone. Instead, it can use the latest techniques of 
brain imaging. Modern researchers, therefore, seem to have opened a ‘window 
to the mind’. In contrast to later medieval scholars, they can look into the brains 
of humans and nonhuman animals, and so they can literally see what is go-
ing on when an infant and a chimpanzee choose a tool. Generally speaking, it 
seems as if they have thus found a solution to what might be called the problem 
of the inaccessibility of mental states, also known as the ‘inobservability thesis’.6 
For later medieval philosophers this was a serious problem. In the debate over 
nonhuman animals’ capacity of judging, Adam Wodeham nicely captures this 
difficulty, saying that ‘we cannot know if they possess this [ capacity],  unless by 
guessing from the effects and movements that follow such simple visions’.7 In 
other words, Wodeham cannot look into an animal’s head and see its mental 
states or cognitive processes. All he can do is to observe the effects of those 
processes, that is, the animal’s behaviour.8
However, it is rather naïve to think that this problem has been overcome by 
the methods of evolutionary biology, empirical studies in comparative psychol-
ogy, and the techniques of brain imaging in modern neuroscience. Admittedly, 
genetic analyses, systematic empirical studies, and brain imaging  techniques 
are a major advance in the field of animal psychology. But they still do not 
solve the problem of the inaccessibility of mental states because empirical 
findings and the images of brain processes need to be interpreted in one way 
or another. When we empirically test whether an animal is capable of solving 
a problem, we still cannot directly access the cognitive process that allows it to 
solve this problem. We do not see the thoughts or beliefs the chimpanzee has 
when picking a tool. And even if we see that there is a particular neural activity 
6 For a discussion see Overgaard (2015).
7 Adam Wodeham, Lectura secunda in primum librum Sententiarum, prol., q. 4, §8, ed. Wood 
(1990), 99: “[...] utrum eis conveniat, scire non possumus, nisi coniciendo ex effectibus et 
motibus sequentibus tales visiones simplices.”
8 This problem was also acknowledged by early-modern thinkers, such as Descartes, who 
conceded that one cannot prove the absence of thoughts in nonhuman animals since one 
 cannot look into their hearts; see Wild (2006), 189.
chapter 31212
<UN>
in a certain region of the chimpanzee’s brain while it picks the tool, we must 
still determine whether what is going on in this area of its brain is a process 
such as reasoning or something else. Thus, “we continue to struggle with the 
question of how to judge the mental life of other species,” as Randolf Menzel 
and Julia Fischer, who both work on contemporary animal psychology, admit.9
Now one might object that this problem is not peculiar to theories of cogni-
tion but is a problem that any kind of scientific theory has always had and still 
has to face. For example, a chemist who tries to explain why salt dissolves in 
water whereas oil does not (or at least not as easily as salt) also has no direct 
access to every dynamic that is or might be involved in this chemical process. 
She might, of course, argue that it makes sense to postulate the existence of 
molecules because the difference in the molecular structures of salt and oil 
helps to explain why they react differently. She might even show us these mol-
ecules under a microscope. Still, she cannot be entirely sure that they cause 
these differences. Hence, it seems right but trivial to say that both medieval 
and contemporary theories of animal rationality need to deal with the inac-
cessibility of what they try to explain because any other theory – no matter 
whether it concerns mental states, molecular structures, or anything else – in 
some sense faces this problem.
On the one hand, this is indeed a legitimate objection, because it belongs 
to the nature of a theory to make certain claims about how things are without 
actually knowing whether this is the correct explanation. On the other hand, 
theories of cognition in general and of rationality in particular, belong to a pe-
culiar genre of theories. Their peculiarity can be illustrated by Daniel Dennett’s 
distinction between three different stances in the explanation of behaviour. 
The first stance is what Dennett calls “the design stance.”10 A design-stance 
prediction of a computer’s behaviour is, for instance, when we say something 
like ‘If you press the button which has a B on it, a B is going to appear on the 
screen of your computer’. The reason is that the computer has been designed 
to show a B on the screen when the B button is pressed. The second stance 
is the so-called “physical stance.”11 A physical-stance explanation is when we 
say something like ‘If you press the B button but your screen remains black 
this might be because your computer is not plugged in’. In this case, a physical 
explanation is given for why the computer does not function as it has been 
designed. Both kinds of explanations can also be applied to the behaviours of 
animals. We could, for instance, say that an animal moves from one corner of 
9 Menzel & Fischer (2011), 1. See also Wasserman & Zentall (2006), esp. 6f.
10 Dennett (1971), 87f.
11 Ibid., 88f.
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the room to another because blood is transported from the heart to its feet and 
because the muscles in its legs go through a serious of successive contractions 
and extensions.
The question, however, is whether this completely accounts for the animal’s 
movement. As regards the design stance and the physical stance, the expla-
nation is complete. But is the explanation of why the animal begins to move 
complete? What if the animal begins to move its legs because it sees the feed-
ing dish standing in the other corner, desires to empty it, and believes that this 
will satisfy its desire? In this case, we do not only refer to the animal’s design 
and the laws of physics but we give an explanation from what Dennett calls 
“the intentional stance.” We predict or explain a system’s behaviour “by ascrib-
ing to the system the possession of certain information and by supposing it to 
be directed by certain goals.”12 Usually, this is exactly the kind of explanation 
cognitive scientists and philosophers give. To be clear, they do not claim that 
physical or physiological explanations are wrong. Rather, they say that those 
explanations are only one piece of the puzzle. In their view, it often takes more 
to move from one corner into another than muscle contraction or blood flow. 
Put in terms Fred Dretske employs, such an explanation requires not only 
causes but reasons, too.13 Such reasons or beliefs or desires are, however, more 
difficult to detect than the movements of molecules, the flow of blood, or the 
contraction of muscles. Therefore, the problem of inaccessibility is particu-
larly relevant for theories which refer to mental states and this is something 
that has not changed from the medieval period to the modern one.
What has not changed either is that from this problem arises a variety of 
explanations or theories of cognitive processes. There is not only one way to 
describe the nature of those processes but many. In the current literature, 
some attempts have been made to depict the differences between those ways 
and one influential suggestion has been to distinguish between two explana-
tory strategies, namely, differentialism and assimilationism.14 This distinction 
goes back to Robert Brandom who, in his book Articulating Reasons, has ar-
gued that two ways can be adopted if one wants to explore how “discursive 
and non- discursive creatures” compare to each other.15 One way stresses the 
continuities between those creatures. The other road concentrates upon the 
discontinuities. For instance, if one studies the use of concepts in various 
creatures, one can either “assimilate conceptually structured activity to the 
12 Ibid., 90.
13 See Dretske (1988).
14 See Perler & Wild (2005), 73; Wild (2013), 36f., and Glock (2016a), 60.
15 Brandom (2000), 2.
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 nonconceptual activity out of which it arises.” Or one can put weight on “what 
is distinctive of or exceptional about the conceptual.”16
Now one might think that this distinction also works perfectly for later me-
dieval theories.17 However, there is a serious problem when applying it to these 
theories because most scholars who draw on Brandom’s distinction take it to 
work as follows: differentialists, they say, consider the difference between hu-
mans and other animals to be qualitative or categorical. To put it in Darwinian 
terms, the difference is a difference in kind, according to this view. Assimilation-
ists, by contrast, consider it to be quantitative or gradual. In other words, the 
extent to which humans differ from apes, dogs, and other nonhuman animals 
is a matter of degree.18 This gives rise to the question of what it means to say 
that a difference is qualitative rather than quantitative, categorical rather than 
gradual. The answer that is usually given is that differentialists posit an an-
thropological difference.19 This means that, for a differentialist there is at least 
one fundamental feature that belongs exclusively to humans. For instance, she 
might hold that the faculty of speech is what sets apart humans from all other 
animals, because, in her view, only a human being has the capacity to form 
concepts and propositions. Nonhuman animals might communicate, but they 
do not speak. Another popular candidate for an anthropological difference is 
reason, and it is this candidate which seems to have dominated over the cen-
turies, especially in the medieval period. This seems to lead to the following 
conclusion: all medieval authors are differentialists because by denying intel-
lect and reason they establish a clear gulf between humans and other species.
To this classification, one might object that later medieval thinkers were 
well aware of the animal nature of human beings and so emphasised the con-
tinuities that exist between all animals. On the ladder of nature, humans stand 
much closer to dogs or apes than to plants because they share with the former 
various cognitive powers, whereas with plants they only share the vegetative 
functions of the soul. And so one might, like Pieter De Leemans and Matthew 
Klemm, think that “the distinction between human and animal behaviour 
is presented as a question of more or less, rather than a radical difference in 
16 Ibid., 3 [italics in the original].
17 Some attempts to apply it to medieval theories have been made by Perler (2006), 96, and 
Davids (2017), 30f. and 114–116. See also Wild (2006), 1–11, who employs this distinction for 
evaluating various early modern theories, and Perler (2009) who applies it to Leibniz’s 
theory.
18 See Perler (2009), 75; Davids (2017), 30; Glock (2013), 120, and (2016a), 60. See also Perler & 
Wild (2005), 73.
19 See Wild (2013), 36.
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kind.”20 This view also seems to be supported by Aristotle who, in a passage of 
the Historia animalium, states that “[n]ature proceeds from the inanimate to 
the animals by such small steps that, because of the continuity, we fail to see to 
which side the boundary and the middle between them belongs.”21
However, it was also Aristotle who prominently established a discontinu-
ity between human and nonhuman animals by denying intellect and reason 
to the latter. Hence, humans are animals, but they are the only animals that 
have “the ‘special somethin’,” as Jonathan Bennett called it.22 And because of 
this special something ‘humans differ from those that are called brute animals 
more than by the species’, as Albertus Magnus neatly expresses it.23 For in-
stance, the difference between a lion and a horse is smaller than the differ-
ence between a human and a horse or a human and a lion, because lions and 
horses are simply different kinds of nonhuman animals. Humans, by contrast, 
constitute a very peculiar species of animals which, possessing intellect and 
reason, has something that no other animal species has.24 Because medieval 
thinkers find a clear metaphysical difference between human and nonhuman 
animals, they all seem to have chosen the strategy of differentialism instead of 
assimilationism.25
The question, however, is what such a metaphysical differentialism amounts 
to and whether choosing this strategy necessarily prohibits one from taking 
the road of assimilationism. Do differentialists necessarily deny any kind of 
cognitive continuity between human and nonhuman species by choosing dif-
ferentialism? Do they always claim that there is a deep gulf between us and 
other animals with a view to cognitive capacities? For Robert Brandom this 
is not necessarily the case. At least in Articulating Reasons, he says that those 
who take the path of differentialism “start by describing a common genus 
and go on to elaborate differentiae (whether qualitative or in terms of some 
20 De Leemans & Klemm (2007), 158.
21 Aristotle, Historia animalium VII.1, 588b5-7, ed. and tr. Balme (1991), 61–63. For a concise 
summary of this idea see Rheins (2015), 390f.
22 Bennett (1989), 4.
23 Albertus Magnus, De animalibus, lib. xx, tr. 2, c. 6, ed. Stadler (1920), 1320: “Homo igitur 
plus quam specie differt ab hiis quae dicuntur bruta animalia. Specie enim differunt leo et 
equus: plus autem quam specie differt homo ab utroque ipsorum.” See also Köhler (2008), 
342.
24 König-Pralong (2011), 74, therefore says that for Albert “l’homme est non seulement au 
sommet, il est aussi au-dessus de la nature” [italics in the original].
25 As Perler (2014b), 232, claims this is what unites Aristotelians and Cartesians because they 
both hold that there is a categorical difference between human and nonhuman animals.
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 quantitative ordering by a particular kind of complexity).”26 The differences 
they see are not necessarily qualitative or categorical. The point is rather that, 
in contrast to assimilationists, they emphasise the differences more than they 
stress the similarities that exist. Assimilationists, in turn, do not necessarily 
reject the existence of an anthropological difference, as Markus Wild points 
out. Assimilationists might claim that there is much continuity on the scala 
naturae but, at some point, ‘the one decisive step’ occurs.27
This point is crucial for the evaluation of later medieval theories of ani-
mal rationality because it shows that one can argue for the existence of an 
anthropological difference and at the same time leave room for continuities 
and similarities between different species. Thus, one could say that all later 
medieval authors covered in this study – or almost all, as shall be discussed in 
more detail below – are differentialists from a metaphysical point of view as all 
of them deny intellectual faculties to nonhuman animals. Still, not all of them 
are differentialists from an explanatory or methodological perspective because, 
as the following chapter will show, some chose a more assimilationist strategy 
for explaining certain cognitive processes underlying the behaviours of nonhu-
man animals.28 This does not mean that their explanations are more coherent 
than differentialist explanations. They are simply different. But this difference 
has often been ignored and so it is worth bringing to the fore.
26 Brandom (2000), 3 [italics in the original].
27 Wild (2013), 37. Wild (2006), 9f., points out that those assimilationists who agree that 
there is an anthropological difference defend a weak assimilationism, whereas those who 
deny such a difference defend a strong assimilationism. For him, the Aristotelian model, 
as it was defended by Aristotle and his medieval followers, can be described as ‘assimila-
tionist account ending in a clear anthropological difference’; see ibid., 34.




Towards a Classification: Differentialist and 
Assimilationist Explanations
When looking at later medieval theories of animal rationality one finds differ-
ent explanatory strategies used across the board. In what follows, these differ-
ent strategies shall be highlighted by taking some of the positions that have 
been discussed in Parts 2 to 4 concerning (i) universal cognition, (ii) judging, 
and (iii) reasoning.1
(i) Universal Cognition and Concept Formation
None of the authors covered in this book deny that human and nonhuman 
animals share a variety of cognitive capacities, most importantly, various kinds 
of sensory cognition. One of the main arguments for why they do so is that all 
animals are endowed with a sensory soul. This type of soul is what sets them 
apart from plants because although plants are living beings, too, they only have 
vegetative souls that are responsible for food intake, growth, and reproduction 
(see Chapter 5). In contrast to animals, plants lack perception. For instance, 
they neither see nor smell what they eat. Animals, by contrast, have all differ-
ent kinds of perceptions. They perceive their food, other members of their spe-
cies, and a great many other things. The decisive question, however, is whether 
there is a big difference between the way in which a human being and a dog 
perceive a steak, for example. Is the dog even capable of seeing a steak, that is, 
can it see the brownish grilled thing as steak? Put differently, is it capable of 
conceptualising its perceptual contents?
As seen in Part 2, late medieval authors discussed questions like these under 
the heading of what is usually called ‘incidental (or accidental) perception’. 
They largely agreed that both humans and nonhuman animals can engage in 
incidental perception because it occurs whenever perceptions from different 
senses somehow interfere with each other. Hence, as long as an animal is en-
dowed with more than one sensory power it is likely to experience incidental 
perception. It perceives something yellow as sweet or, to give another famous 
1 For the sake of brevity, I will focus on the triad of intellectual operations and leave prudence 
out here.
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example, it perceives something grey and furry as hostile, as the sheep does 
when seeing a wolf. However, different thinkers disagreed about the nature of 
the underlying cognitive process, more precisely, they held different views of 
how close nonhuman animals’ incidental perceptions come to the conceptu-
alisation of perceptual contents that we find in human beings. A good example 
of this disagreement is the difference between Thomas Aquinas’ and Pseudo-
Peter of Spain’s accounts of estimative perception (see Chapters 8 and 10).
Both emphasise that the faculty of estimation plays a pivotal role in nonhu-
man animals’ perception of the world because it is this very power that makes 
them perceive things as hostile, hurtful, friendly, useful, and so forth. Still, they 
give different answers to the question of whether this kind of  perception is uni-
versal to some extent. For Aquinas it is clearly not. In his view, ‘the  estimative 
power does not perceive an individual insofar as it is under a common nature 
but only insofar as it is the starting or endpoint of some action or passion’.2 
Therefore, a sheep neither perceives a wolf as a member of the species of 
wolves nor does it sort wolves into the category of hostile things. It does not 
even possess the concept of wolf. Instead, it sees a grey, furry thing (which it 
might also smell or hear, for instance) and once this stimulus has passed the 
sheep’s estimative power it immediately triggers the reaction of flight. Accord-
ing to Aquinas, this is exactly what the estimative power has been designed 
for. Its function is to guarantee the survival of an animal by triggering whatever 
reaction is needed in order to survive.3 This reaction is usually hardwired and 
does not involve universal cognition.4
Now one might object that this is implausible because sheep apparently run 
away from all wolves. This seems to show that their reaction is universal and 
so is the cognition on which this reaction is based. However, Aquinas explains 
that one should not conflate the nature of the reaction with the nature of the 
cognitive process. Sight perceives colours universally (universaliter) insofar 
as it perceives all colours but it does not perceive the universal ‘colour’. Simi-
larly, the sheep by virtue of its estimative power ‘hates wolves in general’ (odit 
 lupus generaliter). Nevertheless, its passion is not based on the cognition of 
2 Thomas Aquinas, In Aristotelis librum De anima commentarium, lib. ii, lec. 13, n. 398, ed. 
Pirotta (1959), 101: “Aestimativa autem non apprehendit aliquod individuum, secundum 
quod est sub natura communi, sed solum secundum quod est terminus aut principium 
 alicuius  actionis vel passionis; solum secundum quod est terminus aut principium alicuius 
actionis vel passionis.”
3 Ibid.: “Naturalis enim aestimativa datur animalibus, ut per eam ordinentur in actiones pro-
prias, vel passiones prosequendas, vel fugiendas.”
4 To say that it is hardwired does not mean that some reactions of this kind are not learned, see 
Chapter 8.
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the universal ‘wolf ’.5 Its cognition does not reach beyond the level of particu-
lars and this is where Aquinas draws the line between the perception of the 
world of humans and nonhuman animals. It is this difference between human 
and nonhuman animal cognition that he wants to illustrate by contrasting the 
way in which a sheep perceives a wolf and our way of perceiving things. While 
the sheep fails to perceive universal aspects, we are capable of cognising both 
particulars and universals, because in addition to various sensory faculties 
we have rational faculties that can engage in universal cognition. In this sense, 
one can say that Aquinas chooses the strategy of differentialism.6
A more assimilationist theory can be found in Pseudo-Peter of Spain’s com-
mentary on De animalibus. In his opinion, the sheep’s reaction to the stimulus 
‘wolf ’ resembles a physician’s reaction to a stimulus such as ‘flu’. Surely, wolves 
that are hostile towards sheep as well as patients suffering from flu are individ-
uals. Nonetheless, wolves are individuals of the same kind and so are patients 
with flu. In other words, all wolves belong to the same category as they share 
a common nature. While Aquinas holds that this common nature cannot be 
grasped by the sheep’s estimative power, Pseudo-Peter thinks that sheep iden-
tify wolves by comparing the ‘common form’ ( forma communis) of wolf with 
the individual they see. Although this does not mean that the sheep grasps the 
quiddity of wolfness its reaction of flight is based on a cognitive process that 
can be characterised as ‘universal grasp’ (acceptio universalis).7 Pseudo-Peter 
of Spain further describes the universal nature of this cognition by introduc-
ing the concept of ‘elevated intentions’ (intentiones elevatas). Those intentions, 
he says, ‘do not attain the same level of elevation as do those that are in the 
intellect’. Nonetheless, they rank above purely particular intentions. Moreover, 
they do not differ in kind from the universal intentions that are found in the 
5 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae i–ii, q. 29, a. 6, co., ed. Leonina vi (1891), 207f.: “Potest 
tamen aliqua potentia sensitiva, et apprehensiva et appetitiva, ferri in aliquid universaliter. 
Sicut dicimus quod obiectum visus est color secundum genus, non quia visus cognoscat col-
orem universalem; sed quia quod color sit cognoscibilis a visu, non convenit colori inquan-
tum est hic color, sed inquantum est color simpliciter. Sic ergo odium etiam sensitivae partis, 
potest respicere aliquid in universali, quia ex natura communi aliquid adversatur animali, et 
non solum ex eo quod est particularis, sicut lupus ovi. Unde ovis odit lupum generaliter.”
6 Davids (2017), 176–178, argues that Aquinas defends a ‘moderate’ version of differentialism 
because he does not deny the many commonalities that exist between human and nonhu-
man animals in the realm of sensory cognition.
7 Pseudo-Peter of Spain, Commentum super libros de animalibus (Venetian redaction), 
fol. 153ra: “Alia [acceptio intentionis universalis] est prout comparat formam communem ad 
particulare, ut agnam ad hanc agnam; hoc non fit sine materia, et hec est anime sensitive.”
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intellect but they differ ‘in degree’ (per gradus).8 Pseudo-Peter is certainly on 
a par with Aquinas in the sense that he denies intellectual universal cognition 
to nonhuman animals. However, he chooses the strategy of assimilationism 
rather than differentialism insofar as he allows for a kind of universal cogni-
tion at the level of the sensory soul, and so he assimilates human and nonhu-
man animal cognition in this respect.
(ii) Judging
A similar difference in the choice of explanatory strategies can be found with 
regard to the capacity of judging. The best example is the debate between 
Adam Wodeham and Gregory of Rimini (see Chapter 18). In this debate, Adam 
Wodeham defends the view that judging is an exclusively intellectual capacity. 
He admits that there are cases in which nonhuman animals that lack intellec-
tual faculties by definition seem to judge, as well. For instance, a dog standing 
aboard a ship mistakenly ‘judges’ the trees standing on the shore to be moving, 
and so it falls prey to an optical illusion just like we do in this situation. Yet, 
Adam argues that we should refrain from ascribing the capacity of judging to 
the dog for at least two reasons.
First, since we cannot see directly what is going on in the dog’s head we 
should avoid anthropomorphising its cognition. From the mere fact that the 
dog behaves like a human being in this situation we should not conclude that 
its behaviour is based on the same kind of cognitive process, namely, a ‘complex 
objective judgment’ (iudicium complexe obiective). Instead, we should account 
for the dog’s behaviour by referring to what Adam calls a ‘simple apprehen-
sion’ (apprehensio simplex), that is, an immediate instinctual reaction.9 This 
is more concise and less anthropomorphic an explanation, hence to be pre-
ferred. The second reason why Adam opts for this explanation rather than for 
the  ascription of judgments is that, in his view, the latter implies the  ascription 
8 Ibid., 152ra: “Dicendum, quod virtus sensitiva non accipit solum intentiones individuales, sed 
intentiones individuales elevatas. Iste tamen intentiones, quas accipit, non attingunt eleva-
tionem, que apud intellectum, sed distant per gradus.”
9 Adam Wodeham, Lectura secunda in primum librum Sententiarum, prol., q. 4, §8, ed. Wood 
(1990), 99f.: “Id est non solum non libere prosequuntur ac fugiunt proficua et nociva, sed nec 
deliberant nec iudicant aliquid iudicio complexo obiective conveniens exsistere vel nocivum 
de fugiendo vel [proficuum de] prosequendo. Sed statim ad simplicem apprehensionem 
 istius quod est nocivum fugiunt et illius quod est conveniens prosequuntur.”
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of ‘practical reason’ (ratio practica) to nonhuman animals.10 This would entail 
a serious shift in the human/animal boundary, because the possession of rea-
son would no longer be the mark of the human. Adam is not ready to give up 
this distinctive feature, therefore, he chooses the strategy of differentialism.11 
He argues that there is a crucial difference between humans and other animals 
to such an extent that only the former are capable of judging.
Although Adam Wodeham’s opponent, Gregory of Rimini, does not deny 
that there are differences between human and nonhuman animals he rejects 
Adam’s denial of the capacity of judging to nonhuman species. There are two 
main reasons for why he does so. The first is that he considers Adam’s theory to 
be unsatisfactory. In his view, an explanation that refers to simple apprehen-
sions cannot convincingly explain those cases in which animals show different 
reactions to like stimuli. He gives the example of an animal that sees a piece of 
bread. According to Adam’s theory, this stimulus must always trigger the same 
reaction. Yet this is not what we see, Gregory objects, because sometimes we 
see the animal going for the bread and sometimes we see it showing no interest 
in the bread at all. This behaviour, Gregory thinks, cannot be explained with a 
simple stimulus-response model. Instead, it must be explained by referring to 
the capacity of judging. Every time the animal sees a piece of bread it does not 
immediately react to this stimulus but judges how it should react. The simple 
apprehension is thus supplemented by a judgment (iudicium).12
However, it is important to note that this kind of judgment is a sensory and 
not an intellectual judgment. It differs from intellectual judgments in two 
10 Ibid., 99: “Sed si hoc movere deberet, esset consequenter in eis ponenda ratio practica, 
id est dictamen practicum de eligendis et respuendis, prosequendis et fugiendi. Sic enim 
agunt si dictamen haberent. Et tunc non video quare non debeant animalia rationalia 
appellari.”
11 Cf. Perler (2006), 91f. According to Perler, Wodeham’s differentialism is also motivated by 
the fact that he holds a theory according to which the content of judgments is a so-called 
‘complexe significabile’ which is “expressed by a full-fledged sentence.” However, this can-
not fully explain Wodeham’s animosity because his opponent, Gregory of Rimini, also 
subscribes to this theory but still grants nonhuman animals a form of judgment that has 
no complexe significabile as its content. On the complexe significabile see also Nuchelmans 
(1973), 227–237, and (1980), 104–106.
12 Gregory of Rimini, Lectura in primum et secundum Sententiarum, dist. 1, q. 3, eds. 
Trapp & Marcolino (1981), 304: “Quod primo convinci potest, quia, sicut videmus, ali-
quando    brutam, apprehendit aliquod sensibile, ut puta panem, et movetur ad ipsum; 
 aliquando vero apprehendit idem, et non movetur ad ipsum. Ergo motus iste, cum sit per 
appetitum animalem et talis appetitus sequatur apprehensionem, praesupponit praeter 




 respects. First, it does not concern universals but only singulars. The animal 
can judge about this bread but not about bread in general or the universal 
‘bread’. Second, it can only judge about sensible things (sensibilia), while hu-
mans can also judge about insensible things (insensiblia) such as numbers or 
justice.13 It is this difference between sensory and intellectual judgments that 
leads to the second reason for Gregory’s rejection of Adam’s view. For Adam 
the ascription of judgments implies the ascription of practical reason and a 
shift in the animal/human boundary. For Gregory this is not the case. He thinks 
that one can assimilate human and nonhuman animals without giving up the 
denial of intellectual faculties to the latter. Humans judge about all different 
kinds of things: particulars, universals, sensible, and insensible things, and they 
do this because they are endowed with both sensory and intellectual powers. 
Nonhuman animals also judge but they lack intellect and reason and so their 
judgments are restricted to the realm of particular, sensible objects. Still, they 
engage in some form of judging and despite all differences this establishes an 
important cognitive similarity between humans and other animal species. In 
contrast to Adam Wodeham, Gregory of Rimini thus chooses assimilationism 
instead of differentialism.
(iii) Reasoning
The third element of the triad of intellectual operations is reasoning. Just like 
the first and second element, universal cognition and judging, this element 
gave rise to the question of whether or not it belongs to human animals alone. 
There are many situations in which nonhuman animals are confronted with 
a certain problem and, from the outside, seem solve this problem in the same 
way that we do. One example that was debated by late medieval authors in 
this context is this: a dog has the choice between a longer and a shorter path 
in order to reach its destination. As long as nothing blocks the shorter path 
it will choose this option simply because it is the best option available. How-
ever, it will choose the longer path when the shorter path is blocked and so it 
takes a detour for a very good reason. The question now is whether or not its 
13 Ibid., 305: “Nec valet ratio cuiusdam doctoris, qui dicit quod secundum hoc in talibus 
animalibus esset intellectus practicus et deberent talia animalia appellari rationabilia. 
Non enim haec sequuntur loquendo de huiusmodi ad sensum, in quo dicimus hominem 
esse rationale et habere practicum intellectum, quia homo non tantum singularia iudicia 
sed et universalia, nec tantum circa sensibilia sed et circa insensibilia habet iudicia, et ex 
talibus ratiocinatur et proprie rationalis appellatur.”
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 behaviour is actually based on a syllogistic process. Does it employ a syllogism 
of the form ‘The shorter path is to be favoured over the longer path because it 
is faster but now that it is blocked I must take the longer path even though this 
will take more time’?
A negative answer to this question was given by John Duns Scotus (Chapter 
19). He argues that from similarities in behaviour we should not infer to ‘similar 
cognition’ (cognitio similis).14 Instead, we should examine whether there could 
also be different cognitive processes leading to the same behavioural results. 
In the case of the dog that makes a choice between two paths the behaviour 
derives ‘from sensory appetite alone’ (ex solo appetitu sensitivo), Scotus argues. 
By contrast, the behaviour of a human being who is confronted with the same 
problem originates from ‘rational discourse’ (discursus rationis) and ‘delibera-
tion’ (deliberatio). Unsurprisingly, the main reason for this difference is the 
metaphysical difference between dogs’ sensory and humans’ rational souls. So 
even though dogs and human beings show the very same behaviour in this 
situation, the cognitive processes underlying this behaviour are essentially 
 different. Those processes do of course lead to very similar behavioural out-
comes which is why they can be characterised as functionally equivalent. This 
means that the function they have is basically the same. Still, the way in which 
this function is realised, namely, by virtue of a particular process is fundamen-
tally different.15
Obviously, Scotus differentiates between human and nonhuman animals in 
this respect as he argues that only humans can engage in rational thinking or 
reasoning. For him a dog is not very much different from a cleverly constructed 
machine such as a calculator, one could say. The calculator will easily solve 
numerous mathematical problems, and it often does this many times quicker 
than we do. Nevertheless, we are relatively reluctant to say that the calculator 
is more intelligent than we are or that it thinks and reasons. Instead, we say 
that it is a machine that has been designed by intelligent, thinking beings for 
the purpose of automatically solving certain tasks quite quickly, much like the 
chess-playing computer that is famously mentioned by Daniel Dennett or the 
14 See John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, lib. i, q. 3, 
§§10f., eds. Andrews et al. (1997), 89: “Bruta multa faciunt ex cognitione eodem modo 
quo fierent ab homine cognoscente per discursum rationis […]. Ad hoc dicitur quod licet 
similiter agant quaedam, sicut homo ex deliberatione ageret, non tamen oportet quod 
similem cognitionem habeant. Nam illud, quod eligitur ex deliberatione, posset etiam 
idem non eligi ex deliberatione, sed ex solo appetitu sensitivo.”
15 The concept of functional equivalence now plays an important role in the debate over 
machine intelligence and morality; see Wallach & Allen (2009), 68.
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heat-seeking missile that features so prominently in Donald Davidson’  paper 
on rational animals and Fred Dretske’s book on behaviour.16 The point of these 
examples is that if we claim that the dog is reasoning in this situation we fall 
into the trap of anthropomorphism, making the dog's cognition much more 
humanlike than it actually is.17 Instead, we should only call it ‘quasi- rational’, 
for example.18 This warning is typical for differentialists and Scotus but also 
Thomas Aquinas can be read in this way.
Some authors, however, preferred a different explanation. A prominent ex-
ample is John Buridan whose explanation of the dog’s cognition is the exact 
opposite of Scotus’ theory (see Chapter 22). For Buridan there is no reason to 
assume that the dog is incapable of reasoning. Rather, there are very good rea-
sons to hold the contrary, because the souls of humans might simply be as 
material as the souls of dogs, donkeys, and other nonhuman animals. To those 
who reject this idea ‘because of the great subtlety of humans or their reason-
ing’ (propter magnam subtilitatem hominis vel eius ratiocinationem) Buridan 
replies that reasoning might simply be a matter of material complexity and 
complexion. Therefore, a dog that has to make a choice between two paths, 
one of which is short but blocked, will take the longer path on the basis of 
reasoning.19 Buridan does of course pay a metaphysical price for this position: 
he gives up the distinction between the immaterial rational and the material 
sensory soul.20 In this sense, his assimilationism is not only methodological but 
also metaphysical. However, one should not ignore that Buridan still stands in 
the tradition of the Aristotelian denial of reason because, like other late medi-
eval thinkers, he does not explicitly ascribe the faculties of intellect and reason 
16 See Dennett (1971); Davidson (1982), 323f.; Dretske (1988), 126. On thinking machines see 
also Searle (2002).
17 On the problem of anthropomorphism see Wild (2013), 69–73; De Waal (1999); Daston & 
Mitman (2005); Wynne (2007).
18 While Scotus does not explicitly employ this terminology, Thomas Aquinas, for instance, 
says that the dog behaves ‘as if using a disjunctive syllogism’ (quasi utens syllogismo 
 divisivo); see p. 135 n5.
19 John Buridan, Quaestiones de anima, Paris, Bibl. Nat., Cod. lat. 15888, f. 70ra: “[...] canes 
et alia animalia ratiocinantur et syllogizant, quamvis non ita subtiliter ac complete sicut 
homo vel simia. Quod apparet, quia, si canis videt dominum suum et vult ire ad ipsum et 
in directa linea inveniat magnam foveam, non intrabit in illam, sed quaerit aliam viam, 
licet longiorem, quod non faceret, nisi ratiocinaretur et syllogizaret, quod non est bonum 
cadere in foveam et cetera.”
20 A Renaissance thinker who was also willing to pay this price is Pietro Pomponazzi; see 
Rubini (2015).
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to nonhuman animals. Rather, he questions, if not rejects, the traditional view 
according to which certain cognitive processes, such as reasoning, cannot be 
had without such faculties.
Now one might think that this view always comes at the price of giving up 
the metaphysical distinction between different types of souls. Yet as the ex-
ample of Albertus Magnus shows this is not necessarily the case. Like Buridan, 
Albert claims that nonhuman animals are not per se incapable of reasoning 
(Chapter 21). There are at least some highly-developed species, such as apes (to 
which belongs the subspecies of pygmies), that can engage in what Albert calls 
‘imperfect practical syllogisms’ (imperfecti sillogismi operum).21 The pygmy in 
particular also ‘seems to somehow participate in making inductive inferences’ 
(inductionis autem aliquid videtur participare), Albert states, but he also notes 
that it does not do this perfectly because it lacks cognitive access to universals 
(see Chapter 9). Consequently, its inferences remain imperfect in comparison 
to ours. One could perhaps compare the reasoning of pygmies to the reasoning 
of human children. They make all sorts of inferences but their reasoning does 
not operate as smoothly as the reasoning of an adult human being and, above 
all, is less complex.
Be that as it may, the crucial point here is that reasoning is no longer the pre-
rogative of the rational soul. There are certain basic types of reasoning in which 
nonhuman animals can engage by virtue of their sensory  powers. One partic-
ular power that Albert highlights in this respect is the faculty of  estimation. 
The estimative power of apes, he explains, is ‘more lucid’ ( lucidior) than the 
 estimation of other nonhuman animals and even amounts to  something that is 
‘similar to reason’ (rationi simile).22 So, unlike Buridan, he maintains the meta-
physical distinction between immaterial rational souls and material sensory 
souls but at the same time ‘upgrades’ the latter, especially the estimative power. 
This means that he ascribes to those sensory faculties certain  capacities, such 
as reasoning, that were usually considered to require an immaterial faculty. 
Now one might say that this claim is rather unconvincing because it  ignores the 
link between the immateriality of a faculty and the  rationality of its operations. 
21 Albertus Magnus, De animalibus, lib. xxi, tr. 1, c. 3, ed. Stadler (1920), 1331: “[...] ita in istis 
animalibus sunt imperfecti sillogismi operum qui non habent nisi fantasticam aestima-
tionem de operabili vel appetibili et appetitum facientem impetum ad opus.”
22 Ibid., 1332: “[...] et ideo pro certo aestimativam haec animalia habent lucidiorem omnibus 
aliis animalibus: propter quod melius aestimant de fantasmatibus quam alia animalia 
et melius eliciunt intentiones acceptas cum fantasmatibus quam aliqua aliorum anima-
lium, ita quod videntur aliquid habere rationi simile.”
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Yet what the assimilationist approaches show is exactly this: the link between 
the nature of a faculty and the nature of its operations can be loosened at cer-
tain points, and so can the link between faculty rationality and process ratio-
nality. In this sense, they create room for rationality at the level of the sensory 
soul and develop the idea of what might be called ‘rationality without reason’.
<UN>
chapter 33
Room for Rationality or Rationality without Reason
According to the standard account of medieval theories of animal cognition, 
human and nonhuman animals differ in at least one crucial regard: rational-
ity. While humans have it, nonhuman animals lack it. There are pretty strong 
reasons to believe that this account is correct. Historically, there is the suc-
cess of Aristotelian faculty psychology. It was quite successful in Antiquity and, 
with the transmission of Aristotle’s writings, encountered success in the later 
Middle Ages, too. Briefly speaking, faculty psychology is the idea that cogni-
tive (and also certain non-cognitive) processes depend on faculties. What this 
means for rationality is this: rational processes such as concept formation, 
judging, or reasoning rely on rational faculties. To put it in modern terms, pro-
cess rationality cannot be had without faculty rationality because the lack of 
rational faculties causes the lack of rational processes.
By and large, there is not much to say against this account because it sim-
ply summarises the Aristotelian background of later medieval theories. The 
 Aristotelian model of the soul is not only the starting point of those theories 
but also the framework within which they are supposed to work. Yet a find-
ing of this study is that this account leaves out some important pieces of the 
picture. One of those pieces is that the Aristotelian denial of reason or the 
metaphysical idea of faculty rationality did not lead into an explanatory one-
way road. When it came to explaining the cognitive processes that underlie 
the behaviours of different animals authors employed different explanatory 
strategies which can be classified as differentialist and assimilationist. This 
means that some of them were keen to stress the differences that exist be-
tween  human and nonhuman cognition, while others put more weight on the 
similarities. Most, if not all, of them did, of course, defend some version of 
metaphysical differentialism insofar as they stuck to the Aristotelian denial of 
reason in terms of faculty rationality. Nonetheless, some chose what could be 
called an explanatory assimilationism. So, while denying rational faculties to 
nonhuman animals, on the one hand, they ascribed them certain rational pro-
cesses, on the other hand.
This kind of explanatory assimilationism leads to another interesting piece 
of information that is usually missing from the standard account, which can be 
called rationality without reason. What it means is basically this: in some cases 
nonhuman animals can engage in rational processes although they lack the 
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correspondent faculties. We have come across some examples of  rationality 
without reason in the previous chapter and among the more obvious cases 
surely is the ascription of reasoning to nonhuman animals as found in Albertus 
Magnus and John Buridan. One could also add Nicole Oresme to this list, as 
well as some of those views concerning other parts of the triad of intellectual 
operations and prudence, such as Pseudo-Peter of Spain’s account of universal 
cognition and Gregory of Rimini’s account of judging. In all of these cases, the 
rationality ascribed to nonhuman animals is not just any kind of rationality. It 
differs from the full-fledged rationality that is usually ascribed to humans in at 
least three regards: (i) it is rational, not intellectual, (ii) practical, not theoreti-
cal, and (iii) particular, not universal.
(i) Rational, Not Intellectual
Throughout this book the terms ‘intellect’ and ‘reason’ have been used quite 
interchangeably. This is very much in line with the terminology of the think-
ers covered in this study, because in denying rational faculties to nonhuman 
animals they did not differentiate between intellect and reason. This does not 
mean, however, that they ignored the differences that exist (or might exist) be-
tween these powers. As mentioned in Chapter 6, Thomas Aquinas, for instance, 
discusses in quite some detail whether or not they are separate powers.1 His 
ultimate answer is no, but he points out that there is a difference between the 
corresponding operations, between ‘reasoning’ (ratiocinari) and ‘understand-
ing’ (intellegere).2 While ‘intellegere’ means to understand something directly 
(simpliciter), reasoning is a more indirect way that involves  various steps until 
the point of understanding is reached. This more or less subtle difference has 
so far not mattered much. In the present context, however, it becomes relevant, 
because if late medieval authors attributed rationality to nonhuman animals 
at all it was in terms of ‘ratiocinari’ rather than of ‘intellegere’. John Buridan, 
for instance, claims that dogs and apes are capable of ‘reasoning’ (ratiocinari) 
and ‘syllogising’ (syllogizari) but he does not employ the term ‘intellegere’ in 
this context.3 Similarly, Nicole Oresme argues that they can mentally ‘run 
1 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae i, q. 79, a. 8, ed. Leonina V (1889), 274f.
2 ‘Intellegere’ is commonly translated with ‘to understand sth’. but one could also translate it 
with ‘to grasp sth. intellectually’.
3 See p. 224 n19.
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through’ something (discurrere) but this, too, is a rational, not an intellectual 
process, insofar as it means to understand something step-by-step rather than 
all at once.4 One could also mention Roger Bacon in this context because even 
though he argues that it is rather misleading to ascribe ‘cognition by syllogism’ 
(cognitio per sillogismum) to other animals, he still thinks that they can engage 
in some sort of mental ‘discourse’ (decursus; discursus).5 He therefore ascribes 
them the faculty of cogitation which was usually taken to belong to the ratio-
nal part of the soul. In sum, what this shows is that if there is rationality with-
out reason at all, it is – somehow tautologically – rationality in a rational, not 
in an intellectual sense of the term.
(ii) Practical, Not Theoretical
A second important feature of rationality without reason is its practical nature. 
This means that such animals can reason about what is practically relevant 
to them, but not about more theoretical issues. For instance, a monkey might 
reason that it should eat this yellow curved thing because another yellow thing 
that looked very similar and that it ate some time ago was quite delicious. In 
this case, the monkey’s reasoning concerns a practical issue: shall I eat or shall 
I not eat this? Its reasoning does not concern theoretical questions such as 
‘Why do some philosophers think that the specific taste I experience when 
eating a yellow curved thing is a so-called quale?’ The monkey simply does not 
care about qualia (even though it might have them) because they are practi-
cally irrelevant for its decision about eating or not eating. What matters are 
those questions that are immediately relevant for its survival, that is, what 
some people like to call ‘the four Fs’ of evolutionary biology: fighting, fleeing, 
feeding, and mating. The practical nature of this kind of reasoning is made ex-
plicit by Albertus Magnus who claims that apes are capable of employing ‘im-
perfect practical syllogisms’ (imperfecti sillogismi operum).6 Similarly, Gregory 
of Rimini emphasises that nonhuman animals do not judge about ‘insensible 
things’ (insensibilia). To be clear, this does not mean that humans’ rationality, 
in contrast, is entirely theoretical. Rather, it is also theoretical, because we can 
reason and judge about both practical and theoretical matters.
4 Nicole Oresme, Expositio et quaestiones in Aristotelis De anima, lib. iii, q. 4, ed. Patar (1995), 
335.
5 Roger Bacon, Perspectiva, pars ii, dist. 3, c. 9, ed. Lindberg (1996), 250.
6 See p. 225 n21.
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(iii) Particular, Not Universal
The third and final feature is that the rational processes nonhuman animals 
can engage in do not involve universals. To take up the example from before, 
the monkey does not possess the concept of banana. It reasons about what 
it perceives at the moment, such as ‘this yellow curved thing’, but not about 
bananas or yellow curved things in general. Surely, someone like Pseudo-Peter 
of Spain might intervene and say that many nonhuman animals can of course 
grasp certain universal aspects of things. Still, even he admits that this kind 
of universal grasp does not attain the level of intellectual concept formation 
and universal cognition one finds in human beings. Albertus Magnus therefore 
says that if nonhuman animals reason at all, they reason about what is ‘here 
and now’ (hic et nunc) and what is here and now is something singular, not 
universal.7 Their rationality is thus also what is called ‘context-dependent’ in 
the modern debate.
Now if one looks at these qualifications, it becomes clear that there are im-
portant differences between nonhuman animals’ rationality without reason 
and human rationality with reason. Human rationality is not only rational but 
also intellectual, it is not only practical but also theoretical, and it is particular 
as well as universal. Nevertheless, there is some common ground, something 
both human and nonhuman animals share, and this in some sense runs coun-
ter to the traditional rationality/non-rationality divide. Rather than just one 
type of rationality that is largely based on faculty rationality there are different 
types or levels of rationality and this is exactly what is also stressed by con-
temporary theories of animal rationality. They do not aim to put nonhuman 
 animals on the same level as humans. Rather, they try to discover common-
alities and differences and what is interesting to see is that there is a certain 
continuity between later medieval and contemporary theories in this respect. 
Most contemporary scholars also emphasise that the process rationality we 
find in nonhuman animals is practical, not theoretical, particular, not univer-
sal (or domain-specific, not domain-general, as they put it).8 So even though 
they have left behind the framework of Aristotelian faculty psychology they 
keep making very similar qualifications when it comes to the question of ratio-
nality in nonhuman animals.
7 Albertus Magnus, De animalibus, lib. xxi, tr. 1, c. 3, ed. Stadler (1920), 1331.
8 See Hurley & Nudds (2006b), 13–19. See also Bermúdez (2003), 38–46, who presents what he 
calls “minimalist approaches to non-linguistic thought.” These accounts are characterised by 
four features: (i) context-bound, (ii) pragmatic, (iii) sensory, (iv) unstructured; see ibid., 45.
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However, one could object to this analysis that the idea of rationality  without 
reason or process rationality without faculty rationality is simply incompatible 
with Aristotelian psychology. One might say that no serious Aristotelian would 
claim that there can be whatever process without the corresponding faculty. 
This is absolutely correct, but misses the actual point. The point is not that the 
idea of rationality without reason makes Aristotelian faculty psychology col-
lapse. None of the authors covered in this book would deny that every process 
relies on a faculty. What some of them seem to suggest is simply that not all of 
those processes that were usually taken to depend on rational faculties, actu-
ally require those faculties. Again, this does not mean that they do not require 
any faculties at all. Rather, they do not require the faculties of intellect and 
reason but can take place in the sensory soul (or some part of the sensory soul). 
Therefore, one could say that the sensory soul is ‘upgraded’ in the sense that 
the scope of its cognitive operations is widened.
It is important to note that this widening does not make the rational facul-
ties superfluous. As we have seen, the reasoning, for example, in which the 
sensory faculties such as the pygmies’ estimative faculty might engage is only 
a very basic form of reasoning. Similarly, sensory judgments are very simple 
judgments that lack the predicative structure and complexity of intellectual 
judgments. Moreover, it should be noted that quite often philosophers do not 
consistently argue for such an expansion of the sensory soul’s capacities. For 
instance, Buridan can be interpreted as a differentialist on concept formation 
but as an assimilationist on reasoning. Gregory of Rimini presents a differen-
tialist explanation concerning reasoning, but gives assimilationist arguments 
with regard to judging. And Albertus Magnus seems to choose the strategy of 
differentialism as far as universal cognition is concerned, but assimilationism 
with regard to reasoning and prudence. This inconsistency arises partly from 
the peculiar conditions under which medieval theories of animal rational-
ity were developed (see Chapters 4 and 30). As has been shown, they were in 
many cases nothing but a by-product of a debate that was not primarily con-
cerned with animals and their cognition.
Despite this historical peculiarity, the assimilationist explanations that one 
finds in the later Middle Ages establish an interesting parallel to both ancient 
and early modern theories. Already in Antiquity, “the denial of reason and 
belief to animals necessitated an expansion of their perceptual content,” as 
Richard Sorabji remarks.9 This expansion became even more common with 
the growing success of the theory of inner senses in the late ancient and early 
medieval period because the inner senses, most importantly imagination and 
9 Sorabji (1993b), 20.
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estimation, have the potential to account for various complex behaviours in 
all kinds of animals. A very similar strategy can be found in the early mod-
ern  period. An illuminating example is Marin Cureau de la Chambre who in 
his Traité de la connoissance des animaux, published in 1648, argues that non-
human animals can engage in ‘judging’ (jugement) and ‘practical reasoning’ 
( raissonement) although they lack the faculties of intellect and reason.10 The 
explanation Cureau gives is that the imagination and other sensory powers 
enable them to do this. So he upgrades those powers by ascribing them cer-
tain capacities that were traditionally taken to belong to the higher faculties, 
namely, intellect and reason.11
Still, like the later medieval Aristotelians we have examined, Cureau em-
phasises that the reasoning of nonhuman animals is inferior to the inferen-
tial capacities of human beings, first and foremost, because it does not involve 
universals.12 He thus defends what is called ‘abstractionism’. This is the thesis 
that nonhuman and human animals share a wide range of cognitive capaci-
ties except for the ability to abstract from the level of particulars to the extent 
that one can form universal concepts. In the abstractionist theory, reason is 
replaced by concept formation as anthropological difference and so concept 
formation and universal cognition establish a cognitive boundary between hu-
man and nonhuman animals. In addition, there also remains a metaphysical 
boundary. According to Cureau, only human souls are characterised by ‘spiri-
tuality and immortality’ (spiritualité et immortalité).13 So, on the one hand, he 
assimilates human and nonhuman animals by ascribing to them a wide range 
of shared capacities such as judging and reasoning. At the heart of this lies the 
idea that sensory powers are capable of much more than usually thought. On 
the other hand, they cannot attain the level of intellectual powers in each and 
every respect. Therefore, one must not ignore the differences that exist.14
Cureau’s position very much resembles several later medieval theories of an-
imal rationality. The strength of the explanation of animal rationality that they 
give is that it allows us to maintain the framework of Aristotelian  psychology. 
10 Marin Cureau de la Chambre, Traité de la connoissance des animaux (Paris 1648), 5.
11 On his position see Wild (2006), 19–21.
12 Cureau de la Chambre, Traité de la connoissance des animaux, 5f. and 9. See also Wild 
(2006), 20f.
13 Cureau de la Chambre, Traité de la connoissance des animaux, 9.
14 Therefore, Wild (2006), 10, classifies Cureau’s assimilationism as ‘weak assimilationism’. 
Other early modern defenders of such a weak assimilationism are Locke and Leibniz; see 
ibid., 290. Hume ultimately defends a strong assimilationism by claiming that there is 
no anthropological difference at all. In Hume’s view, reason is not a separate faculty but 
simply a function of the power of imagination, see ibid., 264.
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The basic idea that processes rely on faculties remains intact. What is slightly 
modified is the correspondence between certain rational processes and ratio-
nal faculties. Although this shift is often ignored one should not overestimate 
its role. It is certainly exaggerated to say that the “principle of a qualitative dif-
ference between humans and animals” that had been established by Aristotle 
and the early church fathers began to break down by the later Middle Ages, as 
Joyce E. Salisbury, for instance, claims.15 Surely, the rediscovery of Aristotle’s 
writings on psychology, zoology, natural philosophy, and other subjects gave 
a major boost to discussions of this principle. Nevertheless, it did not break 
down in the sense that authors began to ascribe intellect and reason to nonhu-
man animals and the holding on to this particular definition of the anthropo-
logical difference truly is an important difference to today’s discussion.
One might ask why this happened. One of the most obvious explanations 
is that, from the viewpoint of medieval Christian theology, “the difference 
 between human beings and brute animals is of course the difference that 
matters, since it is we who are made in God’s image and to whom eternal life 
has been promised,” as Jack Zupko rightly notes.16 So there was a  theological 
interest  in maintaining man’s special status, his status as ‘most excellent 
animal’ (animal nobilissimum).17 Still, the later medieval period saw a lively 
 philosophical discussion on the question of what this special status amounts 
to. As shown, there was a whole spectrum of answers available and within this 
spectrum one can also find the view that the denial of reason does not neces-
sarily imply the denial of rationality.
15 Salisbury (2011), 1–3.
16 Zupko (2008), 184.




This book began with the story about a crisis – the crisis that, according to 
Richard Sorabji, was produced “in psychology, in ethics, and in religion” by 
 Aristotle’s denial of reason to nonhuman animals.1 There is no doubt that 
Aristotle did indeed grant the faculties of intellect and reason to human be-
ings alone, as did his late medieval followers. The crucial question, however, 
is whether the consequences of this denial were as critical as Sorabji has 
 famously suggested. Did it really lead to an excessive downgrading of nonhu-
man animals and a valorisation of humans, especially in the medieval period 
which was and still is described as a ‘dark age’ in this regard?
As has been shown, one cannot give a straightforward answer to this ques-
tion. But as far as the field of psychology is concerned, it has become clear that 
within the Aristotelian theory of the soul there are certain grey areas. There 
is, on the one hand, a clear distinction between humans and other animals: 
while the former possess rational or intellectual souls, the latter have sensory 
souls. Consequently, the behaviours of nonhuman animals are explained by 
the cognitive processes that take place in the external and internal senses, 
most of which they share with humans. Human behaviours, in contrast, are 
 accounted for by the operations of the senses but also, and perhaps even most-
ly, by those operations that originate from the faculties of intellect and reason, 
most  importantly the cognition of universals and the formation of concepts, 
judging, and reasoning. It is these cognitive operations or capacities through 
which humans excel other animals, according to this theory.
On the other hand, this clear-cut distinction gave rise to a variety of ques-
tions. One of these questions was whether one can really explain all kinds of 
nonhuman animal behaviours in a satisfying fashion without referring to ratio-
nal operations. Various species show behaviours that strikingly resemble our 
own, and therefore it seems as if they possess the same cognitive powers we 
have, since similar effects seem to have similar causes. The answers that were 
given to this and other questions by thirteen thinkers between roughly 1250 
and 1350 were the subject of this book, and they have been called theories of 
animal rationality. If one takes this to refer to both human and nonhuman ani-
mals it might seem like a clear contradiction in terms because none of the au-
thors covered here actually ascribed rational faculties to nonhuman animals. 
Nonetheless, all of them seriously discussed the strengths and weaknesses of 
this denial and some even left some room for what could be called ‘rationality 
1 Sorabji (1993a), 1.
© Anselm Oelze, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004363779_042 
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without reason’. This means that some of them, for instance, concluded that 
certain highly developed species of nonhuman animals can engage in rational 
processes, such as basic forms of reasoning although they lack intellect and 
reason. To be clear, this was not the majority view. By and large, late medieval 
authors stuck to the line which had been drawn by Aristotle. But they admit-
ted that this line is blurred in some places, and they realised that it is not al-
ways easy to define or redefine its course: nonhuman animals, for example, 
sometimes seem to have general mental representations, and they also seem 
to judge about what they perceive. Surely, this does not mean that they form 
concepts and propositions but their cognitive life is still much richer and much 
more complex than the denial of reason suggests. This complexity did not es-
cape the attention of medieval scholars, and they chose different explanatory 
strategies for dealing with it. It is this dimension or this spectrum of explana-
tions that the story about the crisis produced by Aristotle risks obscuring.
Still, one should not discard claims about this crisis too quickly. Rather, one 
should further examine the denial of reason and its implications. In this re-
spect, one of the most interesting findings of this book is that, despite much 
sensitivity for the complex cognitive life of nonhuman animals in the Middle 
Ages, the anthropological difference remained untouched. Although various 
authors questioned the denial of rational faculties to nonhuman animals, 
none of them ultimately rejected it. Instead, they tried to formulate theories 
that coherently account for nonhuman animal behaviour without such facul-
ties. Many of their theories significantly differed from each other, as has been 
shown. While some held that natural instinct can explain most of what we see 
in other animals, others claimed that certain high-level cognitive operations 
can be performed without higher cognitive faculties. But even in this latter 
case, the denial of reason remains. Hence, it would be worth asking why they 
did not go beyond this point? Did they fear that the ascription of reason and 
intellect to other animals would seriously endanger man’s exceptional posi-
tion? And if so, was this fear motivated by the Christian doctrine of the im-
mortality of the soul and other doctrines? How did these affect or interfere 
with the philosophical discourse in the Middle Ages, especially in the case of 
animal rationality? This is a promising field for further enquiry.
Other fields of potentially illuminating enquiry include the emotional and 
volitional life of nonhuman animals. The present book has focused mainly on 
the aspect of cognition and even more narrowly on higher-level cognitive ca-
pacities. But there is more to say about animal minds because both human and 
nonhuman animals seem to feel and to want things. The question, however, is 
how the lack or the possession of rational faculties affects emotions and voli-
tions. One could, for instance, ask whether those animals that lack intellect 
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and reason can control their feelings and desires. Do they have different emo-
tions than we do? And are they actually capable of wanting something at all 
since the will was usually taken to be a power of the rational soul? Some of 
these questions have already been addressed in current scholarship, but there 
still remains much to investigate in order to render a more complete picture 
of the medieval philosophy of animal minds.2 Part of this picture would also 
include other aspects, such as the questions of consciousness, self-awareness, 
and self-knowledge.3 On the one hand, these aspects belong to the field of cog-
nition but, on the other hand, there might also be an awareness of feelings 
and desires in nonhuman animals, and so these questions actually concern the 
mental life of other animals in general.
The field of animal minds is, furthermore, linked to another field, namely, the 
field of animal ethics.4 This connection is not an originally modern one, as sev-
eral studies on animal ethics in ancient and early-modern times have shown.5 
The moral status of animals often, if not always, depends on their metaphysi-
cal status and this, in turn, is highly dependent on their mental status and on 
their cognitive capacities, in particular because the cognitive capacities often 
establish a criterion to decide whether or not a being should be treated as a 
member of the moral community. This was also the case in the Middle Ages. 
However, a comprehensive study on animal ethics in the medieval period is 
still missing.6 An interesting question for such a study would be whether the 
metaphysical differentialism of medieval thinkers also produced a moral dif-
ferentialism. Moral differentialism is the view that there is a fundamental dif-
ference between us and other animals – an anthropological  difference – and 
this difference has consequences for our treatment of nonhuman animals.7 As 
the denial of reason establishes such a difference, the question would thus be 
how it affects the definition of moral differences. Did medieval philosophers 
completely deny any kind of moral rights to nonhuman animals or did they 
2 On animal emotions in medieval philosophy see Loughlin (2001); Perler (2012a) and (2012b); 
Köhler (2014), 659–687. Some aspects are also covered by Brungs (2002); Miner (2009); Perler 
(2011); Davids (2017), esp. 202–212; Schäfer & Thurner (2013). On animal volitions see Framp-
ton (2008); Toivanen (2011) and Köhler (2014), esp. 561–612.
3 On these aspects in Islamic philosophy see López-Farjeat (2012), (2013) and (2016). On medi-
eval Latin views see Toivanen (2013a) and (2013b); Perler & Schierbaum (2014).
4 On this connection in current philosophy see the contributions to Petrus & Wild (2013), esp. 
Glock (2013). For a concise introduction to animal ethics see Grimm & Wild (2016).
5 See, for instance, Sorabji (1993b); Steiner (2005) and (2008); Gilhus (2006); Newmeyr (2011); 
Harden (2013); Muratori & Dohm (2013).
6 An overview of animal ethics in the Middle Ages is provided by Oelze (forthcoming a).
7 On moral differentialism see Grimm & Wild (2016), 32–40.
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 acknowledge that other animals are not only moral patients but moral agents, 
as well? In this context, one could also ask how the phenomenon of animal 
trials is to be understood because in this case nonhuman animals seem to be 
treated as morally responsible subjects. In short, medieval animal ethics is an-
other promising field for further investigation.
The present study thus shed light on only one aspect among many others. 
But this aspect is crucial because it concerns the very definition of rational-
ity, which provides the foundation for defining the animal/human boundary. 
Surely, this definition has changed over the centuries. And so later medieval 
theories of animal rationality might look strange from our perspective, not 
only because they were developed in a very different historical context but 
also because they started from a very strong anthropological premise which 
is no longer so widely shared. However, they also look very familiar in at least 
one crucial regard. If one asks a contemporary philosopher what she takes to 
be her job in the current debate over animal minds, she will likely answer that 
her task consists “not in collecting new empirical data about animal behavior, 
its neurological causes or its evolutionary origins, but in clarifying what it is to 
possess various mental properties, and hence in clarifying under what condi-
tions such properties can be ascribed to organisms,” as Hans-Johann Glock put 
it.8 Medieval philosophers might just have given the same answer. And so even 
if one does not share their views, one can hardly deny that they did fulfil their 
philosophical responsibility.
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